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This dissertation argues that in two different genres, oratory and political 
philosophy, Cicero presents to the Roman elite a variety of possible motives for pursuing 
a political career, and advances his vision of legitimate political engagement.  It 
challenges recent interpretations, first, by demonstrating how Ciceronian forensic rhetoric 
transcends judicial goals in pursuit of broader cultural and political aims (Chapter 1); 
second, by demonstrating that Cicero’s political philosophy advances a new form of elite 
engagement, informed by Greek ethical philosophy and contemplative pursuits (Chapters 
2-4); and, third, by demonstrating that Cicero viewed philosophy as essential for rhetoric, 
not due to its instrumental value but as an ethical grounding for both personal behavior 
and public oratory (Chapter 4). 
The first chapter argues that in the Pro Sestio, Cicero uses the prospect of civic 
glory to motivate his listeners to defend the republic.  The second chapter, in contrast, 
shows how Cicero’s first dialogue on political philosophy, the De Re Publica, downplays 
the motive of civic glory in favor of less mercenary motives drawn from Greek ethical 
philosophy, especially the attraction of virtue as its own reward.  Cicero attempts to 
persuade his potentially resistant Roman audience, however, by adopting an initial pose 
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of hostility towards philosophy and by putting philosophical ideas in the mouths of his 
Roman dialogical personae.  The third chapter, on the Somnium Scipionis, argues that 
Cicero concludes the De Re Publica by employing the authority of Scipio to inspire his 
audience to study cosmology in order to acquire knowledge of the motives, ends, and 
means of political engagement; Scipio qualifies Laelius’s earlier argument about virtue, 
reevaluating it as a means to an eternal reward based on Platonic eschatology.  The fourth 
chapter shows that in De Legibus 1, the character Marcus Cicero mounts two arguments 
for natural law in two different styles, one aimed at Atticus the intellectual and the other 
at Quintus the politician, suggesting two chief segments of his potential reading audience. 
Marcus concludes with an inspiring speech intended to show Atticus that philosophy 
demands engagement in politics and to convince Quintus that philosophic knowledge 
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Cicero’s exile and return (58-57 BCE) appears to have provoked a crisis in his 
thinking about motives for involvement in politics and about the particularly republican 
form of politics he had championed.  The prominence of this theme in his literary oeuvre 
in the mid to late-50s BCE suggests that prior to his exile, he had lived more or less 
thoughtlessly in accordance with the ideals of traditional Roman political culture.  He had 
played the part of a good Roman vir, pursuing a career in public life and relishing the 
rewards of status (dignitas) and glory from his fellow-citizens in recompense for public 
service, in keeping with what Robert Kaster has aptly termed “the contractualist premises 
of Roman republicanism.”1   
It is true that Cicero’s political activity before exile was already characterized by 
a certain eccentric Ciceronianism.  Cicero relied more exclusively on the power of the 
spoken word and a comparative neglect of military feats to attain prominence,2 and he 
pointed to literature and learning as an important inspiration for his own political career.3  
And yet Cicero’s motives were, at least insofar as he was willing to express them at the 
time, utterly traditional.  Even in Pro Archia, where as he argued for a greater influence 
of liberal learning on oratory and political activity than was customary in ancient Rome, 
Cicero was nevertheless unambiguous in validating the traditional drive for glory as the 
proper motive for political engagement: 
                                                          
1 2006: 387. 
2 See Narducci 1997 and Dugan 2005. 
3 See, for example, the preface of the youthful De Inventione (c. 88 BCE) and Pro Archia 
12-14 (62 BCE). 
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For if I had not persuaded myself from the time I was young through many books 
and through the teachings of many writers that nothing in life should be eagerly 
sought except praise and honor… I never would have exposed myself, for the 
sake of your safety, to so many and such great struggles, and to these daily attacks 
of the degenerate.4  (14) 
 
Thus in Pro Archia, Cicero suggested that immersion in humanistic learning had served 
to strengthen his commitment to the traditional Roman ideal of pursuing honor as a 
reward for one’s sacrifices for the public good. 
In his works after his return from exile, however, Cicero shows himself more 
ambiguous and more thoughtful on the issue of glory.  In several seminal works written 
post-exile, and in multiple genres, Cicero asks the question: what if you don’t get glory at 
all from engaging in politics, or what if you can lose it—as he himself had come to know 
all too well by dint of bitter, personal experience?  Even if you won’t get any glory and 
recognition, can other motives from the mos maiorum and from Greek philosophy still 
make it worthwhile to engage in politics, and in particular, in such a way as to fight for 
the republican form of government and the interests of citizens loyal to that government?   
Indeed, another important aspect of Cicero’s pursuit of this question of political 
engagement post-exile is his detailed promotion of the proper character of political 
engagement: namely the republican ends to which it should be directed, and the character 
it ought to have.  Here, too, Cicero relied not only on the Roman tradition but also turned 
to Greek philosophy for answers.  In short, the original impetus for Cicero’s closer 
                                                          
4 Nam nisi multorum praeceptis multisque litteris mihi ab adolescentia suasissem nihil 
esse in vita magno opera expetendum nisi laudem atque honestatem… numquam me pro 
salute vestra in tot ac tantas dimicationes atque in hos profligatorum hominum 
cotidianos impetus obiecissem.  Translations throughout this dissertation are my own.   
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consideration of these questions was the personal need to justify his way of life and his 
determination to continue pursuing that way of life in the face of adverse circumstances. 
These adverse circumstances, moreover, suggest that Cicero’s aim in discussing 
these questions was not merely personal.  He was not merely thinking out loud about an 
issue that only concerned him personally.5  Cicero’s justification of republican political 
engagement was also relevant to his contemporaries in the Roman elite in the mid to late 
50s BCE.  The power of the triumvirate and the potentially deterrent exemplum of 
Cicero’s recent exile meant that there were good reasons for his contemporaries among 
the Roman elite either to avoid the trouble of defending the Republic or to join the 
triumvirs in undermining it.  Given the circumstances, whether or not to be involved in 
politics, and how, were not questions that only concerned Cicero. 
Cicero’s discussion of political engagement, therefore, ought not to be seen as 
merely exploratory but as fundamentally rhetorical in character, even in his political 
philosophy.  It is generally admitted that when Cicero speaks of himself or depicts 
himself in the dialogues, he has a rhetorical purpose.  Little has been done, however, to 
analyze the rhetorical function of the arguments and ideas advanced within the dialogues 
in terms of audience, whether within the fictive world of the dialogue or in terms of 
Cicero’s contemporary audience.  Hence the need for this dissertation: the pervasiveness 
of this central theme of political engagement—including the motives, ends, and means or 
character of such engagement—in Cicero’s literary oeuvre post-exile calls for a rhetorical 
analysis of his aims and methods in his pursuit of this question. 
                                                          
5 Zarecki 2014 interprets the rector rei publicae in Cicero’s De Re Publica as a model of 
statesmanship against which Cicero intended only to measure himself. 
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Significance of the study 
This dissertation, therefore, takes a novel approach to Cicero in terms of both 
theme and methodology.  As regards theme, first, focusing on Cicero’s championing of a 
particular kind of political engagement in a major speech, Pro Sestio, will demonstrate 
that Cicero’s aims in a judicial speech need not be limited to the exoneration of his client, 
while taking up this theme in his political philosophy will shed light on the rhetorical 
character of those writings.  Secondly, attention to this theme will provide a new 
perspective from which to view Cicero’s well-known tendency to self-promotion and his 
lifelong effort to preserve republican government at Rome.  In these works, Cicero uses 
his own exemplum and a variety of other arguments justifying his way of life not only to 
promote himself but also, and more fundamentally, to draw others to engage in politics 
with the preservation of the Republic as their goal.  Third, a close reading of Pro Sestio 
and a reinterpretation of Cicero’s De Re Publica and De Legibus will demonstrate that 
while Cicero asserted the superiority of the Roman value of public service over mere 
Greek theorizing, he aimed to bolster that Roman value and reform Roman political 
culture through something traditionally perceived as inimical to Roman culture, namely 
Greek philosophy. 
This dissertation will also make a significant contribution to Ciceronian studies in 
terms of methodology.  My concentration on this theme across genre will demonstrate 
that, despite the traditional manner of studying Cicero’s works in generic isolation from 
one another, a single voice can in fact be heard across genre and time.  I will demonstrate 
that Cicero consistently pursues the same goal of persuading others to engage in the 
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republican political project.  At the same time, however, I will show how Cicero’s 
rhetorical strategies change in accordance with the contingencies of genre and politics in 
the real world.  The kind of arguments advanced and emphasized depends on what is 
appropriate to the genre and opportune in the circumstances. 
My attempt to identify a unified voice in Cicero’s multi-generic writings advances 
a scholarly approach initiated by Catherine Steel (2005) in her monograph on Ciceronian 
self-fashioning,6 an approach that has scarcely been repeated in subsequent scholarship.7  
However, while imitating Steel’s attempt to find a basis on which to unify Cicero’s 
writings, my study strives for greater sophistication.  Steel argues for unity in the 
Ciceronian corpus by highlighting the common goal of self-promotion.  On her reading, 
Cicero created and circulated so many writings to showcase his multi-faceted knowledge 
and ability.  The unity I discern in Cicero, however, regards a theme that is central to a 
number of works taken individually, and my focus on this theme will also considerably 
advance our understanding of each work.   
The generic and temporal scope of this dissertation is admittedly limited, as I will 
take up only two genres, oratory and political philosophy, and will limit myself to works 
                                                          
6 Reading Cicero: Genre and Performance in Late Republican Rome. 
7 Steel 2013b likewise argues for a unified approach to Cicero. Bishop and Köster 
credited Steel in their proposal for a panel on “Cicero Across Genres” at the 2016 SCS 
Annual Meeting.  Prior to Steel, the landmark study of Michel 1960 argued for an 
integrated view of Cicero the philosopher and Cicero the orator; articles appeared from 
time to time attempting to bridge the gap between the different “Ciceros”, often 
employing the phrasing “Cicero between x and y,” as for example Görler 1988b, “Cicero 
zwischen Politik und Philosophie”; Nicolai 2000, “Opus oratorium maxime: Cicerone tra 
storia e oratoria”; Grilli 2002, “Cicerone tra retorica e filosofia.”  See also Stem 2006, 
who argues for the necessity of reading across genre in order to have a proper 
understanding of Cicero’s political thought as a whole; he attempts to do this by 
analyzing the Pro Murena together with some of the Epistulae ad Atticum. 
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produced within a few years of each other during the 50s BCE.  Nevertheless, this 
dissertation lays central groundwork for further pursuit of a cross-generic approach to 
arguments for political engagement in Cicero.  The works under discussion in this 
dissertation are remarkably rich in the variety and complexity of their arguments for 
political engagement.  Pro Sestio is only one speech, but it is also one of Cicero’s longest 
and most complex.  Moreover, as I will demonstrate, the speech is profoundly concerned 
with promoting republican political engagement from start to finish.  De Re Publica 
presents particular challenges for interpretation, given the fragmentary condition in which 
it now stands, and is also explicitly concerned with political engagement from the preface 
until its powerful ending with the Somnium Scipionis.  The Somnium is such a rich text 
for Cicero’s conception of political engagement, and has such a rich tradition of 
commentary, having been transmitted independently of the rest of De Re Publica, that it 
merits special attention in a chapter of its own.  De Legibus, finally, presents a complex 
philosophical conception of law and the relationship between that concept and the 
obligation to serve one’s country and to be concerned with lawgiving in practice.  
Although the works I deal with are limited to the same decade, it is nevertheless 
the case that the delivery of Pro Sestio occurred in circumstances quite different from the 
writing and circulation of De Re Publica and De Legibus.  Cicero delivered Pro Sestio at 
a pivotal moment in the history of the late Republic.  In early 56 BCE, Cicero, one of the 
most prominent champions of republican government, had just been recalled from exile, 
and the triumviral alliance had begun to fracture, offering Cicero a major opportunity to 
rally the body politic to the republican cause.  De Re Publica and De Legibus, however, 
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were written—and in the case of the former, circulated—after the renewal of the 
triumvirate, when Cicero himself had agreed not to oppose the triumvirs in public.  The 
change in his circumstances led Cicero to turn to a new genre, and to cultivate different 
arguments in favor of republican political engagement. 
Relationship to previous scholarship 
Content 
Previous studies of Cicero’s arguments for political engagement chiefly fall into 
two categories.  The first kind has focused on Cicero’s hostility to Epicureanism on 
account of Epicureanism’s enshrinement of pleasure as the highest good and the related 
admonition to avoid the troubles of political life.  Cicero’s De Re Publica, in particular, 
has been the subject of several studies analyzing its salient critique of Epicurean quietism 
(cf. D’Anna 1965, Fontaine 1966, Andreoni 1979, Maso 2008, Englert 2014).  Likewise, 
Cicero’s hostility to Epicureanism in the speech In Pisonem has received various 
treatments (cf. Nisbet 1961, Grimal 1966, Maslowski 1974, Griffin 2001, and Dugan 
2005).  Finally, Cicero’s criticism of the Epicurean admonition to avoid politics has been 
cursorily noted by commentators on Pro Sestio (Kaster 2005) and De Oratore (e.g. 
Leeman, Pinkster, and Wisse 1996, Mankin 2011, and Englert 2014). 
There is still need, however, for a more comprehensive study of Cicero’s attempt 
to marshal a variety of arguments, in several different works, against both Epicureans and 
others in his audience abstaining from political life for reasons that had nothing to do 
with philosophy.  Cicero’s arguments for engagement in politics are not directed 
exclusively against Epicureanism, nor are they limited to the works most frequently 
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analyzed in terms of their anti-Epicureanism (In Pisonem and De Re Publica).  What I 
will particularly show in this dissertation is the way that arguments apparently directed at 
Epicureans in Pro Sestio and De Re Publica actually create the impression of another 
kind of person in his audience: a member of the Roman elite abstaining from politics out 
of laziness, selfishness, or fear for personal safety. 
Even in the case of De Re Publica, whose anti-Epicureanism has been so 
frequently analyzed, the need remains for an analysis of several other arguments in the 
work for political engagement.  In addition, there is more to be said about Cicero’s 
arguments against Epicurean quietism in other contexts, such as De Legibus, where 
scholars have not explored the rhetorical significance of Cicero’s natural argument in 
Book 1 as delivered before an Epicurean, Atticus.   
The second major kind of previous study on Cicero’s arguments for political 
engagement has interpreted Cicero’s political philosophy as straightforwardly advancing 
politics over philosophy, validating the active life over the contemplative life and Roman 
practical values over Greek theory (De Saint-Denis 1938, Gigon 1977: 275-315, Büchner 
1984: 79-94 and 265-77, Blössner 2001, Zetzel 2003, Gastaldi 2014, Schütrumpf 2014).  
The conclusion reached by these studies has been overstated, in part due to a focus on the 
prefaces to the neglect of the body of the works (please see “Integrating the preface…” 
below).  These studies have overlooked the way Cicero seeks in his political philosophy 
to integrate Greek philosophy with the traditional Roman ideal of public service in order 
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to advance new motives for political engagement and to promote a new kind of 
engagement, henceforth to be informed by the frequent study of philosophy.8   
Scholars have also overlooked Cicero’s promotion of philosophic politics in these 
works because Cicero’s intentions are rhetorically masked by passages containing overt 
criticism of philosophy and philosophers, whether by Cicero himself in his own voice or 
on the part of dialogical personae.  Such passages have led scholars to view Cicero as a 
typical Roman who asserts the superiority of Roman values over Greek culture.  But they 
neglect a number of passages in which the persona of the author or the dialogical 
personae advance ethical ideas from Greek philosophy or encourage the study of 
philosophy itself.  By reading Cicero's philosophic works in terms of rhetoric, I will show 
that Cicero was actually trying to make his fellow Romans more "Greek," in the sense of 
making them more interested in philosophical pursuits and in virtuous behavior grounded 
in Greek ideas.9  Cicero does not try to make the Romans Greeks as such, as he does not 
encourage the exclusive pursuit of philosophy but rather a political life informed by the 
continuous study of philosophy.  Read in this light, the "Roman" features of Cicero's 
dialogues prove not how "Roman" Cicero was or that he subscribed to the traditional 
dichotomy of “Roman” versus “Greek,” but rather point to the Roman prejudices of 
Cicero's audience.  Cicero as author will on occasion appear to share those prejudices, or 
will attribute them to some of his dialogical personae, as part of a strategy to gain the 
                                                          
8 A more balanced view of Cicero’s promotion of philosophy and politics in De Re 
Publica is advanced by Zetzel 1998 and Zetzel 2013. 
9 See Narducci 1997 for a similar claim about Cicero’s humanistic project in Pro Archia 
and De Oratore. 
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trust of his audience or to get his audience to sympathize and identify with certain 
personae, whom Cicero will then use to promote philosophy and philosophical ideas. 
Methodology 
Broad rhetorical approach to Ciceronian oratory and political philosophy 
The most important aspect of my method is to further recent, innovative rhetorical 
approaches to Cicero’s speeches and philosophical dialogues.  In the first place, I will 
focus on rhetorical goals besides acquittal in a major judicial speech, Pro Sestio.  Since 
the time of Stroh’s seminal monograph (1975), Cicero’s speeches have frequently been 
analyzed in terms of “persuasive process.”10  Scholars have demonstrated how the 
structure, style, and content of a Ciceronian speech helped Cicero obtain his judicial 
goals, if the speech was given in the law courts seeking the conviction or acquittal of an 
individual; or political goals, in the case of a speech given before the Senate or at a 
contio.  My approach to Pro Sestio, by contrast, follows in the wake of Narducci (1997), 
Habinek (1998), Steel (2005 and 2006), Dugan (2005), and Vasaly (2013), who argue 
that Cicero’s judicial speeches function not only as a means of persuading the jurors to 
acquit Cicero’s client, but also, especially in consideration of their status as published 
texts, as a way of promoting “wide-ranging social/cultural/political aims.”11   
                                                          
10 Major studies of Cicero’s speeches which followed in the wake of the new wave of 
persuasive process criticism initiated by Stroh include Classen 1985, Craig 1993, Vasaly 
1993, Kaster 2006, and Gildenhard 2011. 
11 Vasaly 2013: 141.  Also relevant are the following remarks on the desirability of an 
approach that focuses on political ideas communicated through the speeches: “If, as I 
have argued, the content, not just the fact or outcome, of the many forensic speeches that 
attracted extensive audiences could also constitute an essential mode of political 
communication, further study of the persuasive strategies of Cicero’s judicial speeches 
and the multiple audiences to which they were addressed is called for” (159). 
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I will also make a novel contribution to the much-discussed topic of Cicero’s 
rhetorical self-fashioning.  In my view, inasmuch as Cicero presents himself as an 
exemplum of proper political engagement in Pro Sestio and other speeches, he does so 
not merely to augment his political auctoritas, to engage in vain self-praise, and to seek 
future renown,12 but also to influence the way of life of present and future generations so 
as to preserve republican politics, or bring about its restoration.  This function of Cicero’s 
self-exemplarity continues to be neglected by recent scholarship, which is similar in this 
regard to the 19th-century German tradition—initiated by Mommsen and continued in the 
20th century by Syme and Carcopino—of presenting Cicero as a completely self-absorbed 
politician more concerned with promoting his own glory than with maintaining the 
Republic.13  Cicero’s rhetorical self-fashioning is simultaneously self-serving and geared 
towards inspiring others to imitate his manner of political engagement. 
This dissertation will also build on a recent body of scholarship that investigates 
Cicero’s rhetorical goals in his philosophy.  While Fox (2007) argues that Cicero’s 
adherence to the skeptical Academy and his use of the dialogue form in De Re Publica, 
De Legibus and De Oratore give these works a non-dogmatic and exploratory 
                                                          
12 These aspects of his exemplarity have been especially well-scrutinized in recent 
scholarship.  See e.g. Dugan 2005, Steel 2005, Dolganov 2008, Van der Blom 2010. 
13 Cf. Douglas 1968: 26: “Ancient conventions provide the answer here.  Gloria was the 
natural concomitant and reward of virtus.”  Cf. Sullivan 1941: 382 ff.  Douglas also 
remarks on Cicero and politicians: “When we have referred to [politicians’] ambition, 
their subtlety or ruthlessness, their shortness of view, we have not said everything.  Along 
with all this they have a tendency to believe that they are serving the interests of their 




character,14 I will pursue a recent trend in German classical scholarship, as yet a road not 
taken in the Anglophone sphere, that highlights the way the dialogues exercise a 
persuasive influence on the reader (esp. Leonhardt 1999, Blössner 2001, Sauer 2013).15  I 
will also follow the model rhetorical approach of Baraz (2012), who analyzes how Cicero 
persuades his reading audience to accept the validity of his philosophical project in the 
prefaces of philosophic works written in the 40s BCE.   
Specifically, I will analyze Cicero’s rhetorical aims and methods in De Re 
Publica and De Legibus, bringing to light the way these works are centrally concerned 
with advancing a new form of political involvement, that is, philosophically informed 
republican statesmanship.16  This aim will require me to make a detailed, linear analysis 
                                                          
14 On De Re Publica, for example, Fox comments: “Cicero's faith in Academic 
philosophical method makes the whole notion of a ‘message’ for a philosophical work 
untenable” (109).  Steel 2014 sympathizes with Fox’s approach, criticizing Atkins 2013 
in these terms: “Fox’s analysis of De oratore as a text which evades fixity could offer a 
stimulating counter to Atkins’s approach; for all Atkins’s skill as a close reader and his 
alertness to Cicero’s own sceptical moves, this monograph feels fairly dogmatic in its 
final interpretative positions.”  It is my view that while these dialogues leave Cicero’s 
personal skepticism intact, the dialogues are not skeptical in intent or effect; that spirit is 
more proper to the dialogues of the 40s. 
15 See also Glucker 1988 and Görler 1995 on the dogmatic features of Ciceronian 
dialogue in the 50s, by contrast with the philosophical works of the 40s, where Cicero 
explicitly avows skepticism and makes more extensive use of Academic argumentum in 
utramque partem. 
16 On the importance of political engagement in Rep., see esp. Zetzel 2013: 184: “Cicero 
at times speaks of outstanding figures as leaders and guides, but in fact leadership for 
Cicero is secondary to political participation itself, and the whole dialogue is structured 
as a protreptic to politics.”  However, the need remains for a full analysis of this 
protreptic, especially in terms of the particular kind of philosophically informed political 
involvement that Cicero promotes.  Atkins 2013 argues that a political teaching emerges 
from Rep. and Leg., resisting the “skeptical” reading of Fox 2007, but despite attention to 
differences among the dialogue characters, does not analyze these works in explicitly 
rhetorical terms.  Nor does he pursue the theme of political participation beyond the 
preface of Rep; the focus of his laudable analysis of the dialogue is on the traditional 
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of De Re Publica and of the first book of De Legibus to demonstrate the pervasiveness of 
the political engagement theme,17 and to show the way the arguments within the text 
affect different audiences both inside and outside the text.  Analysis of the internal 
audience will require attention to the character and inclinations of the various dialogical 
personae or interlocutors present for the imagined conversation. 
As regards external audience or Cicero’s actual readers, I will not attempt to 
prove definitively (if that were even possible) through a study of Roman social history 
and prosopography exactly who Cicero's intended or actual readers were.  I will argue, 
rather, that given the different kinds of arguments advanced within the texts and, in the 
dialogues on political philosophy in particular, given the different character types who 
speak and the characters they seem to be speaking to, an impression emerges of Cicero's 
intended audience and various readers.  Some might object that, conceived in this way, 
this study would merely be an analysis of Ciceronian straw-men rather than of arguments 
for political engagement directed at actual people in the real world.  The arguments in the 
texts, it might be objected, construct a problem that does not actually exist, and construct 
a reader who is moved to respond to a constructed problem.18  From this point of view, 
Cicero is a shadow-boxer who artificially constructs an imaginary opponent for the sake 
of talking about what he wants to talk about.19  But this outlook creates problems of its 
                                                                                                                                                                             
questions of political philosophy ancient and modern, such as the Roman constitution and 
citizens’ rights.  See also the discussion on 8-9 above. 
17 Steel’s 2014 review of Atkins 2013 speaks to the desirability of a text-based approach 
to the two dialogues. 
18 See e.g. the reader-response approach employed by Baraz 2012. 
19 See e.g. Gruen 1974 on Cicero’s unreliability as an objective observer of the late 
Republic; see Zetzel 1998 on the Epicurean bogeyman in the preface of De Re Publica. 
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own: if none of the objections posited by Cicero would have occurred to any of his actual 
contemporary readers, and if none of the prejudices, sentiments, and inclinations 
envisioned and presumed by Cicero's arguments actually existed in his readers, how 
could Cicero avoid looking absurd to his contemporary audience?  Cicero would have 
simply been embarrassing himself; and yet we know this is the last thing Cicero ever 
wanted to do. 
Integrating the preface and the body of Cicero’s dialogues on political philosophy 
I will employ a unified approach to Cicero’s De Re Publica and De Legibus, 
integrating a treatment of their prefaces with careful attention to their philosophic 
content, taking the emphasis away from questions of self-presentation which lend 
themselves to a more restricted preface analysis.  Here I distinguish my method by 
contrast with the following approaches.  First, there is a manifest tendency to reduce 
these works to their self-fashioning dimension, as though Cicero’s goals in composing 
them were limited to augmentation of his personal prestige,20 the cultivation of personal 
connections for immediate political purposes,21 or the fashioning of his own persona for 
posterity.22  This approach to Cicero’s philosophic writings ignores the distinctive traits 
of the genre in which they were written, including complex theoretical arguments and key 
                                                          
20 e.g. Dugan 2005, Steel 2005, Dolganov 2008, Stroup 2010, Van der Blom 2012, Steel 
2013a. 
21 esp. Stroup 2010; cf. Dugan 2005 on Orator. 
22 e.g. Dugan 2005, Steel 2005, Bishop 2011. 
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literary features such as the character of the dialogical personae, as well as dramatic 
setting.23 
A second approach concentrates on prefaces to the detriment of the body of the 
works.24  This methodology, if only accidentally, tends to devalue the contents of the 
works themselves.  Consequently—and this is very important for my thesis—it limits our 
ability to take Cicero’s didactic aims seriously, as Steel has observed in commenting on 
Gildenhard (2007): 
If we cannot think ourselves into sympathy with a genuine desire to teach a 
particular body of knowledge while faced with deficient existing tools—as Cicero 
believed was his situation—then we will inevitably have difficulty in 
understanding what Cicero is trying to do, in this work and elsewhere.  Indeed, 
the emphasis in Gildenhard’s book upon the prefaces may unwittingly contribute 
to an assumption that the intellectual and argumentative content of Cicero’s 
philosophical writings does not merit our serious engagement.25 
 
Focusing too closely on self-fashioning or prefaces in Cicero’s philosophy risks 
limiting our understanding of what Cicero aims to accomplish by writing these works.  A 
panoramic view of De Re Publica and the first book of De Legibus, by contrast, has led 
me to argue for Cicero’s broader purpose of reforming Roman political culture by 
injecting into the lives of the elite ethical ideas drawn from Greek philosophy and a 
passion for philosophic and humanistic studies.  Thus in my own treatment of these two 
dialogues, I propose to imitate the general approach of Narducci (1997) and, to a certain 
                                                          
23 General treatments of Cicero’s dialogues tend to downplay the importance of 
characterization of the interlocutors and other dramatic features.  Cf. e.g. Schofield 2008 
and 2013; Powell 1995a and 2005; Steel 2013a; Zetzel 2013. 
24 e.g. Blössner 2001, Stroup 2010, Baraz 2012, and to a lesser extent Gildenhard 2007, 
who engages with the Tusculans as a whole but whose “enormous central chapter of the 
book analyses the five prefaces” (Steel 2009: 407). 
25 2009: 407-08.  Scholars have made similar criticisms of Stroup 2010 (see esp. Zetzel 
2011: 383, 387) and Baraz 2012 (see Altman 2013: 455; Steel 2014: 647). 
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extent, Dugan (2005), who engage in detail with the content of individual rhetorical 
works in order to show that Cicero was pursuing a project of cultural reform, both by 
theoretical argument and personal exemplum.26 
Limiting our purview to questions of self-fashioning or to the prefaces also fails 
to do justice to Cicero’s engagement with philosophical ideas and his talents as a literary 
artist.  Cicero displays considerable learning in his discussion of political, ethical, and 
rhetorical matters.27  We should also remain open to the possibility that, in addition to 
being self-serving, Cicero’s dialogues were intended to have an altruistic or philanthropic 
function of promoting the human good, both through the dissemination of the spirit and 
content of Greek learning and through specific arguments designed to promote political 
engagement on behalf of an order that Cicero believed was just and beneficial for all.28  
                                                          
26 The question of Cicero’s humanism needs to be revisited.  An older approach to 
Cicero’s philosophy exemplified by e.g. Hunt 1956 and Boyancé 1962 was perhaps too 
naïve in focusing on the philosophic content of the works without considering the status 
of the author as a great Roman politician.  Narducci 1997 and Dugan 2005 show greater 
awareness of Cicero’s self-fashioning even as they argue for Cicero’s desire to influence 
and reform Roman culture.  Gildenhard 2007 and, to a lesser extent, Baraz 2012 also 
recognize the humanizing vision of Cicero’s philosophic enterprise in the 40s, though 
both authors place more emphasis on the role of Cicero’s prefaces in presenting this 
vision than on the function of the philosophic content of the works. 
27 For matters relating to rhetorical theory, there are the exemplary monographs of 
Narducci 1997 and Dugan 2005 just mentioned; also Narducci 1989 and 2002a-b.  For 
political and ethical theory, I will follow scholarly models in ancient philosophy and 
political theory whose publications on Cicero have attempted to take stock of the 
philosophic arguments themselves within Cicero’s theoretical works, such as Wood 
1988; E. M. Atkins 1990; Englert 1990 and 2014; Perelli 1990; Asmis 2004, 2005, 2008, 
2014; Schofield 1995a, 1995b, 2009, 2012; Long 1995a, 1995b; Zetzel 1995, 1996, 2001, 
2013; Maso 2008; Altman 2009a, 2016; Lévy 2012a (cf. Lévy 2012b) and the other 
essays in Nicgorski 2012; Gildenhard 2013; Powell 2013; J. W. Atkins 2013a, 2013b; 
Woolf 2015; Nicgorski 2016. 
28 Whether Cicero’s vision for Roman society was self-serving or deluded is irrelevant to 
the question of whether he thought the pursuit of glory was compatible with the pursuit of 
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In sum, by integrating a consideration of the prefaces with the body of the works, with 
due attention to the dramatic features of philosophical dialogue,29 I will be able to show 
what is distinctive about Cicero’s arguments for political engagement in his political 
philosophy as opposed to his oratory.  
Summary of Chapters 
The first chapter analyzes Cicero’s speech Pro Sestio.  While recent rhetorical 
analyses of Pro Sestio subordinate all of its arguments, including the excursus, to the 
immediate legal goal of securing Sestius’s acquittal, in fact the speech’s context and 
content forcibly demonstrate its commitment to promoting the political engagement of its 
multiple audiences.  At the time of the speech’s delivery in 56 BCE, Cicero’s chief 
concern was to motivate courageous action against the apparently weakening triumvirate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
justice for the whole.  With regard to this latter question, Cicero’s well-documented lust 
for fame and glory is not inconsistent with the possibility that he sincerely thought his 
way of life and its aims were beneficial for the common good, since in his account in Pro 
Sestio and De Officiis, at least, the statesman receives glory only on condition that he 
foster and preserve the interests of the citizens who uphold the legitimate republican 
order; only from these citizens, and in the context of the free state, can the statesman 
receive “true” glory. 
29 Models for me to follow in this regard include especially Benardete 1987 on the 
dramatic setting, the interlocutors, and the dramatic action of De Legibus 1 and 2, and 
Atkins’s 2013 monograph on De Re Publica and De Legibus which also carefully 
considers the conventions of the philosophic dialogue in the interpretation of the various 
arguments put forward by the dialogue characters.  To these works should be added 
Görler 1988a on the dramatic setting of De Legibus 1 and De Oratore 1; Schütrumpf 
1988 on Cicero’s debt to Plato’s dialogue conventions in De Oratore 1; Narducci 1997 
on the dramatic setting of the three books of De Oratore; Zetzel 2003 on the dramatic 
setting of de Oratore 1; Stull 2011 on the interlocutors in De Oratore; Caspar 2011 on 
the dramatic action of the three extant books of de Legibus; Atkins 2013 on the dramatic 
setting of De Legibus; and to a lesser extent, Zetzel’s 1995 introduction and commentary 
to De Re Publica, inasmuch as he treats matters of form and structure.  There are several 
helpful works written in German on aspects of the Ciceronian dialogue: Hirzel 1895, Zoll 
1962, Bringmann 1971, Görler 1974. 
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in favor of traditional senatorial government.  But his recent exile and the troubles faced 
by his allies were signs to the audience of the danger of pursuing such a path, thus 
creating a significant challenge to Cicero’s persuasive goals.  This chapter treats Cicero’s 
attempt to meet this challenge by first examining his account of legitimate political 
action, interpreting the examples of Cicero and his allies as illustrations of the principles 
of political conduct affirmed in the excursus.  It also analyzes the complex strategies 
Cicero uses to motivate his listeners, especially his casting shame upon the politically 
withdrawn and holding forth the prospect of glory—whether contemporaneous, 
posthumous, or (in a philosophic sense) eternal—for those who will act in defense of the 
Republic. 
Scholarship on De Re Publica has focused on Cicero’s response to Greek 
constitutional theory and the role of the rector rei publicae.  While scholars have 
interpreted the work as an assertion of the superiority of Rome to Greece or as a skeptical 
exploration of various political questions, the second chapter focuses on the neglected 
question of Cicero’s case for political engagement in the work to show that he strives to 
persuade his readers to embrace a form of political engagement motivated by ethical 
ideas and informed by continuous philosophic study.  Cicero’s rhetorical aims suggest the 
deficiency of traditional Roman politics and culture, which lack Greek philosophy and 
humanistic culture.  Starting from the observation that Cicero was prompted by his loss 
of public standing after the renewal of the triumvirate to take up the new genre of the 
philosophic dialogue (a project originally begun with De Oratore from 56-55), I 
demonstrate that Cicero downplays the motive of civic glory in favor of less mercenary 
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motives drawn from Greek ethical philosophy, especially the attraction of virtue as its 
own reward.  Cicero’s rhetorical strategy before his potentially resistant Roman audience 
consists in adopting an initial pose of hostility towards philosophy and putting 
philosophical ideas in the mouths of his Roman dialogical personae, who create the 
impression of various intended readers with their different prejudices and inclinations. 
The third chapter takes up the grand conclusion of De Re Publica, the Somnium 
Scipionis, analyzing the way Cicero uses this philosophico-political myth to complete the 
work’s exhortation to engage in politics as inspired and informed by philosophy.  Cicero 
employs the authority of Scipio to inspire his audience to study cosmology as something 
pleasant and satisfying in itself and in order to acquire knowledge of the ends, means, and 
motives of political engagement.  In terms of ends, the order of the cosmos serves as 
model of the republican political order to be preserved.  As for means, the sun’s role as 
an intelligent, illuminating, and balancing force models the altruistic role of the morally 
virtuous statesman.  Finally, the statesman learns the proper motives for engaging in 
politics in the foregoing manner from the cosmological perspective’s teaching that human 
glory is futile, and the revelation that the soul is immortal, whose eternal reward consists 
in contemplating the grand spectacle of the cosmos in the company of other outstanding 
statesmen and philosophers.  Moreover, while scholars have often read Scipio’s 
admonition about virtue as an affirmation of the work’s previous argument, a careful 
analysis of Scipio’s language and of the cosmological-eschatological context shows that 
Scipio actually qualifies Laelius’s argument about virtuous political engagement in Book 
3, reevaluating it as a means to an eternal reward of contemplation.  
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The fourth chapter argues that in De Legibus 1, the character Marcus Cicero 
promotes philosophically informed political engagement through two arguments for 
natural law in two different styles.  The first is more strictly logical and is aimed at the 
intellectual Atticus, while the other is more rhetorical in character and aimed at the 
philosophically indifferent Quintus, creating the impression of two chief segments 
of Cicero’s potential reading audience.  The former argument promotes political 
engagement tout court to Atticus, while the latter, directed at Quintus, promotes a 
particular form of engagement that is guided by the virtues both in terms of the public 
man’s personal conduct and in terms of formulating specific leges for the ius civile.  
Marcus also prepares Atticus and Quintus beforehand to be receptive to these arguments.  
To the Epicurean Atticus, Marcus makes an appeal that is at once emotional and 
intellectual, inviting him to have a philosophical conversation in pleasant natural 
surroundings that are also those of Atticus’s best friend.  To prepare Quintus, Marcus 
calls attention to his status as a public man for whom the ensuing conversation is only to 
last during the one day of leisure presently afforded to him.  Finally, just as De Re 
Publica concluded with the unexpected but rhetorically inspiring Dream, Marcus 
concludes the first book with a surprising epideictic speech in praise of sapientia.  
Employing a high rhetorical style, Marcus goes beyond the scope of the two previous 
arguments by asserting that sapientia includes not only theoretical knowledge of ethics, 
physics, and dialectic, but also the practice of rhetoric in public life.  Thus in a way he 
had not before, Marcus emphasizes before Atticus that philosophy demands engagement 
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in politics, while he shows Quintus that philosophy is relevant to political life because it 























Chapter 1: The Case for Political Engagement in the Pro Sestio 
“And such was the character of the speech given by Quintus Hortensius about [Sestius’s] 
tribunate that it seemed not only to contain a refutation of the charges but also to 
prescribe for the young an authoritative lesson on political engagement worthy to be 
remembered.”30  (Cicero, Pro Sestio 14) 
 
What Cicero says in this quotation regarding his fellow counsel Hortensius’s 
account of Sestius’s tribunate applies no less to his own speech taken as a whole, very 
little of which is directly concerned with answering the charge against his client.31  In Pro 
Sestio, more than in any other surviving forensic speech, Cicero is thematically 
concerned with giving the young in particular (iuventuti)32 an exhortation to political 
engagement (rei publicae capessendae).33  This paper proposes that Pro Sestio may 
                                                          
30 De quo quidem tribunatu ita dictum <est> a Q. Hortensio ut eius oratio non 
defensionem modo videretur criminum continere, sed etiam memoria dignam iuventuti rei 
publicae capessendae auctoritatem disciplinamque praescribere.  Cicero refers here to 
Hortensius’s speech in defense of Sestius delivered earlier at the same trial; Cicero was 
the last to speak, preceded in some order by the other members of the defense counsel, 
Hortensius, Crassus, and Calvus (cf. Kaster 2006: 20-21 with note 47).  Translations are 
my own; Latin quotations of Pro Sestio are taken from Maslowski’s 1986 Teubner 
edition. 
31 In a speech conventionally divided into 147 sections, only 71-92 respond directly to the 
charge against Sestius. 
32 The word is Madvig’s conjecture for the otherwise unintelligible manuscripts (cf. 
Kaster 2006: 142, n. on Sest. 14).  In any case, Cicero’s own didactic intentions towards 
the young in Pro Sestio are clear: cf. adulescentes (Sest. 51, 95, 136); iuventus (Sest. 96, 
102, 119). 
33 For the phrase, cf. Sest. 23, 103.  Under his entry in the Glossary for res publica, 
Kaster 2006 writes that “in 14, ‘engage in politics’ renders the idiom rem publicam 
capessere, lit. ‘to take up / take in hand the public interest’” (418).  Cf. Lewis and Short, 
capesso, s. v. IIA: “so, capessere rem publicam, to undertake affairs of state, to engage in 
public affairs, administer (differing, by the idea of zealous co-operation and activity, 
from accedere ad rem publicam, which designates merely the entering upon a public 
office or duty), Cic. Sest. 6, 14; id. de Or. 3, 29, 112; id. Att. 1, 17, 10; 16, 7, 7.”  Cf. 
TLL, s. v. 311.30.  Cf. ullam partem rei publicae... attingere (Sest. 49) and attingant rem 




profitably be read as not only the defense of a client, but also a sustained discourse about 
a specific conception of political engagement34 intended in the context of its oral delivery 
to motivate political action against Caesar35 and Clodius in favor of traditional senatorial 
government and, in the long term, to leave to posterity an account of principled 
republican statesmanship in the form of an everlasting memorial in praise of noble 
principles and good men and in condemnation of base sentiments and wicked men.36  
Cicero’s Pro Sestio exhibits characteristics of deliberative and epideictic oratory no less 
than judicial. 
Previous approaches to Cicero’s Pro Sestio fall into two modes, often 
simultaneously employed by scholars.  First, the speech has frequently been analyzed 
along the lines of persuasive process criticism, which attempts to show how all the parts 
of the speech contribute to its immediate goal of acquitting Sestius, even those parts that 
                                                          
34 haec via ac ratio rei publicae capessendae (Sest. 103).  Cf. Lintott 2008: 195, who 
suggests this rationale for understanding Cicero’s speech but ultimately falls back on 
scholarly paradigms that focus on Cicero’s need to defend his client and to justify his 
own departure into exile: “Hortensius had also used his speech to provide a sermon to the 
young men of Rome on correct political conduct (Sest. 14).  Cicero did the same, but 
since the justification of Sestius's actions logically involved the justification of his own 
return to Rome, he had an opportunity once more to provide an apologia for his exile.” 
35 For the view that Sest. gives no indication that Cicero was engaged in any political 
maneuvering against the so-called first triumvirate, see Mitchell 1991: 174-75.  But see 
Cicero Fam. 1.9.6-7, where he claims in an open letter to Lentulus that his interrogatio of 
Vatinius (In Vatinium) in Pompey’s presence contained an unremitting attack on 
Vatinius’s tribunate, and therefore testified to his resistance to the triumvirate; Cicero’s 
suggestion that his cross-examination of a witness during the trial of Sestius contained a 
critique of Caesar’s policy in 59 invites comparison with Sest. on the same theme.  For 
Vat. as a thinly veiled attack on Caesar and an attempt to draw Pompey away from him 
into alliance with the Senate, see Smith 1966: 172 and Pocock 1926: 1-28.  For an 
alternate view, see Mitchell 1991: 172-76 on Vat. and Fam. 1.9. 




may appear unrelated to judicial issues.  Of this type, May 1988 focuses in part on how 
Cicero’s development of his own ethos contributes to acquittal,37 while Kaster 2006 
argues that every section of the speech, including the famous “excursus” on optimates 
and populares (96-135), is designed for the purpose of persuading the iudices to acquit 
Cicero’s client.38  The other major approach sees certain portions of the speech as 
advancing additional goals besides acquittal.  May 1988 and others have noted that 
Cicero is at pains in this speech to rehabilitate his dignitas in the aftermath of exile.39  In 
addition, many scholars, especially in an earlier period, have isolated the so-called 
“excursus” on cum dignitate otium from the rest of the speech, rightly interpreting it as an 
exposition of Cicero’s political program,40 but without any relation to the rest of the 
speech; some of these readings also treat the passage in a completely ahistorical fashion, 
drawing on it as part of a larger synthesis of Cicero’s political philosophy.41   
                                                          
37 See esp. 90-105 on Sest. 
38 For a summary of Cicero’s rhetorical strategies for acquittal in Sest., see esp. Kaster 
2006: 22-31.  Other studies of the speech’s technique of persuasion include MacKendrick 
1995: 198-204, who gives an analysis of the speech’s form and sees the subject of vis as 
its main theme; Riggsby 1999: 89-97 and 2002, 189 ff., who likewise focuses on Cicero’s 
response to the charge of public violence; Leach 2000 on Cicero’s persuasive strategy of 
investing different kinds of spectacle with moral legitimacy and illegitimacy; Craig 2001 
on the relationship between Cicero’s rhetorical strategies and his rhetorical theory; and 
Levene 2004: 133-37 on the speech’s narratio. 
39 May: “The speeches from this period... are as much apologiae on behalf of Cicero as 
political deliberations or defenses of clients...  the post reditum speeches are the chronicle 
of Cicero’s quest to reestablish and regain what Madvig called ‘that ancient eminence of 
dignity and authority’ which had previously marked his ethos” (89).  Cf. Riggsby 2002: 
167-72 on this goal of the post reditum speeches.  For Cicero’s presentation of his exile 
in this speech and in other works, see Claassen 1992 and 1999, Robinson 1993, and 
Cohen 2006. 
40 Pace Kaster 2006: 33-35. 
41 For the first trend, see e.g. Wirszubski 1954, Balsdon 1960, Lacey 1962, Weische 
1970, Adomeit 1980, Lübtow 1984, Christes 1988, Takahata 1999; for the second, e.g. 
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 The shortcomings of these strands of analysis may be briefly sketched as follows.  
The persuasive process model needlessly restricts Cicero’s speeches to judicial aims, 
demanding that everything said be interpreted in this light.  While it is certain that Cicero 
would never say anything in a defense speech that would positively undermine his 
client’s interests, it does not follow that he speaks with a view to those interests alone.  
Likewise, the need to establish his ethos as a means of persuasion and to repair the 
damage done to his public image by exile do not exhaust the aims of Cicero’s self-
fashioning in this speech.  Furthermore, while the traditional approach to the excursus 
may be faulted for its isolation of that section from the rest of the speech or from a 
consideration of its political ideals in the historical context, it is worth investigating how 
the ideals in the excursus might be related to the rest of the speech on a different basis 
from common judicial aims.  To put it another way, one can apply the traditional 
scholarly focus on political, philosophic, and cultural goals in the excursus to the speech 
as a whole.  Therefore a fruitful approach to the abiding question of the relation of the 
excursus to the rest of the speech may be found in recent work on Cicero that focuses on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Boyancé 1941, Fuhrmann 1960, André 1966: 295-304, Wood 1988: 193-99, Perelli 1990: 
53-68, Dalfen 2000.  To the first group there might be added the more recent reading of 
Lintott 2008: 194-99, who views the excursus in particular as part of Cicero’s policy of 
maneuvering in the direction of the optimates at that point of his political career.  He also 
joins the persuasive process critics, however, in viewing the political vision set forth in 
the excursus as a well-calculated element of Cicero’s defense of his client: “What we 
have in Pro Sestio, then, is hardly a realistic programme for the time, nor even a properly 
elaborated theory, but an ideal vision suited to the appeal that Cicero was making to a 
jury of senators and equites, especially as it might recall the histories of the early 
Republic where the cadet members of the elite were heroised for using violence on behalf 
of the senate” (199). 
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his promotion, at times across genres, of “wide-ranging social/cultural/political aims.”42  
In addition, this approach allows for interpretation of rhetorical self-fashioning within the 
speech to be expanded beyond dimensions previously explored such as self-praise, the 
ethical needs of the case, Cicero’s promotion of his political influence, and seeking future 
renown,43 focusing rather on how Cicero’s use of himself as an exemplum functions as a 
means of persuading his audience to embrace a cultural and political ideal—republican 
political engagement—that he presents as beneficial to both the individual statesman and 
to the community as a whole. 
This paper argues that in addition to the goal of Sestius’s acquittal, Cicero’s 
immediate political aim in Pro Sestio is to further weaken an already vulnerable 
triumvirate and to restore republican government based on the consensus ordinum 
solidified during the year of his consulship by motivating nobles and equestrians alike to 
join him in the vigorous pursuit of a particular way of life that he claims will prove 
beneficial both to themselves and society.  In addition, Cicero’s emphasis on the young in 
his audience speaks to the speech’s long-term aims, as publication enabled Cicero to 
leave posterity his account of the right way of life and right political principles to be 
                                                          
42 Vasaly 2013: 141; cf. Narducci 1997, Habinek 1998, Steel 2005 & 2006, Dugan 2005, 
Gildenhard 2011.  Also relevant are Vasaly’s remarks on the desirability of an approach 
which focuses on the political ideas communicated and the multiplicity of audiences 
addressed in the speeches: “If, as I have argued, the content, not just the fact or outcome, 
of the many forensic speeches that attracted extensive audiences could also constitute an 
essential mode of political communication, further study of the persuasive strategies of 
Cicero’s judicial speeches and the multiple audiences to which they were addressed is 
called for” (159). 
43 These aspects of Cicero’s self-exemplarity have been especially well-scrutinized in 
recent scholarship.  See e.g. Dugan 2005, Steel 2005, Bücher 2006, Kurczyk 2006, 
Dolganov 2008, Van der Blom 2010. 
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followed, to the extent that circumstances would permit.44  Through the combined 
rhetorical appeal of principles and positive and negative exempla to be followed or 
avoided, Cicero makes a case throughout the speech, both prior to and during the famous 
excursus, not only for political engagement as opposed to withdrawal (rem publicam 
capessere) but also for a particular kind of involvement with its own characteristic form 
and aim, designated most memorably by the metaphor of the via (Sest. 100, 103, 137, 
140).45  These two threads of argument are summarized in the principle of cum dignitate 
otium (Sest. 98)46: statesmen should secure their own honor (dignitas) by pursuing a 
political career that aims at upholding the honor (dignitas) and tranquility (otium) of the 
community; the statesman’s personal otium is mentioned only as something to be 
                                                          
44 This paper follows the approach of Gildenhard 2011: 14 on Cicero’s speeches in 
general in assuming that the text of this speech as we have it is more or less what Cicero 
delivered on the original occasion, it being an exaggerated historicist approach that would 
demand of Cicero significant revisions based on political circumstances at the time of 
publication.  Cf. Kaster 2006: 36-37 for an argument, based on historicist premises, that 
the excursus was in fact included in the original, oral version.  For the general issue of the 
relationship between oral and written versions of Cicero’s speeches, see Vasaly 1993: 38; 
Powell and Paterson 2004: 52-57; Manuwald 2007: 54-90.  For Cicero’s desire to 
influence the young through publication of his speeches, see Stroh 1975: 50-52 and 
Achard 2000.  But see Kaster 2006: 35, who denies that Cicero’s remarks in the excursus 
of Sest. are primarily aimed at the young. 
45 The notion of political engagement as a via is isolated to the so-called excursus, though 
I will argue that this section by no means constitutes a digression from the speech’s main 
theme.  In support of this notion, it is worth noting that the second mention of the via 
(103) occurs along with the term ratio—haec via ac ratio rei publicae capessendae (cf. n. 
4 above)—which is used in a similar sense already at 23 (offici rationem); cf. 36, 87, 92 
(in reference to the political activity of Cicero and his allies; 101, 114 (in reference to the 
activity of populares); 136, referring to the pursuit of the cursus honorum by Cicero and 
other equestrians, occurring again in close proximity with via (137). 
46 Cf. otiosa dignitas... fundamenta (98), otii... portum et dignitatis (99). 
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sacrificed for the sake of the community’s.47  These two goals—that is, personal glory 
and public order—are inseparable in Cicero’s account, since the statesman can 
legitimately gain glory only from law-abiding citizens (the boni, synonymous with the 
broadly redefined optimates),48 and only on the condition of securing their tranquility.  
This goal is achieved by the efforts of statesmen (principes optimatium) to pursue a 
policy of governing by consensus, adhering to ancestral custom, especially as regards 
constitutional procedure, and defending the lives and property of law-abiding citizens.  
These policies also govern the use of force, to be employed or eschewed with a view to 
the foregoing foundations of the Republican constitution.  Cicero also stresses that 
pursuit of this via must be characterized by courage and constancy in the face of toil and 
suffering, including exile and even death.   
In order to persuade his audience that pursuit of this via is personally profitable 
despite its risks, Cicero makes a variety of appeals: to a sense of shame based on Roman 
cultural expectations regarding virtus, bolstered by the identification of non-participation 
with Epicurean philosophy; to a sense of the noble, that is, the love of the good for its 
own sake; to temporal glory, whether with one’s contemporaries or posterity; and finally 
                                                          
47 Scholars have debated whether the terms dignitas and otium in the phrase refer to the 
individual or to society, and in which combinations.  I concur with Wirszubski 1954 in 
seeing them as having reference to both simultaneously (cf. Kaster 2006 ad. loc.; pace 
e.g. Boyancé 1941 and Weische 1970).  Cicero himself uses the terms flexibly throughout 
the speech: he speaks of dignitas in a personal sense prior to the excursus (re: Piso, 23; 
re: Milo, 87) and during the excursus, where the phrase cum dignitate otium is introduced 
(98).  Dignitas is also used in a public sense regarding Milo (87).  Likewise, otium refers 
at times to private leisure (e.g. 23, 138) and at other points to the public tranquility (e.g. 
98, 139).  For a fuller discussion, see section III below. 
48 The redefinition of optimates occurs at Sest. 96-98; these optimates are also designated 
individually as optimus quisque (96, 97). 
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to the ultimate justifying motive of eternal reward.  Moreover, Cicero’s appeals are aimed 
at a variety of audiences, but above all at the young, who are implicitly conceived of as 
falling into two categories.  On the one hand, Cicero’s exhortation is aimed at the 
ambitious who need no exhortation to political involvement as such but for whom the 
apparently easy path of the improbi represents a real temptation as the way to honor and 
power.  Here, Cicero must especially counter the dangerous precedent set by the recent 
political conduct of not only Piso, Gabinius, and Clodius, the speech’s obvious targets of 
criticism, but also Caesar and Crassus, who are faulted in thinly veiled terms.  On the 
other hand, Cicero is also concerned with a certain element among the boni who feared 
fighting for republicanism because of the personal danger and inconvenience this would 
involve.49   
1. The exordium: formulating the contemporary problem 
                                                          
49 These two audiences may be considered fairly fluid in terms of social composition, 
consisting of both nobles and equestrian novi homines; and in spite of Cicero’s emphasis 
on the younger generation, he was doubtless concerned with the inactivity of senior 
statesmen as well.  Therefore we may consider as belonging to the second group both 
equestrians with the family tradition of political involvement at Rome and certain nobles 
in favor of senatorial government who had withdrawn from active politics, including 
older men such as Lucullus and Hortensius, the targets of Cicero’s complaint about 
wealthy fish-breeders in Att. 2.1.7 and in several other letters from 60-59 BC (cf. Att. 
1.19.6, 1.20.3, 2.9.1; Shackleton Bailey 1965: 338 on Att. 1.19.6, re: piscinarios, quoting 
Macrobius Sat. 3.15.16).  Likewise, some equestrians might be highly ambitious but 
inclined towards an unscrupulous path to honor, such as Crassus, implicitly attacked 
during the speech for his role in the triumvirate.  As for the general sense that Cicero’s 
exhortations to politics were aimed chiefly at the young, an abiding concern on his part 
with the political policies and allegiances of the young during the 50s BC is illustrated by 
the correspondence he kept up with young men such as the younger Scribonius Curio 
(tribune of 50) and Caelius (tribune of 52), a concern that was subsequently validated 
during the civil war when both sided with Caesar.  On Cicero’s correspondence with 
these and other young men, see Leach 2006. 
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The speech’s central concern with political engagement is announced at the very 
outset, during its opening cadences, where Cicero gives an initial account of the ends and 
means of statesmanship: 
If anyone wondered before now, judges, how it was that, given the greatness of 
the Republic’s resources and the greatness of its empire’s prestige, there could be 
found not quite enough citizens of undaunted courage, daring enough to put 
themselves and their own safety in jeopardy for the sake of the established order 
of the state and the common liberty, at the present time he ought to wonder if he 
sees any patriotic and brave citizen at all, rather than if he sees anyone who is 
either timid or taking thought for his own interests rather than those of the state.  
(Sest. 1) 
 
Si quis antea, iudices, mirabatur quid esset quod pro tantis opibus rei publicae 
tantaque dignitate imperi nequaquam satis multi cives forti et magno animo 
invenirentur qui auderent se et salutem suam in discrimen offerre pro statu 
civitatis et pro communi libertate, <i>s [ex] hoc tempore miretur potius si quem 
bonum et fortem civem viderit, quam si quem aut timidum aut sibi potius quam 
rei publicae consulentem. 
 
Political engagement is an action undertaken by those outstanding individuals who 
dutifully present themselves (se offerre), much in the way that a soldier presents himself 
for duty,50 for the sake of the existing constitution (pro statu civitatis), which refers to the 
community’s political organization, and for the sake of its liberty (pro communi 
libertate), which refers to the character of that community.51  The chief aim of political 
engagement, then, is the preservation of the existing constitutional order and its liberty, as 
the former is the chief safeguard of the latter.  In addition, one of the fundamental means 
                                                          
50 The sense of presenting oneself as a matter of duty is implied by the etymological 
connection of offerre with officium. 
51 Arena 2012: 73 describes two senses in which Roman writers spoke of the loss of the 
community’s liberty, the second of which applies here: “[Late Republican writers] 
maintained that a civic community loses its liberty when it falls under the power or 
control of an agent distinct from the sovereign body of the citizens, be it either a monarch 
or a group of people.” 
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of political engagement is courageous action: since politics is a risky business that 
involves “putting one’s life and safety in danger” (se et salutem suam in discrimen 
offerre), it requires brave and magnanimous citizens (cives forti et magno animo) willing 
to exercise a certain daring (auderent). 
 Meanwhile, the last clause of the sentence reveals the main audience of Cicero’s 
exhortation to political engagement, as Cicero designates two classes, composed of 
numerous individuals, that contrast with the class of courageous statesmen, now almost 
non-existent and whom the Republic so desperately needs.  Those who do not 
courageously engage in politics on behalf of the Republic’s constitution and liberty are 
either fearful (aut timidum) or absorbed in their own interests (aut sibi potius quam rei 
publicae consulentem).  The “fearful” refers to those who favor the Republic (the boni) 
but are unwilling to take action on its behalf due to the dangers this would involve.  The 
second group, however, is somewhat more complex as the progression of Cicero’s 
argument will reveal that it consists of two sub-classes.  On the one hand, Cicero is 
referring to another sector of non-participating boni, but this time to those who hold back 
from the fray not out of mere fear but rather due to the desire for leisure and self-
indulgence, relying on the efforts of others to secure the conditions of that leisure.  On the 
other hand, his words also designate those whose focus on self-interest allows for the 
potential of a perverse kind of political involvement that would serve only to satisfy their 
ambition for glory and power at the expense of the public interest.   
Cicero’s exordium, besides furnishing us with a summary of his ideal of political 
engagement and an indication of the sort of men he seeks to create out of his present 
32 
 
audience, also formulates what may be called “the problem” of political engagement, the 
chief obstacle to the realization of his ideal.  Cicero confesses that the current lack of 
republican statesmen comes as no surprise given the maltreatment to which those few 
who have fought for the Republic have been subjected:  
For, omitting the recollection of each particular man’s misfortune, you can see 
with one glance that those who, with the senate and all patriots, have stirred the 
afflicted state to life and freed it from internal brigandage are in a state of sorrow, 
in mourning garb, put on trial, struggling for their lives, their reputation, their 
citizenship, their fortunes, and their children; by contrast, you see that those who 
have violated, vexed, thrown into confusion, and overturned all things divine and 
human, are not only flitting about eagerly and cheerfully, but are also devising 
peril for the best and the bravest citizens among us, while fearing nothing for 
themselves.  (Sest. 1) 
 
nam ut omittatis de unius cuiusque casu cogitando recordari, uno aspectu intueri 
potestis eos qui cum senatu, cum bonis omnibus rem publicam adflictam 
excitarint et latrocinio domestico liberarint, maestos, sordidatos, reos de capite, de 
fama, de civitate, de fortunis, de liberis dimicantis; eos autem qui omnia divina et 
humana violarint, vexarint, perturbarint, everterint, non solum alacris laetosque 
volitare, sed etiam fortissimis atque optimis civibus periculum moliri, de se nihil 
timere. 
 
Cicero focuses his audience’s attention on the misfortune endured by those who have 
suffered for their efforts on behalf of the state.  He emphasizes the specific character of 
their political engagement, noting their republican aims and the consensus backing their 
actions by the claim that they have acted cum senatu, cum bonis omnibus.  This 
formulation anticipates the well-known distinction Cicero makes later on (96ff.) between 
the two legitimate elements of the Republic, the optimates, a term he uses at that point 
interchangeably with boni to designate all citizens loyal to the regime, and the principes 
optimatium, the leaders who serve their interests by directing state policy as magistrates 
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and as members of the senate.52  And yet these principes are too few at present owing to 
the recent tendency of their counterparts, the improbi to prosper at their expense.  By 
concentrating on these concerns at the outset, Cicero indicates the broad political and 
cultural goals of his speech.  In addition to refuting the arguments of the prosecution, 
Cicero aims to alter the existing state of affairs in which the elite are derelict in their duty 
either to involve themselves in public affairs or to do so in a responsible manner.  For if 
Cicero knows that the sufferings of those who defend the constitution are deterring the 
timid and self-indulgent from acting in its defense, he is no less concerned that the 
prosperity of the revolutionaries may serve as an inducement to similarly wicked political 
activity on the part of the ambitious.  From the perspective of the exordium, therefore, 
Cicero’s speech is not only a specimen of judicial oratory (i.e. addressing the question “is 
Sestius, the accused, guilty of vis?”) but also of deliberative oratory (“should we engage 
in politics, and if so, how?”). 
2. Piso the Epicurean consul as foil for Cicero’s ideal of political engagement 
The twofold nature of Cicero’s conception of ideal political engagement as both 
public service, as opposed to withdrawal, and as necessarily entailing the pursuit of the 
public good, as opposed to mere self-interest, is nicely illustrated by the speech’s attack 
on Piso, the consul of 58.  The critique of Piso also illustrates one of Cicero’s salient 
rhetorical strategies in favor of his vision of republican political engagement, namely the 
identification of non-participation with a caricatured Epicureanism.  This caricature is 
designed to induce shame in any elites who hold back from the fray out of self-interest, 
                                                          
52 For more on Cicero’s use of boni in this speech and elsewhere, see Lacey 1970 (also on 
improbi) and Baraz 2012: 54-55 and 217-20. 
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and to invite participating Epicureans to reflect on the character of their own engagement 
in politics.53  In addition, it is significant that the criticism of Piso’s principles and 
political conduct occurs relatively early in the speech, as it provides Cicero with a foil for 
his ideal that foreshadows and illustrates in advance several of the principles that Cicero 
will announce in the excursus regarding proper political goals and means according to 
which statesmen ought to act.  In this section, therefore, I will demonstrate that Cicero’s 
critique of Piso’s principles and practical political conduct is continuous with the ideas of 
the excursus and contributes to the speech’s thematic unity centered on the attempt to 
motivate others to Cicero’s particularly republican vision of participation in public life. 
A) Epicurean withdrawal versus traditional Roman mores  
The initial characterization of Piso’s manner of life as one of idleness and laziness 
(videbamus genus vitae, desidiam, inertiam) is reinforced by a statement of various 
Epicurean beliefs which Piso is said to have praised.  Each of these is then contrasted 
with the public-spirited ideals of the way of life preferred by Cicero (as well as Sestius 
and Cicero’s other allies), which line up more closely with received Roman cultural 
norms.  Cicero begins by attempting to prejudice his audience against Piso’s ideals by 
representing them as specifically Greek with the word philosophos.  Cicero also identifies 
himself with his public audience’s likely anti-Greek prejudices by affecting contempt for 
these prized philosophers of Piso, dismissing them as forgettable nonentities with the 
throwaway phrase nescio quos.  The views which Piso reproves, however, are the ideas 
                                                          
53 On political participation by a good number of Roman Epicureans in the late Republic, 
see Roskam 2007 and Fish 2011.  On Cicero’s engagement with participating Epicureans 
in the Letters, see Gilbert 2015. 
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of some unspecified eos, who are neither said to be philosophers nor opposed to the elite 
ideal of pursuing honor through public life, therefore instinctively inviting the audience’s 
approval.   A careful analysis of Cicero’s diction here sheds additional light on the idea of 
political engagement that was first presented in the preface.  The orator repeats the idiom 
rem publicam capessere used earlier in reference to Sestius’s tribunate (14), attributing to 
Piso the Epicurean commonplace that the wise man should avoid politics,54 here 
sardonically rephrased as the saying of a man “in his right mind” (hominem bene sanum).  
By contrast, Piso considers those concerned with their status as public men (dignitati 
serviendum)55 “insane dreamers” (vaticinari atque insanire).  According to Cicero, Piso 
believes it is wise to act with one’s own interests in mind, what we might call 
colloquially “looking out for number one” (sapientis omnia sua causa facere).  Cicero, 
by contrast, implies that any Roman ought to pursue the interests of the Republic (rei 
publicae consulere) over his own interests.  Cicero implies that the audience shares his 
belief in seeking duty over comfort (officii rationem... non commodi esse ducendam), and 
he amplifies his account of this mentality by mentioning three different acts embraced on 
behalf of one’s country (pro patria), indicating the self-sacrificial spirit in which they are 
to be undertaken.  Piso and the Epicureans, however, prize above all the life of leisure 
(otiosa vita), defined (tendentiously and without doing full justice to the Epicurean 
position) as a gluttonous pursuit of pleasures (plena et conferta voluptatibus).  The 
                                                          
54 Diogenes Laertius x. 119 = Fr. 8 Usener), οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι, ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ 
βίων.  See also Fr. 551 Usener, λάθε βιώσας.  For Cicero’s criticism of these Epicurean 
tenets in Pis., see the brief discussion at Fowler 1989: 122-23 (with references in 123 n. 
16); cf. Grimal 1966. 




comparatively brief explanation of the life of leisure emphasizes its inferiority to the life 
of duty towards one’s country.  Throughout, Cicero attempts to shame his audience into 
adopting his views when faced with the unseemly alternative of thinking like a base 
Epicurean (and, therefore, Greek) philosopher.56   
Significantly, Cicero’s reference to Piso’s genus vitae (23) sets up an implicit 
contrast with his client Sestius’s genus vitae (5), on which Cicero made a start earlier in 
the speech before turning to the crisis of 58.  Piso’s life before his consulship of 58 is 
characterized (falsely, inasmuch as he was involved in public life)57 as one of desidia and 
inertia (23), while Sestius is praised for his “zeal for preserving the community’s peace 
and security” (studium conservandae salutis communis atque oti, 5).  Cicero immediately 
goes on to praise Sestius for the variety of offices held and services performed prior to his 
tribunate (6-12 passim).  The point of these character descriptions is not simply to 
denigrate a political enemy (Piso) in order to build oneself up at his expense, nor simply 
                                                          
56 The contrast Cicero establishes may be summarized according to the following 
schema: 
Piso / philosophizing Epicureans  Cicero & Sestius / republican Romans 
philosophos nescio quos... eos laudabat 
maxime...auctores et laudatores voluptatis 
Eos 
sapientis omnia sua causa facere rei publicae consulendum 
rem publicam capessere hominem bene 
sanum non oportere 
dignitati esse serviendum 
nihil esse praestabilius otiosa vita offici rationem in omni vita, non commodi 
esse ducendam 
plena et conferta voluptatibus adeunda pro patria pericula 
vulnera [pro patria] excipienda 
mortem [pro patria] oppetendam 
eosdemque praeclare dicere aiebat eos autem qui dicerent... vaticinari atque 
insanire dicebat 
 




to praise a political ally and client (Sestius) in order to garner sympathy from the judges 
for his acquittal, but to contrast two ways of life, holding one up to criticism and praising 
the other as a model of virtue.58  Indeed, Cicero prefaces his discussion of Sestius with an 
announcement of his multi-faceted intention to “seem to have omitted nothing relevant to 
your judicial inquiry, to the accused, and to the Republic” (nihil a me quod ad vestram 
quaestionem, nihil quod ad reum, nihil quod ad rem publicam pertineat praetermissum 
esse videatur, 5).  Holding up Sestius’s actions as exemplary has the effect of both 
arguing for his acquittal59 and showing the right sort of behavior others ought to imitate, 
fulfilling cultural-political aims no less than judicial aims. 
B) Fashioning all withdrawal as Epicurean lack of civic responsibility 
 Cicero returns to the pointedly anti-Epicurean themes of the Piso passage towards 
the end of the speech (138), during the so-called excursus on optimates and populares 
(96-143).60  In this passage, Cicero addresses those citizens whom he considers law-
                                                          
58 Cicero’s overall purpose of promoting political engagement explains why he omits an 
account of Sestius’s early life, eager as he is to present Sestius’s exemplary conduct as a 
public man to his audience.  Contrast the puzzled attitude of a persuasive process critic: 
“C. takes up S.’s life story at a fairly late stage, when S. is already married, omitting the 
sorts of information about his youth that he had once recommended (Inv. 1.35) and that 
he would retail in (e.g.) his defence of Caelius a few weeks later.  Perhaps S.’s 
prosecutors (unlike Caelius’s) had not attacked his early life; in any case, the matters C. 
does stress in his review are traits or actions germane to C.’s positive defence (see 6–13 
introd. n.)” (Kaster 2006: 120). 
59 In accordance with the rhetorical strategy of “generalizing the case.” 
60 Kaster delineates Cicero’s digressio as taking place between sections 96-135.  
However, Cicero’s own words indicate otherwise, as he feigns a sort of coming back to 
himself at the beginning of section 144: “But even as I speak about the status and glory of 
exceedingly brave and illustrious citizens, judges...  the sight of these men has suddenly 
stopped me in the very course of my speech.”  Consequently, it is more accurate to follow 
the division implied by the title of Lacey 1962, “Cicero Pro Sestio 96-143.” 
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abiding and loyal to the Republic but politically withdrawn, fashioning this class of men 
as Epicurean in their self-centeredness and lack of concern for the Republic.   
Although he avoids directly referring to such men as Epicureans, the ideals by 
which they are said to live and the vocabulary employed to describe them (Sest. 138) bear 
a striking similarity to the previous discussion of Piso (Sest. 23), amounting to a shaming 
tactic designed to motivate these non-participating boni to remove themselves from any 
taint of Epicureanism by embracing the Ciceronian via.61  The same semantic network of 
oppositions used earlier when Cicero compared Piso’s purported Epicurean principles 
with Roman cultural norms recurs here.  The contrast in 138 between engagement in 
public life (virtus) and a private life of inactivity (desidia) recalls Cicero’s accusation 
against Piso in 23 of desidia in his youth and supposed rejection of participation in public 
life (rem publicam capessere) as a matter of principle.  The ideal of caring for one’s 
status (dignitas) and the praise (laus) and glory (gloria) that attend it versus the 
cultivation of pleasure (voluptas) echoes the criticism of Piso at the beginning of the 
speech for considering people crazy who were concerned for their dignitas, while 
commending the Epicureans for praising voluptas as an end.  Finally, the contrast 
between being born to pursue the interests of one’s country (patriae) and fellow citizens 
(civibus) on the one hand and being destined for a life of sleep (somno), banqueting 
(conviviis), and delights (delectationi) recalls Cicero’s assertion earlier that Piso believed 
the wise man does everything for his own sake rather than considering the public good 
                                                          
61 Commentators have noted the similarity of language but have neglected the 
significance of these passages for the thematic unity of the speech, nor have they drawn 




(rei publicae consulere), as well as his preference for a life plena et conferta voluptatibus 
over the life of hardships endured pro patria.   
A clue to the intended audience of these remarks in section 138 can be found in 
Cicero’s contemptuous conclusion here that these self-indulgent people should continue 
to enjoy the leisure they possess only by dint of hard work on the part of brave men.  
If any people are led on by pleasures and have surrendered themselves to the 
blandishments of vice and to the pimp’s pandering to desires, let them lose public 
offices, let them have nothing to do with public life, let them allow themselves the 
enjoyment of their own leisure by means of brave men’s toil.  (Sest. 138) 
 
nam si qui voluptatibus ducuntur et se vitiorum inlecebris et cupiditatium 
lenociniis dediderunt, missos faciant honores, ne attingant rem publicam, 
patiantur virorum fortium labore se otio suo perfrui. 
 
This final salvo shames the self-indulgent still further by characterizing them as 
especially effeminate, as patiantur subtly indicates the essential passivity of their state, 
where they enjoy leisure in stark contrast to and precisely due to the labor of viri (rather 
than simply homines) who exhibit the manly traits of bravery and enduring toil.  In terms 
of indicating Cicero’s specific audience in this section, his final remarks about the non-
participators’ parasitical leisure not only recall Piso’s praise of the otiosa vita (23) in a 
general way, but also repeat Cicero’s complaint in a more recent passage (100) about 
those who neglect their dignitas in the delusional expectation of being able to enjoy their 
otium indefinitely: 
Good men, for some reason unbeknownst to me, are rather slow to act, and having 
neglected the initial stages of events are finally stirred into motion by necessity 
itself at the last minute, in such a way that often by their delay and slowness to 
act, while they are willing to maintain their grasp of leisure even without status, 




boni nescio quo modo tardiores sunt et principiis rerum neglectis ad extremum 
ipsa denique necessitate excitantur, ita ut non numquam cunctatione ac tarditate, 
dum otium volunt etiam sine dignitate retinere, ipsi utrumque amittant. 
 
The nexus of this passage (100) with the later one (138), and thus with the attack on Piso 
at the beginning of the speech, is demonstrated by the repeated characterization of such 
men as slow to act (tardiores... tarditate), the charge of negligence in the face of 
developing events (principiis rerum neglectis), and the desire to enjoy leisure (otium) 
without concern for their dignitas.  These combine to present these men in the same light 
as (1) the (supposed) irresponsible, philosophizing inactivity (inertia) and neglect of 
status (dignitas) attributed to the pre-consular Piso at the beginning of the speech; and (2) 
the un-named pleasure-seekers of section 138.  Cicero, therefore, attempts to shame a 
certain portion of his audience into active civic engagement by appealing to received 
Roman cultural norms and to Roman prejudice against (especially Epicurean) 
philosophy.62    
C) The character of proper participation and dangers of the Epicurean pleasure principle 
It may appear somewhat puzzling, however, that Cicero should attack Piso for 
supposedly espousing the Epicurean view that a wise man should not engage in politics.  
Given that Piso actually pursued and won public office, indeed, the highest office in all of 
Rome, how are we to understand his supposed belief that politics should be avoided?  
The answer is that Cicero makes the argument that Piso was neither properly engaged nor 
a true consul, because his Epicurean views led him to take up the consulship only for his 
own self-interest, not for the public interest or for other honorable motives.  Hence, after 
                                                          
62 On the dynamics of Roman pudor, see Kaster 2005: 28-65. 
41 
 
laying out Piso’s pernicious principles, Cicero goes on to show the ways those principles 
have led him to exercise his consular power in a self-serving manner.  Piso’s colleague 
Gabinius is likewise condemned for acting in a selfish manner, though his motivations 
are described as those of a typical voluptuary without Piso’s philosophic underpinning 
(18, 20). 
Accordingly, Piso and Gabinius are accused of making a treacherous agreement 
with Clodius, promising to give the tribune free rein to attack the Republic in exchange 
for his support of a law granting the consuls lucrative provinces (24).  Cicero says that in 
so doing, the consuls consented to the prior condition of “betraying the Republic” to 
Clodius (si ipsi prius tribuno plebi... rem publicam tradidissent), and “said that the pact 
they had struck would be cemented by my own blood” (id autem foedus meo sanguine 
ictum sanciri dicebant).63  The corrupt agreement also involved allowing Clodius to 
create and incite a violent mob in order to dominate the popular assemblies and 
consolidate all power in himself (34), effectively undermining the existing constitution: 
“After [Clodius] had withdrawn the two consuls from the Republic by the agreement 
about the provinces, he dominated...” (34).  Allowing such a dominatio to take place 
indicates the consuls’ cravenness in the face of their duty to place themselves in danger 
for the sake of the liberty of the community (1).64  In a way, then, the consuls have 
withdrawn from political administration by allowing their consular functions to be 
replaced by Clodius’s violent seizure of the reins of government.  
                                                          
63 Here we have a foretaste of a theme Cicero will soon argue at length (45-9), that his 
departure into exile constituted him a sort of consecrated victim for the Republic.  Thus 
the consuls’ conduct, besides being unpatriotic, borders on sacrilege. 
64 Cf. n. 19. 
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Cicero also accuses Piso and Gabinius of improper political conduct on the 
grounds of their refusal to rule by consensus and to uphold ancestral custom in general.  
On these grounds, Cicero argues they are unworthy to be called by the name used to 
designate their office:  
What should I say?  ‘Consuls’?  Am I to dignify with this appellation the 
overthrowers of this empire, the betrayers of your dignity, the enemies of all good 
men—since they decided that they had been endowed with those fasces and the 
other signs of the highest office and greatest power for destroying the senate, 
afflicting the equestrian order, and abolishing all the laws and customs of our 
ancestors?”  (Sest. 17) 
 
quid dicam? consules? hocine ut ego nomine appellem evorsores huius imperi, 
proditores vestrae dignitatis, hostes bonorum omnium, qui ad delendum senatum, 
adfligendum equestrem ordinem, extinguenda omnia iura atque instituta maiorum 
se illis fascibus ceterisque insignibus summi honoris atque imperi ornatos esse 
arbitrabantur? 
 
Cicero indicates what consulere rei publicae means in practice by pointing to the 
principles of ruling by consensus, as the references to boni omnes, senatus, and equestris 
ordo imply, and respect for the mos maiorum.   
Regarding consensus, Cicero cites in particular the consuls’ refusal to defend him 
against the legal onslaught of Clodius in spite of “the daily complaints of omnes boni” 
(25) and in the face of the obvious support shown by a gathering of men on the 
Capitoline “from the whole city and from all Italy” who put on mourning and resolved to 
defend Cicero, “making use of every method that their private counsels should suggest, 
given the Republic’s lack of public leadership” (26).65  Cicero argues that in this way, the 
                                                          
65 Cf. 27: “For the sake of one citizens, all good men by private consensus and the entire 
senate by public counsel put on mourning.” 
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general public was making known outwardly its conviction that an attack on Cicero was 
equivalent to an attack on the Republic:  
The senate became concerned, you, Roman equites, were upset, all of Italy was in 
turmoil, indeed, all citizens of every rank and order thought that they should seek 
help from the consuls and from their supreme authority for the supreme interests 
of the Republic.  (Sest. 25)66 
 
Hic tum senatus sollicitus, vos, equites Romani, excitati, Italia cuncta permota, 
omnes denique omnium generum atque ordinum cives summae rei publicae a 
consulibus atque a summo imperio petendum esse auxilium arbitrabantur. 
 
This ideal of government in accordance with consensus is stated more expressly as a 
constitutional principle during the excursus.  Cicero argues that when the maiores 
established the Republic, 
they created annual magistracies in such a way that the senate was to preside over 
the Republic as an everlasting council, while members for this council should be 
chosen by the whole people, and entrance into this highest order should be open 
to all hard-working and virtuous citizens.  (Sest. 137) 
 
ita magistratus annuos creaverunt ut consilium senatus rei publicae praeponerent 
sempiternum, deligerentur autem in id consilium ab universo populo aditusque in 
illum summum ordinem omnium civium industriae ac virtuti pateret. 
 
As a matter of constitutional principle, political legitimacy derives from the role of all 
those who hold political office and of the orders that contribute to those holding such 
offices, whether by electing (all orders) or supplying (nobles and equestrians) members.  
The same ideal was at work in Cicero’s representation of the consuls’ conduct as 
illegitimate due to their refusal to heed the manifestly universal position of the different 
social classes within the state.  Of particular note is the contrast between the annual 
(annuus) tenure of magistrates and the perpetual (sempiternus) status of the senate, which 
                                                          
66 Cf. 31: “For you [judges] and all good men have judged that disaster that befell me to 
have been an especially great wound to the Republic as well.” 
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is consonant with Cicero’s desire to downgrade the authority of the consulship in the 
circumstances, given his need to place political and indeed moral authority in the opinion 
of the senate over the obstinacy of Piso and Gabinius on the question of his exile. 
Regarding ancestral custom, Cicero particularly takes the consuls to task for their 
collusion with Clodius in passing a law abolishing the Aelian and Fufian laws regarding 
auspices, laws so important, he says, that their nullification meant that “the entire 
Republic was destroyed” (universam rem publicam esse deletam, 34).  In the excursus, 
Cicero states expressly that such laws are fundamental to the political ends that good 
statesmen should seek, namely the honor and tranquility of the community (one sense of 
the catchphrase cum dignitate otium): “Now, this tranquil honor has the following 
foundations and elements, which must be protected by the leaders and defended even at 
the cost of their own lives: religious rites, auspices... laws, ancestral custom...” (Sest. 98: 
Huius autem otiosae dignitatis haec fundamenta sunt, haec membra, quae tuenda 
principibus et vel capitis periculo defendenda sunt: religiones, auspicia… leges, mos 
maiorum).   
Another way in which Piso and Gabinius are accused of violating the mos 
maiorum regards their refusal to heed the authority of the senate (cf. auctoritas senatus, 
Sest. 98) and its leading men.  Gabinius proudly rejects the protestations made on 
Cicero’s behalf by that “most honorable order and its most illustrious citizens” (Sest. 26: 
amplissimi ordinis preces et clarissimorum civium lacrimas repudiavit).67  Both consuls 
                                                          
67 Cf. 32: “Is it not enough, Piso, to say nothing of Gabinius, to have disappointed men so 
much?  Did you also have to neglect of the senate’s authority [and] despise the advice of 
all the best men (optimus quisque)?” 
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decree that the senators should put off the mourning they had adopted as a public 
expression of support for Cicero (32), thereby nullifying a previous decree of the senate 
calling for such a display (26).  These actions run counter to the ideal Cicero elaborates 
later in the speech according to which the maiores desired magistrates to obey the senate: 
“They established the senate as the guardian, the chief protector, the champion of the 
Republic; they wanted magistrates to act on the authority of this order and to be servants, 
so to speak, of its advice, which carries the most weight” (Sest. 137: senatum rei publicae 
custodem, praesidem, propugnatorem conlocaverunt; huius ordinis auctoritate uti 
magistratus et quasi ministros gravissimi consili esse voluerunt).  Here, the august place 
of the senate in the republican constitution is persuasively asserted not only by co-opting 
the authority of the maiores, always a strong rhetorical appeal before a Roman audience, 
but also by the sheer extent of space devoted to his discussion of the senate.  In contrast, 
magistrates are given only two brief mentions, and are presented as somehow inferior to 
the senate in each case.68  In addition, the role of the leading men within the state that 
was implicitly endorsed by the example of those “most illustrious citizens” 
(clarissimorum civium, 26) who protested to the consuls on Cicero’s/the Republic’s 
behalf makes its appearance again in the excursus, where the “leaders of the state”  
(principes civitatis) are identified as the “most illustrious citizens” (clarissimi cives) (97).  
Respect for the primacy of the senate’s role within the state, therefore, especially as 
embodied in the views expressed by its leading men, is another principle of proper 
conduct Cicero that teaches throughout the speech. 
                                                          
68 Cf. the contrast between the brief tenure of magistrates and the perpetual status of the 
senate discussed above. 
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In sum, Cicero gives an account of Piso’s Epicurean views prior to his consulship 
because he is concerned with showing how Piso’s philosophical (i.e., Epicurean) 
principles were bound to prove harmful to the Republic in practice.  Hence the apparent 
contradiction between Piso’s profession that the sane man should abstain from politics 
and his subsequent pursuit of the consulship proves to be no contradiction at all, as Piso 
holds the consulship in name only, having abrogated all the responsibilities that the office 
ought to entail.  Rather, it can be understood in light of Cicero’s understanding of 
political engagement as necessarily entailing the pursuit of the public interest, defined in 
practice by such principles of conduct as respect for societal consensus for ancestral law 
and custom, especially as regards the role of the senate and its leading men at the center 
of the republican constitution. 
3.  Ends and means of the republican via, illustrated by exempla 
To this point, we have seen how Cicero uses the foil of Piso (and Gabinius), 
especially at the beginning of the speech, to put forward his vision of participation in 
public life and how these negative exempla foreshadow principles Cicero announces later 
on in the excursus.  In this section, I wish to consider other positive and negative exempla 
of political participation put forward by Cicero in Pro Sestio by examining the 
ethical/political principles contained in the excursus and then showing how Cicero has 
illustrated these principles throughout the speech as a whole.  The negative exempla I will 
discuss are particularly significant for determining Cicero’s persuasive purposes in the 
context of the speech’s oral delivery since they constitute an implicit critique of Caesar 
and Clodius, both of whom are held up to young nobiles and equites as exemplifying a 
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manner of political action to be eschewed in favor of the republican via or path of 
political engagement.  This via is represented by the positive exempla of Cicero and his 
allies Cato, Sestius, Milo, and Pompey, the praise of whom highlights Cicero’s intention 
to split the triumvirate.   
A) The aims of political engagement 
According to the excursus, the goal of the statesman’s political engagement is 
cum dignitate otium, which amounts to a twofold aim relating to society and to oneself: to 
uphold the honor and tranquility of the community, and to seek personal honor over 
private leisure.  The two are fundamentally interrelated inasmuch as personal honor is the 
just reward the statesman receives from the community for pursuing its honor and 
tranquility.  These conclusions are warranted, first of all, by Cicero’s shifting application 
of the terms dignitas and otium at one time to the individual and at another to the state.  
When Cicero initially speaks of cum dignitate otium, otium and dignitas are considered 
from the point of view of the community: “What is deemed most excellent and most 
desirable by all sane, good, and happy men is tranquility with honor.  All who wish for it 
are optimates; those who effect it are considered the leading men and the saviors of the 
state” (Sest 98: id quod est praestantissimum maximeque optabile omnibus sanis et bonis 
et beatis, cum dignitate otium.  hoc qui volunt, omnes optumates, qui efficiunt, summi viri 
et conservatores civitatis putantur).  These leading men are described as effecting otium 
and dignitas on behalf of the community that desires these things for its own benefit.69  
                                                          
69 For the concept of the state’s dignitas, see esp. Wirszubski 1954, Balsdon 1960, Lacey 
1962, Perelli 1990.  For additional bibliography on the much discussed topic of cum 
dignitate otium in Sest., cf. n. 12. 
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But in the very next sentence, Cicero’s reference to dignitas and otium appears on close 
examination to refer to both individual and society in a dizzying fashion: 
For it is fitting neither for men to be so carried away by the honor of managing 
public affairs that they fail to keep tranquility in view, nor for them to embrace 
any tranquility that shrinks from honor.  (Sest. 98) 
 
Neque enim rerum gerendarum dignitate homines efferri ita convenit, ut otio non 
prospiciant, neque ullum amplexari otium, quod abhorreat a dignitate. 
 
This time, the explanation of the terms is given from the statesman’s or potential 
statesman’s point of view.  Rerum gerendarum dignitas clearly refers to the dignitas 
pursued by individual statesmen for their public deeds, while the otium they ought to 
keep in view is that of society.70   Cicero condemns statesmanship that focuses on 
augmenting personal prestige at the expense of public tranquility.  This scenario 
(personal dignitas at the expense of public otium) is exemplified prior to the excursus not 
only by Piso and Gabinius, who use their consulship to gain additional honors (and 
wealth) at the expense of allowing Clodius to create public turmoil (cf. 34 regarding their 
agreement to Clodius’s violent dominatio in exchange for provinces), but also by Clodius 
himself, who augments his status by using his tribunate to wreak havoc on the state.   
 Less obvious in this regard is the case of Caesar and his fellow triumvirs, whose 
unwillingness to defend Cicero against the revolutionary Clodius out of fear for the harm 
                                                          
70 For a similar account of the varied range of meaning carried by these two terms in the 
foregoing sentence, see Kaster 2006: 322-23, though I see no grounds in this context for 
taking this first use of otium in the private senses of “peace of mind or cultivation.”  The 
omission of the latter sense in this particular passage is in keeping with Cicero’s 
rhetorical purpose of encouraging public service; wherever private otium appears in the 
speech, it is tinged with the negative connotation of self-indulgence, laziness, and even 
cowardice (as it is in the second half of the sentence under discussion, neque ullum 
amplexari otium; cf. 23, 100, 138). 
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he might inflict on their legal status or their legacy from the year of Caesar’s consulship 
mirrors the conduct of Piso and Gabinius: 
They were utterly terrified at the time by another fear, because they thought 
everything they had enacted and accomplished in the previous year was being torn 
down by the praetors and undermined by the senate, as well as by the leading men 
of the community.  They were unwilling to alienate a populist tribune from 
themselves, and said their own dangers were looming over themselves more 
closely than mine.  (Sest. 40) 
 
illi autem aliquo tum timore perterriti, quod acta illa atque omnis res anni 
superioris labefactari a praetoribus, infirmari a senatu atque a principibus civitatis 
putabant, tribunum popularem a se alienare nolebant, sua que sibi propiora esse 
pericula quam mea loquebantur. 
 
That the triumvirs were unwilling to get in Clodius’s way appears very much like the 
“corrupt deal” made between Clodius and the consuls of the following year (58).  But in 
the case of the triumvirs, the self-centered gain in terms of personal safety and prestige 
centers around the acta of Caesar’s consulship, which Cicero subtly condemns as 
contrary to the public interest by casually mentioning the efforts of the praetors, the 
senate, and the principes civitatis (cf. principes optimatium) to overturn them.  Here is 
one of those moments in the speech where Cicero tacks against the triumvirate, in this 
case by propagating the idea that their legislation was contrary to the public interest.  In 
this passage, he adds his voice to the others within the senate calling for the invalidation 
of Caesar’s acta as part of a more general design in this speech to strengthen the 
senatorial party and indeed to restore that consensus ordinum that held sway prior to the 
ascendancy of the triumvirate.  The political aims of the speech foreshadow Cicero’s 
motion in the senate on April 5 scheduling a discussion of Caesar’s agrarian law 
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regarding the Ager Campanus for the following month, the last of his efforts to resist the 
triumvirate before succumbing to its renewed power in the face of the meeting at Luca.   
To continue with Cicero’s description of the proper relationship between the 
pursuit of dignitas and otium, the second instance of otium in the sentence shifts from the 
communal to the personal sense, as the individual would-be (or “should-be”) statesman is 
warned not to embrace any personal leisure that neglects dignitas—which seems to 
double in this context as the prestige of the state and that of the individual.  Both kinds of 
dignitas would suffer, as there would be no one to defend the community’s prestige71 
against the attacks of revolutionaries (personal otium at the expense of public dignitas), 
while the individual would lack the honor of status within the community as he fades into 
private obscurity (personal otium at the expense of personal dignitas).  These two 
scenarios are exemplified prior to this passage by the principles of Piso prior to his 
consulship (23), and subsequent to this passage by the non-participating boni (100 & 
139).  On the positive side, Milo is presented as someone who avoids these two pitfalls.  
Cicero lavishes praise upon Milo for promoting “the cause of the Republic” (causam rei 
publicae) by striving to bring about Cicero’s return from exile (87).  Milo’s sense of 
personal honor compels him to stand up for himself and his community, whose prestige 
he will not allow to be damaged: “he reflected on what was honorable for the state and 
for himself, and who he himself was” (Sest. 87: quid re publica, quid se dignum esset, 
quis ipse esset… cogitabat).  There is no mention here of otium in any sense, so keen is 
Cicero to emphasize the union between the pursuit of personal honor and the prestige of 
                                                          




the state.  In sum, the excursus’s ideal of cum dignitate otium evidently refers to the 
statesman’s personal pursuit of honor and glory by means of aiming at the honor and 
tranquility of society, a principle that is illustrated earlier in the speech by the contrast 
between public-spirited figures such as Milo on the one hand and self-serving individuals 
like Piso on the other. 
 Cicero’s political and cultural ideal of seeking individual glory by aiming at the 
good of the community is further clarified by his redefinition of the political buzzword 
optimates and by the affirmation that the statesman’s honor depends on his service of 
their interests.  The statesmen who strive for the goal of cum dignitate otium, the 
principes optimatium, are not serving the interests of a faction as the traditional sense of 
the term optimates would seem to imply, but rather the common interest, since he 
redefines optimates by expanding it to take in all citizens who were in favor of the 
republican constitution, in addition to the traditional ruling class: 
They are the chief men who make public policy; they are those who follow their 
lead; they are men of the most prominent orders to whom membership in the 
senate is open; they are Romans who live in municipia and on farms; they are 
men of business; there are even freedmen who are optimates... All are optimates 
who are neither vicious, nor immoral by nature, nor madmen, nor burdened by 
domestic evils (97)… What is deemed most excellent and most desirable by all 
sane, good, and happy men is tranquility with honor.  All who wish for it are 
optimates…  (Sest. 98) 
 
sunt principes consili publici, sunt qui eorum sectam sequontur, sunt maximorum 
ordinum homines, quibus patet curia, sunt municipales rustici que Romani, sunt 
negoti gerentes, sunt etiam libertini optumates… omnes optumates sunt qui neque 
nocentes sunt, nec natura inprobi ac furiosi, nec malis domesticis inpediti (97)… 
id quod est praestantissimum maximeque optabile omnibus sanis et bonis et 




Cicero identifies the boni with the optimates and defines them in contrast with the 
improbi as those who wish to see the republican regime preserved and undisturbed, which 
is what he means by otium.  Furthermore, the principes consilii publici serve the interests 
of these optimates,72 upholding the communal dignitas and otium that all optimates 
desire: “Those who in governing the Republic serve the wishes, interests, and wealth of 
these men are the defenders of the optimates, and are themselves counted amongst the 
most eminent citizens and leaders of the state” (Sest. 97: horum qui voluntati, commodis, 
opinionibus in gubernanda re publica serviunt, defensores optumatium ipsi que 
optumates gravissimi et clarissimi cives numerantur et principes civitatis).73 
Indeed, the notion that those who pursue the wishes of the optimates are 
“counted” (numerantur) as the most eminent citizens and “considered” (putantur) leading 
men points to the key link between personal honor and public service in Cicero’s 
conception-- namely, esteem in the eyes of a grateful public as a just reward for 
enslavement (as the strongest sense of servire might imply) to their interests.  Kaster has 
aptly termed this notion the “contractualist premise[s] of Republicanism.”74  Towards the 
end of the excursus, Cicero repeatedly drives home this premise: “But those who strive 
                                                          
72 At the beginning of the excursus, these citizens are designated individually as optimus 
quisque (96 & 97).  However, earlier in the speech Cicero uses optimus quisque to refer 
to the senate’s leading men (32), and he appears to repeat it in this sense during the 
excursus when he claims that the people (populus) at present “delight in their own 
tranquility (otio suo) and in the honor (dignitas) of optimus quisque and in the glory of 
the whole Republic (universae rei publicae gloria),” where the separate designation of 
the glory of the Republic seems to be synonymous with the dignitas of the state, leaving 
dignitas optimi cuiusque to refer to the honor of the state’s leading men. 
73 Cf. Sest. 98: “Those who bring about [tranquility with honor] are considered the 
leading men and the saviors of the state (qui [cum dignitate otium] efficiunt, summi viri et 
conservatores civitatis putantur). 
74 2006: 302. 
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after the good opinion of good men, which alone can truly be called glory, ought to seek 
leisure and pleasures for others, not for themselves” (Sest. 139: qui autem bonam famam 
bonorum, quae sola vere gloria nominari potest, expetunt, aliis otium quaerere debent et 
voluptates, non sibi).  The only legitimate form of honor is having a good reputation in 
the eyes of good men, the optimates.  Here the distinction between public and private 
otium is somewhat blurred, as communal otium is seen under the aspect of its enjoyment 
by individual members of the non-elite.  This is also one of the rare occasions when 
Cicero speaks of voluptas in any sort of positive sense, an anomaly that can be explained 
by its presentation in this context as something made available to the members of the 
community by high-minded statesmen who are oriented towards the more noble thoughts 
of personal honor and the benefit of the public.75  In another passage, Cicero 
emphatically employs his own auctoritas in favor of the same idea: 
Believe me, this is the one and only path of praise, and status, and honor: to be 
praised and esteemed by men who are good and wise and of a good disposition by 
nature; to acknowledge the constitution of the state as it was established most 
wisely by our ancestors...  (Sest. 137) 
 
haec est una via, mihi credite, et laudis et dignitatis et honoris, a bonis viris 
sapientibus et bene natura constitutis laudari et diligi; nosse discriptionem civitatis 
<a> maioribus nostris sapientissime constitutam... 
 
The characterization of boni viri as bene natura constituti recalls the definition of 
optimates as all those who are not natura improbi, and sheds light on the seamless 
transition Cicero makes from the thought of being praised by good men and recognizing 
                                                          
75 For another positive use of voluptas, likewise in a politically protreptic context, see 
Rep. 1.3—though it should be noted that some textual critics have emended the text here 




the structure of the state as it was established by the maiores.  Since the optimates/boni 
by definition are not revolutionaries like the improbi, they favor the preservation of the 
republican mode of government, and they reward the champions of republican 
government with public honors.  Once again, the earlier example of Milo illustrates this 
ideal in practice.  Milo strives to maintain the republican constitution against Clodius’s 
violent domination of popular assemblies, seeking “no reward except… the esteem of 
good men” (Sest. 86: qui nullo praemio proposito praeter… iudicium bonorum).  The 
principes optimatium, therefore, pursue personal dignitas in a legitimate manner by 
hoping for praise from the good citizens as a reward for using their position and power to 
seek the preservation of the republican constitution against those who would disturb the 
public tranquility. 
In the impassioned plea above (137), it is also noteworthy that Cicero designates 
the interrelated pursuit of individual glory and societal benefit as a via, a term that makes 
its most striking appearance in connection with a ratio, when Cicero speaks of “this 
[particular] method and path of political engagement,” haec ratio et via rei publicae 
capessendae (103).76  The metaphor of the via77 aptly suggests both a destination and the 
road that leads to it.  Meanwhile, the word ratio implies both a manner of acting 
(“method”) and a set of reasons or principles for that manner of acting.78  Ratio, 
therefore, implies a  principled method of political engagement, a principled manner of 
                                                          
76 Cf. Sest. 100, 137, 140. 
77 The metaphor of the via also figures in Sall. Cat. 11.1-2 (on which see Krebs 2008), 
distinguishing a vera via for the pursuit of glory from corrupt ambitio.  In Sest., however, 
the via concerns the question of politics versus withdrawal in addition to the different 
paths to glory within politics. 
78 Cf. Cicero’s comments on Cato’s ratio in Mur. 2. 
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acting that envisions an end and the appropriate means to reach it; it is appropriately 
paired with the via, a path travelled in order to reach the destination79 of personal dignitas 
and public dignitas-otium that is directly contrasted with a different kind of political 
activity and endgame—that of populares politicians.80  Thus Cicero states that “ there 
have always been in this state two kinds of people who were involved in politics and 
were eager to distinguish themselves therein” (Sest. 96: Duo genera semper in hac 
civitate fuerunt eorum qui versari in re publica atque in ea se excellentius gerere 
studuerunt).  The reference to each group’s desire to seek distinction shows that the 
counterparts to the principes optimatium—namely those who “have wished both to be 
and to be considered populares… [and] who wanted their words and actions to be 
pleasing to the multitude” (Sest. 96: populares… et haberi et esse voluerunt… qui ea 
quae faciebant quaeque dicebant multitudini iucunda volebant esse)—also seek honor as 
their reward, but do so by pursuing aims that are different from those desired by the 
optimates.81   
Accordingly, the aim of such populares turns out to be seeking dignitas by means of the 
creation of turmoil and the destruction of the Republic.  Cicero distinguishes between the 
populares politicians themselves and the reckless men whose interests they serve: “And 
when advisers and leaders have been found for the accomplishment of these men’s 
vicious desires, rising waves are stirred up in the Republic” (Sest. 99: qui cum tutores 
                                                          
79 Cicero also refers to attaining cum dignitate otium with the nautical metaphor of safely 
navigating [a ship] to port: tenere cursum... et capere otii illum portum et dignitatis (99). 
80 See Seager 1972: 328-31 for analysis of Cicero’s conception of populares in Sest. 
81 Defined as the majority of citizens who want to see the preservation of the existing 
social order (cf. Sest. 98). 
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sunt et duces suorum studiorum vitiorumque nacti, in re publica fluctus excitantur).  
Therefore as the principes optimatium are to the optimates, so the populares are to this 
“great crowd amidst so great a number of citizens” (in tanto civium numero magna 
multitudo, 99) a crowd to which three basic types of people belong.82  Some “seek 
revolution and regime change” (novos motus convorsiones que rei publicae quaerant), 
while others “either… feed on civil strife and sedition or… prefer to see the community 
burnt down than to go up in flames alone” (Sest. 99: aut qui… discordiis civium ac 
seditione pascantur, aut qui… communi incendio malint quam suo deflagrare).  Their 
aims are nothing short of revolutionary.  Accordingly, the leaders of these improbi83 seek 
their end of changing the form of government by means of a concerted effort to 
undermine the state’s traditional foundations.  Making mention as I just have of their 
modus operandi calls attention to the fact that in terms of the via metaphor, so far I have 
only analyzed the respective destinations that the two kinds of political engagement aim 
to reach.  An explanation is still required of the topographical features (so to speak) of the 
respective roads that may be travelled, to which the two rationes correspond.84 
B) The means of political engagement 
a) Abiding by the rule of law—and the legitimate use of force 
                                                          
82 Cicero assigns various selfish motives to each of these three groups. 
83 Their identity as the notorious improbi so often lambasted in Cicero’s orations is 
implied by the definition of the optimates as nec improbi natura (97).  Cf. particularly the 
description of Catiline’s followers in the speeches of 64-62. 
84 The recurrence of ratio throughout the speech in a variety of instances where Cicero 
describes the policies pursued by different public figures, some republican and some 
revolutionary, contributes to the sense of the speech’s unified theme.  Cf. 36, 87, 92, 101, 
114, 136, discussed in the next section (cf. n. 13). 
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 One element of the Ciceronian ratio is the defense of the rule of law as one of the 
state’s foundations (leges... iudicia, iuris dictio 98), a principle that is complicated by 
Cicero’s willingness to condone violence in extreme circumstances.  Magistrates ought to 
abide by lawful procedure, but may meet force with force when facing violent threats to 
such procedure, to their own persons, or to the state itself—with the additional, and 
indeed crucial, stipulation that resorting to violence would not overthrow the state itself 
or jeopardize the safety of its citizens.  Accordingly, Milo and Sestius are praised for 
attempting to observe lawful procedure, but also for arming themselves in order to ensure 
the observance of legal process as well as their own safety in the face of Clodius’s 
violence in the assemblies and against themselves.  In discussing Milo’s and Sestius’s 
relationship to the question of law and violence, Cicero may once again be seen 
explaining a principle of political conduct whose importance he will reiterate during the 
excursus.  Cicero singles out Milo for the highest praise as 
the one man of all the citizens who seems to me to have taught not with words but 
in action what outstanding men in the Republic ought and were compelled by 
necessity to do: namely that it was necessary to resist by means of the laws and 
courts the criminality of reckless men seeking to overthrow the Republic; and that 
if the laws had not force and there were no courts, if the Republic was being held 
down and oppressed by the violence and armed conspiracy of reckless men, then 
it was necessary to make use of an armed guard and troops to defend life and 
liberty.  (Sest. 86)  
 
qui mihi unus ex omnibus civibus videtur re docuisse, non verbis, et quid 
oporteret a praestantibus viris in re publica fieri et quid necesse esset: oportere 
hominum audacium, evorsorum rei publicae, sceleri legibus et iudiciis85 resistere; 
si leges non valerent, iudicia non essent, si res publica vi consensu que audacium 
armis oppressa teneretur, praesidio et copiis defendi vitam et libertatem necesse 
esse. 
 
                                                          
85 Cf. Sest. 98: leges et iudicia. 
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The reference to the oppression of the Republic by violence is the stereotypical language 
of opposition to tyranny, the only circumstance that justifies seditio or vis.86  The prior 
use of violence by another to undermine the state’s organs of legal procedure violates its 
liberty and justifies gathering troops, while violent threats to personal safety justify 
having an armed guard to defend one’s life.  Milo demonstrated this principle in action by 
first attempting to defeat Clodius through the law courts, but when his efforts were 
arbitrarily rebuffed by edicts of magistrates friendly to Clodius, he was left with no 
choice but to take an armed guard: “he acted in such a manner that, since he was not 
permitted to make use of the laws against [Clodius], he need not fear his violence either, 
whether as regarded his own danger or the Republic’s” (Sest. 89: perfecit ut, quoniam sibi 
in illum legibus uti non liceret, illius vim neque in suo neque in rei publicae periculo 
pertimesceret).87 
 Likewise, Sestius’s efforts to have Cicero recalled began with attempts to use 
legal process, but when that process was interrupted by Clodius’s violence and the 
destruction of many lives, he employed an armed guard in self-defense.  Sestius was not 
yet attended by an armed guard on the day when he went to the temple of Castor to 
announce unfavorable omens.  But his attempt to rely on law and legal process proved 
futile: when he attempted obnutatio and relied on his sacrosanct status as tribune as a 
guarantee of personal safety, he was violently attacked by Clodius’s gangs and barely 
                                                          
86 Cf. Augustus, RG 1: exercitum privato consilio et privata impensa comparavi, per 
quem rem publicam a dominatione factionis oppressam in libertatem vindicavi. 
87 Cf. 90-91, where Cicero justifies Milo’s actions through a digression on the trope of 
the necessity of using force in one’s defense whenever a sort of state of nature prevails in 
which the force of law is lacking. 
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escaped alive (79).  Sestius’s attempt to pursue legal process prior to taking up arms in 
self-defense justifies Cicero’s claim that Sestius’s ratio (92) was similar to Milo’s except 
with regard to prosecuting Clodius, since “it was not necessary for everyone to do the 
same thing” (neque enim per omnis fuit idem fieri necesse, 92).  Far from being a lame 
excuse for violence on Cicero’s part, this argument assumes, not unreasonably, that the 
audience will let Sestius go for not attempting prosecution (in addition to exercising 
obnutatio) before arming himself, and will rather sympathize with Sestius for taking 
immediate measures for his self-defense after nearly being killed.  In addition, Cicero’s 
argument shows Sestius and Milo attempting an initial legal battle against Clodius on two 
fronts: the former in the assemblies, the latter in the courts.  Consequently, he suggests, a 
second and simultaneous attempt at prosecution on Sestius’s part would be superfluous. 
 Finally, Cicero himself serves as a positive exemplum of using or avoiding 
political violence on the occasion of his exile.  Cicero asserts that rather than departing 
into exile without a fight, he had the right to resist Clodius and his armed gangs by force, 
since he “had no fear that anyone would blame me for repelling force with force” (non 
verebar ne quis aut vim vi depulsam reprehenderet, 39).  Cicero might seem to contradict 
his insistence on the observance of leges in proper political conduct, but presumably he 
means that Clodius’s laws regarding his exile were illegitimate because they had been 
passed by force, in circumstances when “armed men held control of the forum and the 
public meetings” (armati homines forum et contiones tenebant) and “one man held all 
power over all through arms and bands of thieves” (unus omnem omnium potestatem 
armis et latrociniis possidebat, 34).  And yet although he had a right to use violence, 
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Cicero claims that concern for the state’s integrity and for the safety of his fellow citizens 
led him to eschew such a course of action.  Sometimes violence might be just in itself, 
but not prudent due to even worse consequences that might arise from employing it.  
Cicero claims to have reflected on the harmful precedent of a private citizen’s taking up 
arms against a magistrate (43), and even more significantly, on the destruction of the 
Republic that could have resulted from violently resisting Clodius’s allies, the consuls 
Piso and Gabinius and other, unnamed defenders: 
What did [Clodius] mean by [his threat that I would have] to conquer twice?  No 
doubt that, after I had struggled against that madman of a tribune of the plebs, I 
would have had to contend with the consuls and his other avengers (43)... But that 
second struggle would have meant that neither as conquerors or conquered would 
we be able to retain the Republic.  (Sest. 44) 
 
quid erat bis vincere? id id profecto, ut, cum amentissimo tribuno plebis 
decertassem, cum consulibus ceterisque eius ultoribus dimicarem (43)… erat 
enim illa altera eius modi contentio ut neque victi neque victores rem publicam 
tenere possemus.  (Sest. 44).   
 
Note the subtle reference to Caesar in the vague “his other avengers”—having already 
named the consuls, who else could Cicero possibly mean?  Such a fight, moreover, would 
have meant excessive loss of life and destruction of property for his fellow-citizens:  
Should I have fought it out, not, I say, to your complete destruction, but certainly 
with danger to you and your children? (46) ... Therefore, I saved the Republic by 
my departure, judges: slaughter, devastation, fire, rapine—I warded them off from 
you and your children by my own grief and mourning, and I alone saved the 
Republic twice, once with glory, once again through my agony.  (Sest. 49) 
 
depugnarem potius cum summo non dicam exitio, sed periculo certe vestro 
liberorumque vestrorum? (46) … servavi igitur rem publicam discessu meo, 
iudices; caedem a vobis liberis que vestris, vastitatem, incendia, rapinas meo 
dolore luctuque depuli et unus rem publicam bis servavi, semel gloria, iterum 




With these last words in particular Cicero intentionally recalls his self-fashioning in the 
Catilinarians, where the situation was reversed: in that case, it was fitting for him as a 
public magistrate to use violence against the conspirators since this was necessary to 
protect the lives and property of Roman citizens.88 
 Clodius is an obvious exemplum of the improper use of law and violence.  Clodius 
upon becoming tribune occupies the temple of Castor and fills the forum with armed men 
(34).  He habitually subverts popular assemblies by force: his gangs disrupt the concilium 
plebis by attacking Quintus Fabricius on the Rostra and killing many of his supporters 
(75); on the same occasion they drive the tribune Cispius from the forum and seek in vain 
to find Quintus Cicero in order to kill him (76); they attempt to kill the tribune Sestius in 
the temple of Castor (79).  In addition, Clodius is willing to use violence against Cicero’s 
allies where Cicero is unwilling to use it against Clodius: as a private citizen, Clodius 
repeatedly hounds the tribune Milo with his gangs, attempting assassination (89) and 
even the burning of his house (85, 89). 
  But a less noticeable exemplum of the misuse of violence in politics can be seen in 
the case of Caesar.  Cicero notes that Caesar and the triumvirs were unwilling to come to 
his defense in the face of Clodius’s efforts to achieve his exile because they could not 
afford to alienate Clodius at a time when their political program from the year of Caesar’s 
consulship was already under attack from the senate and its leading men (40).  But these 
“accomplishments of the previous year” (acta atque omnes res anni superioris) 
necessarily include such unconstitutional measures as the passing of the Campanian land 
                                                          




law by violence and the violent treatment of Caesar’s consular colleague Bibulus at the 
hands of Caesar’s ally, the tribune Vatinius, upon the consul’s attempt to exercise 
obnutatio at the temple of Castor (cf. Vat. 21-22).  Moreover, this temple, as we have 
seen, is frequently mentioned in this speech as the site of Clodian violence (34; 78-79).  
Through the similarity between the actions of Caesar’s open ally Vatinius and those of 
Clodius, Cicero associates Caesar with the violent subversion of assemblies, for the sake 
of forcing through his own laws in the first instance and in order to lay the groundwork 
for Cicero’s exile in the second. 
Yet another negative association with Clodius’ violent intentions towards Cicero 
may be seen in the reference to the presence of Caesar’s army at the gates of the city 
during the crisis leading up to Cicero’s exile.  Although Cicero denies Clodius’ claim that 
Caesar was hostile to him (41) and makes excuses for his silence (40), he admits that 
such threats influenced his decision to go into exile (42).  More fundamentally, the 
broader pattern of cooperation between Caesar and Clodius as evidenced in the transfer to 
plebeian status and the willing acquiescence in Clodius’s efforts to obtain Cicero’s exile 
affords good reason for believing that Clodius’s threats about Caesar’s intentions were 
actually true, notwithstanding Cicero’s superficial assurances to the contrary.  Finally, 
Cicero supplies an additional reason for not giving credence to his own excuses for 
Caesar by mentioning the presence of Clodius’s own brother as an officer in Caesar’s 
army (41).  The larger picture gives us a sense that Caesar was keeping his threatening 
army at the gates of Rome in order to aid Clodius’s program, intimidating Cicero and his 
allies into silence and pressuring them not to resist Clodius’s efforts to exile Cicero, to 
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the ultimate harm of the republican program.  Caesar, therefore, is implicitly condemned 
as a cooperator with the improbi among the tribunes, who seek to undermine and 
ultimately to overthrow the Republic through the use and threat of violence.   
b) Sustaining traditional values and institutions 
A second key strategy by which republican statesmen attain their dual goal of 
public good and individual glory (cum dignitate otium) found both in the excursus and 
throughout the speech consists in upholding the ancestral laws and customs (98).  This 
ideal figures earlier in the speech in Cicero’s praise of some and reprobation of others for 
promoting or undermining several of these elements,89 especially those that come at the 
beginning of the list: religiones, auspicia, potestates magistratuum, senatus auctoritas, 
leges, mos maiorum.90  The most striking negative exemplum in this regard is Caesar, 
whom Cicero criticizes fairly openly for bringing about the adoption of Clodius into a 
plebeian family.  
This hideous, wild beast, though bound by the auspices, tied down by the customs 
of our ancestors, and constrained by the chains of the leges sacratae, was, through 
a law suddenly passed in the centuriate assembly, let loose by the consul—either, 
as is my opinion, because he [sc. the consul] had been excessively importuned, or, 
as quite a few people thought, because he was angry with me; but whatever the 
reasons, he was certainly unaware, and had no idea, that such great crimes and 
evils would follow.  (Sest. 16) 
 
hanc taetram inmanem que beluam, vinctam auspiciis, alligatam more maiorum, 
constrictam legum sacratarum catenis, solvit subito lege curiata consul, vel, ut ego 
                                                          
89 Kaster 2006: 323 suggests my line of inquiry—“most of these components have been 
mentioned several times over in the speech”—but does not list references. 
90 Piso and Gabinius were shown above to exemplify the failure to respect senatus 
auctoritas in particular; Cicero also attacks them for furthering the passage of a law that 
declared the auspicia should have no effect, and that the Aelian and Fufian law should be 
null (Sest. 33). 
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arbitror, exoratus vel, ut non nemo putabat, mihi iratus, ignarus quidem certe et 
inprudens inpendentium tantorum scelerum et malorum. 
 
At the beginning of the sentence, Clodius is the most obvious offender against auspicia, 
mos maiorum, and the leges sacratae, as these restrictions are grammatically linked to 
him.  Nevertheless, what stands out most is Caesar’s role in the transfer, which Cicero 
brilliantly emphasizes by abruptly placing all the agency with consul, the subject of the 
sentence (solvit... consul), while Clodius is the object (beluam).  The very structure of the 
sentence argues not simply for Caesar’s complicity but indeed his principal agency in 
undermining sacred and ancestral custom.91  In addition, Cicero’s protestation that Caesar 
did not realize that the transfer of Clodius would lead to commotion is disingenuous at 
best, and at worst an indictment.  By raising the possibility both here and elsewhere in the 
speech92 that Caesar was angry with him—merely voicing his supposed disagreement 
with such an idea, without giving any reason why—Cicero repeatedly insinuates to the 
audience that Caesar was knowingly trying to stir up trouble for him.93  Meanwhile, 
expressly excusing Caesar on the grounds that he was imprudens amounts to a great 
insult for Caesar’s lack of one of the most basic virtues of a statesman, political prudence 
                                                          
91 Cicero may be accused of contradiction, given that Caesar and Clodius (not to mention 
Piso and Gabinius in the case of the Aelian and Fufian law) observe due constitutional 
form by having the Centuriate Assembly pass a lex, which he later declares one of the 
foundational elements of public otium.  Perhaps he would retort that ancestral custom and 
religious laws should have priority. 
92 Within Pro Sestio, see 41 and 71, where Cicero engages in the same process of 
suggesting and rejecting the possibility of Caesar’s being angry with him, while in Dom. 
41, Cicero expressly asserts that Caesar cooperated with Clodius’s transfer to the plebs 
because he was angry with Cicero for criticizing the situation in the state. 
93 Cicero’s procedure here might be conceived in terms of the phenomenon of “figured 
speech” or “doublespeak,” on which see Ahl 1984 and Bartsch 1994 respectively. 
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or foresight.94  But even if one takes Cicero at his word and assumes that Caesar had no 
bad intentions, the fact remains that Caesar has cooperated in undermining several 
foundations of cum dignitate otium, thereby situating himself outside the category of 
those principes optimatium who exercise political power legitimately, and hence aligning 
himself with the improbi.  Cicero thus appears to have Caesar in mind when he speaks of 
the auctores and duces who take up the cause of the reckless citizens, especially since the 
latter seems to point to Clodius.95  In particular, Cicero’s characterization of the improbi 
as motivated to attack the Republic out of “fear of punishment and awareness of their 
sacrilegious crimes” (propter metum poenae, peccatorum suorum conscii, 99) counts as a 
scarcely concealed allusion to Clodius’s recent trial over the bona dea scandal. 
c) Acting with consensus 
A third means of republican statesmanship consists in commitment to the 
principle of rule by consensus.  This idea emerges in a general way in the excursus from 
                                                          
94 Kaster 2006 also notes the insult implied by imprudens.  Mitchell 1991: 174 accepts 
Cicero’s excuses for Caesar at face value.  Cicero’s procedure of making excuses that 
subtly imply guilt was used earlier in his career as well, under another autocrat: cf. Rosc. 
Am. 130-31, where Sulla is exonerated from any part in Chrysogonus’s misdeeds on the 
grounds that Sulla allowed many things to happen under his rule partim improbante, 
partim imprudente, and that since not even Jupiter can keep his eye on everything at 
once, neither should Sulla be held responsible for failing to notice everything. 
95 Scholarly consensus has centered around the view that Clodius was an “independent 
agent” (first argued by Gruen 1966) who pursued his own designs without doing Caesar’s 
bidding.  Some passages in Pro Sestio supply evidence for this view, especially the 
previously discussed passage regarding Caesar’s supposed fear for his consular 
legislation from potential attacks by Clodius.  However, the notion that Caesar would 
have come to Cicero’s aid had it not been for the threat he felt from Clodius appears to be 
an intentional Ciceronian fabrication designed to avoid directly attacking Caesar, the 
same procedure as is used in the present passage.  While Clodius was not a slavish pawn 
in Caesar’s hands, Caesar nevertheless was quite happy to make use of Clodius as an ally, 
manipulating Clodius’s desire to revenge himself on Cicero as a means of weakening 
Cicero and the senatorial party. 
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Cicero’s assertion that statesmen should pursue the interests of the majority of citizens, 
namely the optimates, who are defined as loyal citizens from all classes (97).  It is also 
implicit in Cicero’s description of the Roman constitution: magistrates are supposed to 
obey the wishes of the senate, whose members are chosen by the whole people (ab 
universo populo) and come from the ranks of all citizens (omnes cives); the senate is also 
charged with “protecting and increasing the liberty and interests of the plebs (plebis 
libertatem et commoda tueri atque augere, 137).  Therefore, when magistrates obey the 
wishes of the senate, they heed the wishes of all of society.  The most salient positive 
exemplum of a magistrate who pursues policies that meet with the approval of all levels 
of society is, as we might expect in a Ciceronian speech, Cicero himself.  Cicero recalls 
his decision to execute the Catilinarian conspirators during his consulship: 
The policies that I carried out were not solely of my design alone.  I acted as the 
executor of the common resolve, and these policies concerned not just my own 
individual glory but the common safety of all citizens, and practically of all 
nations.  I carried them out with the stipulation that everyone should always 
vouch for and uphold what I had done.  (Sest. 38) 
 
eas res gesseram quarum non unus auctor sed dux omnium voluntatis fuissem, 
quaeque non modo ad singularem meam gloriam sed ad communem salutem 
omnium civium et prope gentium pertinerent; ea condicione gesseram ut meum 
factum semper omnes praestare tuerique deberent.  
 
Cicero’s claim to have been dux omnium voluntatis refers to the decree of the 
senate in favor of executing the conspirators and to the implicit support of the equestrians 
who guarded the Temple of Concord from the outside during the senatorial debate.  
Throughout Pro Sestio, he confirms his claim to have acted in accordance with the will of 
the Roman people by pointing to the demonstrations of public support that occurred when 
67 
 
he was threatened with exile (Sest. 26-27, 32, 36) and upon his glorious return (128-29, 
131). 
This universal public support for Cicero’s recall also forms the basis of lauding 
the tribune Milo for seeking to bring about Cicero’s restoration.  Cicero calls special 
attention in this regard to Milo’s ratio, his manner of acting, which had the “full 
agreement of all” (plena consensionis omnium, 87).  He demonstrates this general 
consensus in favor of Milo’s policies by listing the many allies Milo had in his cause: his 
colleagues in the tribunate, one of the consuls, the senate, the equites, and the general 
population (Italia) (87).  In addition, the convergence of the several parts of the state and 
of all classes in society speaks to the spirit of unity (ratio... plena concordiae, 87) with 
which Milo is said to have acted.  Cicero likewise praises Sestius for the pursuit of 
concordia.  Upon being elected tribune in 58 and prior to assuming office, Sestius 
“undertook a journey to Gaius Caesar on behalf of my safety” (iter ad C. Caesarem pro 
mea salute suscepit, 71).  The purpose of this journey is restated and revised shortly 
thereafter to read “for the sake of the Republic” (rei publicae causa), yet another instance 
of the oft-insinuated and oft-repeated premise that Cicero’s prestige within the Republic 
is commensurate with its well-being.  But what stands out in the mission to Caesar is 
Sestius’s attempt to forge a consensus in favor of his political goals.  Sestius is said to 
have sought out Caesar “because he thought that doing so was germane to concord 
among citizens and that he could more easily achieve his purpose if Caesar were at heart 
not opposed to my cause” (pertinere et ad concordiam civium putavit et ad perficiundi 
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facultatem animum Caesaris a causa non abhorrere, 71).  Sestius’s mission thus stands 
out in its adherence to the Ciceronian principle of acting by consensus in political affairs.   
d) Magnitudo animi 
 A fourth key aspect of political engagement for republican statesmen concerns 
magnanimity of spirit coupled with sacrificial altruism for the sake of the Republic.  In 
the excursus, Cicero establishes from the outset that statesmen must be prepared to 
defend republican institutions “even at the danger of their own lives” (vel capitis periculo 
defendenda sunt, 98); “to be the defender and patron of so many and such great matters 
as these requires greatness of soul,96 great ability and great constancy” (harum rerum tot 
atque tantarum esse defensorem et patronum magni animi est, magni ingeni magnae que 
constantiae, 99).97  Cicero echoes the point with which he began the speech, that the 
present lack of republican statesmen should come as no surprise given the many dangers 
they face (1-2).  Emphasizing the need for a rare resolve to persevere, Cicero exploits the 
trope of statesmanship as an occupation full of toil: “they only remain who bear 
everything for the sake of the Republic (permanent illi soli atque omnia rei publicae 
causa perferunt, 101); “there is toil, I won’t deny it; great dangers, I admit (est labor, non 
nego; pericula magna, fateor, 102); “this type of man, I admit, as I said before… must 
face many dangers, be exposed to many attacks, bear and undergo great toils” (huic 
hominum generi fateor, ut ante dixi… multa proponi pericula, multas inferri iniurias, 
                                                          
96 See Schofield 2009 for magnitudo animi as an important republican virtue throughout 
Cicero’s corpus. 
97 Cf. 100: hanc ego viam, iudices, si aut asperam atque arduam et plenam esse 
periculorum aut insidiarum negem, mentiar, praesertim cum id non modo intellexerim 
semper sed etiam praeter ceteros senserim. 
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magnos esse experiundos et subeundos labores, 138); “they have to wear themselves out 
for the sake of the common interest… they must contend with many reckless and wicked 
men, sometimes even with the mighty” (sudandum est iis pro communibus commodis, 
adeundae inimicitiae, subeundae saepe pro re publica tempestates, cum multis 
audacibus, inprobis, non numquam etiam potentibus dimicandum, 139).  This last 
reference to the mighty constitutes another subtle shot at the triumvirs, especially 
Caesar—yet another indication of Cicero’s design to rally the troops against the greatest 
force undermining the Republic at present. 
Earlier in the speech, Cicero had given various exempla illustrating such 
magnanimous conduct.  Above all, he recalls his own consulship, in which he pursued 
policies favorable to the Republic in spite of the risk of death and exile to which they 
exposed him.  Even then, he foresaw these possibilities:  
When I was pursuing those great policies in the midst of so great a gathering of 
the wicked, was not death, was not exile staring me in the face?  Weren’t these 
oracles, so to speak, being prophesied in the very act of carrying out my policy?  
(Sest. 47) 
 
aut ego illas res tantas in tanta improborum multitudine cum gerebam, non mihi 
mors, non exilium ob oculos vorsabatur? non haec denique a me tum tanquam fata 
in ipsa re gerenda canebantur? 
 
In speaking of “oracles” which were “prophesied” at the time, Cicero recalls his own 
acknowledgement at the time that he was making enemies for himself and could face 
retaliation for his actions.98  In fact, Cicero expressed the same principle in the Fourth 
Catilinarian as in his critique of Piso (rei publicae consulendum, Sest. 23) regarding the 
                                                          
98 Cic. Cat. 4.3. 
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statesman’s duty to take thought for the good of all citizens (consulite vobis... populi 
Romani nomen salutemque defendite, Cat. 4.3) at the risk of his personal safety.   
 Cicero reinforces this image of himself as a great-souled statesman by fashioning 
his departure into exile as an altruistic decision whereby he sacrificed himself in order to 
preserve the state and its citizens from destruction through civil war:  
And regarding this matter, you, you, I say, my fatherland—and I also call you to 
witness, household and ancestral gods—that I, for the sake of your dwellings and 
temples, that I, for the safety of my fellow citizens, which has always been more 
dear to me than life, fled fighting and bloodshed.  (Sest. 45).   
 
de quo te, te, inquam, patria, testor et vos, penates patrii que dei, me vestrarum 
sedum templorum que causa, me propter salutem meorum civium, quae mihi 
semper fuit mea carior vita, dimicationem caedemque fugisse. 
 
He illustrates this self-sacrificial action with the scenario of a ship at sea attacked by 
pirates who demand a hostage as surety for the other passengers (46).  He then applies 
this scenario to the ship of state when faced with the onslaughts of Clodius: “[Was it not 
better] that I alone for the sake of all should undertake to endure what was threatening 
everyone?” (…quam [non] id quod omnibus inpendebat unus pro omnibus susciperem ac 
subirem? 46).  Furthermore, such sacrifice demands willingness to endure sorrow as a 
means of preserving the Republic: “I warded off slaughter… from you and your children 
by my own grief and mourning, and I alone saved the Republic twice, once with glory, 
once again through my agony” (caedem a vobis liberisque vestris… meo dolore luctuque 
depuli et unus rem publicam bis servavi, semel gloria, iterum aerumna mea, 49).  While 
Cicero doubtless seeks exclusivity in enjoying the special distinction of two-time Savior 
of the State, nevertheless he presents his method of saving the state in this second 
manner, namely, through personal grief, as “an example of preserving the Republic” 
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(exemplum rei publicae conservandae, 49), and also cites Cato’s conduct during the year 
58 in this regard.99 
Like Cicero, Cato is targeted for his previous policy of demanding the execution 
of the conspirators: “he was the head, the originator, the instigator of those policies” (dux, 
auctor, actor rerum illarum fuit, 61).100  And just like Cicero, Cato in so acting at the 
time is said to have disregarded real concerns for his own safety for the sake of the 
common benefit: “it’s not that he failed to see the danger he was in; but when such a 
great storm was raging in the Republic, he simply thought he should think of nothing but 
the dangers threatening the fatherland” (non quo periculum suum non videret, sed in tanta 
rei publicae tempestate nihil sibi nisi de patriae periculis cogitandum putabat, 61).  But 
most striking of all is Cato’s willing acceptance of dishonor and a sort of “exile” as 
governor of Cyprus (non illi ornandum M. Catonem, sed relegandum... putaverunt), a 
post imposed on him by enemies of the Republic who were eager to diminish his 
influence in Rome.  Even though he considers this resolution unjust, Cato goes along 
rather than “sacrificing himself to their reckless designs” (non offert se ille istis 
temeritatibus), avoiding a path of resistance that would have been “useless to the 
Republic by depriving it of the citizen that he was” (ut, cum rei publicae nihil prosit, se 
civi rem <publicam> privet, 61).   
From one point of view, Cicero can certainly be seen co-opting Catonian 
auctoritas in order to legitimize his own choice to depart into exile, assimilating Cato’s 
supposed motives to his own stated reason of avoiding resistance to lawful authority to no 
                                                          
99 For bibliography on Cicero’s exile, see n. 10. 
100 dux, auctor, actor rerum illarum fuit.   
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good purpose.  But in terms of the promotion of a cultural ideal, fashioning Cato in this 
way contributes to educating the audience on republican political principles by presenting 
another noble figure who, like Cicero, sacrifices personal interest for the republican 
cause.  Cicero concludes his discussion of Cato by making the likeness with himself more 
explicit: “He yielded to the same crisis as we did, to the madness of the same person, to 
the same consuls, to the same threats, plots, and dangers” (ille vero eidem tempori cui 
nos, eiusdem furori, eisdem consulibus, eisdem minis, insidiis, periculis cessit, 63).  
Cicero then implicitly admits that Cato’s “exile” to the governorship of a province lacked 
the shame of his own exile: “I drank a more bitter cup of mourning, though he had no less 
sorrow of soul” (luctum nos hausimus maiorem, dolorem ille animi non minorem, 63).  
But this comparison, far from contributing to Cicero’s shame, augments his glory 
inasmuch as he claims to have suffered more than Cato did for the Republic. 
 In a general way, Cato may be grouped with Sestius and Milo as an exemplum of 
courage in discharging the office of the tribunate.  Cicero praises Cato for his courage 
(M. Catone tribuno pl., fortissimo atque optimo civi) in defending the Republic (rem 
publicam defendente, 12) and for his “unheard of greatness of soul” (singulari 
magnitudine animi) and “unbelievable courage” (incredibili virtute).  Sestius, likewise, 
evidently endured toils for the sake of the Republic at the risk of his safety and indeed his 
very life, attacked by the gangs of Clodius in the Temple of Castor and left for dead (79).  
Cicero also exalts his courage by asserting that if Sestius had in fact died, “at some point 
a statue would be stood up in the Forum in honor of a man who had been killed defending 
the Republic” (aliquando statua huic ob rem publicam interfecto in foro statueretur, 83).  
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Milo is praised in even more extravagant terms for the “immortal courage” (immortalis 
virtus) he has displayed in “enduring all dangers, the greatest of toils, and the most 
dangerous struggles and hostile attacks” (omnia pericula, summos labores, gravissimas 
contentiones inimicitiasque suscepit, 86).  These multiple concrete exempla prepare the 
way in Cicero’s persuasive design for his vindication of republican courage in more 
theoretical terms within the excursus. 
4. Motives for pursuing the via 
 Having laid out the character of republican via, I proceed now to a fuller 
investigation of the motives Cicero holds out to entice his audience to embrace this 
particular form of participation in public life.  In section 2, I showed how one of Cicero’s 
persuasive strategies in this regard involved creating a sense of shame in the timid, non-
participating boni within his audience by likening them to apolitical and self-indulgent 
Greek Epicurean philosophers, and in the ambitious by depicting the selfish political 
behavior of Piso as stemming from an Epicureanism at odds with traditional Roman 
republicanism.  He also motivates these two constituents of his audience through appeals 
to the noble and the just for their own sake and above all by means of a variety of 
arguments concerning the prospect of gaining glory—whether contemporaneously, 
posthumously, or eternally—as well as by holding out the possibility of an eternal reward 
beyond fame itself.  Cicero makes clear at various points that his arguments are chiefly 
addressed to the younger generation among these two basic groups in his audience, as he 
looks to raise up a class of enthusiastic and energetic young people willing to act 
decisively in favor of the Republic both at the present moment when the triumvirate 
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appears to be weakening and in the future.  Loyal but pusillanimous citizens must be 
convinced to give up personal quiet and safety for the sake of the Republic, while the 
ambitious who may be tempted to go the way of a Clodius or Caesar must be persuaded 
that the only path to lasting glory is the republican via. 
 It bears mentioning that immediately before the excursus, Cicero repeats the same 
basic problem that he initially set forth in the exordium—given the impunity with which 
the improbi afflict republican statesmen, it is hardly surprising if most citizens pursue 
their own interests rather than the Republic’s (1).  He finds occasion to express his 
chagrin about this situation again just after describing Milo’s frustrations in seeking legal 
recourse against the attacks of Clodius, this time indicating a special concern for the 
detrimental effect of these political events on the young:  
But as for the young men who see all this, to what course of action will they turn 
their minds?  The man who has attacked, destroyed, and set fire to public 
monuments, sacred temples, and the houses of his enemies... flits about as aedile 
and prosecutes the man... who protected himself so as to defend... in the political 
realm the rights of his tribunate and the auspices, but has been forbidden by a 
decree of the senate to prosecute lawfully the man by whom he is himself 
wickedly prosecuted.  (Sest. 95).  
 
sed qui haec vident adulescentes quonam suas mentes conferent?  ille qui 
monumenta publica, qui aedes sacras, qui domos inimicorum suorum oppugnavit, 
excidit, incendit… volitat101 aedilis, accusat eum… qui se est tutatus sic ut… in re 
publica iura tribunatus atque auspicia defenderet, accusare eum moderate a quo 
ipse nefarie accusatur per senatus auctoritatem non est situs. 
  
In other words, Cicero echoes the complaint of the exordium that the politically wicked 
prosper while the politically just who attempt to defend the Republic are successfully 
frustrated by their enemies and appear to be on the losing side.  But Cicero’s words imply 
                                                          
101 Cf. Sest. 2, volitare. 
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a very real concern not just that some will be deterred by present dangers from standing 
up for the Republic but also that some may decide to follow the path of Clodius and his 
allies—hence the two basic audiences I have described above, though Cicero also 
indicates a particular concern with the young within these two groups.  Asserting that the 
prosecutor has asked derisively who are the natio optimatium (96) (“tribe of aristocrats”), 
given that by all appearances Milo has been blocked from prosecuting Clodius by a 
senate full of optimates, Cicero states that the prosecutor “asks about a matter that is 
excellent for the youth to learn, nor difficult for me to teach in full” (rem quaeris 
praeclaram iuventuti ad discendum nec mihi difficilem ad perdocendum), promising to 
“say a few things about the matter” (de qua pauca… dicam), denoting three purposes for 
this (so-called) excursus: it will be useful for the general audience (nec ab utilitate eorum 
qui audient... abhorrebit), relevant to the judges’ “duty” (officium vestrum), and relevant 
to the case itself (ipsa causa P. Sesti) (96).102 
Therefore in addition to its bearing on the case at hand,103 Cicero conceives of the 
excursus, which contains an account of ends and means of political engagement as well 
as various motives for such engagement, as an explanation of duties to the judges that 
will also be useful for the entire listening, and by extension, reading audience; it is also 
conceived as educational material addressed to the young.  Cicero’s evident didactic 
                                                          
102 Cf. Sest. 5, where Cicero, after posing the contemporary problem of political 
engagement in the exordium, announces the broader purposes of this speech in similar 
terms to Sest. 96: “...if only I can see to it that in this broad and universal defense I may 
seem to have omitted nothing relevant to your judicial inquiry, to the accused, and to the 
Republic.” 
103 It is this aspect of the excursus on which Kaster 2006 focuses his analysis, and with 




concern in this speech with teaching the young their duties and in addition his efforts to 
depict Caesar’s conduct in a negative light reveal his concern already in the mid-50s BCE 
with many of the same topics he would later take up in De Officiis, his final philosophic 
work, penned in the aftermath of the Ides.  Furthermore, as will be clarified in the 
following discussion, Cicero is as deeply concerned in Pro Sestio, delivered in the 
aftermath of Caesar’s consulship and in the face of the first triumvirate, with the problem 
of the unprincipled pursuit of glory as he would later be in De Officiis, written soon after 
Caesar’s dictatorship and death.104 
 In exhorting his audience to embrace their public duty, Cicero also makes use of 
appeals to pure patriotism or to the love of the noble for its own sake, though to a limited 
degree.  Such arguments only make their appearance towards the end of the speech, in the 
final sections of the excursus.  For example, Cicero drums up patriotic fervor by posing 
the rhetorical question “what ought we to do... who have attained the duty of defending a 
Republic whose dignitas is so great that it would be preferable to die in her defense rather 
than to acquire nations by attacking her?” (Sest. 141: quid nos tandem facere debemus… 
ad eam rem publicam tuendam adgressi quae tanta dignitate est ut eam defendentem 
occidere optabilius sit quam oppugnantem rerum potiri?).  Here, the dignitas of Rome 
herself calls for subordinating and moderating one’s pursuit of personal dignitas for her 
benefit, even at the cost of one’s own life. 
But besides its rhetorical function as an argument that Rome is of such inherent 
worth that she merits statesmen to defend her, this impassioned appeal also serves, as at 
                                                          
104 See Long 1995a. 
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least one commentator has suggested,105 as a veiled criticism of Caesar’s politics.  We 
recall that Cicero has already alluded in a general way to Caesar’s use of violence in the 
assemblies during his consulship, which ensured not only the success of the Campanian 
land law but also the conferral of an exceptional and ostensibly unconstitutional five-year 
provincial command through which he went on to his career-making conquests in Gaul.  
In this sense he could be seen as attacking his own country for the sake of acquiring 
power over other nations.  Further, Cicero may be seen making a ploy that foreshadows 
Cicero’s contrast of himself with Caesar in De Officiis by asserting the superiority of 
statesmanship over generalship (cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi, Off. 1.77, 
quoting the poem on his consulship).  Earlier in this speech, when Cicero was arguing 
that it was unfitting for him as a private citizen to resist a magistrate such as Clodius by 
force, he added that such violent resistance would have also been committed by someone 
“who even as consul had preserved the Republic without arms” (qui sine armis etiam 
consul rem publicam conservarat, 47).  This argument confirms the sense that Cicero 
promotes his brand of ordinarily non-military statesmanship throughout the speech.  The 
implicit force of this argument is the same as a series of others intent on portraying 
Caesar’s self-serving and violent form of politics in a negative light and drawing his 
young audience to resist the triumvirate by following the path of Ciceronian 
statesmanship. 
 A second argument appealing to an esteem for the noble occurs not much later in 
the final section of the excursus (143), a section which on its own may be seen as the 
                                                          
105 Gardner 1958: 230 n. a. 
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peroratio both of that digression and of the speech as a whole.  As part of a grand 
exhortation summing up the motives for engagement he has described to that point, he 
states “let us deem as ‘best’ that which is most just” (id esse optimum putemus quod erit 
rectissimum, 143).  The superlative rectissimum is proper in the context of this grand 
peroratio, and seems to denote what is morally right and high.  Here is one of the few 
instances when Cicero exhorts the audience to act in accordance with justice for its own 
sake, simply on account of its excellence.  The paucity of such arguments in the speech as 
a whole as well as in the immediate context of 143, which concentrates on various glory 
motives (described below), indicates Cicero’s sense of its comparative rhetorical 
weakness in the context.  It also constitutes an important respect in which Cicero’s 
arguments for principled engagement in Pro Sestio differ from the later De Officiis, 
where the conception of the honestum is central to the argument of a work written in the 
genre of a philosophic epistle addressed to students of philosophy as such.106 
 In Pro Sestio, by contrast, Cicero’s main focus is on convincing his audience that 
fulfilling one’s public duty of republican engagement will prove personally profitable 
(utilis-- cf. 96, utilitas eorum qui audient) in terms of individual glory.  Certainly he also 
favors political engagement because it is profitable for the Republic, but in his vision, the 
pursuit of personal glory is potentially reconcilable with the public good, and indeed the 
chief way to bring about the latter is by exploiting the passion for the former.   
                                                          
106 cf. Off. 1.1-2, where Cicero indicates as his chief audience young Romans engaged in 
the serious study of philosophy through the figure of his son Marcus, presently engaged 
in philosophic studies with the Peripatetics in Athens. 
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Consequently, a large part of his argument relies on the appeal of a sort of 
immediate gratification by advancing the notion that republican political engagement is 
desirable due to the likelihood of glory with one’s contemporaries.  From a logical point 
of view, this argument emerges as one of his weakest, since adducing examples of 
individuals who were remunerated with glory from their fellow citizens for their public 
service by no means proves that this will always be the outcome.  First, Cicero uses the 
example of his own recent exile and return as proof that misfortunes suffered by 
republican statesmen such as exile will only be temporary, as the Roman people can be 
relied upon to restore one to honor.  This might be termed the argument of the “happy 
ending”: “And now that I have been restored to [the Republic], in me there also lives an 
example of fidelity to the public good (exemplum fidei publicae).  But if it be kept in 
mind immortally, who can fail to understand that this community will be immortal?” 
(Sest. 50: in qua quidem nunc me restituto vivit me cum simul exemplum fidei publicae.  
quod si inmortale retinetur, quis non intellegit inmortalem hanc civitatem futuram?).  
The reason this exemplary turn of events can preserve the Republic in perpetuity is its 
being kept in mind by the young and future generations who, recalling Cicero’s 
experience, will follow in Cicero’s footsteps in defending the Republic, confident in the 
expectation that they will be honored by the Roman people:  
Therefore, I admonish you, young men—and I have the right to teach you this—
you who look to status, to politics, and to glory, if necessity ever requires you to 
defend the Republic against evil citizens, do not hesitate or shrink from taking 
firm measures on my account, when you recall my misfortune (51) … For you can 
see that, after a brief period of sorrow, I have been recalled by the voice of the 




Quare moneo vos, adulescentes, atque hoc meo iure praecipio, qui dignitatem, qui 
rem publicam, qui gloriam spectatis, ne, si quae vos aliquando necessitas ad rem 
publicam contra improbos cives defendendam vocabit, segniores sitis et 
recordatione mei casus a consiliis fortibus refugiatis (51) … videtis me… in meam 
pristinam dignitatem brevi tempore doloris interiecto rei publicae voce esse 
revocatum. (52) 
 
But in what follows, it becomes clear that this supposed guarantee is actually dependent 
on the emergence of many courageous defenders of the Republic to act after Cicero’s 
fashion.  His claim is qualified by several important conditions: such misfortunes as he 
endured will never occur again if the consuls who acted against him “receive their due” 
(si erit is id quod debetur persolutum, 52); and never again, “as he hopes” (ut spero), will 
an imperator stationed at the gates of the city, i.e. Caesar, have any reason to allow his 
frightening presence to be used as a false threat (52).  The conditional and uncertain 
nature of these hopes indicates that they depend on the audience’s willingness to act to 
bring about their fulfillment.  Implicit, then, in Cicero’s assurances about civic glory is 
the need for statesmen to act decisively against the enemies of the Republic in order to 
ensure that they end up receiving this glory and not suffering the shame of exile upon 
their defeat.  Cicero in effect calls for resistance to these various political actors hostile to 
his person and to the interests of the Republic, most obviously to Clodius (quisquam 
improbus, 52)—but also to Caesar, inviting young Romans to profit from the recent 
upsurge in public support for the Republic by joining in the fight to remove Clodius and 
Caesar from power.  Ensuring that Caesar should never again be at the gates of Rome 
with an army would require, at the very least, that his proconsular command in Gaul be 
terminated or at least not renewed.  Ingeniously, the fact that Cicero continues the 
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charade of placing all blame on Clodius allows him plausible deniability with Caesar and 
the general public as far as any claims of hostility.   
In a similar way, Cicero argues in the excursus that the recent public shows of 
honor in his favor among the people prove that those politicians who style themselves 
populares are in fact not popular with the Roman people, and demonstrate that the path to 
glory with one’s contemporaries lies in Cicero’s vision of serving the interests of the 
optimates, defined here as loyal citizens of all ranks.  At an earlier point in the history of 
the Republic, Cicero says, one had reason to be afraid for oneself when following the 
republican via and its methods (sed tamen haec via ac ratio rei publicae capessendae 
olim erat magis pertimescenda, 103).  For example, at the time of the Gracchi, the 
interests of the people and those of the Republic were at odds (103).  But in fact at the 
present moment the people are not interested in revolution and “delight in their own 
tranquility, the status of all the best men, and the glory of the whole Republic” (et otio 
suo et dignitate optumi cuiusque et universae rei publicae gloria delectatur, 104).  Their 
support for the Republic is manifest, he claims, in their recent public support for Cicero 
in the assemblies, and at theatrical performances and public games (106-27).  All these 
arguments imply that Clodius actually lacked a popular mandate to exile Cicero in the 
first place, consistent with Cicero’s earlier claims about Clodius’s violent coercion of 
assemblies to impose his own dominatio on the state.  Republican statesman therefore can 
rely on the support of the people in the contemporary climate, with exile being a most 
unlikely possibility.  Such assurances are meant to motivate the young to join the 
republican cause against Caesar and Clodius in view of the cheerful prospect of the glory 
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they may gain for their service.  These lessons also suggest a traditional and important 
role for the people as a whole, whose own manner of political participation consists in 
various forms of consent, formal and informal, to the policies of republican statesmen.  
 But Cicero also relies on a series of arguments guaranteeing glory with one’s 
contemporaries based on the lessons of historical experience, attempting to supply the 
defect of his evidently shaky assurances that such an experience of exile as his own will 
likely not be repeated in the future.  Towards the end of the excursus, Cicero argues that 
in the past, even when republican statesman did get exiled, with only one exception, they 
were gloriously restored within their lifetime:  
And lest anyone should fear to embrace this way of life on account of my 
misfortune or anyone else’s, consider that there is only one person in this state, as 
far as I can recall, at least… who most unfairly died [while still in exile]… As for 
everyone else, after they had been driven out by sudden violence or the 
tempestuous populace, they were nevertheless rehabilitated and recalled by the 
people themselves; or they lived out their lives entirely uninjured and free from 
harassment.  (Sest. 140) 
 
Ac ne quis ex nostro aut aliquorum praeterea casu hanc vitae viam pertimescat, 
unus in hac civitate, quem quidem ego possum dicere… indignissime concidit…  
Ceteri vero aut repentina vi perculsi ac tempestate populari per populum tamen 
ipsum recreati sunt atque revocati aut omnino invulnerati inviolatique vixerunt. 
 
It is perhaps telling that he offers no specific examples of these ceteri.  In an attempt to 
strengthen these rather weak grounds for republican statesmanship, he approaches the 
question from the negative point of view: 
By contrast, almost all of those who disregarded the will of the senate, the 
authority of good men, and the traditions of our ancestors, and sought to curry 
favor with the ignorant and excitable mob, paid the penalty to the Republic by 




At vero ii, qui senatus consilium, qui auctoritatem bonorum, qui instituta maiorum 
neglexerunt et imperitae aut concitatae multitudini iucundi esse voluerunt, omnes 
fere rei publicae poenas aut praesenti morte aut turpi exsilio dependerunt.  
 
This statement implicitly recalls such examples as that of the Gracchi, reminding the 
audience that even in the case of unpopularity with a populace inclined to support 
revolutionaries, such unpopularity can be quelled by violently ridding oneself of the 
senate’s enemies among the people’s leaders.  Also implicit in this particular history 
lesson is an intimidating warning to the improbi, an exhortation to the young to be ready 
to use violence against the likes of Clodius and his henchmen, and an attempt to deter the 
ambitious from following Clodius’s popularis path in favor of the principled republican 
via to glory.107 
Cicero, however, implicitly acknowledges the failure of these arguments to 
account for the (supposedly) exceptional cases when a republican statesman is deprived 
of all glory with his contemporaries.  Consequently, he makes another kind of argument 
that guarantees glory with posterity.  His arguments regarding posthumous glory rely on 
historical exempla.  The first concerns the one exception Cicero can think of to the 
general rule of being honored by one’s contemporaries, Lucius Opimius: 
There is only one person in this state, as far as I can recall, at least… who most 
unfairly died [while still in exile]: Lucius Opimius, a man who was outstanding in 
his service to the Republic, whose monument in the Forum is extremely crowded 
with people, and his remote tomb on the shore of Dyrrhachium has been 
abandoned.  (Sest. 140) 
 
                                                          
107 Pace Lacey 1962: 70, who argues that Cicero is not addressing the possibility that 
someone in his audience may wish to follow in the footsteps of Clodius.  Cicero also 
seems to condone here in advance Milo’s putting an end to Clodius. 
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unus in hac civitate, quem quidem ego possum dicere, praeclare vir de re publica 
meritus, L. Opimius, indignissume concidit; cuius monumentum celeberrumum in 
foro, sepulcrum desertissumum in litore Dyrrachino relictum est. 
 
For the first time, Cicero acknowledges that there has been a statesman who championed 
the republican principle of the senate’s primacy108 and was exiled and never recalled, as 
the comment about his tomb at Dyrrhachium shows.  But he mitigates the potentially 
deterrent force of this example by implying that Opimius has not lost out on honor in the 
long term, since his “monument,” a reference to either the Temple of Concord or its 
adjoining Basilica Opimia, is still crowded with people.109  Of course, the fact that many 
people visit this Temple or its basilica on a daily basis does not necessarily arise from 
their intention to honor Opimius, since the same might be said of any public place to 
which people habitually repair.  Cicero also attempts to mitigate the misfortune by 
claiming that Opimius was not exiled due to “hatred on account of the destruction of 
Gaius Gracchus” (invidia propter interitum C. Gracchi), since on that matter he was 
“freed from danger by the Roman people itself” (ipse populus Romanus periculo 
liberavit), but rather due to “a certain other storm, an unjust verdict” (alia quaedam… 
iniqui iudici procella, 140), a reference to his condemnation in 110 BCE “among other 
senatorial leaders... by the Quaestio Mamilia for compromising the interests of Rome by 
                                                          
108 Opimius as consul in 121 B.C., supported by the senatus consultum ultimum, had put 
C. Gracchus to death (see Kaster 2006: 382). 
109 Gardner (1958: 228 n. b) thinks that Cicero has in mind the Basilica Opimia, built in 
121 “to commemorate the restoration of senatorial authority.”  However, it is just as 
likely that Cicero gestured towards the Temple of Concord (my thanks to Ann Vasaly for 
this suggestion), which Opimius also built on the same occasion (see Kaster 2006: 382), 
especially since this was the site of the senate’s meeting on 5 Dec. 63 when Cicero was 
authorized to proceed against Catiline on the basis of the senatus consultum ultimum. 
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intrigues with Jugurtha.”110  In his attempt to claim that Opimius’s exile ultimately had 
nothing to do with his politics, Cicero conveniently ignores that Opimius’s enemies were 
surely looking for an opportunity to get their revenge, whatever the legal pretext, and 
finally found it some eleven years after his consulship.  Nevertheless, Cicero has turned 
the objection on its head, as his argument is intended to show that not even Opimius was 
exiled for his defense of the Republic.  Therefore, according to the argument, Opimius’s 
death in exile is not germane to the issue at hand. 
Cicero also adduces the cases of various foreign statesmen who, in spite of their 
exile and loss of reputation at the time, nevertheless acquired a glorious reputation in the 
estimation of future generations.  First he recalls certain Athenian statesmen who were 
expelled from the community for “defending the state against the rashness of the people” 
(qui rem publicam contra populi temeritatem defenderent), mentioning the cases of 
Themistocles, Miltiades, and Aristides (141).   
Since they served their cities, they now have so much glory, not only in Greece 
but also among us and in other lands, that no one can even name their oppressors.  
Indeed, everyone considers the disaster those statesmen met with to be greater 
than the tyranny of the others.  (Sest. 142).   
 
quia bene sunt de suis civitatibus meriti, tanta hodie gloria sunt non in Graecia 
solum sed etiam apud nos atque in ceteris terris, ut eos a quibus illi oppressi sint 
nemo nominet, horum calamitatem dominationi illorum omnes anteponant. 
 
An unrevoked exile may ultimately prove a cause for glory, as Cicero insists that 
posterity, and in many different countries at that, respects and remembers by name those 
                                                          
110 Gardner 1958: 229 n. c. 
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Athenian statesmen who were wronged for doing the right thing.111  Cicero also mentions 
the example of Rome’s arch-enemy, Hannibal, as an exile driven from Carthage by his 
fellow citizens (sui cives) but nevertheless “celebrated and remembered in our literature” 
(litteris nostris et memoria… celebratum, 142).  That Cicero recalls exempla of foreign 
provenance before his Roman audience suggests the possibility of gaining world-wide 
fame in the long term, beyond the confines of the Republic itself.112 
Cicero also makes an argument regarding glory from posterity without calling 
direct attention to it as such by praising various maiores for their courageous public 
service.  The chief target of this appeal is the non-participating boni, of whose slowness 
to act on account of fear he has just complained (100).  Great men of the past, in contrast 
to such men, “endure everything for the sake of the Republic” (omnia rei publicae causa 
perferunt), such as Scaurus, who resisted the seditious Gaius Gracchus, and Metellus, 
who as censor placed a ban on the tribune Saturninus, a political participant according to 
the popularis method (in populari ratione) (101).  Cicero holds out lasting glory with 
posterity as a reward for imitating their example: 
Imitate these examples, by the immortal gods, you who seek status, praise, and 
glory!  These examples are glorious, they are divine, they are immortal, they 
obtain the fame of celebrity, are committed to the monuments of history, and are 
passed down to posterity.  (Sest. 102) 
 
Haec imitamini, per deos inmortalis, qui dignitatem, qui laudem, qui gloriam 
quaeritis! haec ampla sunt, haec divina, haec immortalia; haec fama celebrantur, 
monumentis annalium mandantur, posteritati propagantur. 
                                                          
111 Incidentally, in a different rhetorical context, the letter to Lucceius (Fam. 5.12), 
Cicero’s Themistocles serves as an example of an exile who was recalled, and is thereby 
assimilated to Cicero’s own political fortunes. 
112 Cf. Arch. 23, where Cicero speaks of the power of literature written in Greek, in 
particular, to spread one’s fame throughout the whole world. 
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In addition to its strong appeal to the passions through the oath (per deos inmortalis) and 
rhetorical ornamentation, especially anaphora (qui/haec), this exhortation insinuates the 
godlike status (per deos inmortalis… haec divina, haec immortalia) that these republican 
statesmen have attained in the minds of future generations.  In the conclusio of the 
excursus, Cicero develops this notion of lasting glory through divinization:  
Therefore, let us imitate men like our own Brutus, Camillus, Ahala, Decius, 
Curius, Fabricius, Maximus, Scipio, Lentulus, Aemilius, and countless others who 
have made this Republic strong—whom I, at least, place in the numerous 
company of the immortal gods.  (Sest. 143) 
 
Quare imitemur nostros Brutos, Camillos, Ahalas, Decios, Curios, Fabricios, 
Maximos, Scipiones, Lentulos, Aemilios, innumerabiles alios, qui hanc rem 
publicam stabiliverunt; quos equidem in deorum immortalium coetu ac numero 
repono. 
 
Once again, there is an appeal to the godlike men of the past, although this time Cicero 
argues more directly, and on his own authority (equidem), that they ought to be enrolled 
among the gods.113 
Cicero will soon indicate the philosophic and moral grounds for this view, but 
before he does so, he continues the conclusio by summarizing his arguments for political 
engagement.  First, he recalls the basic nature of republican political engagement, the end 
of which is to serve the interests of good men, through compliance with the leadership of 
the senate: “let us love our fatherland, let us obey the senate, let us take thought for the 
interests of good men” (amemus patriam, pareamus senatui, consulamus bonis, 143).  
Secondly, he recalls the chief motives he has set forth for such engagement, namely 
                                                          




seeking glory from one’s fellow-citizens and from posterity—though placing his 
emphasis on the latter: 
Let us disregard what we may gain for the present; let us be in the service of glory 
that comes from posterity; let us consider what is right to be the best; let us hope 
for what we want, but be ready to bear whatever comes.  (Sest. 143) 
 
praesentis fructus neglegamus, posteritatis gloriae serviamus, id esse optumum 
putemus quod erit rectissimum, speremus quae volumus, sed quod acciderit 
feramus. 
 
This exhortation attempts a careful negotiation between acknowledging the legitimacy of 
the desire for immediate gratification in terms of present glory with a recommendation to 
adopt the long view.  At the same time, by including the less self-interested and more 
noble motive of doing the right thing for its own sake, he gradually moves the audience 
away from reliance on earthly, temporal motives for engagement towards the truly divine 
and everlasting with which he will now conclude.  
 Accordingly, the final lines of this exhortation implicitly present the entirely new 
motive of the immortal soul’s conscious enjoyment of eternal glory, the ultimate appeal 
to the deferral of immediate gratification in favor of long-term self-interest.   
Finally, let us reflect that the body of brave men and of great persons is mortal, 
but the motions of the soul and the glory of virtue are everlasting, and if we see 
that this opinion has been made sacred through what happened to that most 
venerable man, Hercules, of whom it is said that, once his body had been burned, 
his life and virtue were taken up into immortality, then we should be no less 
inclined to consider that those men who have by their counsels and toils 
strengthened or defended or preserved this great Republic have obtained immortal 
glory.  (Sest. 143)  
 
Cogitemus denique corpus virorum fortium magnorumque hominum esse mortale, 
animi vero motus et virtutis gloriam sempiternam, neque, hanc opinionem si in 
illo sanctissimo Hercule consecratam videmus, cuius corpore ambusto vitam eius 
et virtutem immortalitas excepisse dicatur, minus existemus eos, qui hanc tantam 
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rem publicam suis consiliis aut laboribus aut auxerint aut defenderint aut 
servarint, esse immortalem gloriam consecutos. 
 
Cicero crafts his final argument for political engagement by forging a connection 
between two things he says are everlasting: the movements of the soul and the glory of 
virtue.  The first notion implicitly but unmistakably recalls the classic proof of the soul’s 
immortality from self-motion given by Socrates in Plato’s Phaedrus (246c5-246a2).114  
Together with this doctrine of the soul, the second half of the equation, virtue understood 
as courageous acts of service to the state, gives rise to the notion of eternal glory in re 
and not just in the opinion of human beings or Roman citizens.  That this is the sense of 
the passage becomes clear by comparison with the Dream of Scipio in book 6 of De Re 
Publica, where Cicero presents the same basic idea of the immortal soul’s reward for 
virtuous public service.  In a famous passage, Scipio Africanus informs his grandson 
Scipio Aemilianus that “for all those who have preserved, aided, or strengthened the 
fatherland, there is without doubt a specific place in the heavens where the blessed enjoy 
an eternal age (ubi beati aevo sempiterno fruantur)” (Rep. 6.17).  It is noteworthy that 
Africanus’s words qui patriam conservaverint adiuverint auxerint closely resemble 
Cicero’s words at Pro Sestio 143, qui hanc tantam rem publicam... auxerint aut 
defenderint aut servarint.115  In the Somnium, Cicero has nearly transposed the verbs 
from Pro Sestio in reverse order.  Furthermore, Africanus reveals that the eternal reward 
he makes known is ontologically possible due to the duality between body and soul, the 
                                                          
114 Cicero translates this proof at length at Rep. 6.27-28 and Tusc. 1.53-55. 
115 Coleman 1964: 3-4 notes another possible connection on the level of language, tying 
the phrase in Rep. to a different passage in Sest.: hi semper habiti sunt optimatium 
principes auctores et conservatores civitatis (138). 
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one being mortal and the other immortal,116 echoing the same concept as Cicero 
announced in his own voice in Pro Sestio when referring to the contrast between 
Hercules’s body consumed on the pyre and his soul, taken up to heaven.117  Therefore 
while Cicero has retained in this last argument the basic understanding of virtue as 
republican political engagement held throughout the speech, he has moved on from the 
various incitements to virtue previously held out during the excursus, namely the ideal of 
gaining glory from one’s contemporaries and so-called “immortal glory” in the eyes of 
posterity.  To sum up the Platonism implicit in this final appeal: Cicero transcends his 
previous rhetorical appeals from the realm of becoming, where false opinions about glory 
abound, by making an argument based on being, where the truth about glory is 
revealed.118 
                                                          
116 Referring to those who served the state on earth who have since arrived in the heavens 
to enjoy their eternal beatitude, Africanus says: “Having been loosed from their bodies 
(corpore laxati) they dwell in the place you see. . . Consider that it’s not you who are 
mortal, but this body; for you are not what that measly appearance (forma ista) declares 
you to be, but rather your own mind— that’s what each man is (mens cuiusque is est 
quisque)” (Rep. 6.20; 6.30). 
117 Cicero also makes reference to the apotheosis of Hercules in De Re Publica, no less 
than in Pro Sestio.  Augustine (Civ. Dei, 22.4.1-9) testifies to a passage in which Laelius 
apparently spoke of the same dualism, referring to the cases of Hercules and Romulus in 
particular (Rep. 3.32). 
118 Since the immortal glory of which Cicero speaks in the final exhortation is of an 
entirely different order, it seems to me that the most recent commentator on the speech, 
Kaster, is mistaken in affirming that this immortal glory was “promised by the 
contractualist premises of Roman Republicanism, implicit since the speech’s first 
paragraph... and repeated at key points in the interval” (ad. loc.).  Pace Kaster, when 
Cicero refers to “the brevity of life and the eternity of glory (cursum gloriae 
sempiternum)” in Sest. 47, the vagueness of that eternal glory is made more definite by 
the ensuing discussion in that context of the two possibilities of what happens after death, 
and shows that Cicero looks ahead to the same concept of eternal enjoyment of glory by 
the conscious soul as he describes in Sest. 143, not the idea of being rewarded for one’s 
political service with the “immortal” glory of memorialization (see Gildenhard 2011: 383 
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Indeed, this final argument for political engagement in Pro Sestio hearkens back 
to the suggestion about life after death that he made in passing earlier in the speech, 
where he expressly posed this issue as a philosophic question: 
Did I not know that while the course of life is short, that of glory is everlasting? 
… Did I not know that there was a controversy among the most wise of men, 
some of whom said that the souls of men and their consciousness are snuffed out 
at death, while others said that especially the minds of wise and manly men have 
consciousness and life—and that the first option, to lack consciousness, was 
nothing to be avoided, while the other, being in a state of better consciousness, 
was even to be positively desired?  (Sest. 47) 
 
nesciebam vitae brevem esse cursum, gloriae sempiternum? …nesciebam inter 
sapientissimos homines hanc contentionem fuisse, ut alii dicerent animos 
hominum sensus que morte restingui, alii autem tum maxime mentes sapientium 
ac fortium virorum, cum ex corpore excessissent, sentire ac vigere?  quorum 
alterum fugiendum non esse, carere sensu, alterum etiam optandum, meliore esse 
sensu. 
 
What Cicero raises as a question here—the notion that the souls of men (mentes 
hominum) are by nature immortal, and that the souls especially of heroes (fortium 
virorum) may attain a better state of existence after death—is endorsed without 
qualification in the final exhortation, though in the latter passage the philosophical 
portion of the argument on which immortality is based (animi vero motus... sempiternam) 
fades somewhat into the background in that grand period’s final accent on immortal glory 
(immortalem gloriam).  While the previous discussion vaguely suggests entering into a 
state of conscious existence that is in some way “better” (47), the final exhortation fills 
out this picture with the rhetorically appealing assurance that the attainment of this state 
consists in the possession of glory. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
for a similar view).  Note also the repetition of language from Sest. 47 that occurs only in 
Sest. 143:  virtutis gloriam sempiternam, a phrase coupled with animi... motus. 
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It is unlikely that most listeners or readers would notice the philosophic and, in 
particular, Platonic turn of this passage.  As Gildenhard 2011: 381 has shown, Cicero 
subtly extends the notion of immortal glory to take in an actual eternal, conscious state, 
even as this meaning is somewhat obscured by its placement in the context of the 
traditional Roman conception of honoring the memory of great men of the past.  The bold 
philosophic vision implied in this magnificent period is further obscured by the 
prominence of Hercules, a figure the audience would naturally associate with myth and 
cult, not philosophy.  Hercules’s apotheosis when viewed from a religious perspective 
would serve as a spur to political action in order to gain what would seem to be the 
pinnacle of glory before posterity, being viewed and worshipped as a god.  Hercules, 
moreover, is an ideal exemplum for encouraging the audience to political labors on behalf 
of others.  Just a few sections prior, Cicero had said that the principes or leaders of the 
Republic “carry on their backs the great duty of upholding the Republic” (suis cervicibus 
tanta munia atque rem publicam sustinent, 138).  The audience would naturally form the 
comparison between Hercules’s labors, including the slaying of terrible monsters to make 
the world safe for civilization, and Cicero’s vision of republican statesmanship as a 
heroic battle to preserve the Republic against the unremitting attacks of its enemies, the 
improbi (cf. 99).  In this regard it is fitting to recall Cicero’s designation of one such 
enemy, Clodius, as “a hideous and wild beast” (taetra immanisque belva, 16).  
Accordingly, Cicero’s argument that Hercules is rightly thought (opinionem) to have 
attained divine status as a reward for his courageous services to mankind would appear to 
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most of the audience as a mythical exemplum illustrating from another perspective the 
possibility of obtaining “immortal glory” with posterity. 
And yet to the more philosophically attuned listener or reader, surely a minority 
of the audience in the case of this forensic speech, Cicero’s metaphysical doctrine is 
unmistakable.  It is the soul’s nature as something with motion that will go on forever 
that provides the metaphysical foundation for believing that an apotheosis such as that of 
Hercules can actually happen.  Such “immortal glory of virtue” would be something 
belonging to the immortal soul itself by right, and consequently enjoyed by it 
independently of the subjective opinion of human beings who may or may not recognize 
such a person for the god that he is, or rather has become, after death.  This kind of glory 
belongs to an entirely different species from the human glory given by posterity to the 
“divine and immortal” Roman statesmen mentioned earlier (101).119  This immortal glory 
of the virtuous soul, by contrast, as it does not depend on the recognition or opinion of 
human beings,120 is consequently the most reliable form of glory, and constitutes the 
ultimate and truest motive for republican political engagement.  This argument 
constitutes the ideal appeal to the philosophic portion of his Roman audience, since it 
brilliantly transforms the traditional Roman cultural aspiration to immortal glory, giving 
philosophic grounding to a conception of glory that cannot fade with time. 
                                                          
119 cf. Cole 2013: 82 also notes the conventional conception of immortality in these 
earlier sections and observes the novel development of ideas in Sest. 143 (cf. 83-85). 
120 Pace Cole 2013: 84: “His choice of language here is also calculated to legitimize the 
public’s role in apportioning divinity (opinio).”  Cicero says existimemus (143), to be 
sure, and exalts the opinio that affirms Hercules’s divine status, and yet the heart of his 
novel approach is precisely the philosophic basis he gives for such mythical and religious 
traditions by affirming the immortality of the soul and the rewards of virtue (animi... 
motus virtutisque gloriam sempiternam, 143). 
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Generic restraints, however, prevent Cicero from developing these ideas too 
openly.  The speech’s primary emphasis on motives more congenial to traditional Roman 
culture represents a rhetorical concession on Cicero’s part to the character of his 
audience—there will be few philosophers among them.  But even for these few he lays a 
special bait, enticing them to public service on the basis of a metaphysical doctrine about 
the soul which also implies the existence of justice, vindicated in an ultimately just 
universe.  Gildenhard, by contrast, would limit the import of this Platonic passage to its 
function as an argument for Cicero’s own future immortality (2011: 380-82).  Doubtless 
he is correct that Cicero meant his audience to understand that he, as one of those “who 
had preserved this great Republic” (qui hanc tantam rem publicam… servarint, 143), 
could rightly lay claim to the award of apotheosis suggested here.  But limiting the 
passage’s persuasive purpose to the promotion of personal gloria not only restricts the 
universality implicit in this as in any philosophic claim but also assumes that to the 
degree Cicero was engaging in self-promotion, this was for him an end in itself, missing 
his intention to fashion others in his own self image as a means to motivate action in 
defense of the republican political ideals he cherished. 
5. Conclusion 
 Cicero’s speech Pro Sestio evinces a thematic concern with promoting 
statesmanship on behalf of his political vision of republican government, while at the 
same time providing a powerful defense of Sestius as man and as political actor.  Cicero 
has structured his argument by announcing his main theme with an initial complaint 
about the lack of good statesmen and the unjust prosperity of the wicked, setting himself 
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the task of both explaining proper political conduct and motivating his audience to 
choose it over the politics of his enemies, despite the disparity of outcome.  The 
principles and policies of good and bad statesmen are then illustrated with the contrasting 
example of himself and his allies, especially Sestius, versus that of his enemies.  With the 
excursus, Cicero’s exposition of good statesmanship takes on a more theoretical form in 
comparison with the more concrete procedure he employs up to that point.  The excursus 
also contains a more extended attempt to provide motives for republican engagement, as 
Cicero strengthens his previous assurances about the reliability of the statesman’s 
recompense of contemporary glory with lessons from Roman history and the recent past; 
he also adds the “insurance” argument of posthumous glory.  These arguments culminate 
in a grand finale that adds the motive of high-minded moral behavior for its own sake 
and, more subtly, suggests the conscious enjoyment in eternity of the ultimate elite status 
attainable for the soul of the magnanimous statesman. 
Cicero is particularly concerned in the excursus to leave no one unsatisfied, 
countering potential objections at every turn and providing multiple arguments for 
multiple audiences.  His emphasis on the reward of glory before one’s fellow citizens 
seeks to move those whom he envisions as the majority in the audience, who will be 
unwilling to act unless immediate success is all but assured, while his admission that 
glory may come only with future generations provides an answer to the objections of 
those who fail to be convinced by the first glory argument.  But for the smallest 
component of his audience, the philosophic-minded who are able to transcend the “cave” 
of their own time and place with its Roman valorization of civic glory, Cicero suggests 
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the inherent value to the soul of right action and the soul’s potential gain in eternity, the 
latter enticement being based on the possibility that the soul’s nature is immortal—
though for the philosophers, this claim surely remains a question, not a certainty, and 
therefore retains its character as a primarily rhetorical appeal to action, albeit a 




















Chapter 2: Advocating Philosophically Grounded Engagement in the De Re Publica 
“That man of outstanding intelligence and erudition, Plato, thought that states would at 
long last be happy only at such time as either learned and wise men began to rule them or 
if those who ruled were to concentrate all their efforts on learning and wisdom.”121  
(Cicero, Q. fr. 1.29) 
 
In De Re Publica, Cicero continues to make the case for political engagement that 
was so prominent in the speech Pro Sestio, but in altered political, generic, and hence 
rhetorical conditions.  The choice to write in the philosophic genre at this particular 
moment in his life seems to have been dictated by political conditions, but once chosen, 
the genre itself influences the sort of arguments for political engagement that Cicero 
makes.  First, the philosophic context enables Cicero to make the case for the philosophic 
life in conjunction with the case for politics, or rather, for political activity that is 
informed and morally elevated by philosophic principles and by the pursuit of the 
philosophic life itself.  Secondly, as part of this argument for a philosophically informed 
politics, the genre occasions a redefinition of political engagement, which is expanded to 
take in precisely such politically-oriented philosophic activity as is represented both by 
and in the text: Cicero’s act of writing and the activity in which the interlocutors are 
depicted.  Though the concept of political engagement is expanded, the ideal form of 
political engagement is still seen as engagement “properly speaking,” that is, involvement 
in public life, for which political engagement in the expanded sense serves as a 
preparation.   
                                                          
121 Atque ille quidem princeps ingeni et doctrinae Plato tum denique fore beatas res 
publicas putavit si aut docti ac sapientes homines eas regere coepissent aut ii qui 
regerent omne suum studium in doctrina et sapientia collocarent.  Translations are my 
own, except where otherwise noted.  Cicero has nearly translated Plato Letter 7.326b 
verbatim; cf. Plato Republic 5.473d. 
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I.  Approaching De Re Publica 
 With the renewal of the triumvirate at Luca in April 56, just weeks after Cicero’s 
urgent call to action issued in Pro Sestio and his subsequent scheduling of a senatorial 
debate on Caesar’s Campanian land law for May 5, the consular saw his hopes of 
overcoming the dynasts’ stranglehold on the state dashed for the time being.122  Pompey 
extracted a promise from Quintus Cicero that Marcus would cease making trouble for the 
triumvirs politically, and the latter showed his compliance at once by foregoing the 
meeting of the Senate at which Caesar’s Campanian land law was to be called into 
question.  Cicero even actively defended before the senate the renewal of Caesar’s 
appointment in Gaul in De Provinciis Consularibus, outraging the conservative senatorial 
elites to whom he had recently issued an impassioned call to resistance.123 
 Cicero’s public apologia for his accommodation of the triumvirs can be read in 
his open letter to Lentulus (Fam. 1.9).  Two points especially stand out: first, Cicero 
claims that he has not abandoned his principles but is merely adapting to circumstances 
for the good of the Republic, since direct resistance to the triumvirs would produce more 
harm than good.  Secondly, the moment to make inroads against the triumvirate has 
passed, as the senatorial elite failed to act energetically and take advantage of the brief 
window of opportunity offered by Pompey’s thaw with Caesar and simultaneous 
maneuver towards Cicero and the senate.  But beyond anything Cicero says in this letter, 
we also have as evidence for his claim not to have abandoned his principles the continued 
                                                          
122 For the most recent account of events that immediately followed the delivery of Pro 
Sestio, including the renewal of the triumvirate, see Grillo 2015: 9-10; cf. xiv.-xv for a 
general timeline of the year 56 BCE. 
123 For this speech, see Grillo 2015.  
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promotion of his republican ideals in the philosophical writings he published during this 
period of political subordination: De Oratore in 55 and De Re Publica in 51.  Given the 
change in political circumstances, Cicero altered his strategy of resistance to the enemies 
of senatorial government accordingly.  Since Quintus had given surety for his brother’s 
good conduct and since Cicero was eager to maintain good relations with the triumvirs in 
order to avoid exposing himself to the continued hostility of Clodius, he bowed to 
pressure to defend their allies in a variety of speeches which are for the most part 
unmemorable and among Cicero’s least read works.124  But while the speeches of this 
period exhibit little in the way of promoting his republican ideals, Cicero’s philosophic 
dialogues are another matter.  Indeed, Cicero found in the Platonic dialogue in particular, 
with its conventions of employing multiple speakers and retrogression into the past via 
historical setting, a suitable generic means for continuing to encourage his fellow elite 
countrymen to fight for the republic while being able to claim superficially that he was 
doing nothing more than recording a conversation from the past.125 
                                                          
124 Several private letters from this period (see esp. Q. fr. 3.4 and 3.5) reveal the great 
shame Cicero felt at his accommodations to the triumvirate and experienced great 
frustration in being required to defend his former enemies in court.  His philosophic 
writings from this period seem to have been at least partly inspired by the desire to 
assuage his own feelings of guilt by finding a way to express republican ideals in a 
different forum. 
125 See Cic. Q. fr. 3.5.2 on his desire to “not to offend anyone by touching upon our own 
times” (ne in nostra tempora incurrens offenderem quempiam).  Plato was the chief 
inspiration and model for Cicero’s use of the dialogue form, but he also followed 
Aristotle by supplying prefaces in his own voice (Zetzel 1995: 5 and Schofield 2008: 75-
76) and by generally preferring continuous speeches on the part of his characters to rapid-
fire Socratic exchange (Schofield 2008: 69).  On Ciceronian dialogue in general, see 
Hirzel 1895: 433-93, Zoll 1962: 25-72, Powell 1995, Powell 2005: 230-34, Schofield 
2008, Schofield 2013. 
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 But why write in a philosophic genre if one’s only purpose is to promote political 
ideas?  Indeed, some scholars have suggested that Cicero’s choice of the philosophic 
genre is totally irrelevant to his real aims, which are to be seen as purely political.126  
From this point of view, would Menippean satire, such as written by Varro, or some other 
literary form have served Cicero’s purposes just as well?  I hope to show in what follows 
that Cicero chose the philosophic genre because he had philosophic aims and ambitions 
in addition to the practical political dimension of these texts.   
 The majority of scholars have long recognized De Re Publica as a genuine 
specimen of political philosophy.  In addition to his use of the dialogue form, Cicero 
investigates standard questions in political philosophy such as the best regime, the nature 
of justice, and the education of citizens.127  Besides these substantive philosophic aims, 
Cicero’s evident attempt to write a dialogue on the state in the tradition of Plato has been 
seen as part of a larger philosophic project aimed at creating a name for himself with 
posterity as “the Roman Plato.”128  On the other hand, there is a scholarly tradition that 
argues that the text has immediate political purposes.  Those who defend a political 
reading of the text rightly contend that Cicero works rhetorically on the reader in order to 
achieve practical political aims, and that the dialogue is not written in a dispassionate or 
merely investigative spirit.129   For example, scholars have argued that one of Cicero’s 
                                                          
126 This is the main thesis of Blössner 2001. 
127 For extensive bibliography, see Zetzel 1995 and Zetzel 2013. 
128 See Bishop 2015 and Bishop’s forthcoming monograph. 
129 This recent trend in German classical scholarship, generally ignored in the 
Anglophone sphere (but see Steel 2013), was initiated by Leonhardt 1999.  See esp. 
Blössner 2001—whose interpretation, however, is extreme (see discussion below)—
Stevenson 2005, and Sauer 2013. 
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aims was the revival of middle-Republican institutions by having Scipio and the 
interlocutors endorse the mixed constitution of the middle Republic as the best regime.130  
Others have seen the work as having immediate pragmatic intentions, whether as a call 
for investiture of an individual with extraordinary powers131 or an attempt on Cicero’s 
part to shore up his social status in the midst of an embarrassing period of public 
subordination to the triumvirs.132 
In recent years it has become fashionable to view Cicero the philosophic writer as 
carefully and consistently avoiding anything that would prejudice the reader of his 
dialogues in favor of a particular viewpoint.  This argument is based on the premise that 
Cicero consistently adhered to the New Academy throughout his life and was therefore 
consistently skeptical in both philosophic beliefs and methods.133  Granted that Cicero 
                                                          
130 See Schmidt 1973, Girardet 1983, and Perelli 1990.  Their readings, however, go too 
far in reducing the work’s purposes to these practical political dimensions (cf. Zetzel 
1995: 27 n.58 on Schmidt and Girardet). 
131 Meyer 1918 and Pöschl 1936 suggest that Cicero’s concept of the rector rei publicae 
has reference to an office to be held by a monarchical figure and probably refers to 
Pompey (cf. Reitzenstein 1924 for a similar view); Achard 1990 interpreted Cicero’s 
reference in the Dream to a possible dictatorship for Scipio as a subtle offer of his own 
services as dictator.  For the usual view of the rector as an ideal statesman whose 
political activity takes place within the republican constitutional structure, see Heinze 
1924, How 1930, Lepore 1954, Krarup 1956, Coleman 1964, Powell 1994, and Ferrary 
1995.  For a new interpretation, see Zarecki 2014. 
132 Steel 2005: 70-82 on Rep. and the other two philosophic dialogues of the late 50s. 
133 See Fox 2007: 80-90, Atkins 2013a: 14-26 and 32-42, and Bishop’s forthcoming 
monograph.  Bishop calls attention to the Academic method of argumentum in utramque 
partem in Rep. 3 as proof of Cicero’s skepticism in the work, on which however see my 
comments below; Fox’s approach is the most extreme in this regard.  A corollary of this 
view is the denial that Cicero makes use of Scipio (or anyone else) as an authoritative 
spokesman or alter-ego. 
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was indeed a skeptic in his philosophic views,134 it does not follow that he always 
employed the same method or had the same aims when writing philosophic works, 
including dialogues.  Indeed, scholars have frequently observed a difference in character 
between the dialogues of the 50s BCE and the 40s, one going so far as to characterize 
their relationship as “dogmatic” versus “skeptical.”135  Setting aside for the moment the 
question of Cicero’s personal philosophic views—which should be hard to discern, given 
that Cicero frequently avers in his later philosophic works that he intends to keep these 
views hidden136—there can be no denying that the character and purpose of dialogues 
written in the 50s such as De Re Publica differs significantly from the Academic 
dialogues of the 40s.  As Gildenhard has emphasized, Cicero presents himself in De 
Divinatione (44 BC) as having still been a public man during his first spate of 
philosophic writing,137 while the writings of the 40s are expressly presented as the 
                                                          
134 This is the scholarly communis opinio, first cemented by Görler 1995, who attacked 
the theory advanced by Glucker 1988 and Steinmetz 1989 that Cicero adhered to the 
doctrine of Antiochus during the 50s (cf. Glucker 1992).  For an important and novel 
challenge to this consensus, see Altman 2016, who also rejects the view of 
Glucker/Steinmetz. 
135 Thus Brittain 2012: 82.  See also Zoll 1962: 147-53 (who sees the dialogues of the 50s 
as more didactic); Glucker 1988: 49-50 and esp. 57-58; Powell 1995: 19. 
136 See e.g. Tusc. 5.11: “I have chosen to follow that [philosophic sect] which I think 
agreeable to the practice of Socrates, in trying to conceal my own private opinion. . . (ut 
nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus).  Cf. Nat. Deor. 1.10: “Those however who seek to 
learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of 
curiosity” (Rackham 1933 trans.; qui autem requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, 
curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est).  For a detailed discussion of these two passages in 
context, see Altman 2009: 418-19 and 2016 passim, suggesting that Cicero supplies the 
reader with the clues needed to perceive the proper distinction between the real Cicero 
and “Cicero,” a skeptical authorial persona who serves the real Cicero’s pedagogical 
purposes in the philosophic project of the 40’s BCE. 
137 Div. 2.3: “To this list of works must be added the six volumes which I wrote while 
holding the helm of the state, entitled On the Republic” (Falconer trans.; atque his libris 
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product of someone forced into retirement.138  Since Cicero conveys a persona of a 
politically involved man for the author of De Re Publica, we should not expect that text 
to remain neutral on the question of political engagement in favor of the republican 
regime. 
Indeed, one of Cicero’s most salient persuasive aims in De Re Publica is his 
exhortation to the reader to take part in public life.  This feature of the work is nowhere 
more obvious than in the protreptic to political life in what survives of the prefaces to the 
first and third books.  Scholars have frequently interpreted the argument of these passages 
as an elevation of politics over philosophy, and as a call to the reader to reject the latter 
for the former.139  Furthermore, Cicero is usually thought in such passages to be chiefly 
concerned with condemning Epicureans for their withdrawal from politics.  Likewise, the 
Dream of Scipio that concludes the work is usually read as a condemnation of Epicurean 
                                                                                                                                                                             
adnumerandi sunt sex de re publica, quos tum scripsimus, cum gubernacula rei publicae 
tenebamus). 
138 2007: 51 n.184 (cf. 81 n.261); cf. Schmidt 1978: 119-20 and Baraz 2012: 9-10 on the 
difference in Cicero’s political circumstances between the dialogues of the 50s and the 
genesis of the philosophic project of the 40s.  However, these commentators exaggerate 
the actual differences in Cicero’s circumstances, as the earlier period of the 50s already 
represents a stage of forced retirement for Cicero. 
139 De Saint-Denis 1938, Gigon 1977: 275-315, Büchner 1984: 79-94 and 265-77, 
Blössner 2001, Fox 2007: 105-10, Gastaldi 2014, Schütrumpf 2014.  Grilli 1971, Atkins 
2013a: 27-31, and Zarecki 2014: 31-34 are more balanced, arguing that Cicero seeks to 
unite political and philosophic life and to justify the proper place of each rather than to 
condemn philosophy in the name of politics.  Similarly, Zetzel 1998: 237-44 detects a 
tension within the Book 1 preface between the protreptic to political life and the context 
in which this argument is cast, as part of a philosophic work written by a man evidently 
engaged in philosophic writing rather than public activity. 
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withdrawal and an endorsement of engagement in politics as opposed to philosophic 
pursuits.140 
It is my contention, however, that these interpretations are excessively one-
dimensional, both in terms of Cicero’s persuasive aims and audiences addressed.  Those 
who argue that Cicero’s purpose is to prejudice the reader against philosophy in favor of 
politics overlook the positive arguments advanced in favor of philosophy not only in 
these same prefaces and in the Dream but also in various passages permeating the body 
of the work.  In addition, an exclusive focus on the prefaces gives undue weight to the 
anti-philosophic arguments advanced there by “Cicero”, the persona of the author, while 
it fails to account for the role of the prefaces in the work’s architectonic persuasive 
design, whereby the reader is gently and gradually led to a greater appreciation for 
philosophy.  Furthermore, the traditional scholarly focus on the work’s anti-Epicureanism 
does not sufficiently account for the complexity of Cicero’s envisaged audience, whether 
in the prefaces, the Dream, or the work as a whole.  While some scholars have 
acknowledged that the anti-philosophic remarks of the Book 1 preface do not exclusively 
concern the Epicureans,141 little has been done to elucidate the various audiences to 
which Cicero addresses himself there and elsewhere, whether of philosophers or non-
philosophers. 
                                                          
140 On Cicero’s anti-Epicureanism in the prefaces and the Dream of Scipio, see e.g. 
Fontaine 1966, André 1974, Maslowski 1974: 56-65, Büchner 1984 and Zetzel 1995 
passim, Powell 1990 passim, Zetzel 1998: 237-44, Fox 2007: 105-6, Englert 2014. 
141 The usually assumed broader audience of the passage is philosophers in general.  In 
this sense, the passage is viewed as a vindication of the active life in general vis-à-vis the 
strict pursuit of the contemplative life.  See e.g. Boyancé 1970: 185, Sharples 1986: 32-
33, Zetzel 1995 passim, Zetzel 1998: 237-38, Blössner 2001: 213 and passim. 
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 In this chapter, I will argue that in De Re Publica, Cicero addresses a greater 
variety of readers than has previously been recognized, advancing a corresponding 
variety of motives for republican political engagement.  I will also show how he draws all 
these readers to participate in politics in accordance with the ideal, Platonic in spirit, of 
the politically experienced and philosophically enlightened statesman, the rector rei 
publicae,142 who seeks the preservation of the republican form of government at Rome 
but whose motives for engaging in politics are based on Greek ethical ideas foreign to 
Roman tradition and reinforced by philosophical pursuits.  While the characteristics of 
the rector are familiar, Cicero’s rhetorical strategies for convincing a broad variety of 
readers to become the rector, so to speak, are not.143  Cicero’s rhetorical strategies and 
audiences will be explored in all their complexity.   
Taking up the preface of the first book, I suggest that, given how few politically 
withdrawn men there were in Cicero’s day even among the Epicureans,144 Cicero’s attack 
on Epicureanism creates the impression of an audience not primarily composed of 
Epicurean quietists or philosophers in general, who must have been a very small portion 
of his reading audience, but of a larger group of Roman elites who hold back from 
                                                          
142 For the rector as the Roman republican version of Plato’s philosopher king, see 
Powell 1996 and Stroh 2008: 63. 
143 Krarup 1956: 204-5 argues that the rector is “an idealized version of Cicero himself” 
(Zarecki 2014: 10 n.35), but even if this formulation is true, we should add to it “…which 
has a rhetorically exemplary purpose.”  I do not follow the basic thesis of Zarecki 2014 
that Cicero intended the rector as a model against which to measure himself alone.  
Zarecki is correct that the rector is an ideal that is also meant to be practicable (2014: 11), 
but it is meant to be practicable for others as well. 
144 Cf. Momigliano 1941.  Following Momigliano’s groundbreaking work, recent 
scholarship has demonstrated how common it was for Roman Epicureans to participate in 
public life in the late Republic and beyond: see esp. Castner 1988, Griffin 1989, Sedley 
1989, Griffin 2001, Benferhat 2005, Roskam 2007, Fish 2011. 
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concern for the state out of fear or self-centeredness.  Cicero tactfully confronts this 
group through by criticizing their behavior under the guise of a putative crowd of non-
participating philosophers; he obliquely targets this audience with his typical anti-
Epicurean charges of cowardice, lack of manliness, and self-indulgent pleasure seeking—
a strategy we have already seen him employ against such persons in Pro Sestio.145   
However, the thrust of the most powerful arguments in the dialogue creates an 
impression of a “normative” reader.  The image of this reader takes shape both through 
the content of these arguments and through the distinct dialogical personae who make 
them and to whom they are directed.  This primary audience of the work seems to consist 
of the politically ambitious who are indifferent to or contemptuous of philosophy.  The 
majority of the interlocutors fall in to this category, and they represent members of every 
generation.  Among the older men present is Spurius Mummius; there is the middle-aged 
Laelius, who is, however, more moderate in his stance towards philosophizing, since he 
rejects what we would call the sciences while embracing ethical and political philosophy; 
and among the youth, Laelius’s two sons-in-law, the Scaevolae.  At the opposite extreme 
of anti-philosophical politics lies Tubero, who appears to be more interested in abstruse 
theoretical questions at the expense of politics.  Scipio, meanwhile, occupies the middle 
ground between philosophy and politics. 
The work’s sustained address to the normative reader starts with Cicero’s initial 
assertion of the superiority of politics to philosophy, which has the effect of calming the 
suspicions of such a reader, who may doubt the value of this philosophic work.  In this 
                                                          
145 See esp. Sest. 23 and 138. 
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way, the reader is taken in by the way the author appears to share his anti-philosophic 
prejudices, even as Cicero simultaneously embarks on the project of insinuating 
philosophic motives and ethical norms for engagement.  Starting in the preface and 
continuing throughout the work, Cicero gradually draws this reader towards an ideal of 
philosophic politics.   
His aim in so doing is to elevate the character of elite political activity, and he 
does this in two ways.  First, he encourages the pursuit of the contemplative life itself, 
including such subjects as astronomy and mathematics, the pleasure of which ought to be 
valued over bodily pleasures, and which also offer moral lessons that can bring about a 
change in attitude towards political ambition.  Secondly, Cicero promotes ethical 
doctrines drawn from Greek philosophy, especially the notion that we ought to engage in 
politics virtuously for the sake of possessing virtue itself, thereby offering higher motives 
for political engagement than were traditionally offered by Roman culture.   
Finally, while promoting contemplative pursuits to the typical elite Roman 
politician, Cicero also addresses another group, imaged by Tubero, namely Roman 
statesman whose excessive inclination to abstract contemplative pursuits Cicero seeks to 
moderate and to bring into connection with the consideration and practice of politics.  
Among his contemporaries, Cicero may have had in mind star-gazing neo-Pythagoreans 
such as Nigidius Figulus, who is one of Cicero’s speakers in his version of the Timaeus. 
II.  Cicero’s readers: Targets of Cicero’s anti-Epicurean Diatribe in the Preface of Book 1 
A) Epicureans who reject politics and political philosophy 
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 In general, Cicero’s apology for participation in public life in the preface of Book 
1 is directed only on a superficial level at Roman Epicureans who had completely 
withdrawn from politics.  The paucity of this type among Cicero’s contemporaries 
obviates the need for him to dedicate his remarks in the preface, let alone the work as a 
whole, to the primary purpose of persuading the few truly withdrawn Epicureans to 
embrace political life.146  The only people in this category attested by the historical 
record are Cicero’s friend Atticus and his literary contemporary Lucretius; perhaps 
Catullus could be added as an intellectual lacking political ambition (though not 
necessarily an Epicurean).  Doubtless there were others, who have remained in obscurity 
due to their very withdrawal.  In any case, a politically withdrawn mode of life was 
foreign not only to the Roman ethos in general, but also to Roman Epicureanism in the 
late Republic, as we know of a number of elites who identified with Epicureanism, such 
as Piso and Cassius.  Besides, Cicero’s contemptuously dismissive tone and slandering of 
Epicurean doctrine are hardly designed to be persuasive to the mind of an Epicurean 
philosopher thinking through the matter.   
To Epicurean withdrawal, Cicero opposes the example of Cato Maior, who 
“preferred to be tossed about in these tempestuous waves into ripe old age rather than to 
live very pleasantly in that tranquility and leisure” (1.4) so eagerly sought by the 
                                                          
146 For Rep. as an extended response to the philosophical views and way of life advocated 
by Lucretius in DRN, see Andreoni 1979 and references in n. 20 above.  See also 
Blössner 2001: 212, whose suggestion that Cicero viewed non-participating philosophers 
as the greatest threat to the Republic is quite an exaggeration.  Blössner rightly assumes 
that Cicero’s anti-philosophic remarks are not limited to Epicureans, but in my view these 
remarks do not concern other philosophers at all, since we have plenty of examples of 
Stoic and Antiochean sympathizers among the political elite (Cato; Brutus, Varro). 
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Epicureans.  But in framing this contrast as a choice between duty and self-indulgence, 
Cicero provides an extremely ungenerous characterization of the philosophic life of 
Epicureans.  He portrays this life not as dedication to the life of the mind or even the 
pleasures of the mind, but simply as a desire “to live very pleasantly” (iucundissime 
vivere, 1.4) and a surrender to the “enticements of pleasure and leisure” (blandimenta 
voluptatis otiique, 1.1).  By implying that Epicureans are lazy and live only for sensual 
enjoyments, he is hardly engaged in a good-will attempt to understand Epicurean 
philosophic ideals on their own terms (as by contrast he may be seen to do in De Finibus 
1-2) and to show them where they err.  Cicero’s overall attitude towards Epicureans in 
this preface is one of contemptuous dismissal.  As I shall argue at length in the next 
section, Cicero’s general tendency in this preface not to engage with Epicurean ideas 
seriously or even to name them suggests that his attack on voluptas and otium are also 
intended for another, larger group he has in mind for whom sensuality and idleness have 
become chief pursuits instead of dedication to preserving the Republic.147 
However, despite the invective tone that pervades the preface of Book 1 as a 
whole, one passage in particular gives evidence of an attempt to convince Epicureans of 
the folly of their views on rational grounds.  Here Cicero seems especially concerned to 
draw the minority of contemporary Epicureans who are actually abstaining from public 
life to the study of politics, as a first step in the direction of political participation.  Cicero 
                                                          
147 Similarly, Zetzel 1998: 244 argues that “Epicurean attitudes, while useful as a focus of 
attack, were so absurd that their falseness could simply be assumed” (244).  He suggests 
that attacking Epicureanism was a foil providing Cicero with the opportunity to present 
his own political ideals, especially vis-à-vis philosophers in general who believe the 
contemplative life is superior (237-38, 241-44); I detect a different audience behind the 
foil (see section B below). 
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confronts the Epicurean argument that the wise man will only engage in politics when 
compelled (coegerit) by an “emergency”, a concept he clearly indicates by the hendiadys 
necessitas et tempus (1.10).  But is this argument Epicurean?  Some scholars have seen in 
this passage an attack not on Epicurean withdrawal, but on Socrates’s argument in Plato’s 
Republic that the philosopher will only return to the Cave of political life when 
compelled by a necessity (anagke).148  However, it is clear that the notion of engaging 
only in an emergency has an Epicurean rather than Platonic tenor for two reasons.  First, 
Cicero has already linked this notion to the Epicureans using similar language when 
describing how those people (isti) thought Cato the Elder a madman (demens) for 
engaging in politics “although no necessity compelled him” (cum cogeret eum necessitas 
nulla) and he could have enjoyed “a most pleasant life of tranquility and leisure” (in illa 
tranquillitate atque otio iucundissime vivere, 1.1).  Secondly, in Plato’s Republic, the 
possibility is not envisioned that philosophers would be willing to rule in case of an 
emergency.  Philosophers would rule only as the result of some form of compulsion or 
persuasive argument directed at them by the architects of this putative ideal city (7.520-
521a).149 
Cicero responds to the Epicurean argument of “emergency participation only” by 
showing that emergency participation logically requires the prior pursuit of a political 
career, or at least political philosophy.  He argues that an Epicurean who waits for a crisis 
to begin concerning himself with politics will neither be in a position to bring aid to the 
                                                          
148 See e.g. Atkins 2013a: 35, who, having acknowledged that the attack concerns 
Epicureans (28), suggests that the attitude condemned resembles the philosophers in 
Plato’s Republic who will only rule out of necessity (citing Plato Rep. 520c in 35n66). 
149 Cf. 7.539e-540b6 and 1.346e-347d.  
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state without having previously gained some status in the state through a political career, 
nor sufficiently knowledgeable and experienced to deal effectively with a crisis even if 
suddenly offered political power.  He illustrates the first part of this claim with rhetorical 
questions that refer to the example of his own career: could any greater emergency 
(necessitas) ever occur than the Catilinarian conspiracy that arose during his consulship?  
And how could he have helped the state if not for his status as consul, itself dependent on 
his previous pursuit of a political career? (1.10).  Cicero’s own plan of life (vitae cursus, 
1.10) shows that political ambition is necessary for the benefit of the community, since it 
leads to the acquisition of political experience and, in a regime with a democratic element 
such as Rome’s, to the possibility of gaining positions in which one can be of service to 
the state.  The second part of his response catches Epicureans in a self-contradiction: they 
claim that knowledge of political affairs belongs only to those who have experience of 
them, yet they also put themselves forward as qualified to engage in politics in a moment 
of crisis (1.11).  The inevitable conclusion to be drawn, Cicero suggests, is the need of 
the philosopher to prepare himself for political service in the most crucial times by means 
of prior political experience in less turbulent circumstances (1.11). 
In making this case that the philosopher needs political experience, Cicero 
appears to be inspired by Plato’s Republic, as his response to Epicurean political 
indifference in matters of both theory and practice implicitly calls for a return to the study 
of political philosophy initiated by Plato and his hero Socrates, the ultimate founder of 
the Greek philosophic schools (cf. Rep. 3.5).  Plato’s political philosophy in the Republic 
deals not only with the question of the best form of government but also with the question 
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of the two lives, and explores the idea of the philosopher turned politician.  It is usually 
assumed that Plato was hostile to the notion of pursuing a political career, and I have just 
observed that scholars have seen Cicero singling out Plato for criticism in this context.  In 
fact, far from condemning Plato, Cicero is arguably using Plato to correct Epicurus, since 
Socrates argued in the Republic that while it would indeed be desirable for philosophers 
to rule, his Guardian-philosophers should be required after their initial youthful education 
in philosophy to gain practical experience through involvement in administrative and 
military affairs from the age of thirty-five to fifty (7.539e2-540a4)150 before the 
completion of their philosophic education and subsequent government of the entire city 
(7.540a4-b6).  Plato, therefore, understood the need a philosopher-ruler would have of 
practical experience in a way that Epicurus did not.  Admittedly, Roman readers not 
intimately familiar with Plato’s writings, i.e. the vast majority, would not see Cicero 
pitting Plato against Epicurus in this context, naturally assuming from Cicero’s emphasis 
on his own life that he is contrasting his own Roman practical-mindedness with 
Greek/Epicurean flights of theoretical fancy.  But well-read Roman Epicureans who have 
made philosophic learning their exclusive pursuit very well could have recognized the 
implicit contrast between Epicurus’s political teaching and Plato’s reflections on 
philosophy and politics in his own Republic.  Thus Cicero may be seen selectively 
drawing from Platonic philosophy such notions as he deems useful and applicable to the 
                                                          
150 “‘After this you’ll have to take them back down in to that cave again, and they’ll have 
to take up military posts and other positions of command suitable for the young (καὶ 
ἀναγκαστέοι | ἄρχειν τά τε περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ὅσαι νέων ἀρχαί) in order not to fall 
behind the rest in experience (ἐμπειρίᾳ)…’  ‘How long a time do you set for this?’ he 
asked.  ‘Fifteen years,’ I said…” (Emlyn-Jones and Preddy 2013 trans.).  For this point, 
see also Sedley 2007: 271. 
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contemporary Roman situation.  In this case, Cicero adopts the idea that a philosopher 
will be in a position to benefit the state as ruler only if, in addition to his superior 
philosophical outlook, he has also acquired some degree of political experience prior to 
assuming the highest positions in the state.  While in Plato’s Republic this idea was found 
in the context of a discussion about an imaginary city whose ultimate realization was 
portrayed as a near impossibility, in Cicero’s Republic it is considered as applicable to 
the real world of the Roman republic.  And so as the author of the preface of the first 
book, Cicero adopts the same practice as his character Scipio of embracing an idealized 
form of the real (cf. Rep. 2.21-22, 2.52).  
 Cicero’s correction of the Epicureans by means of Plato is most pronounced, 
however, in the preface’s invitation to the study of political philosophy.  Cicero offers 
Epicureans an opportunity to become political even while still at leisure—they can begin 
seeking theoretical knowledge of political affairs as an important object of study prior to 
gaining the additional desideratum of practical experience: “I would think that the wise 
man should be especially careful not to neglect this science of political affairs, since he 
ought to prepare all things, since he cannot know whether he will at some point need to 
use them” (1.11).151  Cicero follows up this exhortation based on logical considerations 
with an appeal to the authority of other philosophers:  
If there are any who are moved by the authority (auctoritate) of philosophers, let 
them pay attention for a while and heed those whose authority (auctoritas) and 
glory among learned men are the greatest.  In my view, even though some did not 
                                                          
151 arbitrarer hanc rerum civilium minime neglegendam scientiam sapienti, propterea 
quod omnia essent ei praeparanda, quibus nesciret an aliquando uti necesse esset.  




themselves administer the state (rem publicam), nevertheless, since they inquired 
and wrote a great deal about the state (de re publica), they have discharged a 
certain duty to the state (rei publicae).  (Rep. 1.12)   
 
At tamen si qui sunt qui philosophorum auctoritate moveantur, dent operam 
parumper atque audiant eos quorum summa est auctoritas apud doctissimos 
homines et gloria; quos ego existimo, etiam si qui ipsi rem publicam non 
gesserint, tamen, quoniam de re publica multa quaesierint et scripserint, functos 
esse aliquo rei publicae munere. 
 
Through repetition of the terms auctoritas (twice) and res publica (thrice) in close 
proximity, Cicero builds up the prestige of political philosophers at the same time as he 
forges a strong connection between philosophy and politics in the mind of the Epicurean 
reader.  In addition, Cicero subtly mingles his own authority with the authoritative 
example of these philosophers to promote the validity of political philosophy with the 
emphatic ego existimo which fronts the thought.  
In these words, Cicero also implies to his learned Epicurean audience that the 
authoritative example of Plato among philosophers ought to lead them to reevaluate the 
place of politics in their studies.  After all, what better description than the preceding 
could there be of Plato himself, who apart from attempts to serve as a philosophic adviser 
to Dionysius and Dion (on the testimony of the Letters), generally avoided participation 
in public life while nevertheless frequently thinking, writing, and teaching about politics?  
Admittedly, Cicero’s use of the plural eos encourages the reader to think of multiple 
individuals, and commentators have suggested that Aristotle could also be placed in this 
category, and perhaps even Zeno the Stoic, who also wrote a Republic.152  On the other 
                                                          
152 In the catalog of his philosophic works at Div 2.3, Cicero himself suggests that he has 
Plato and the Peripatetics in mind in this passage, describing the topic of Rep. as follows: 
magnus locus, philosophiaeque proprius a Platone, Aristotele, Theophrasto totaque 
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hand, the chief inspiration for the present work and its title is Plato and his immortal 
Republic, not the Stoic Zeno or even Aristotle with his Politics or, among the latter’s 
exoteric works, the dialogue On Justice.  We might also add the general but obvious 
observation that Cicero, as an Academic, adhered to the school founded by Plato, and as 
such can be assumed to put Plato in the highest place among philosophers; and the only 
other philosopher mentioned by name in the extant portion of this preface is Xenocrates 
(1.3), Plato’s second successor in the Academy.  But most significant of all is the 
evidence of a very much neglected testimonium from Pliny the Younger, from which we 
learn that at some point in De Re Publica, Cicero declares himself to be a follower of 
Plato regarding politics (NH praef. 22): non Tulliana simplicitate, qui de re publica 
Platonis se comitem profitetur (“not with the simplicity of Tully, who declares himself 
Plato’s companion regarding the state”).  Despite our uncertainty about the location of 
this fragment in the work’s original structure, this statement serves to show the 
preeminent place of Plato in Cicero’s mind among philosophic writers on politics.  In 
sum, Cicero proposes Plato, who was disengaged from political activity but active as a 
political thinker, as an authoritative Greek model for the imitation of philhellenic Roman 
Epicureans indifferent to the science of politics (rerum civilium… scientia, 1.11). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Peripateticorum familia tractatus uberrime (“a large topic, and a part of philosophy 
given a very rich treatment by Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the whole Peripatetic 
household”).  Note that while the rhetorical emphasis of the passage seems to be on the 
Peripatetics, Plato nevertheless holds the first place.  (The fact that Cicero does not 
mention Plato or Aristotle by name in the Rep. preface is part of his initial strategy in the 
work of being guarded in his presentation of philosophy before a large Roman audience, 
most of whom regarded these Greek figures with suspicion.) 
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 Another important implication of Cicero’s argument to the Epicureans about 
political philosophy is that his understanding of political engagement in the Pro Sestio 
has been effectively expanded or modified to allow for a second-best form, of which 
Cicero also holds himself out to the Epicureans as a model for imitation.  This 
modification also functions as Cicero’s apologia for his present policy of generally 
avoiding politics in preference for leisure,153 an answer to potential detractors who might 
decry him as a hypocrite for condemning Epicurean withdrawal while seeming to practice 
it himself.  Cicero answers this charge in various ways throughout the work and 
simultaneously makes himself a model of modified political engagement, both in the 
preface and through his character and chief interlocutor Scipio.  The first part of the 
answer occurs in the preface’s argument for political philosophy, where we have seen 
him distinguish between two forms of civic responsibility: ad rem publicam adire and 
aliquis rei publicae munus (1.12).154  At the end of the preface, it becomes obvious that 
Cicero is now chiefly practicing the latter form of engagement when he claims that his 
past experience in the former type should make him an authority as a political writer: 
                                                          
153 For Cicero’s general avoidance of politics and public controversy at this time, see Q. 
Fr. 3.5.4-5 (Oct. or Nov. 54 BCE): “I really am drawing myself away from every 
political burden and am dedicating myself to literature… and in sum, as you advise, I am 
completely turning to leisure and peace” (abduco equidem me ab omni rei publicae cura 
dedoque litteris… et in omni summa, ut mones, valde me ad otium pacemque converto).  
The second half of this quotation is Cicero’s conclusion regarding the question of 
defending Gabinius.  He explains to Quintus that although he bowed to the triumvirs’ 
wishes to defend many clients against his own wishes, he drew the line with Gabinius.  
Thus Quintus appears to have urged his brother to avoid political affairs, and even the 
law courts, as much as possible at this time, and Cicero promised accordingly to act upon 
this advice. 
154 Cicero also calls political philosophy a munus at 1.11 (cf. rationes civitatis… id 
munus), and uses the designation rem publicam gerere for active politics (1.11). 
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“Since in my own case I have ended up attaining something worthy of being remembered 
in administering the state, and a certain ability for explaining the rationale of political 
affairs, I have turned out to be an authority not only because of experience but also by 
dint of enthusiasm for learning and teaching” (1.13).155  He does not, however, give any 
reason for his decision to write such a work.  This reason is supplied through the drama 
of the dialogue, particularly the drama of Scipio, who is presented as a Ciceronian 
character.  Like Cicero, he occupies a special place as a political thinker due to his 
combination of practical experience and acquired learning (1.36; cf. 1.13).156  This is but 
the first time in the dialogue that Cicero establishes implicit identity with Scipio, and the 
similarities do not end there.  The dialogue indicates that Scipio is at leisure not only in 
the immediate context of the three-day Feriae Latinae, but also in a more general way 
due to his being excluded by his enemies from exercising a leading role in the state in the 
current crisis (as Laelius complains at 1.31) despite his previous leadership as consul.  
The attentive reader will observe that Cicero, too, though recently consul, finds himself to 
a certain degree in a state of forced leisure due to the stranglehold of the triumvirs and 
their allies on public policy.  Finally, the Dream shows us Scipio being told in a 
                                                          
155 Quoniam nobis contigit ut idem et in gerenda re publica aliquid essemus memoria 
dignum consecuti, et in explicandis rationibus rerum civilium quandam facultatem, 
<evenit ut> non modo usu se etiam studio discendi et docendi essemus auctores.  In this 
way Cicero rivals Plato and Aristotle, striving to outperform them by adding to the 
pursuit of political theory both the accomplishment of something significant as a 
statesman and the knowledge acquired by this practice, which in turn allow for a superior 
political theory; cf. Laelius’s comments on Scipio’s procedure at Rep. 2.21-22.  See 
Asmis 2001: 110-11 on Cicero’s desire to improve upon his Greek predecessors as a 
political theorist; cf. Altman 2016: 1-3, commenting on Quintilian’s claim that Cicero 
was Platonis aemulus, points to Cicero’s embrace of active politics as his chief manner of 
rivalling Plato. 
156 See Asmis 2001: 111; Atkins 2013a: 35 on the similarity of characterization. 
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conditional prophecy that he will eventually emerge from a period of leisure (which 
began after his consulship in 133) to restore the state as dictator.  All of these details 
point to the notion that like Scipio, Cicero is spending his leisure time engaging in 
philosophy—especially political philosophy—in order to equip himself to serve the state 
in some upcoming emergency provided he can only get the opportunity.  His immersion 
in political philosophy thus testifies to his ongoing service to the Republic.  Later on, in a 
letter written to Varro during his second period of forced leisure, Cicero was to establish 
this same rationale even more expressly for himself and his philosophic friends, adducing 
the authoritative practice of the first Greek political theorists (doctissimi veteres; cf. Rep. 
1.12, quorum summa est auctoritas apud doctissimos homines).157 
B) Pleasure-seekers, or “Epicures” 
The other target of Cicero’s polemical attack on Epicureanism in the preface, a 
target not expressly named, are those of his Roman contemporaries who hold back from 
courageous action on behalf of republican government out of fear or self-interest, not out 
of philosophic principle.  In taking on this audience, Cicero repeats one of his strategies 
                                                          
157 Fam. 9.2.5, on which see Kronenberg 2009: 89 and Baraz 2012: 84-86: modo nobis 
stet illud, una vivere in studiis nostris, a quibus antea delectationem modo petebamus, 
nunc vero etiam salutem; non deesse si quis adhibere volet, non modo ut architectos 
verum etiam ut fabros, ad aedificandam rem publicam, et potius libenter accurrere; si 
nemo utetur opera, tamen et scribere et legere πολιτείας et, si minus in curia atque in 
foro, at in litteris et libris, ut doctissimi veteres fecerunt, navare rem publicam et de 
moribus ac legibus quaerere (“Only let this be fixed: to live together in our pursuits, from 
which before we sought only pleasure, but now also safety; not to fail, if someone wants 
to summon us, not only as architects, but also as builders for building up the republic, and 
rather, to respond to the summons with swiftness and joy; if no one should make use of 
our labor, nonetheless both to read and write “Republics” and, if less so in the senate 
house and the forum, then in letters and books, as the most learned of the ancients did, to 




from Pro Sestio.158  That is, by means of a phony war of words against Epicurean 
philosophers, Cicero tries to get these men to look at themselves in the mirror and see 
themselves as Epicureans, to see themselves in the people being condemned, thus 
tactfully avoiding naming them directly.  This strategy also plays to their anti-philosophic 
prejudices, and is a significant part of the explanation for Cicero’s polemical case for the 
inferiority of the philosopher to the politician in the preface of a philosophic work.  Since 
these men are not particularly inclined to the intellectual life, and hence are not among 
“those moved by the authority of philosophers” (1.12), Cicero seeks to move them to 
political action through appeals to the traditional Roman cultural code, principally Roman 
manliness—the traditional meaning of virtus—and generous patriotism, framed as the 
fulfillment of duty towards one’s country. 
1) Appeals to Roman virtus 
In a strategy familiar from Pro Sestio, Cicero shames this audience by implicitly 
imputing cowardice to them and recalling them to the courage shown by the maiores.  
The preface as it has come down to us opens in the midst of an enumeration of brave 
military feats by great Romans of the past followed by the domestic political activity of 
Cato Maior amidst the great storms of domestic politics (1.1).  In describing Cato’s 
rejection of private ease for public life, Cicero draws a contrast between the pursuit of 
one’s own health and that of the Republic.  Cato could have “enjoyed himself in leisure at 
Tusculum, a health-giving (salubri) place nearby,”159 but instead decided to follow the 
way of “countless viros”—note the use of the gendered viros, as opposed to mere 
                                                          
158 See esp. 23 and 138; cf. pp. 14-17 in Chapter 1 above. 
159 licuit Tusculi se in otio delectare, salubri et propinquo loco. 
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homines, to describe these manly Romans who pursued public life—“each of whom 
proved to be a cause of this community’s well-being (saluti)” (1.1).160  Those who 
criticize Cato as a madman are designated with the nicely indeterminate isti, usually 
thought to indicate Epicureans or philosophers in general who prefer the contemplative to 
the active life.  Indeed, isti does refer to both these groups, but the relatively small 
number of such individuals in late Republican Rome suggests Cicero may be using these 
easy targets to speak to others as well.  In particular, the example of Cato’s avoidance of 
his villa at Tusculum stands out for its resonance with Cicero’s frequent complaint in the 
letters to Atticus from the early 50s about the “fish-pond hatchers” who avoid political 
conflict in the senate by retreating to their villas, probably including aristocratic 
optimates such as Lucullus and Hortensius; Lucullus is even known to have had such a 
villa at Tusculum.  Cicero may also have such aristocrats in mind when he exhorts the 
reader not to listen to those who sound the trumpet to retreat, but to (1.3) “hold fast to the 
course that has always been followed by every excellent man” (teneamus eum cursum qui 
semper fuit optimi cuiusque).  Although optimus quisque seems to refer to the aristocratic 
class that traditionally gave the state its leaders, Cicero intends, as in Pro Sestio,161 to 
expand the group designated by this term to include ambitious members of the equestrian 
class, in accordance with Cato’s example and his own.  For when introducing Cato, 
                                                          
160 innumberabiles viros, quorum singuli saluti civitati huic fuerunt. 
161 See Sest. 136: “And you, young men… together with [the nobles], I exhort you, who 
can obtain nobility by your character and virtue, to pursue the way of life (ratio) in which 
many new men have prospered with both honor and glory.” 
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Cicero describes him as (1.1) “a new man, and unknown (by whom all of us who are 
intent on the same matters are led, as by an exemplar, to hard work and courage).”162   
The imagined objection that political involvement will lead to suffering creates 
the image of a reader who has withdrawn from politics due to a lack of courage and 
Roman virtus.  Once again, the identity of the critics who supposedly advance this 
objection is deliberately left vague; they are simply “those who argue the contrary” of 
what Cicero has said up to this point (1.4).163  This allows Cicero to address any reader 
with similar thoughts, whether this reader is inclined to philosophy or not.  This particular 
critic is said to urge against participation in public life because of its labors and risks to 
one’s personal safety.  The mere formulation of these objections, so contrary to the ideal 
of manly courage that was part and parcel of the mos maiorum, is meant to cast shame on 
whoever might agree with them, and Cicero adds to the humiliating effect by interrupting 
to point out the cowardice inherent in such thoughts even as he formulates them:  
Reasons opposed by those who argue the contrary are first, the labors which must 
be undergone in defending the state—a light burden, of course, for anyone 
responsible and hard-working, and which ought to be despised not only in such 
great political matters as these but also in ordinary pursuits or duties or even 
business affairs; to this the dangers to one’s life are added, and a base fear of 
death is opposed by these people to brave men—to whom it typically appears a 
more miserable thing to waste away in the natural course of old age than to be 
given an occasion to give up their life for their fatherland, as opposed to giving it  
up to nature, which they would have had to do anyway.  (Rep. 1.4) 
 
His rationibus tam certis tamque illustribus opponuntur ab eis qui contra 
disputant, primum labores qui sint re publica defendenda sustinendi—leve sane 
impedimentum vigilanti et industrio, neque id solum in tantis rebus sed etiam in 
                                                          
162 homini ignoto et novo (quo omnes qui eisdem rebus studemus quasi exemplari ad 
industriam virtutemque ducimur).  For a study of the concept of virtus in the Roman 
Republic, see McDonnell 2006. 
163 qui contra disputant. 
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mediocribus vel studiis vel officiis vel vero etiam negotiis contemnendum; 
adiunguntur pericula vitae, turpisque ab his formido mortis fortibus viris 
opponitur: quibus magis id miserum videri solet, natura se consumi et senectute, 
quam sibi dari tempus ut possint eam vitam quae tamen esset reddenda naturae, 
pro patria potissimum reddere. 
 
The validity of these objections is undermined by the commentary Cicero embeds within 
the passage, establishing political engagement as the responsibly hard-working, (vigilanti 
et industrio), courageous (fortibus), manly (viris), patriotic (pro patria potissimum 
reddere), and magnanimous (vitam quae tamen esset reddenda naturae) thing to do.  A 
contrast is drawn with the envisioned reader, whose hesitation over labor or danger is 
depicted as the mark of an indolent, cowardly, effeminate, self-absorbed, and petty-
minded person.  Most of these contrasting characteristics are implicit, but one of them, 
cowardice, is expressly stated when Cicero refers to “a base fear” (turpis formido) of 
death.  The choice of formido for “fear” (rather than timor or metus) also forms a nice 
contrast with fortibus, which follows.164  Furthermore, Cicero’s dismissal of the fear of 
death repeats an idea from the Pro Sestio, that the brave man, realizing that everyone is 
destined to die eventually, considers it more miserable to endure old age than to give his 
life bravely for his country (Sest. 47).165   
2) Appeals to Roman pietas 
In addition to the tactic of shaming the non-participating, non-philosophic Roman 
reader for lacking the courage displayed by his ancestors, Cicero also exhorts this reader 
                                                          
164 Cf. Tusc. 4.19, where Cicero relates Stoic distinctions between different kinds of fear: 
“they define… ‘formido’ as a lasting fear” (definiunt… formidinem metum 
permanentem). 
165 For a similar argument in the Somnium based on manly courage, shaming the reader 
to the degree that he feels himself to fall short of such a sentiment, see the discussion in 
the next chapter. 
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to public service by appealing to his sense of pietas.  He calls for imitation of the mos 
maiorum and advances the view that political involvement is a duty owed in justice to the 
patria.  One way he appeals to Roman tradition is by adducing the example of previous 
Roman statesmen.166  For instance, when the extant portion of the preface to the first 
book begins, we find Cicero accumulating the names of those who served Rome by 
fighting against Carthage (1.1).  Cicero clarifies the lesson to be derived from their 
example in the exhortation “let us hold to the course which has always been followed by 
every excellent man (optimi cuiusque)” (1.3).  In addition, the authoritative practice of 
previous generations is brought forward as a justification in subtler fashion through the 
example of the dialogue characters themselves.  Cicero promotes politics simply by 
placing before the reader’s eyes prominent political men of the late second century BCE.  
The presence of older and younger men in the dialogue seems designed to move both old 
and young in the reading audience to political involvement; everyone is given an example 
to follow, regardless of age.  Among the younger generation who are present, even 
Tubero, despite his evident inclination to abstract studies (see Scipio’s remark to in 1.14 
that “this holiday gave you a really good opportunity to unfold your scrolls”167), was 
known to have served as tribune some time before 129 BCE; he also ran an unsuccessful 
campaign for the praetorship.168  Cicero also notes that Laelius’s sons-in-law, Gaius 
Fannius and Quintus Scaevola, were present for the conversation (1.18).  The indication 
of their relationship to Laelius, Laeli generos, emphasizes that the younger generation is 
                                                          
166 On Cicero’s use of the maiores as exempla more generally, see Van der Blom 2010: 
61-148. 
167 Dabant enim hae feriae tibi opportunam sane facultatem ad explicandas tuas litteras. 
168 Zetzel 1995: 10-11. 
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present to learn from the elder, strengthening further the continuity of the tradition of 
seeking a public career.  That they were “already at the right age for quaestor” (iam 
aetate quaestorios) further suggests their ambition to climb the political ladder (1.18).169  
Among older Romans present, the figure of Laelius would be known to Cicero’s 
readers as the consul of 140 BCE.170  Furthermore, Cicero characterizes him as especially 
concerned with political affairs: he complains about the present political crisis at Rome 
(1.31) and condemns the Gracchans for departing from the mos maiorum (3.41), demands 
that the conversation focus on politics rather than astronomy (1.33, 1.19-32 passim), and 
insists on usefulness to the city as the ultimate criterion of wisdom and virtue (1.33).  His 
character also represents the political in a more metaphorical fashion.171  Just as politics 
involves force and necessity, Laelius intrudes into the conversation on abstract topics that 
had begun before his arrival by aggressively criticizing those present and forcing them to 
adopt a different topic.  The way he derails the conversation on astronomy already in 
progress between Tubero, Philus, and Scipio is reminiscent of, and likely modeled upon, 
the compulsion exercised by Polemarchus, Adeimantus, and their companions, who force 
Socrates and Glaucon to stay in the Peiraeus to attend a torch-race on horseback in honor 
of the goddess, followed by an all-night festival where they will meet other young men 
and engage in conversation.172  Socrates and Glaucon therefore are intimidated into an act 
of piety in the context of which there is also to be friendly conversation with others.  
                                                          
169 For more on the intergenerational theme in Rep., see Zetzel 1999: xiii. 
170 Zetzel 1995: 9. 
171 See Barlow 1987: 363 (cf. 369) and Atkins 2013a: 36 (cf. 39) for Laelius as the 
dialogue character who represents the city’s point of view. 
172 Plato Rep. 327b-328a; more will be said below about the inquisitive young Glaucon as 
a model for Tubero.   
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Likewise, Scipio and the others go along with Laelius’s request for a more political topic, 
displaying their own pietas, as none is willing to oppose this venerable figure’s insistent 
demands.  There are, however, a few interesting differences.  In Cicero’s Republic, Scipio 
and friends do not need to be urged to engage in friendly conversation, as they are 
already doing so and have welcomed Laelius and his companions among their number, 
however uneasily (see Philus’s remarks at 1.19).  Furthermore, while Polemarchus relied 
on the greater number of his companions to intimidate Socrates and Glaucon into staying 
and engaging in an act of piety and in conversation, Laelius singlehandedly browbeats 
Scipio and friends into adopting a “pious” topic of conversation.  By sheer force of ego, 
he continually intervenes in the conversation in progress, managing to insult almost 
everyone present.  First Philus receives the brunt of Laelius’s sarcastic remarks for his 
interest in the phenomenon of the two suns (1.19), followed by Manilius, whose expertise 
in law Laelius gratuitously mocks in connection with that phenomenon, before Manilius 
had even said anything (1.20).  Laelius also condescendingly suggests that Tubero’s 
cosmological inquiries are studies fit for the “minds of boys” (ingenia puerorum, 1.30) in 
preparation for the consideration of “greater things” (maiora), namely politics.173  The 
only person Laelius does not directly insult for speaking about something other than the 
city is Scipio.  When Scipio has just finished praising contemplative pursuits, Laelius 
takes a more tactful line: “I won’t even dare to respond to all that, Scipio” (1.30).174  
                                                          
173 Laelius’s denigrating remarks about cosmology are loosely based on Callicles’s 
assertion in Plato’s Gorgias (484c-486c) that philosophy is a fitting pursuit for the young 
while they are still being educated, but that it should be dropped upon reaching adulthood 
and entering the world of politics. 
174 ‘non audeo equidem’ inquit ‘ad ista, Scipio, dicere…’ 
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Although the rest of Laelius’s immediate reaction is lost in a lacuna, when the manuscript 
picks up he is at work denigrating the subjects praised by Scipio and esteemed by Tubero 
and Philus.  In short, the powerful presence of Laelius in this passage and the 
acquiescence of the interlocutors to his demand to focus on a political topic that Laelius 
says can make them more useful to the Republic (1.33) models for the reader a pious 
devotion to the concerns of the state. 
But the character Scipio, though sharing a different attitude towards philosophy 
than Laelius, stands out nevertheless as the dialogue’s preeminent exemplum of 
engagement in politics in accordance with Roman tradition.  Scipio calls attention to his 
own participation in public affairs on two significant occasions within the dialogue.  He 
can be presumed to do this especially for the sake of the young in his audience, including 
the Stoics Tubero and Rutilius Rufus (ostensibly Cicero’s source for the whole 
conversation, 1.17), and the sons-in-law of Laelius.  When called upon by Laelius to lead 
a discussion about the best regime, Scipio responds in part that “the one work I have to 
do, bequeathed to me by my parents and elders, is the management and administration of 
the republic” (1.35).175  Scipio calls attention to his own political career and eagerness to 
imitate the maiores before the young men present for the conversation.  At the same time, 
of course, Cicero the author places this patriotic example of Scipio before the eyes of his 
elite readers. 
                                                          
175 ego cum mihi sit unum opus hoc a parentibus maioribusque meis relictum, procuratio 
atque administratio rei publicae… See also the discussion below of this aspect of 
Scipio’s exemplarity in the Somnium (in the following chapter). 
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The second aspect of Cicero’s appeal to the non-philosophic reader’s sense of 
pietas consists in arguments that encourage the reader’s feelings of patriotism.  The first 
such argument appears in the preface of the first book.  Cicero suggests that we owe 
public service as a form of repayment to the patria in exchange for its having given us 
birth and education (1.8).  Cicero engages in extended metaphor: the patria is personified 
as a father who, having begotten his children, educated them, and provided them with 
peace and safety, is owed sustenance in return (alimenta).  The argument relies on 
unspoken assumptions about the obligation of children to care for their parents in old age.  
This sense of pietas towards one’s parents, especially the father, was especially strong in 
Roman culture.  Furthermore, since an inclination to love one’s parents is something 
natural and pre-rational—we love our parents simply because they are ours—portraying 
Rome as a parent has the effect of stirring up the natural feelings of love the Roman 
reader has simply because Rome is his home country.176  
Another way Cicero persuades readers to act in defense of the Republic is to make 
them esteem their country as something uniquely worth defending.  Cicero’s account of 
the Roman constitution fosters admiration for Rome in the mind of the reader.  He uses 
the auctoritas of the dialogue characters to establish belief in the mind of the reader that 
Rome’s is the best form of government.  Laelius recalls how Scipio, when conversing 
with Panaetius and Polybius, had “synthesized many matters and taught that the 
arrangement of the state that our ancestors had bequeathed to us was by far the best” 
                                                          
176 For appeals to pietas towards one’s ancestors and the fatherland in the Somnium, see 
the next chapter. 
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(1.34).177  Likewise, in the ensuing discussion of the different kinds of regimes, Scipio 
indicates that he considers the mixed regime the best (1.54).  Scipio issues a solemn 
declaration at the end of Book 1 to the same effect, designating Rome itself as the best 
instance of such a regime: “For so do I decree, so do I believe, so do I affirm: no other 
republics, whether as to their founding, organization, or educational customs, can be 
compared with the one that our fathers, having inherited it long before from their 
ancestors, have bequeathed to us” (1.70).178  In addition to the impressive style (note 
especially the triple anaphora of sic), the persuasive force of the affirmation depends on 
the manipulation of several layers of authority.  The consular Cicero places an 
authoritative endorsement of the Roman Republic as it existed at the time of Scipio in the 
mouth of this same historical Scipio, the most authoritative of his dialogue characters; 
Scipio strengthens his authoritative judgment by asserting the antiquity of this regime in 
his reference to the previous generation and to its predecessors (patres nostri, maiores).  
Scipio’s subsequent account is, according to his own acknowledgment, designed 
to “demonstrate both the character of our republic and that it is the best” (1.70).179  
Cicero thus uses Scipio to foster affection for the free Republic and its institutions by 
tracing their development out of a system in which the Romans were not yet free, under 
kings.  He gives an account of the dangers of monarchy, vividly illustrated by the decay 
of the Roman monarchy under the tyranny of Tarquin (2.43-48; cf. 2.51).  Similarly, he 
                                                          
177 multaque colligere ac docere optimum longe statum civitatis esse eum quem maiores 
nostri nobis reliquissent. 
178 Sic enim decerno, sic sentio, sic affirmo: nulla omnino rerum publicarum aut 
constitutionem aut discriptionem aut disciplinam conferendam esse cum ea quam patres 
nostri nobis, acceptam iam inde a maioribus, reliquerunt.   
179 simul et qualis sit et optimam esse ostendam. 
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recounts the long struggle between the people and the aristocrats to agree on a form of 
government, laws, and institutions deemed equitable to each class (2.57-63; cf. 1.62 for 
the early excesses of the people).  The difficulty with which the free Republic in Rome 
was established inspires the reader to treasure it.  Later on, in the preface of Book 5, 
Cicero laments the decline of this ancestral regime.  His intention is to spur the reader to 
take action to prevent the total loss of this priceless heirloom:  
But our own era, after it had inherited the republic like an outstandingly beautiful 
picture that was nevertheless starting to fade with old age, has not only neglected 
to restore it using the same colors as before, but has not even taken care to do the 
bare minimum of preserving its outline and surface brushstrokes, so to speak.  
(Rep. 5.1) 
 
Nostra vero aetas, cum rem publicam sicut picturam accepisset egregiam sed iam 
evanescentem vetustate, non modo eam coloribus eisdem quibus fuerat renovare 
neglexit, sed ne id quidem curavit ut formam saltem eius et extrema tamquam 
lineamenta servaret. 
 
This complaint insinuates the precious value of the republic, which is idealized as a 
remarkable work of art.  In addition, the accusation of neglect challenges the reader to 
behave differently than he has up to this point, to take action to restore the fresco, in a 
manner of speaking.  In sum, Cicero strives in a variety of ways to inculcate admiration 
for the republican regime to inspire the reader to take action on its behalf.180  
III.  The heart of the appeal: drawing Roman politicians to philosophic statesmanship 
The majority of the arguments regarding political engagement in De Re Publica 
give the impression of being addressed to a group of “normative” readers, elites already 
                                                          
180 This is not to argue that Cicero’s purpose in Rep. is a work of nostalgia written to 
move the reader to restore the constitution of the middle Republic exactly as it was in 
Scipio and Laelius’s time (cf. Zetzel 1995: 27, with n58).  Rather, the reader is urged in a 
general way to treasure Rome for exemplifying the ideal, mixed regime. 
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engaged in politics and intent on gaining distinction, or, among the very young, those 
intent on the same purpose.  The primary purpose of the work thus emerges as the 
encouragement not of political engagement as such—an obvious notion to most 
contemporary Romans that requires no justification—but a particular form of public 
involvement, characterized by individual moral restraint in the pursuit of the good of the 
res publica, as opposed to private gain.  Promoting philosophy is the means by which 
Cicero hopes to create a morally reformed ruling class.  This promotion of philosophy 
has two sides.  One aspect is the promotion of contemplative pursuits in general, which 
Cicero takes up in the body of the work itself.  The other aspect is already evident in the 
preface of the first book, and involves Cicero’s promotion of specific ethical doctrines 
drawn from Greek philosophy on the basis of which he encourages the normative reader 
to engage in politics.  Cicero means for these doctrines to supply the normative reader 
with higher motives for political engagement that can supplement and ultimately replace 
traditional motives for participating in politics such as the pursuit of glory, manliness, 
and patriotism.  
Both aspects of this promotion of philosophy—that is, of the general pursuit of 
knowledge and of specific ethical ideals —aim at making the Roman ruling class less 
acquisitive, less greedy for glory, power, riches, and pleasures.  In terms of this majority 
audience, the problem Cicero had to confront was not the avoidance of public affairs but 
rather a political engagement that was not, according to his own definition in the work, 
truly “political.”  The decline of traditional morality in late Republican Rome had led to a 
situation where politicians tended not to be truly public men, but rather individuals 
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abusing positions of public trust for private ends.  Scipio’s account of the cycle of 
regimes in Book 1 reveals Cicero’s conviction that a decline in the moral character of 
those who rule in the regime will eventually lead to the collapse of the regime itself.181  
Not even the mixed regime such as the Roman Republic will survive if its leaders 
(principes) become corrupt (1.69).  Thus the eagerness of the Roman elite to engage in 
politics in order to satisfy their personal ambitions and desires rather than to seek the 
good of the whole heralded the rise of civil strife.  Since Cicero believed the continuation 
of the mixed regime ultimately depended on men of good character, he aimed to reform 
the Roman Republic through the wisdom and good morals of philosophic statesmen.182 
What I particularly wish to bring to light is just how subtle Cicero’s rhetorical 
strategy is.  He achieves his aims incrementally, and without pursuing them too openly 
lest he lose the sympathy of this segment of his audience.  Indeed, his rhetoric proves a 
classic example of ars celans artem.  Scholars have been misled by Cicero’s apparent 
hostility to philosophy in De Re Publica.  For example, Yelena Baraz, in her recent 
monograph on Cicero’s justification of philosophic activity in the philosophic works of 
the 40s BCE, posits a fundamental difference in attitude towards philosophy in the works 
of the 50s BCE.  She suggests that in De Re Publica and other works written in the 50s 
BCE, Cicero took the position that philosophy was of “limited utility” (2012: 17), but I 
hope to show that the thrust of these works is, in fact, to encourage philosophy.  
                                                          
181 Rep. 1.66-69; see the discussion at Atkins 2013b: 27. 
182 Pace Perelli 1990, who argues that Cicero allows no serious place for the influence of 
philosophy on the Roman regime, since Cicero was simply seeking to restore the 
aristocratic republican regime of Scipio’s time (though Perelli sees an exception to this 
attitude in the preface of Book 3). 
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Doubtless, Cicero does not call for full-time dedication to philosophy, which is to remain 
an occupation of leisure, and yet Cicero’s goal is to bring statesmen to embrace 
philosophic pursuits as an essential complement to their public activity.  For Cicero, at 
the time he was writing in the 50s BCE, philosophy had never been more needful for the 
good of the state.183  In the 50s BCE, Cicero embarks on a project to improve Roman 
society through philosophy, a project which he pursued on a larger scale in the 40s BCE. 
It is important to add that the following arguments and rhetorical aims are not 
exclusively aimed at those who were already ambitious or involved in politics before they 
began Cicero’s book, although I view them as primarily aimed at such readers.  Cicero’s 
arguments here are also directed at the non-participating, self-indulgent kind of reader I 
have delineated in the previous section.  To the extent that Cicero succeeds in 
transforming this kind of reader into an “ambitious” citizen, these arguments may be 
viewed as concerning him as well.  While Cicero approaches this insufficiently ambitious 
reader by rousing him with appeals to courage, pietas, and other commonplaces of 
traditional Roman culture, he also wants this reader to be drawn to philosophic pursuits 
so that the source and ends of his ambition would be moved by the higher motives and 
ethical considerations he promotes. 
A) Setting the stage: the preface 
1) Devaluing philosophy 
                                                          
183 Once again, Zetzel (cf. n. 27) suggests the rationale for my approach: “Cicero’s 
project in the 50s [was] an attempt… to provide a more rigorous philosophical model for 
Roman public behavior and institutions than had previously existed” (1999: xi). 
133 
 
In addition to the goals I have already described in Cicero’s attack on Epicureans 
and Epicures in the preface, this attack serves a parallel but different rhetorical purpose in 
its address to another class of readers: Romans prejudiced against philosophy.  Cicero 
begins the work by giving the impression of attacking philosophy itself.  In a general 
comparison of the value of philosophy and statesmanship, he repeatedly suggests that the 
former is inferior (Rep. 1.2-3, 10-11).  But this is in fact a captatio benevolentiae to put 
the majority of his reading audience at ease.  In her analysis of the cultural context in 
which Cicero embarked on a more comprehensive philosophic project in the 40s BCE, 
Yelena Baraz has shown that a significant portion of Roman readers found philosophy 
objectionable as a pursuit.184  Baraz’ analysis focused on the rhetorical strategies in the 
prefaces to Cicero’s philosophic works, where he needed to win over his reader from the 
start to the validity of philosophy as a pursuit.  In my view, Cicero’s goals are similar 
here in the preface of what was arguably his first philosophic work.  But unlike the 
prefaces of the 40s, where this concern is more openly acknowledged,185 in De Re 
Publica Cicero’s first step in promoting philosophy is to seem to attack it.  In keeping 
with this strategy, he depicts himself in the preface as a politically engaged person, not 
the man of otium devoted to philosophical pursuits that he has to a great extent become 
since the renewal of the triumvirate at Luca.   
Cicero adopts a pose of hostility to philosophy in order to give the impression that 
this work will maintain a thoroughly traditional, Roman focus on political and pragmatic 
                                                          
184 Baraz discusses the widespread prejudice against philosophy in Rome at 2012: 3-4 
and 13-22.  Cf. Griffin 1989: 18-22, Gildenhard 2007: 7-83, and Atkins 2013a: 29-31. 
185 See e.g. the prefaces of Fin. 1 and Tusc. 2.  A longer rebuttal of philosophy’s 
detractors was apparently to be found in the Hortensius (cf. Tusc. 2.4). 
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issues.  For example, as we have seen, Cicero uses his typical anti-Epicurean terminology 
to suggest that philosophy is a self-indulgent, private activity that neglects public duties 
(in illa tranquillitate atque otio iucundissime vivere, 1.1).  But as I have argued, this 
passage can also be seen, and is indeed used as, a criticism of withdrawal from politics in 
general, without reference to philosophy.  So Cicero proceeds to criticize philosophers by 
name, suggesting that their conversations about virtue lack practical effectiveness in 
comparison with the action of the politician.  Philosophers merely gab about virtue in 
their corners, while statesmen lead citizens to the practice of virtue by establishing 
educational regimen, customs, and laws (1.2).  This argument starts from the premise that 
while other arts or skills are constituted by being known, virtue consists entirely in its 
being put into practice or “use” (1.2).186  This premise is later echoed in similar language 
by Laelius, a character whom Cicero often uses to articulate the anti-philosophic 
prejudices of this sort of reader: “[Learning] the theoretical subjects which make us 
useful to the city: I think that this is… the greatest proof or duty of virtue” (1.33).187  
Moreover, in the preface, Cicero adds the example of the Academic Xenocrates, who in 
effect admitted that he was only able to lead a few people to virtue: “They say that even 
Xenocrates, a noble philosopher and among the best, when asked what his students were 
learning, answered ‘to do of their own free will what they were compelled to do by the 
                                                          
186 “Although an art of which one makes no use can still be retained by one’s very 
knowledge of it, virtue lies entirely in its use” (Etsi ars quidem, cum ea non utare, 
scientia tamen ipsa teneri potest, virtus in usu sui tota posita est, 1.2).  Significantly, 
Cicero will go on to contradict this argument and suggest that virtue can indeed be known 
prior to being put into practice (in the preface of Book 3).  The argument is also implicit 
here in the preface of Book 1, though in a very subtle form. 
187 ‘[Discendas] eas artes quae efficiant ut usui civitati simus; id enim esse… 
maximumque virtutis vel documentum vel officium puto.’ 
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laws’” (1.3).188  Cicero concludes that the statesman’s superiority is manifest, given his 
ability to “compel everyone by the power of his office and by the threat of punishment 
held out by the laws to do what the philosophers by their words are scarcely able to 
persuade a few people to do” (1.3).189  Cicero strengthens his persona as a traditionalist 
Roman who views philosophers with contempt by quoting from Ennius, the authoritative 
epic poet of Roman tradition:  
For my part, just as I think that ‘great and powerful cities,’ as Ennius calls them, 
should be esteemed more than villages and forts, so in my view those who preside 
over these cities by their wisdom and authority ought to be counted as far superior 
in wisdom itself compared with those who lack experience in any public business.  
(Rep. 1.3)  
 
Equidem quemadmodum ‘urbes magnas et imperiosas’, ut appellat Ennius, viculis 
et castellis praeferendas puto, sic eos qui omnis negoti publici experts sint longe 
duco sapientia ipsa esse anteponendos. 
 
In this comparison, Cicero is affecting contempt for philosophers, whom he likens to 
rural backwaters in comparison with grand cities, who stand for statesmen.  Furthermore, 
based on the analogy, the implicit point of comparison between the two lives seems to be 
the amount of fame one can achieve.  Since traditionalist Romans esteemed fame and 
glory as unquestionable markers of worth, Cicero cleverly works in this appeal to their 
prejudices as well.  From an analogy that concerns size and fame, Cicero squeezes out the 
baseless conclusion that statesmen are wiser than philosophers.  It is indeed plausible that 
statesmen are wiser in terms of the arts of governance, but not necessarily in every 
                                                          
188 Quin etiam Xenocratem ferunt, nobilem in primis philosophum, cum quaereretur ex eo 
quid adsequerentur eius discipuli, respondisse, ‘ut id sua sponte facerent, quod 
cogerentur facere legibus.’ 




respect: experience in government does not presuppose or imply acquaintance with all 
other branches of theoretical and practical knowledge.  Cicero’s claim that statesmen are 
wiser than philosophers only works if one unduly restricts the meaning of wisdom to 
experiential knowledge of government, as Cicero does here. 
All these arguments assuredly do demonstrate the necessity of statesmanship and 
political life and the inadequacy of philosophy by itself to change the world, but that is 
not their primary purpose vis-à-vis Cicero’s anti-philosophic readers, who need no 
persuading in this regard.  The purpose they serve for this kind of reader is rather a 
certain reassurance that the author shares their prejudices.  They are made to feel that the 
work they have begun to read entitled De Re Publica will not be a purely theoretical or 
“Greek” investigation into political questions.  Indeed, Cicero’s need to do this is all the 
greater if, in fact, as textual scholars generally hold, he had stated earlier in this same 
preface to the first book that he was “Plato’s companion regarding the state” (Pliny NH 
praef. 22).190  If this placement of the fragment is correct, Cicero would need to convince 
his anti-philosophic audience that this initial declaration of allegiance to Plato still leaves 
the author Cicero firmly in the Roman camp on the side of pragmatism, experience, and 
political involvement by contrast with Plato and Socrates.  In a certain sense, the 
preface’s elevation of politics and denigration of philosophy forms part of an exercise in 
                                                          
190 The whole testimonium reads: non Tulliana simplicitate, qui de re publica Platonis 
comitem se profitetur.  Bréguet 1980 (Fr. 1.3), Ziegler 1969 (Fr. 1.1b) and Pohlenz 1931 
assign the fragment to the preface of Rep. 1.  The most recent editor, Powell 2006, 
declines to take a position himself, simply listing the passage among the Testimonia, 
Apud alios auctores, 17 (see 2006: 369). 
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persuasion by means of ethos: it contributes to Cicero’s crafting of a persona that this 
portion of his audience would find sympathetic and likeable.191 
The rhetorical employment of authorial ethos is even more evident in Cicero’s 
portrayal of himself in the preface.  He is careful to appear eminently political and 
interested in philosophy only inasmuch as it is centered on political questions.  First, he 
calls attention to his identity as a prominent Roman statesman.  He refers to his own 
consulship, exile, and return (1.6-7) and alludes to his illustrious accomplishments in 
general (1.13).  Secondly, he is careful to fashion his authorship of the present work on a 
political subject as having the same moral value as engagement in politics.  He sets forth 
the idea that those who have written about politics have also performed a useful service 
the state (1.12).  Cicero then presents himself as uniquely qualified to serve the state in 
this way due to the knowledge he has acquired through both theory and practice: “I ought 
to be an authority not only because of experience but also because of my enthusiasm for 
learning and teaching” (1.13).192  Cicero thus claims to excel other political writers 
inasmuch as his work will be informed by his own real-world political experience.  
Therefore, in crafting his persona as a writer, Cicero emphasizes his identity as a man of 
                                                          
191 In a similar way, Cicero will later present his alter-ego Scipio as initially denigrating 
the theoretical speculation of Greek philosophers who lacked the political experience of 
Romans (1.36).  And yet it turns out that it is not such theoretical speculation that Scipio 
rejects, but rather the method used by the Greeks: Scipio states that Plato’s abstract 
speculation did in fact illustrate the principles of political affairs.  What Scipio professes 
to find faulty in Plato is his method of using an imaginary state to illustrate those 
principles; he will “cap” Plato by using the concrete example of a real state to illustrate 
the same principles.  Thus Scipio actually reproduces the theoretical speculation of Plato 
regarding political matters, but by means of a different method.  Cf. Nicgorski 1991: 235-
36, Atkins 2013b: 25-29, and Powell 2013: 51-56. 
192 non modo usu sed etiam studio discendi et docendi essemus auctores…  
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practical experience.  This authorial persona, coupled with the reassuring criticisms of 
philosophers, helps Cicero win the traditionalist reader’s confidence and trust.  It also 
misleads this reader into thinking that the work is concerned exclusively with politics.  It 
disarms him in the face of Cicero’s frequent insinuation of philosophy’s value and of the 
value of specific philosophic doctrines, a feature that punctuates the work as a whole no 
less than this very preface to the first book, as I will show in the following sections. 
2) Promoting philosophical ideas 
 Even as he attacks philosophy as politically ineffective and gives the impression 
of being a Roman traditionalist, Cicero subtly promotes motives for political involvement 
derived from Greek philosophy.  Drawing on Stoic ideas, he asserts that there is a natural 
human impulse to practice virtus, understood as serving the needs of society.  Cicero also 
works in the Platonic motives of fulfilling a debt owed in justice to the country that gave 
us our education, and engaging in politics in order to avoid the penalty of being ruled by 
bad men.193  Cicero thus strives to transcend and replace traditional Roman motives for 
political involvement.  The appeals to glory and fame that were so prominent in Pro 
Sestio give way in this philosophic work to more high-minded ideals, whose philosophic 
pedigree is nonetheless disguised in the interest of persuasiveness.  The genius of 
Cicero’s method lies both in the way he embeds these arguments in the context of an 
extended polemic against philosophers and in the suggestive, and indeed deceptive, 
                                                          
193 Asmis 2001 focuses on Cicero’s opposition of Stoic to Epicurean ideals in the 
following passages.  Certainly Cicero prefers Stoicism for its greater compatibility with 
Roman ideals of public service in general, but I argue that in terms of motives for 
statesmanship, Cicero’s chief concern is to oppose Stoic and Platonic ideals to the 
traditional Roman aspiration of gaining gloria through virtus. 
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association of these motives with the mos maiorum.  This strategy allows him to associate 
the authority of tradition with concepts that are derived from Greek thought and thus 
foreign to the Roman ethos. 
 Cicero’s departure from the appeal to the traditional Roman motive of gloria that 
held center stage in Pro Sestio in favor of a greater focus on philosophically derived 
motives for political engagement in De Re Publica is determined both by genre and by 
historical circumstances.  Since the latter is a philosophic dialogue, one naturally expects 
more philosophic arguments there than in a public speech.  And yet, as I have suggested 
in the general introduction to this chapter, the change in historical circumstances was 
decisive for Cicero’s choice of the philosophic genre itself.  The work does indeed 
advance philosophic arguments and ideals, but it was circumstance that led to such a 
strategy.  At the time Cicero was writing De Re Publica, he had to deal not only with the 
general problem of untrammeled ambition in the late Republic but also, and in particular, 
with a political situation in which the triumvirs were solidifying a monopoly on political 
power, honors, and offices.  A certain form of civic glory was, therefore, ready for the 
taking—for those who would side with the triumvirs against republican government.  
Cicero had to convince the normative reader—and perhaps himself as well, given his 
momentary entente with the triumvirate—to follow a different path, and thus needs to 
offer motives for serving the common interest rather than the interests of a political 
faction that could easily offer them power, wealth, and pleasure.  Cicero also had to 
convince them to do this in the face of his own present weakness as a politician and the 
weakness of his republican allies.  The precariousness of Roman politics and of one’s 
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standing with the public, and hence of civic glory, were all too clear for Cicero’s readers 
given his exile, recall, and subsequent decline in influence.  Thus Cicero sought to 
introduce new motives, derived from philosophy.   
Cicero’s general strategy for inculcating conviction in philosophic ideas before 
his normative Roman audience in the preface of the first book involves disguising the 
philosophic provenance of these very arguments by incorporating them into a highly 
rhetorical passage that reads more like invective oratory than a philosophic treatise.194  
Cicero begins by following the Stoics—significantly, without saying so.  He grounds 
public service in man’s natural inclinations and suggests that the great Roman statesmen 
of the past were impelled by nature to perform their services to the state rather than out of 
desire for prestige.  Having named several such individuals from previous generations, he 
says he could name others from more recent times but will refrain from doing so lest he 
give anyone cause to complain that family members have been overlooked (1.1).  This 
catalogue is concluded with the following authoritative assertion:  
I lay down only this: that so great a necessity for virtue has been given to the 
human race by nature, and so great a love for defending the well-being of the 
community, that this force has overcome all the seductive charms of pleasure and 
ease.  (Rep. 1.1) 
 
Unum hoc definio: tantam esse necessitatem virtutis generi hominum a natura 
tantamque amorem ad communem salutem defendendam datum, ut ea vis omnia 
blandimenta voluptatis otique vicerit.   
 
By placing this statement of principle at the end of a list of Roman statesmen, Cicero 
implies that the maiores were motivated to perform their services to Rome by a natural 
                                                          
194 For Cicero’s view of the philosophic style as more mild in tone than the 
contentiousness of public orations, see Leg. 1.11. 
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impulse.  He appropriates their authoritative example and colors it with ethical motives 
derived from Stoicism.  There is no mention of ambition for glory and fame, which surely 
were among the prime motives of so many public men.195  While the content of virtus is 
still in line with the Roman ideal of courageously taking on the burden of public service 
for “the well-being of the community,” this service has been sundered from its traditional 
motive.  Instead, there is supposedly an overwhelming inclination to virtus and an amor 
for defending the state that arise from nature (a natura… datum).  The experience of 
these inclinations and sentiments is therefore universal and not limited to Rome (generi 
hominum).   
These ideas are reinforced through their repetition and elaboration in short order:  
And since we are seized most of all by an enthusiasm to increase the resources of 
the human race, and to render human life safer and wealthier by our prudent 
efforts—and we are stirred to this resolve by the goads of nature itself—let us 
hold fast to the course that has always been followed by every excellent man…  
(Rep. 1.3) 
 
et quoniam maxime rapimur ad opes augendas generis humani, studemusque 
nostris consiliis et laboribus tutiorem et opulentiorem vitam hominum reddere, et 
ad hanc voluntatem ipsius naturae stimulis incitamur, teneamus eum cursum qui 
semper fuit optimi cuiusque…  
 
This time, nature is practically personified as a driver holding the reins with which he 
urges an animal forward.  Human beings are seized (rapimur) by an innate enthusiasm 
(studemus).  With these expressions, Cicero argues for a natural human passion for the 
political.  Cicero is evidently developing the earlier claim that nature has implanted in 
                                                          
195 See Blössner 2001: 232-36 for commentary on this passage.  He contrasts the motive 
Cicero offers here, a natural necessitas virtutis, with the traditional glory motive Cicero 
openly espouses in Pro Archia 28-29, and with the argument based on a firm hope of 
immortality at Tusc. 1.32-33.  There is of course to be found also in Rep. an argument for 
engagement based on immortality, especially in the Dream; see below.  
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mankind an amor for public service.  But significantly, the object of this passion is not 
one’s own glory.  This passion is aimed rather at benefitting others.  These benefits are 
specified—safety and prosperity—and expanded by their application to human beings in 
general (generis humani… vitam hominum).  Scholars have suggested that Cicero is 
arguing here for Stoic cosmopolitanism, though this is debatable, since the purpose of the 
universalizing terms could simply be to establish the claim that the inclination to public 
service is natural and common to all human beings.196  In any case, Cicero’s “nature” 
argument is loosely based on Stoic oikeiosis theory, according to which human beings 
have a natural social impulse.  This impulse is manifested in the desire to care for others 
in ascending order, starting with one’s own offspring and family relations, branching out 
towards fellow citizens, and ultimately extending to the whole human race.197  Cicero is 
therefore promoting a more altruistic ideal of public service based on Stoic ideas.198  He 
promotes such notions to make ambitious Romans more keen to participate in politics 
with a view to the benefit of others.  The service of the community through participation 
in public life becomes the end, rather than the means to one’s personal gain.  That is, one 
acts for the sake of others in accordance with nature’s dictates, a principle that replaces 
the traditional Roman view of public service as a means to the private good of personal 
glory.  While, as in the first passage, this replacement is disguised by the insinuation that 
Roman statesmen have traditionally acted on the basis of such altruistic motives, in the 
                                                          
196 For recent studies of Cicero’s cosmopolitanism, see Brown 1997 (Diss. University of 
Chicago, forthcoming in 2020 as Stoic Cosmopolitanism with Cambridge University 
Press), Pangle 1992, Asmis 2001, and Subacus 2015 (Diss. New York University). 
197 Cicero places a more detailed account of this theory in the mouth of Cato in De 
Finibus 3. 
198 For this interpretation, see Asmis 2001 passim. 
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second passage quoted above, an artificial connection between Stoic ideas and the mos 
maiorum is forged by the concluding exhortation to imitate the examples of the past.  
This exhortation employs the traditional language of Roman politics to suggest that the 
state’s aristocratic leaders (optimus quisque) have always (semper) adhered to the 
altruistic vision just described. 
Cicero’s intention to advance the idea of public service as the fulfillment of a 
natural love for defending the community shines forth even more clearly in the way he 
handles the problem of exile, including his own, and his discussion in the preface 
contrasts with his treatment of the issue in Pro Sestio.  The occasion for him to illustrate 
the principles he has just laid down (i.e., a natural impulse to virtue and to love of the 
community) is an imagined objection to political service that alleges the labors and 
anxieties that inevitably attach to it (1.4-6).  Just as in Pro Sestio, Cicero here anticipates 
the objection based on the possibility of exile at the hands of an ungrateful citizenry, but 
whereas in the speech he was eager to promise the rewards of glory before one’s 
contemporaries and with posterity, here at the outset of Rep. he tries to detach the reader 
from such motives and expectations.  In a list of statesmen who suffered exile or rejection 
at the hands of an ungrateful citizenry, Themistocles and Opimius199 again make their 
appearance, but he lists many more Romans than he did in Pro Sestio: “the exile of 
Camillus, or the unpopularity of Ahala, or the hatred against Nasica, or the expulsion of 
                                                          
199 For analysis of Cicero’s use of Opimius as an exemplum in his corpus as a whole, see 
Van der Blom 2010: 208-13; on Themistocles and other Greek exiles, see 213-16. 
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Laenas, or the condemnation of Opimius, or the flight of Metellus, or the extremely bitter 
fall of Gaius Marius” (1.6).200   
Cicero thus readily admits, unlike in Pro Sestio, that when it comes to 
statesmanship, no good deed goes unpunished, and suggests that his readers should not 
expect glory and gratitude from their fellow citizens for public service, but rather public 
humiliation and rejection.  Nor does he mitigate the suffering of these public figures, as 
he did in Pro Sestio, by pointing out that they were eventually vindicated, whether during 
their own lifetime or with posterity.  While he does point out that he himself ultimately 
garnered glory from his exile and return and could console himself with the thought that 
good citizens appreciated his efforts (1.7), unlike in Pro Sestio, he admits that this “happy 
ending” was in no way guaranteed, and insists that he would have been satisfied even if 
things had turned out differently: “But even if, as I said before, it had turned out 
differently, how could I complain, since nothing happened to me that was unforeseen or 
more serious than I had expected as a result of such great deeds as were mine?”201  
Rather, a sufficient reward for his service was the certainty that he had preserved the 
common safety: “[when] upon laying down my consulship I had sworn an oath in an 
assembly with the Roman people that the republic had been preserved, I easily 
                                                          
200 Nam vel exilium Camilli, vel offensio commemoratur Ahalae, vel invidia Nasicae, vel 
expulsio Laenatis, vel Opimi damnatio, vel fuga Metelli, vel acerbissima Gai Mari 
clades…  Contrast the readiness to give Roman examples here with Sest. 140, where there 
is merely a compressed allusion to “other” republican statesmen (ceteri).  The account in 
Sest. also lacks pathos.  Cicero insists that these others were either quickly recalled from 
exile and thus vindicated by the people, or else never suffered injury at all; in Rep., he 
calls attention to their ills. 
201 Sed si aliter, ut dixi, accidisset, qui possem queri, cum mihi nihil improvise, nec 
gravius quam expectavissem, pro tantis meis factis evenisset? 
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compensated for the anxiety and trouble of all injustices endured.”202  Developing this 
idea, Cicero insists: “I did not hesitate to place myself in the path of the most serious 
storms and almost of the thunderbolts themselves for the sake of preserving the citizens, 
and through my own dangers to provide a communal tranquility for the rest (commune 
reliquis otium).”203   
This idea of “the statesman’s burden” for the sake of the public’s otium is familiar 
from Pro Sestio, as commentators have noted.204  But there is an important difference that 
should not be overlooked.  In De Re Publica, Cicero is downplaying the chief motive for 
such endurance that he had held out in the speech: glory arising from recognition by 
one’s grateful fellow citizens, whether contemporaneously, posthumously, or both.  Thus, 
in De Re Publica, Cicero aims to show that public service should be naturally generous, 
and not mercenary.  Faithful to his persuasive procedure thus far, he also enlists the great 
statesmen of the past in the service of his ideal.  By capping a list of statesmen and their 
misfortunes with his own example, he subtly imputes to them his same motive of desiring 
to preserve the common safety.  The auctoritas of the maiores and of Cicero himself 
(who like the maiores was doubtless moved by other motives besides natural love for 
others) is in this way marshalled to promote a more altruistic motive for political 
engagement derived from Stoic thinking. 
                                                          
202 The beginning of this sentence is lost, but the basic sense has been plausibly 
reconstructed: [*** cum… rem publicam… ] salvam esse consulatu abiens in contione 
populo Romano idem iurante iurassem, facile iniuriarium omnium compensarem curam 
et molestiam. 
203 non dubitaverim me gravissimis tempestatibus ac paene fulminibus ipsis obvium ferre, 
conservandorum civium gratia, meisque propriis periculis parere commune reliquis 
otium. 
204 See e.g. Zetzel 1995. 
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Cicero also seeks to replace the glory motive with motives taken from Plato but 
not expressly attributed to him.  The first such motive is the conviction that, as a matter 
of justice, we owe public service to our country as to the parent who gave us birth and 
raised us.  The persuasiveness of this Platonic notion derives from its proximity to 
traditional Roman patriotism, from which it is nevertheless distinct. 
For our fatherland has not begotten or educated us on the condition that it should 
not expect any repayment for support (so to speak) from us, and that it should 
only serve our comfort, and provide a safe refuge for our leisure and a tranquil 
place for rest; but rather on the condition that it should lay claim for itself, for its 
own utility, the majority of, and most capable parts of, our intelligence, talent, 
prudence; and that it should leave to us for our own private use only so much as it 
retains as a surplus.  (Rep. 1.8) 
 
Neque enim hac nos patria lege genuit aut educavit, ut nulla quasi alimenta 
exspectaret a nobis, ac tantummodo nostris ipsa commodis serviens tutum 
perfugium otio nostro suppeditaret et tranquillum ad quietem locum; sed ut 
plurimas et maximas nostri animi ingeni consili partes ipsa sibi ad utilitatem suam 
pigneraretur, tantumque nobis in nostrum privatum usum, quantum ipsi superesse 
posset, remitteret. 
 
As commentators have observed, the notion of owing repayment to our country as to a 
parent who gave us our education recalls an argument from Book 7 of Plato’s 
Republic.205  Socrates says they will persuade their philosophically educated guardians 
that it is just for them to return to the Cave to rule because they owe their philosophic 
education to the city.  Although the Romans in Cicero’s audience, unlike Plato’s 
Guardians, have presumably not received a philosophical education from their city, 
nevertheless they have been educated by Rome, whose protection created the conditions 
                                                          
205 Plato Rep. 7.520b.  On the rareness of the word alimenta, see Zetzel 1995 ad. loc.; cf. 
Büchner 1984: 88. 
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in which they could be brought up.  There is, moreover, another Platonic intertext to this 
passage, from one of the letters to Archytas:  
But as to you, they reported that you think it a heavy trial not to be able to get free 
from the cares of public life… But this also you must bear in mind, that none of 
us is born for himself alone; a part of our existence belongs to our country, a part 
to our parents, a part to our other friends, and a large part is given to the 
circumstances that command our lives.  When our country calls us to public 
service it would, I think, be unnatural to refuse; especially since this means giving 
place to unworthy men, who enter public life for motives other than the best.206  
(Plato, Letter IX, 357e3-358b1)   
 
Cicero imitates the general notion that we have not been born to serve our own private 
interests alone.207  In particular, Cicero’s discussion of partes argues for an intertextual 
connection with Plato’s Letter 9.  Cicero has taken up Plato’s assignation of “parts” of 
ourselves to different duties, though Cicero further specifies what Plato calls our 
“existence” according to our faculties (nostri animi ingeni consili).  He also alters the 
Platonic passage by creating a binary opposition between the two objects towards which 
these faculties may be directed: private use or public use.  This rhetorical simplification 
serves the needs of the present argument before the present audience.  He is at pains to 
bring about a change in basic orientation towards the public instead of a self-interested 
attitude that renders a person unwilling to serve if there is no glory to be gained.  Further, 
by personifying the patria as a parent to whom one owes the obligation of providing 
sustenance in his or her old age, Cicero plays on Plato’s assertion that it would be 
“unnatural” to refuse public service to our country.  Indeed, there is good reason to think 
                                                          
206 Translation by Morrow 1997. 
207 Zetzel 1995: 106, commenting on this passage (Rep. 1.8), notes that “at Off. 1.22 C. 
cites Pl. Epist. 9.358a for the doctrine of our responsibility to country and fellowmen.”  
But as I argue in what follows, Cicero, although he does not cite that Platonic letter 
directly here (1.8), seems to be engaging with it. 
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that Plato considered such refusal unnatural because our country is similar to our parents, 
since Plato places obligation to country first on his list, immediately before parents. 
Furthermore, Cicero blends this philosophic argument about fulfilling a natural 
obligation to one’s country with the argument that the safety of the community as a 
whole depends on the willingness of individual statesmen to disregard consideration of 
their personal safety, a point he previously made in Pro Sestio.208  But in using a 
philosophic argument to bolster this vision of self-sacrifice for the common benefit, 
Cicero is choosing to emphasize a different motive than he had in the speech.  While in 
Pro Sestio the chief motive he emphasized was “striving after the good opinion of good 
men” (139) and the related need to uphold one’s own dignitas (23), in the present work, 
he places the accent on duty to one’s country regardless of personal gain.209  Cicero 
implies that it would be unjust to refuse to serve.  He aims to change the thinking of the 
otherwise politically ambitious in his audience who might be deterred from participation 
if they were to judge that glory before their peers and the people was no longer attainable.  
Cicero’s teaching is that even without glory as a reward, there is still an obligation to 
serve the country.  Retiring into one’s own private concerns and enjoyments runs 
                                                          
208 Cf. Sest. 139: “But those who strive after the good opinion of good men, which alone 
can truly be called glory, ought to seek leisure and pleasures for others, not for 
themselves” (qui autem bonam famam bonorum, quae sola vere gloria nominari potest, 
expetunt, aliis otium quaerere debent et voluptates, non sibi).  See also the discussion of 
Sest. 99-100 in Ch. 1 above, 22-28. 
209 Sest. does contain an appeal to one’s basic obligation to one’s country and fellow 
citizens, but even this appeal is coupled with the recompense of glory given by that 
country and those citizens, a theme pursued throughout the speech (138): “But my whole 
speech is addressed to… those who think they have been born… for their country, for 
their fellow citizens, for praise, for glory” (sed mihi omnis oratio est… cum iis, qui se 
patriae, qui suis civibus, qui laudi, qui gloriae… natos arbitrantur). 
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contrary to justice, which is an obligation stemming from our natural relationship with 
the country in which we have been born.  
In his second major argument that draws on Plato in the preface, Cicero mingles 
Roman political vocabulary with Platonic ideals to persuade the normative reader to 
engage in politics, moved by what he implies are the most just of motives: to avoid the 
punishment of being ruled by bad men, and to protect the republic from them.  He makes 
these points in direct response to arguments against engagement attributed to those who 
“make excuses for themselves to enjoy their leisure more easily” (1.9).210  The vagueness 
of their identity suggests they are a foil for a point Cicero wants to make to some other 
unnamed audience.  These people supposedly object that it is “not proper for a free man, 
while struggling against morally degraded and monstrous adversaries, to endure the 
blows of their verbal abusive or the painful expectation of injuries that are not to be 
endured by a wise man” (1.9).211  The objector appears therefore to consider himself a 
free man and wise.  Sapiens might denote a philosopher—Cicero’s Epicurean bogeyman 
once again212—but in this context, it seems rather to signify a prudent person, someone 
with basic good sense who realizes it is foolish knowingly to expose oneself to the 
attacks of hateful and hate-filled people.  This objector also holds that a person loses his 
freedom if he is constantly embroiled in political struggles; he seems to identify his 
libertas with the right to enjoy uninterrupted otium.   
                                                          
210 quae sumunt sibi ad excusationem quo facilius otio perfruantur. 
211 neque liberi [esse] cum impuris atque immanibus adversariis decertantem vel 
contumeliarum verbera subire vel exspectare sapienti non ferendas iniurias. 
212 The reference cannot be to the Stoic sapiens because the Stoic ideal viewed politics as 
a duty (see e.g. Fin. 3.54 and Tusc. 5.70). 
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Cicero’s response argues that such thinking is in fact not good sense.  For through 
lack of involvement, one exposes oneself—and the whole state—to the mistreatment of 
the improbi that one thought he could avoid by remaining withdrawn: 
Just as if for men who are good, brave, and endowed with magnanimity, there 
could be any more just reason for entering political life than not having to obey 
wicked men, and not allowing them to tear the republic apart.  (Rep. 1.9) 
 
proinde quasi bonis et fortibus et magno animo praeditis ulla sit ad rem publicam 
adeundi causa iustior, quam ne pareant improbis, neve ab eis dilacerari rem 
publicam patiantur.  
 
Cicero’s answer indicates that political engagement is the sensible thing to do; it is also 
necessary to guard one’s freedom, and that of others.  The response also attributes the 
classic republican virtues of bravery and magnanimity to those who take action.  The 
ambitious reader already considers himself free, sensible, manly, and magnanimous.  So 
Cicero uses the foil and the response to flatter such a person.  But he also identifies this 
person as one of the boni, who must act to defend himself and the state against the 
improbi.  The argument thus suggests to the reader that brave men are on the side of the 
boni.  This politically charged word denotes Cicero’s allies in the fight for republican 
institutions, the opponents of the triumvirate and of the seditious tribunes who aid them.  
Cicero therefore plays on the reader’s sense of himself to gain him as an ally for the 
republican cause.  But he has also implicitly undermined the Roman honor motive by 
promoting two new considerations for the Roman elite to follow.  As to the first 
consideration, Cicero has imported an argument about motivation for rule from Plato’s 
Republic: “The good… do not wish to serve for honor, for they are not ambitious.  So 
they must have imposed on them in addition an obligation and a penalty… But the most 
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serious aspect of the penalty, if they are not themselves willing, is to be ruled by someone 
inferior” (1.347b-c).213  To this reason, which is fairly self-interested, Cicero has added 
the just motive of defending the state from being harmed by others.  The first reason, in 
the context of Plato’s Republic, is conceived as an argument directed at good men who 
are “not ambitious.”  But the portion of Cicero’s audience to which he chiefly directs 
these remarks is quite the opposite.  He speaks not to philosophers disinclined to rule, but 
to men who see themselves as eminently practical, and are ambitious for public honors.  
These men are not in fact yet “good”, because they lack the philosophical motivations to 
which he wants to lead them.  Thus he tries to make men good by telling them what boni 
do: they engage not out of thirst for honors, but with a desire to prevent a fundamental 
disorder which is also contrary to their own interests, presumably to their own safety: the 
oppressive rule of evil over good.  To this reason from Plato, Cicero adds the motive of 
acting in the interests of everyone else, the res publica.  Furthermore, denoting such 
considerations as iustior suggests that the argument from earlier in the preface that one 
owes alimenta to the patria represents a lower form of justice.  It is therefore more true to 
the nature of justice to act with the motive of preventing a fundamental disorder—the evil 
ruling the good—and in order to shield others from the harm the evil would otherwise be 
free to inflict.  Cicero will gladly make use of many arguments to gain his end—any tool 
                                                          
213 Cf. Plato Letter IX: “When our country calls us to public service it would, I think, be 
unnatural to refuse; especially since this means giving place to unworthy men, who enter 
public life for motives other than the best” (Morrow 1997 trans.; emphasis mine).  Such 




in a fight—but here is our first indication that the different motives offered may be 
ranked.214 
B) The Call to Statesmen to Engage in Philosophy 
In section A, I have shown how Cicero begins his appeal to the normative 
reader—the ambitious statesman eager to succeed in politics but unlikely to become 
politically engaged without the incentive of a personal reward or to see any worth in 
immersing himself in philosophy.  Cicero establishes an ethical bond in the preface with 
such a reader through a seeming denigration of philosophy, even while promoting certain 
(Stoic and Platonic) philosophical ideas within it.  I shall now show how Cicero promotes 
philosophy in the rest of De Re Publica (with the exception of the Somnium, which will 
be treated in the next chapter) in order to produce philosophic statesmen.  As I mentioned 
in the general introduction to section III, Cicero’s promotion of philosophy has two 
aspects, and its purpose is the creation of a morally reformed ruling class that seeks the 
good of the whole state rather than private gain.  The first aspect involves an attempt to 
promote ethical doctrines drawn from Greek philosophy to give Romans higher motives 
for public service.  The second aspect involves promoting the philosophic life in general, 
which, as I shall show, refers not only or even primarily to the practice of political 
                                                          
214 In fact, these two motives contain in germ the substance of two notions of justice that 
Cicero develops at greater length as the work proceeds: justice as the harmonious order 
obtaining between reason and the passions (Laelius’s teaching in Book 3), and justice as 
defending others from harm, seeking their good regardless of oneself (Scipio’s teaching 
in the Dream).  Cicero also explores the extent to which these paradigms of individual 
justice can be applied to the state, thus making his own the familiar question of the city-
soul analogy that was a prominent feature of Plato’s Republic.  See the discussion in 
section B.2 below, and in the next chapter. 
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philosophy.215  My contention, rather, is that Cicero also wants to provoke interest in 
philosophic and humanistic studies in general.  The foreseen effect of such studies is that 
Romans should prize the pleasures of contemplation itself above goods customarily 
sought such as wealth, power, or glory, and attain a greater realization of the beauty of 
virtue as they internalize through their own study the ethical doctrines they had perhaps 
first encountered, or encountered anew, when reading Cicero’s De Re Publica.  Thus the 
second aspect of promoting philosophy will reinforce the first.   
Moreover, this double-edged promotion of philosophy and its foreseen fruit can 
also be seen as Platonic in spirit.  Cicero’s promotion of philosophy aims to help the 
politically ambitious “to discover,” as Plato writes, “a life better than ruling” (Rep. 
7.521a).216  Since the whole passage is highly germane to my argument about Cicero’s 
aims and their Platonic inspiration, I will reproduce it here: 
‘My friend, this is how it is, you know,’ I said.  ‘If you discover a life better than 
ruling for those who are intending to govern, a well-run state becomes a 
possibility; for only there will the genuinely rich govern, rich not in monetary 
terms, but in that in which the happy man must be wealthy: a good, intelligent 
life.  But if beggars and those starved of private resources enter public service 
thinking they must seize the good, it isn’t possible, for when the government 
becomes a matter of contention, such civil and internal war destroys both them 
and the rest of the state.’  (Plato, Republic 7.520e5-521a9)217 
 
The end of this passage reads like an accurate description of Rome during the 1st century 
BCE.  Cicero aims to help the Republic reverse course by moving in the direction of this 
“well-run state” of philosophically enlightened rulers.  Cicero aims to establish such a 
                                                          
215 Scholars have frequently noted the work’s protreptic to political philosophy in 
particular.  See esp. Barlow 1987 passim and Atkins 2013a: 30-31. 




state in Rome by first creating a class of statesmen who follow Socrates’s recipe for a 
true happiness, “a good, intelligent life” (ζωή ἀγαθή τε καὶ ἔμφρων), a phrase that nicely 
captures the twofold sense in which Cicero is promoting philosophy.  That is, he will use 
philosophy to provide Romans with a moral doctrine that encourages them to engage in 
politics virtuously, and he will also encourage elites to complement their public activity 
with the pursuit of studies traditionally associated with the contemplative life. 
My argument also bears on the often discussed question of the identity and 
qualities of Cicero’s ideal statesman, the rector rei publicae, whom I will argue is meant 
to be Cicero’s version of Plato’s philosopher-king, but adapted to the context of 
republican Rome as a philosophizing member of the ruling senatorial elite.  In my 
approach, I follow the basic line of thought suggested by Stroh in his recent biography of 
Cicero, where he makes a similar point, and also claims that Cicero modeled his own life 
on the Platonic ideal.218  Cicero certainly seems to have conceived of himself and 
fashioned himself in this way, as the following passage from an open letter to his brother 
Quintus written in 59 BCE suggests: 
That man of outstanding intelligence and erudition, Plato, thought that states 
would at long last be happy only at such time as either learned and wise men 
began to rule them or if those who ruled were to concentrate all their efforts on 
learning and wisdom.  He believed that this union, namely of power and wisdom, 
would conduce to the community’s well-being.  And this is a thing which perhaps 
happened at some point to our whole republic, but now in any case has certainly 
happened to this province of yours…  (Q. fr. 1.29) 
 
Atque ille quidem princeps ingeni et doctrinae Plato tum denique fore beatas res 
publicas putavit si aut docti ac sapientes homines eas regere coepissent aut ii qui 
                                                          
218 See Stroh 2008: 12-13, 63; cf. Altman 2009: 420-21; 2012: 1-3 and 359-61; and 2016 
passim, but especially xxix and 3-6.  These two scholars appear to have arrived at their 
conclusions independently of one another.   
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regerent omne suum studium in doctrina et sapientia collocarent.  Hanc 
coniunctionem videlicet potestatis et sapientiae saluti censuit civitatibus esse 
posse.  Quod fortasse aliquando universae rei publicae nostrae, nunc quidem 
profecto isti provinciae contigit…219  
 
Shackleton-Bailey interprets Cicero’s vague reference to some past moment when the 
union of philosophy and political power may have taken place as a thinly veiled reference 
to Cicero’s own recent consulship.  But since Cicero presumably aspired to this ideal 
throughout his political career, it might refer to any moment after his admission to the 
senate, after which he held power in the state to at least some degree, whether in office or 
not.  In any case, the suggestion that the Platonic ideal may have been realized at some 
point in the Roman past and is now certainly realized in Quintus’s province220 implies 
that, for Cicero, the res publica in which philosophy is joined to political power in the 
person of its rulers can exist apart from the institutions of the utopian city described in 
Plato’s Republic.221  In Cicero’s mind, the ideal of combining philosophy and power may 
be realized even within the Roman state.  It does not depend primarily on a state’s 
constitutional framework, and certainly not on the order described in the ideal city of 
Plato’s Republic, but on the placement of a philosopher in a position of political power, 
or the conversion of someone in office to philosophy.  Cicero thus appropriates an ideal 
found in Plato, separating it from its original context: Cicero embraces an idealizing form 
of the real, hoping to bring about a combination of philosophy and power in the real 
                                                          
219 Text taken from Shackleton Bailey 2002. 
220 Cicero’s assertion about Quintus’s province amounts to an exhortation or a wish by 
way of flattery. 
221 Cf. the rejection of Plato’s utopian city by Scipio at Rep. 2.52 and by the unidentified 
speaker, probably Scipio, in Frag. 4.19 Powell. 
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world, in the Roman state.222  Since the majority of Cicero’s Roman audience was 
involved in public life but indifferent to philosophy, Cicero’s effort to combine 
philosophy and political power will chiefly focus on the second half of the Platonic 
solution, namely bringing “those who rule to concentrate all their efforts on learning and 
wisdom.” 
 However, Cicero is also concerned, though to a lesser extent, with another 
audience among his Roman contemporaries, namely those whose inclination to 
philosophy, especially the more abstract disciplines, tended to draw them away from 
concerning themselves with political problems, even as they continued to be involved in 
public life.  Thus the other half of the Platonic solution to the perennial problems of cities 
constitutes another of Cicero’s persuasive ends, namely ensuring that “learned and wise 
men begin to rule.”  We have already seen how Cicero draws Epicurean philosophers in 
his audience towards political engagement by inviting them to political philosophy as a 
first step.  In section 1 below and in the following chapter on the Somnium, I will 
demonstrate how Cicero also encourages statesmen with an inclination to abstract 
disciplines to bring their studies to bear on political problems so that their pursuit of 
wisdom may take on greater relevance to the benefit of the city.  
Although the spirit of Cicero’s cultural-political project in De Re Publica is 
Platonic in the broad sense, Cicero not only eschews those Platonic doctrines he finds 
unrealistic but also willingly promotes specific doctrines of other philosophers and 
                                                          
222 For a different view, see the introduction to Altman 2016, where it is argued that 
Cicero was Plato’s best and most accurate interpreter by discovering that the 
philosopher’s return to the Cave was the essence of Plato’s teaching about justice. 
157 
 
encourages the study of particular disciplines in a way that reflects the views and interests 
of Greek philosophers who lived after Plato, from the Peripatetics to the Stoics.  In the 
letter to Quintus quoted above, Cicero, before referring to Plato’s famous ideal of rule by 
philosophers, had also pointed to the value of Greek learning in general:  
It truly causes me no shame to say this—especially given such a life as I have 
lived and such deeds as I have accomplished, in which there cannot be suspicion 
of anything slothful or unserious—whatever things I have reached, I have attained 
them through the pursuit of those arts which have been handed down to us by the 
teachings contained in the literary heritage of Greece.  (Q. fr. 1.28)  
 
Non enim me hoc iam dicere pudebit, praesertim in ea vita atque iis rebus gestis 
in quibus non potest residere inertiae aut levitatis ulla suspicio, nos ea quae 
consecuti simus iis studiis et artibus esse adeptos quae sint nobis Graeciae 
monumentis disciplinis tradita. 
 
In De Re Publica, therefore, Cicero may be seen drawing on his own vast stores of Greek 
knowledge to present a variety of ideas and subjects to a normative audience that will 
necessarily display different tendencies and interests depending on the individual.  His 
presentation of ethical ideals and philosophic pursuits cannot be monolithic if he is to 
overcome their prejudice against the assiduous cultivation of knowledge after one’s 
youthful education and thus succeed in creating other statesmen like himself whose 
engagement in politics is inspired by philosophic ideals and consists in the continued 
pursuit of philosophy.223   
                                                          
223 See McConnell 2015: 55-61 on the letters from the mid to late 50s BCE, discussing 
the prominent role Cicero assigns to philosophy as useful for and an integral component 
of political engagement. 
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In the body of the work, Cicero’s effort to produce a Roman elite of philosophic 
rulers or rectores224 entails appealing to the various tendencies and interests of the 
individuals in his normative reading audience by means of differences in personality and 
point of view among the dialogical personae.  With regard to the value of the philosophic 
life tout court, Cicero stages a disagreement between two groups.  On one side are those 
who oppose spending any time on non-political humanistic studies after one’s youthful 
education.  Laelius is the chief advocate of this point of view, and his persona reflects the 
character of the normative reader in the audience.  On the other side are those who argue 
for the value of humanistic studies, but are excessively theoretical and insufficiently 
practical, including Philus and especially the young Stoic Tubero.  Occupying the middle 
ground and seeking to correct the excesses of both Laelius and Tubero is Scipio, whose 
authoritative dialogical persona represents Cicero himself.225  Thus, even as Scipio 
intervenes on Tubero’s side against Laelius, Scipio also undertakes to persuade Tubero to 
study cosmology in a way that focuses less on abstruse theoretical questions and more on 
the relationship between cosmology and human life.  Finally, although Laelius’s 
                                                          
224 I concur with Powell 1994 that Cicero wants to populate the ruling elite with multiple 
rectores (cf. Coleman 1964: 8-10).  There is strong evidence for this interpretation in the 
text itself.  In Book 2, Laelius and Scipio both suggest that there may be many ideal 
statesmen.  Laelius states: “There is a fine supply of them among those present; you 
might even begin from yourself.”  Scipio responds: “If only the proportion in the whole 
senate were the same!” (These translations are taken from Zetzel 1999.)  The dialogue’s 
frequent references to the rector in the singular should not lead us astray; the 
investigation of the ideal statesman as a type (prudentem… ipsum istum, 2.67) 
necessitates this practice. 
225 For Scipio as Cicero’s mouthpiece, see Nicgorski 1978: 93-4, MacKendrick 1989: 54, 
Zetzel 1998: 236, Asmis 2001: 111, Asmis 2004: 573, Brunt 2013: 235, Zarecki 2014: 
31-32 (pace Fox 2007 and Atkins 2013a). 
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pragmatic orientation is extreme, Laelius joins Scipio in urging Tubero to be more 
practical, to apply himself to the urgent political problems of the day. 
Secondly, in terms of the other aspect of Cicero’s engagement with philosophy in 
the work, namely his attempt to promote Greek philosophic ideas as a new basis for 
political engagement instead of the traditional ideas of Roman culture, Cicero uses the 
personae of both Laelius and Scipio.  In the debate on justice in Book 3, Cicero, having 
already constructed Laelius in such a way as to make the normative reader sympathetic to 
his character, uses Laelius to urge on this reader a new philosophical ethic of political 
engagement.  Although Laelius has up to that point shown himself hostile to the idea of 
ongoing immersion in abstract disciplines, Laelius gladly champions ethical doctrines 
that bear on the motives and ends for which one engages in politics.  In the debate on 
justice, Laelius argues in favor of the Stoic doctrines of natural law as the universal, 
objective basis of right and wrong, and of virtue as an end in itself and thus as the proper 
reward to be sought by the statesman, who ought to be heedless of rewards traditionally 
sought for engagement such as wealth, pleasure, and honors.  Cicero also deploys 
Scipio’s authority and the positive reaction of the other interlocutors to validate Laelius’s 
viewpoint, thus adding to the persuasive effect on the normative reader of Laelius’s 
argument.  However, as I will discuss in the following chapter on the Somnium, Scipio 
ultimately corrects and offers an authoritative alternative to that argument by proposing a 
more purely altruistic notion of justice as looking solely to the good of others, and by 
transforming virtue from an end in itself and its own reward into a means to the ultimate 
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end and reward of eternal contemplation, the possibility of which is justified by means of 
the Platonic doctrine of soul immortality. 
1) Promoting a measure of contemplation 
In the first book, before Laelius succeeds in turning the topic of conversation to 
the subject of the best form of government, Scipio, siding with the philosophically 
inclined Tubero and Philus, attempts to persuade Laelius of the value of abstract studies, 
especially cosmology.  Scipio’s effort to persuade Laelius within the text functions 
simultaneously as Cicero’s attempt to persuade the normative reader.  Laelius is used by 
Cicero as a sort of mirror for what I assume to be the majority of his readers—i.e. 
politically ambitious members of the elite who, in a typically Roman way, reject the 
value of continuing with abstract studies beyond one’s youth.226  Laelius summarizes the 
prevailing Roman attitude when he disparages “those theoretical subjects so dear to you” 
(istae artes) as being useful only “for sharpening somewhat and, so to speak, itching the 
curious minds of boys in order to make it easier for them to learn about greater matters” 
(1.30),227 by which, as he goes on to explain, he means political matters (1.31).  Since 
these remarks come after Scipio’s attempt to persuade him of the value of the more 
                                                          
226 By the time of the 50s BCE, most members of the Roman elite had acquired some 
familiarity with Greek studies, including philosophy.  The custom of spending some time 
abroad during one’s youth studying in Athens and other centers of Greek learning seems 
to have begun with a minority of individuals in the generation of Cicero and Caesar in the 
80s and 70s BCE (Rawson 1985: 9; cf. 6-7 on the paucity of such individuals before their 
generation).   But by the end of the Republic, it had become a more widespread custom 
(Rawson 1985: 10-11). 
227 istae quidem artes, si modo aliquid, valent ut paulum acuant et tamquam irritant 
ingenia puerorum, quo facilius possint maiora discere.  Laelius’s persona is parallel to 
that of Antonius in De Oratore.  Both Laelius (Rep. 1.30) and Antonius (De Orat. 2.156) 
approve the sentiment of Ennius’s Neoptolemus, who wants to learn “only a little” (cf. 
Zetzel 1995: 14 with n46). 
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abstract artes, Scipio’s initial efforts must be judged a failure.  However, these efforts are 
an important first step in an incremental process of persuasion that Scipio continues by 
applying cosmology to political philosophy at various points in the body of the dialogue, 
and most of all in the Dream narrative that brings this process to a close, to be discussed 
in the following chapter.   
In the initial discussion among the dialogue characters on the value of cosmology 
and other abstract studies, Cicero tries to interest the normative reader in such studies 
through two main strategies, each of which are pursued by Scipio, the most authoritative 
dialogue character.  First, Scipio attempts to attract Laelius to abstract studies by arguing 
for the practical utility of cosmological knowledge for the statesman engaged in 
governance.  Secondly, Scipio employs an epideictic strategy in an extended passage in 
praise of philosophical studies, exalting them for the valuable moral lessons to which 
they lead, lessons that make the individual happy, and for the inherent pleasure they 
entail.  Getting politicians to complement their public activity with philosophical studies 
will be beneficial to the Roman state, not only because of the practical applicability of 
certain tenets relating to cosmology, but also, and even more fundamentally, because of 
the improvement in politicians’ moral character that results from such studies.  Thus 
Cicero’s primary aim in promoting philosophical studies is to improve the moral 
character of those who are politically engaged by means of the ethical insights they can 
gain through studying the cosmos and by means of the superior pleasure to be found in 
study.  The goal is to get politicians to seek their greatest happiness not in the traditional 
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pleasures to be gained through political engagement but in the pleasures of virtue and 
knowledge. 
  But in several of the same passages where Scipio makes the case for 
contemplative pursuits to the pragmatic Laelius, he also addresses the intellectually 
inclined Tubero.  Scipio strives to moderate Tubero’s passion for abstract studies by 
encouraging him to focus within those studies on particular questions that he can 
reasonably expect to be able to answer, to consider the way those answers might be 
useful for statesmanship, and to cultivate the art of rhetoric in order to communicate 
one’s politically relevant philosophic insights effectively. 
In his first attempt to draw Laelius to abstract studies, Scipio appeals to Laelius’s 
pragmatic orientation by demonstrating that cosmological knowledge has instrumental 
value for the statesman.  It should be remembered that for Laelius, practical utility for the 
state is the sole criterion for judging the value of any subject (1.32).  Accordingly, Scipio 
recalls the time Galus, a Roman legate, calmed the superstitious fears of Aemilius 
Paulus’s army by giving a scientific explanation for a solar eclipse (1.23), adding to this 
the recollection of Pericles’s assuaging the fear of the Athenians on a similar occasion 
(1.25).  Scipio appeals to Laelius’s traditionalism by recalling that even Ennius was 
interested in such matters and wrote about them (1.25).  He also claims that knowledge of 
solar eclipses is so precise that Ennius and the writers of the annales maximi were able to 
calculate the exact date of the solar eclipse that occurred on the day of Romulus’s death 
(1.25).  By presenting this sort of knowledge as something that can be attained with 
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certainty and which has political utility, Scipio tries to inspire Laelius to think of studying 
cosmology as a worthwhile pursuit. 
However, while he may disagree with Laelius’s curt dismissal of cosmology as 
utterly irrelevant to human life (cf. 1.19 and 1.32), Scipio is careful to distinguish his own 
view from the more extreme Stoic position on cosmology represented in the dialogue by 
Tubero, whose enthusiasm for the more arcane aspects of the subject Scipio wishes to 
moderate in favor of focusing on those aspects of cosmology that are potentially 
knowable and which can be beneficial to human life.  Thus when Scipio points out one 
such benefit before Laelius, namely that knowledge of solar eclipses is both attainable 
and useful for governing the ignorant, his argument simultaneously functions as an 
implicit exhortation to Tubero to focus his cosmological interests on those things that can 
actually be known and which can be potentially useful for statesmanship.  Earlier, in his 
initial meeting with Tubero prior to the other interlocutors’ arrival, Scipio had called 
attention to the Stoic tendency to make rash claims of certainty in the realm of natural 
philosophy, and to be excessively focused on obscure matters.  The scene unfolded as 
follows.  Scipio replied to Tubero’s query about the phenomenon of the two suns (1.15) 
by remarking that the Stoic Panaetius could probably give an explanation if he were 
present.  But then Scipio indicated his skepticism about what he considered Panaetius’s 
rather rash claims to knowledge on obscure cosmological matters:  
But in fact, Tubero—for to you I will say openly how I feel—I don’t entirely 
agree with that friend of mine about that whole subject.  We are scarcely able to 
conjecture what the nature of those things is, but the way he makes claims about 
them, you would think he can see them right before his eyes and literally touch 
them.  And for this reason, I usually consider Socrates to have been even wiser for 
putting away all concern with these questions, and saying that those natural 
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questions were either beyond the attainment of human reason or else had 
absolutely nothing to do with human life.  (1.15) 
 
Sed ego, Tubero—nam tecum aperte quod sentio loquar—non nimis assentior in 
omni isto genere nostro illi familiari; qui, quae vix coniectura qualia sint 
possumus suspicari, sic affirmat ut oculis ea cernere videatur, aut tractare plane 
manu.  Quo etiam sapientiorem Socratem soleo iudicare, qui omnem eiusmodi 
curam deposuerit, eaque quae de natura quaererentur aut maiora quam hominum 
ratio consequi possit, aut nihil omnino ad vitam hominum attinere dixerit. 
 
The attitude Scipio originally displayed about cosmology in his conversation with Tubero 
was both dismissive in tone (istud genus) and extreme in its denial that anything could be 
known about this subject or that it had any relevance (nihil omnino) to human life.  In 
retrospect, however, Scipio’s original stance should be understood as a rhetorical posture 
meant to provoke Tubero to focus on the knowable aspects of cosmology and to seek to 
relate the whole subject to human life.  As the scene continued, Tubero retorted that 
Socrates did in fact think that such knowledge was relevant to life, adducing the example 
of Plato’s dialogues, which show Socrates relating abstract studies such as mathematics, 
geometry, and harmony to questions of morality, virtue, and even politics (1.16).  Scipio 
responded that this picture was not true to the historical Socrates, but rather represented 
Plato’s coloring of Socrates with the interests that Plato himself acquired later in life 
under the influence of the Pythagoreans with whom he studied (1.16).  And yet after the 
arrival of Philus, Laelius, and the other interlocutors, as we have seen, Scipio takes up the 
defense of cosmology as offering knowledge that is both certain and useful for human 
life, using the example of a solar eclipse (1.25).  While it is tempting to conclude that 
Scipio is unaware of the contradiction or that we must make an exclusive choice between 
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either 1.15 or 1.25 as representing Scipio’s “true” views,228 it is more reasonable to 
conclude that Scipio is gauging his words in each circumstance with a view to his 
audience.  Thus when he is alone with Tubero, Scipio adopts an extreme pose against 
cosmology because he views Tubero as excessively interested in abstract theoretical 
questions without considering their relevance to politics.  But Scipio focuses on the 
opposite problem in Laelius, who neglects abstract subjects entirely.  He seeks to redress 
the extremes in the souls of both, trying to moderate their excessive tendencies. 
Scipio’s position, therefore, seems to be characterized by a combination of Plato 
(or Plato’s Socrates) and the historical Socrates, inasmuch as, like Plato, Scipio maintains 
a lively interest in abstract studies and strives to relate them to morals and politics, and at 
the same time, like the historical Socrates, is concerned with human life.  Scipio’s 
rhetorical aim regarding Tubero is to convince him to study cosmology in the right spirit, 
that is, in the right measure and for the right purpose.  In spite of his avowed 
disagreement with Panaetius on the level of certainty attainable on cosmological matters, 
Scipio nevertheless does think that some such matters are knowable—solar eclipses, for 
instance.  Since knowing about solar eclipses can also prove politically useful, this is the 
sort of sub-topic within cosmology that is worth pursuing.  Scipio thus teaches the 
intellectually curious Stoic Tubero that the philosopher should not spend his time 
indulging the desire to know about any and every subject, but should regulate his 
interests in accordance with what he can reasonably hope to know and with what could 
                                                          
228 If one were forced to choose, it would seem that 1.15 holds the key to what Cicero 
presents Scipio as truly believing, since he depicts him as speaking with Tubero in the 
most private of circumstances, in his own bedchamber, and since he calls attention to 
their solitude and claims that he is revealing “openly” what he actually thinks. 
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prove useful.  Scipio’s discourse on solar eclipses also teaches Tubero about a topic 
Tubero has evidently neglected while spending too much time on abstract pursuits: 
rhetoric.  By recalling the successful speeches Galus and Pericles gave when explaining 
the phenomenon of a solar eclipse to the superstitious masses (1.23), Scipio teaches 
Tubero that the philosopher must learn how to communicate his scientific knowledge 
effectively to the common man.  That Tubero has heretofore neglected to do so is evident 
from the surprise with which he reacts to Scipio’s account of Galus: “Is that right?  Did 
he actually succeed in teaching this thing to men who were practically rustics, and did he 
dare to say all this in front of the unlearned?” (1.23).229  Tubero’s inclination is to spend 
time on other studies, as is indicated by the greeting Scipio gives his nephew: “What are 
you doing up so early, Tubero?  I would have thought this holiday was a good chance for 
you to roll out your books” (1.15).230  What he requires is moderation in his pursuit of 
abstract studies and a greater focus on how to use that knowledge to help his fellow 
citizens. 
Scipio’s interest in cosmology is also evident in the fact that immediately after 
praising Socrates as wise for completely setting all cosmological considerations aside, 
Scipio himself does nothing of the sort.  After his exchange with Tubero is interrupted by 
the arrival of Lucius Furius Philus and Rutilius Rufus, who, like Tubero, are public men 
with strong Stoic views, Scipio returns of his own volition to the cosmological question 
Tubero had originally posed, the meaning of the two suns.  When returning to the topic, 
                                                          
229 ‘Ain tandem?’ inquit Tubero, ‘docere hoc poterat ille homines paene agrestes et apud 
imperitos audebat haec dicere?’ 
230 ‘Quid tu’ inquit ‘tam mane, Tubero?  Dabant enim hae feriae tibi opportunam sane 
facultatem ad explicandas tuas litteras.’ 
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Scipio notes that he and Rutilius used to converse about this sort of thing during the siege 
of Numantia (1.17), an indication of Scipio’s own longstanding interests in cosmology.  
Then he asks Philus for his opinion of the two suns (1.17), showing not just a willingness 
but an eagerness to pursue cosmological inquiry.  As we have seen, Scipio proceeds to 
speak about solar eclipses (1.23-25).  Finally, he amplifies cosmology and other abstract 
studies in the epideictic passage which follows for their positive moral and political 
effects and for the humanizing pleasures of such pursuits (1.26-29, discussed in the next 
paragraph).  Since Scipio values cosmology and other abstract topics for their benefit to 
human beings both individually and socially, his character ultimately emerges as 
something of a combination of Plato’s Socrates and the historical Socrates, since Scipio 
shares with Plato a real interest in the pursuit of cosmological knowledge and a desire to 
relate it to morals and politics, and since he shares with Socrates an abiding concern with 
how knowledge can make human life better.  In a way, the initially stark anti-
cosmological position that Scipio affects before Tubero functions as a challenge, and is 
much the same challenge as the historical Socrates issued to his disciple Plato, or which 
Plato in any case may have felt he ought to take up: when Scipio and the historical 
Socrates denigrate cosmology as utterly unknowable and useless, they provoke their 
disciples to prove them wrong by concentrating on what is knowable in that field and by 
seeking to relate that field to human life and human happiness. 
 In his epideictic speech on philosophical studies (1.26-29), Scipio continues to 
make the case to Laelius for cosmology and other abstract studies, but shifts his focus 
from the immediate pragmatic applicability of specific points of cosmology to the 
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positive moral effects on the individual produced by cosmology and other abstract studies 
in general, and to the inherent pleasure that accompanies such studies.  Scipio develops 
the same two basic points that Philus had made to Laelius earlier in defense of 
cosmology—significant insights are there to be gained, and it is an enjoyable activity as 
such: 
If we are ignorant of these things, then we must be ignorant of many important 
things.  And besides, the very act of knowing and ruminating on things is pleasant 
to me, just as it is, by Hercules! to you yourself, Laelius, and to all who are eager 
for wisdom.  (Rep. 1.19) 
 
Si haec ignoramus, multa nobis et magna ignoranda sint.  Ac me quidem, ut 
hercule etiam te ipsum, Laeli, omnesque avidos sapientiae, cognitio ipsa rerum 
consideratioque delectat. 
 
Scipio’s ultimate purpose vis-à-vis Laelius and the normative reader is to inspire them to 
embrace these studies with the foreseen result that they will still engage in politics, but 
will no longer do so with a thought to personal gain or rewards.  Instead, having 
discovered the philosophic life—what Plato called “a life better than ruling”—they will 
engage in politics for the sake of duty and seek their happiness where alone it can be 
found, in the pleasures of the mind. 
 Scipio argues that among the positive moral effects of studying cosmology is the 
tempering of ambition for power and glory.  This epideictic passage is slightly truncated 
at the beginning, but the text picks up with a tricolon that foreshadows the themes of the 
Somnium: 
What will be considered excellent in human affairs by the one who has 
thoroughly examined these realms of the gods?  Or long lasting, by the one who 
has come to know what is eternal?  Or glorious, by the one who has seen how 
small the earth is: first, considered as a whole, next, the part of it that human 
beings inhabit?  And although we are attached to the smallest part of it and are 
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utterly unknown to the majority of nations, do we hope nonetheless that the fame 
of our name will fly about and wander far and wide?  (Rep. 1.26) 
 
Quid porro aut praeclarum putet in rebus humanis, qui haec deorum regna 
perspexerit? aut diuturnum, qui cognoverit quid sit aeternum?  aut gloriosum, qui 
viderit quam parva sit terra, primum universa, deinde ea pars eius quam homines 
incolant; quamque nos exiguae eius parti adfixi, plurimis ignotissimi gentibus, 
speremus tamen nostrum nomen volitare et vagari latissime? 
 
Scipio encourages Laelius to study the cosmos in order to acquire a new perspective on 
the glories of political life.  The glories of the cosmos, the realm (regna) inhabited by the 
gods that is eternal and of unlimited expanse, trump the glories of human affairs, whose 
arena is limited with respect to both time and space (cf. 6.24-28).  The continual 
contemplation of what is eternal and divine leads one to “look down on all human things 
and consider them inferior to wisdom” (despicientem omnia humana et inferiora 
sapientia ducentem), and by comparison no power, political offices, or empire can seem 
so excellent (Quod autem imperium, qui magistratus, quod regnum potest esse 
praestantius?, 1.28; cf. 6.24: haec caelestia semper spectato, illa humana contemnito).  
In addition to tempering ambition for power and glory, abstract studies eliminate 
greed for wealth and pleasure because they afford the student a superior pleasure by 
satisfying his natural desire to know.  First, Scipio presents the pursuit of knowledge 
through such abstract studies as mathematics as characteristically human.  While Cicero 
seemed to depreciate philosophy in the preface at the expense of the natural desire to 
protect the political community (1.1, 1.3), Cicero now balances out the picture for the 
normative reader by having Scipio emphasize the natural desire to know: “And he is 
convinced that while others may be given the name, they alone actually are human 
beings who have been polished by the sciences proper to human nature” (1.28).  Scipio 
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illustrates his point by recounting the story of a shipwreck upon an apparently deserted 
island.  Upon discovering geometrical figures traced in the sand, “Plato or whoever else 
said it” told his companions to be of good heart, since there were evidently human beings 
nearby (1.29).  Scipio thus suggests to Laelius that contemplative pursuits are natural to a 
human being no less than political ones.  The pursuit of this natural desire, moreover, 
entails a pleasure all its own that produces detachment from wealth and pleasures.  Scipio 
argues that the contemplative life leads to a devaluation of material goods:  
But farms, dwellings, flocks, and a massive weight of silver and gold—he is 
accustomed neither to call nor to consider them goods, because to him, the 
enjoyment of these things seems slight, their usefulness extremely limited, the 
maintenance of control over them uncertain, and seems in addition to be 
something that admits of no limit, held in the grasp of the worst kind of men.  
(Rep. 1.27) 
 
Agros vero et aedificia et pecudes et immensum argenti pondus atque auri, qui 
bona nec putare nec appellare soleat, quod earum rerum videatur ei levis fructus, 
exiguus usus, incertus dominatus, saepe etiam deterrimorum hominum immensa 
possessio. 
 
Since their enjoyment seems only slight to him (earum rerum videatur ei levis fructus), it 
is implied that he has discovered some greater form of pleasure.  This idea is elaborated 
later in the speech when Scipio refers to the intellectual pleasures contemplative men 
experience when “they either hold interior conversation or are present, so to speak, in a 
council of the most learned men, in whose discoveries and writings they take delight.”231  
Moreover, the uncertainty of maintaining control over material goods (incertus 
dominatus) also makes them inferior to the more stable goods of the mind, which are not 
subject to fortune: “And who would consider anyone… more secure from the 
                                                          
231 Vel secum ipsi loquantur, vel quasi doctissimorum hominum in concilio adsint, cum 
eorum inventis scriptisque se oblectent. 
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depredations of fortune than the person who can, as they say, carry everything he owns 
out of a shipwreck with his own person?”232  Finally, since the contemplative man finds 
true value in the interior goods of the mind, he seeks material goods in moderation, only 
as much as he needs: “And who would consider anyone more rich than the person who 
lacks nothing that nature, in any case, requires?”233 
Scipio is careful to suggest to Laelius that this contemplative person will still 
participate in politics, but will do so out of an impulse for virtue rather than to gain glory 
or material goods, for which he has no desire.  While Scipio depreciates human affairs in 
comparison to the grandeur of the cosmos (1.26) and the mental consideration of what is 
“everlasting and divine” (sempiternum et divinum, 1.28),234 he does not mean to do away 
with political engagement.  Those who have pursued their natural desire to know will still 
engage in politics, but without any desire for power, glory, or rewards:  
He considers power and our consulships as necessary, not things to be 
passionately sought; to be taken up for the sake of fulfilling a duty, not to be 
hungered after for the sake of glory and rewards.  (Rep. 1.27) 
 
qui imperia consulatusque nostros in necessariis, non in expetendis rebus, muneris 
fungendi gratia subeundos, non praemiorum aut gloriae causa appetendos putet. 
 
                                                          
232 Quis vero… quemquam putet… firmiore fortuna quam qui ea possideat quae secum 
(ut aiunt) vel e naufragio possit ecferre? 
233 Quis vero divitiorem quemquam putet quam eum cui nihil desit, quod quidem natura 
desideret? 
234 From a Stoic point of view, the immanent divine mind who rules the universe is the 
“everlasting and divine” thing contemplated; in this sense, the passage looks forward to 
the princeps deus of the Dream (6.17, also called the summus deus in 6.21).  For the 
Peripatetics, the cosmos itself is divine, and in this sense, these ideas foreshadow the 
teaching of the Dream that everything above the moon is eternal, including the individual 
planets, whose eternal movements indicate their divinity (6.21).  On Cicero’s sources for 
this passage, see Perelli 1971. 
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Calling political offices necessaria is consistent with the Stoic argument from the preface 
that argued there is a necessitas virtutis given by nature that impels us to public 
service.235  That such public roles are still to be sought after, but in the right spirit, is 
evident from the clause that follows, where they are to be assumed for the sake of 
fulfilling a duty, a duty that is implicitly natural, since this statement is in parallel with 
the call to view them as necessaria.  Thus Scipio’s speech continues the process Cicero 
began in the preface of displacing the glory motive for political engagement with a 
motive derived from Stoic philosophy, namely the desire to live in accordance with 
nature, allowing oneself to be carried along by a natural love to defend the common 
safety (cf. 1.1). 
 In addition to his assertion of the delight to be found in these studies and the 
extensive rhetorical ornamentation of the passage, two other salient rhetorical strategies 
are in visible in Scipio’s attempt to inspire Laelius (and the normative reader) to an 
enthusiasm for abstract philosophical subjects.  Scipio’s also appeals to the desire for 
happiness and to authoritative exempla.  Scipio claims that the contemplative person is 
happy because of the enlightened and virtuous state of soul he has achieved through his 
studies.  For example, Scipio marvels at “how fortunate” (quam… fortunatus) we should 
                                                          
235 Pace Atkins 2013a: 35, Scipio is not contradicting the argument of the preface that 
criticized certain philosophers for only being willing to govern in the case of an 
emergency, designated by the hendiadys necessitas et tempus at 1.10.  By necessaria, 
Scipio does not designate an emergency, but something that is necessary by nature.  Thus 
Scipio does not radically separate the philosophic life from political life, but unites them 
on the basis of the idea that we have a natural inclination to both lives (a notion common 
to several philosophers, including Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics).  Thus the philosopher 




consider the person who undergoes political activity for the sake of fulfilling a duty rather 
than avidly seeking glory (1.27), and exclaims that no one can be considered “more 
blessed than the one who has been freed from every disturbance of soul” (1.28).236  
Furthermore, Scipio marshals the authoritative exempla of his grandfather Africanus and 
of himself to argue that the contemplative person experiences happiness through study.  
Scipio counterintuitively presents contemplation as more active than the active life 
itself:237 “How fortunate should this person be considered… who can declare of himself 
the same thing as Cato writes that my grandfather Africanus used to say, that he was 
never doing more than when he was doing nothing, that he was never less alone than 
when he was alone” (1.27).238  Finally, in bringing his speech to a conclusion, Scipio 
declares: “And so, Tubero, learning, learned men, and those studies of yours have always 
brought me delight” (1.29).239  Scipio’s personal auctoritas has already been a means of 
persuasion, since he was the speaker of all those sentiments in favor of the contemplative 
life, but in concluding, he makes more explicit the autobiographical subtext of those 
remarks.  Since he, Scipio, esteems these abstract studies so highly and can personally 
attest to their great value, Laelius ought to be inspired to imitate his example.  Indeed, in 
the final analysis, Scipio’s speech amounts to something of a Ciceronian 
                                                          
236 Quis vero… quemquam putet… beatiorem quam qui sit omni perturbatione animi 
liberatus? 
237 Possibly Cicero is inspired by the beginning of Aristotle Politics 7, where Aristotle’s 
apologia for the contemplative life includes the argument that contemplation is in fact an 
activity, and a superior activity. 
238 quam est hic fortunatus putandus… qui denique ut Africanum avum meum scribit Cato 
solitum esse dicere, possit idem de se praedicare, numquam se plus agree quam nihil cum 
ageret, numquam minus solum esse quam cum solus esset. 




autobiography.240  Scipio’s supposed enthusiasm for study, especially cosmology, makes 
us think of Cicero himself, whether we consider his youthful translation of Aratus or the 
ongoing life of study that complemented his public activity as attested in the Pro Archia 
(12-14) and in the final verses of the Muse Urania’s exhortation in De Consulatu Suo 
(2.55-65).241 
 Although I view this passage as primarily addressed to Laelius, Scipio’s express 
address to Tubero in the last sentence suggests that the speech has a particular message 
for the young Stoic as well.  While Scipio appears to conclude with a straightforward 
endorsement of Tubero’s interests in cosmology and mathematics, the preceding content 
of Scipio’s speech actually indicates to Tubero a way of studying cosmology that is 
chiefly moralistic in orientation, concentrating on the benefits to individual human beings 
and society, in contrast with Tubero’s Stoic focus on scientifically dogmatic answers to 
abstruse theoretical questions that have no direct bearing on human existence.  Thus, just 
as Scipio’s speech was initially prompted by Tubero, he also ends his speech with a nod 
in Tubero’s direction.  Reacting to Scipio’s observations on the political utility of 
cosmology, Tubero believes he has spotted a volte-face: “Do you see now, Africanus, that 
what seemed otherwise to you a little earlier, that learn[ing] (?) …” (1.26).242  His 
response is cut short by the loss of two leaves, but it is fairly clear that Tubero is pointing 
out a contrast between Scipio’s current remarks and his earlier praise of the historical 
Socrates for setting aside consideration of the cosmos as absolutely irrelevant to human 
                                                          
240 Similarly, Cicero concludes his praise of philosophy at Leg. 1.58-63 (often compared 
with Rep. 1.26-29) with an autobiographical endorsement. 
241 See also e.g. Leg. 1.63, Brutus 306, 315. 
242 Videsne, Africane, quod paulo ante secus tibi videbatur, doc[trina? ***] 
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life.  Scipio responds to Tubero with a speech whose themes show that Scipio still does 
not agree with the dogmatic conclusions about the natural universe that Panaetius and the 
Stoics claim to reach through their cosmological investigations.  As we have seen in his 
address to Laelius, Scipio does not speak of solutions to complex cosmological problems, 
but focuses on more generally obvious conclusions to be drawn, such as the contrast in 
glory between the cosmos and the earth (1.26).  He also focuses on the moral conclusions 
to be drawn from these observations, and the new perspective on engaging in politics that 
these observations will engender (1.26-27).  Since men who engage in politics out of duty 
(1.27) will inevitably improve the character of Roman politics, Scipio implicitly focuses 
on the benefit of these studies to the body politic.  Thus through his moralizing vision of 
cosmology, Scipio continues to challenge Tubero to relate his abstract studies to human 
life and morals, and in this way to adopt a position that combines the cosmological and 
mathematical interests of Plato with the spirit of the historical Socrates, who was 
concerned above all with improving human life and morals. 
 In the immediate aftermath of Scipio’s speech, Cicero uses the pragmatic persona 
of Laelius to further Scipio’s purpose of balancing out Tubero’s apolitical inclinations.  
Cicero has already indicated through Scipio’s counterarguments that Laelius’s position 
against abstract studies is extreme, but that does not prevent Cicero from using Laelius as 
a voice to draw Tubero and the sort of reader he represents to a more pragmatic 
orientation.  Thus Laelius adopts the opposite extreme point of view in favor of politics at 
the expense of contemplation, urging Tubero to consider himself exclusively as a citizen 
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of Rome rather than of the cosmos, and to drop all consideration of cosmology as 
irrelevant to the real world: 
For why is the grandson of Lucius Paulus, and someone with such an uncle as 
Scipio, and who was born into one of the most noble families in so glorious a 
republic as ours, asking me how two suns have been seen, and is not asking how it 
is that in one republic there are two senates, and practically two peoples?... So if 
you’ll listen to me, young men: don’t be afraid of the second sun; for it’s either 
the case that no such thing can exist, or if we grant that things are as they appear, 
then it’s not a problem.  We cannot know anything about that stuff, or even if we 
knew it really well, we would be neither better nor happier on that account.  But 
for us to have one senate and people is both possible and a major problem until it 
happens.  And to heighten the contrast, we both know and see that if this unity is 
brought about, our lives will be better and happier.  (Rep. 1.31-32) 
 
Quid enim mihi Luci Pauli nepos, hoc avunculo, nobilissima in familia atque in 
hac tam clara re publica natus, quaerit quomodo duo soles visi sint, non quaerit 
cur in una re publica duo senatus et duo paene iam populi sint?...  Quamobrem si 
me audietis, adulescentes, solem alterum ne metueritis; aut enim nullus esse 
potest, aut sit sane ut visus est, modo ne sit molestus; aut scire istarum rerum 
nihil, aut etiamsi maxime sciemus, nec meliores ob eam scientiam nec beatiores 
esse possumus.  Senatum vero et populum ut unum habeamus, et fieri potest et 
permolestum est nisi fit; et secus esse scimus, et videmus, si id effectum sit, et 
melius nos esse victuros et beatius. 
 
Unlike Scipio, Laelius unambiguously embraces the position Scipio attributed to the 
historical Socrates on the inability of cosmology to contribute to human life or happiness 
(1.15).  Laelius directs two chief complaints at Tubero.  First, he suggests that Tubero’s 
insistence on theory is contrary to pietas, specifically to Tubero’s duty to maintain the 
traditional reputation of his own family for public service and to uphold the glory of his 
city, Rome.243  It is also utterly impractical to be concerning oneself with abstruse 
astronomical investigations in the midst of a political crisis.  However, although Laelius 
                                                          
243 Laelius emphasizes Tubero’s kinship to Scipio Aemilianus and the latter’s politically 
illustrious family.  But in fact, by the time of the late Republic, the Tuberones in 
particular had established a reputation for intellectual pursuits (see Rawson 1985: 95-96).   
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argues that cosmology has no relevance to the political world whatsoever, his own pivot 
from the quandary of the two suns to the problem of the two senates ironically suggests a 
way that cosmology might be related to politics, and may even foreshadow Scipio’s 
method of using the cosmos as an image of the ideal state244 in the Somnium, where a 
single sun’s exercise of rational control over the universe is arguably an image of what a 
unified senate is meant to do for the whole state.245  Thus, in spite of himself, Laelius 
joins Scipio’s effort to urge Tubero to find some way to link the cosmological 
considerations Tubero so loves to political and ethical ones.  For the moment, however, 
Laelius does succeed in entirely removing cosmology from the conversation in favor of 
Greek studies that are “more proper to free men and more broadly applicable, which we 
can make useful for life or even the republic itself” (1.30),246 namely ethics and political 
philosophy, which Laelius thinks bear no relation whatsoever to cosmology and abstract 
studies.  For Laelius, these are the only areas of Greek learning worth studying, and 
Cicero uses Laelius’s preference for political and ethical theory, to which the dialogue 
now turns, to balance out Tubero’s imbalanced focus on the more abstract Greek artes. 
 Returning to Scipio’s efforts to draw Laelius away from his own extreme 
pragmatic position, in the body of the work, Laelius remains fairly resistant to the value 
of abstract studies.  Laelius is not initially persuaded by Scipio’s speech to esteem or 
pursue abstract subjects of astronomy and mathematics.  His immediate response is to 
                                                          
244 The imago naturae Scipio suggests is necessary to illustrate the ideal state (2.66) 
seems to be the picture of the cosmos he gives in the Somnium (cf. Zetzel 1999: 55 n80 
and Atkins 2013a: 64-65). 
245 See the discussion in the next chapter. 
246 sunt alia liberiora et transfusa latius, quae vel ad usum vitae vel etiam ad ipsam rem 
publicam conferre possimus. 
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say, “I certainly won’t dare to say anything to all that, Scipio,” and the rest of his 
response is soon cut off by a lacuna (1.30).247  Since Laelius will only hear of political 
philosophy (the subject of Books 1 and 2) and ethics (Book 3), Scipio attempts to make 
the cosmos relevant to Laelius’s interests.  But even when Scipio makes a first try at 
using cosmology to illustrate political matters, Laelius insists that Scipio give up the 
comparison.  Attempting to illustrate the merits of monarchical rule, Scipio refers to the 
teaching of philosophers who believe the divine mind rules the whole universe (1.56).  
Laelius, however, politely asks Scipio, “please bring down this speech from that place to 
these things that are closer to us” (1.57fr.).248  Scipio complies in this context by turning 
to practical examples (cf. 1.58).  As far as we can tell from the fragmentary state of the 
work, it is not until its conclusion that Scipio makes another major extended effort to 
convince Laelius of the inherent value and political relevance of philosophic studies, 
including cosmology.249  
2) A new, philosophically informed politics 
i.) Reassessing the rhetoric of Book 3 
In Book 3, Cicero argues explicitly in the preface for the need the politician has of 
the teachings of the philosophers on both abstract and moral subjects, after which he 
stages a debate on justice in such a way as to privilege an ideal of ethically informed 
individual political engagement, characterized by personal moral restraint and motivated 
by the desire to attain to a virtuous state of soul.  Thus this debate on justice bears on the 
                                                          
247 Tum Laelius: ‘Non audeo equidem’ inquit ‘ad ista, Scipio, dicere…’ 
248 Quare si placet, deduc orationem tuam de eo loco ad haec citeriora. 
249 See the discussion in the next chapter. 
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question of whether justice exists and is profitable not only for the state, but for the 
individual as well.250  Of course, given the fragmentary nature of the text of Book 3, 
which survives only in an incomplete palimpsest and through quotations by late antique 
authors, my argument must remain on the level of hypothesis.251  And yet enough 
evidence has survived to make the case that the material in Book 3 serves to continue a 
sequence of persuasion focused on the normative reader, begun in the preface of Book 1, 
in which Cicero is at pains to demonstrate the political relevance and indeed the political 
necessity of philosophical ideas about virtue.  But while his effort to present Greek 
doctrines as a solid basis for engagement in politics was merely implicit in the preface of 
the first book, as I previously demonstrated in section III.A, it is at the front and center of 
Book 3.   
Scholars have interpreted the debate on justice as a typical instance of Cicero’s 
Academic method (common in the philosophic works of the 40s BCE) of argumentum in 
utramque partem, but far from simply recounting the equally balanced arguments of 
Carneades, Cicero has actually slanted them in his presentation with the goal of making 
the case for justice more persuasive, since I believe that Cicero is not concerned with a 
dispassionate exploration of ideas, but with motivating right action by politicians.  While 
the speeches of Philus and Laelius probably rest on the original arguments of 
                                                          
250 Because Scipio and the interlocutors speak of the need to investigate the question of 
justice in the state, and because this is the primary focus of the extant fragments, scholars 
have overlooked the problem of individual justice that is nonetheless also addressed in 
the extant material.  For analysis of the arguments as they bear on the question of justice 
in the state, see Büchner 1984, Zetzel 1996, Hahm 1999, and Powell 2012. 
251 On the text of Book 3, see Hahm 1999: 167 with further bibliography in n3. 
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Carneades,252 it is nevertheless the case that Cicero’s presentation of the debate is 
ultimately weighted in favor of Laelius’s position in three ways: he fronts the debate with 
a preface that trumpets the ideal of combining philosophic insights about virtue with 
political activity; he frames the debate with Philus’s preliminary expression of disgust at 
having to argue for injustice and Scipio’s subsequent praise of Laelius’s argument; and 
he assigns the argument for justice to Laelius, whose similarities in character to the 
normative reader gains that reader’s sympathy for his arguments. 
Here a problem may seem to arise, since the anti-philosophical Laelius seemed to 
represent the character of the normative reader.  How then can he become the means of 
persuading the normative reader to accept a philosophical vision?  Laelius’s character, 
however, was never identical to the normative reader’s, since prior to book 3, Laelius was 
characterized as both like and unlike the normative reader.  Laelius was like the 
normative reader, and thus represented the object of Scipio’s persuasion, in his hostility 
to abstract subjects and his belief that they bore no relation to politics; but, unlike the 
normative reader, Laelius was always in favor of other Greek studies, namely ethics and 
political philosophy (‘sunt alia [studia Graecorum]… quae vel ad usum vitae vel etiam 
ad ipsam rem publicam conferre possimus,’ 1.30).  Moreover, in the course of the 
discussion of constitutions in Books 1 and 2, it is implied that Laelius is highly learned in 
the political philosophy of Plato and the Peripatetics (see e.g. 1.66, 2.21-22).  Thus, while 
Laelius shares the normative reader’s prejudice against abstract studies and this reader’s 
                                                          
252 However, Ferrary 1977 and Hahm 1999 argue that Philus’s speech departs from 
Carneades in various ways.  For Cicero’s sources in Book 3, see Ferrary 1974 and 
Ferrary 1977 (on the speeches of Laelius and Philus, respectively), and Glucker 2001. 
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pragmatic orientation, Laelius’s pragmatic orientation is unique for its being informed by 
Greek learning.  It is thus in keeping with Laelius’s character that he should give a 
moralistic argument about justice in Book 3.  In addition, by choosing Laelius for this 
argument, Cicero continues his brilliant strategy of blurring the lines between the ideas of 
the mos maiorum and Greek learning in such a way as to make Greek learning appear to 
be part of Roman tradition.  That is, since the dialogue character Laelius purports to 
represent the historical Laelius, and since this character is presented as a traditional 
patriot who simultaneously embraces Greek ethical and political teachings, the normative 
reader is encouraged to conclude that professing and acting on the basis of such teachings 
is part of the mos maiorum.  Thus the third book differs from the preface of the first book 
by more expressly advancing Greek doctrines as the basis for political engagement.  
However, the third book continues the particular strategy, initially pursued in the preface 
of the first book, of attributing Greek doctrinal motives for engagement to the maiores, 
this time by attributing them to Laelius and to the other prestigious dialogue characters 
who express their approval of Laelius’s views. 
ii.) Promoting philosophic statesmanship in the preface of Book 3 
 The preface of the third book prepares the normative reader for Laelius’s 
philosophical argument that statesmen ought to engage in politics in a just manner for the 
sake of virtue itself as their reward rather than conventional gloria.  It argues for the ideal 
of combining a philosophical understanding of virtue with knowledge and experience of 
one’s own political tradition.  Cicero begins by suggesting that philosophers alone are 
authoritative teachers of virtue.  “Let us therefore think of those who have written about 
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the right way to live as great men, since indeed they are; let us consider them learned, let 
us consider them teachers of truth and virtue” (3.5).253  Cicero goes on to state that 
knowledge of political affairs, or “civil science and the government of peoples” (ratio 
civilis et disciplina populorum), should be considered no less important.  However, this 
form of knowledge can be potentially credited to two groups, either to philosophers who 
wrote about it in their leisure or to statesmen who discovered it through experience (3.5).  
When it comes to knowledge of political affairs, there is an implicit contrast with 
knowledge of virtue, which is credited to philosophers alone.  Thus it emerges that a 
proper understanding of virtue cannot be learned through political experience—and hence 
does not belong to the body of acquired practical knowledge that constitutes the Roman 
political tradition—and will have to be taken from (Greek) philosophers, all of which 
suggests that Roman politicians have something to learn from philosophers.  In this way 
Cicero is preparing the reader to be receptive to Laelius’s Stoic account of virtue as the 
politician’s reward in the body of the book.   
In this section Cicero deliberately distracts from the cultural novelty of what he is 
proposing by leading the reader to think that it is actually in keeping with the mos 
maiorum for politicians to learn from and advance the teachings of philosophers on 
virtue.  He asserts that Rome has historically been ruled by men who promoted the 
teachings of philosophers: “But this city alone has produced many men who, if they are 
not exactly wise (since they use this term in such a restricted way), are nevertheless 
certainly worthy of the highest praise, since they have cultivated the precepts and 
                                                          
253 Quare sint nobis isti qui de ratione vivendi disserunt magni homines, ut sunt; sint 
eruditi, sint veritatis et virtutis magistri. 
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discoveries of the wise” (3.4).254  These discoveries of the wise are “the principles of 
nature (naturae principia) that philosophers have promoted by their words and teachings” 
(3.4),255 among which principles is doubtless an understanding of the right way to live 
(ratio vivendi) and virtue, subjects which Cicero has designated as the proper sphere of 
philosophers (3.5), and the proper understanding of which, in keeping with the Stoic 
tenor of this passage, is derived from nature.  There is moreover a special appeal to 
Roman patriotism in Cicero’s words, since he claims that Rome is unique (haec… una 
civitas) in having produced many statesmen who learned from philosophers.  Thus Cicero 
reprises the strategy pursued in the preface of Book 1, where he simultaneously cited the 
patriotic behavior of statesmen from generations past and blurred the boundary between 
foreign Greek philosophical ideas and Roman tradition, anachronistically attributing to 
the maiores motives for political engagement that were actually foreign to traditional 
Roman culture.  Continuing to make this case in the preface to book 3, Cicero also 
adduces the example of the characters themselves in the dialogue he is in the process of 
recalling (cf. Cicero’s assertion of the dialogue’s historicity at 1.13) as additional 
evidence that combining Greek philosophy with Roman tradition is itself part of Roman 
tradition:  
For what could be more excellent than joining hands-on experience of important 
political affairs with studying and coming to know those theoretical subjects?  Or 
what greater perfection could be conceived than Publius Scipio, than Gaius 
Laelius, than Lucius Philus, who in order to avoid omitting anything that could 
contribute to illustrious men’s attainment of the highest praise, added to the 
                                                          
254 Plures vero haec tulit una civitas, si minus sapientes (quoniam id nomen illi tam 
restricte tenent), at certe summa laude dignos, quoniam sapientium praecepta et inventa 
coluerunt. 
255 illi verbis et artibus aluerunt naturae principia. 
184 
 
customs of their homeland and of their ancestors the foreign learning that 
originated with Socrates?  (Rep. 3.5) 
 
Quid enim potest esse praeclarius quam cum rerum magnarum tractatio atque 
usus cum illarum artium studiis et cognitione coniungitur?  Aut quid Publio 
Scipione, quid Gaio Laelio, quid Lucio Philo perfectius cogitari potest, qui ne 
quid praetermitterent quod ad summam laudem clarorum virorum pertineret, ad 
domesticum maiorumque morem etiam hanc a Socrate adventiciam doctrinam 
adhibuerunt? 
 
“Those theoretical subjects” (illae artes) and “the foreign learning that originated with 
Socrates” (a Socrate adventicia doctrina) refer back to the two subjects mentioned earlier 
in the same fragment (3.5), namely ethics (ratio vivendi) and political science (ratio 
civilis et disciplina populorum).  Furthermore, it comes as no surprise that the three 
characters Cicero singles out for praise are the principle speakers of Book 3,256 where 
they will be shown bringing the philosophers’ teachings about justice and virtue to bear 
on political life.  Even Philus, the spokesman on behalf of injustice, is no exception, since 
by denouncing his own arguments before delivering them he in effect joins Scipio in 
endorsing Laelius’s case for political engagement characterized by justice and motivated 
by the reward of virtue itself (cf. section iii. below).  Thus, before it even begins, the 
debate on whether justice is needful for the state and whether it is profitable to act 
virtuously in political life has already been slanted, through the authoritative 
pronouncements of the author and the authoritative example of the interlocutors, in favor 
of a politics grounded in a philosophical understanding of virtue. 
In the passages we have just reviewed in which Cicero promotes his ideal of 
political engagement informed by the ethical teachings of philosophers, Cicero may also 
                                                          
256 Hahm 199: 167. 
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be seen employing an epideictic strategy, praising great Romans of the past for pursuing 
this ideal and motivating the normative reader to imitate them by appealing to this 
reader’s own appetite for such praise.  Cicero asserted that the large number of Roman 
politicians who “cultivated and promoted the precepts and discoveries of the wise” 
deserve the highest praise for doing so (summa laude digni, 3.4).  Then he declared that 
when Scipio, Laelius, and Philus added Greek learning to the mos maiorum, they were 
seeking something that “could contribute to illustrious men’s attainment of the highest 
praise” (quod ad summam laudem clarorum virorum pertineret, 3.5).  In that sentence, 
Cicero also used rhetorical questions to lavish praise on the ideal itself (quid 
praeclarius?) and on those who practiced it, including the rhetorical ornamentation of 
anaphora (quid Publio Scipione, quid Gaio Laelio, quid Lucio Philo perfectius?).  To 
these laudatory sentiments Cicero added a generalizing conclusion that showed the way 
for the normative reader to become such a praiseworthy man himself: “Therefore 
whoever has been willing and able to acquire both, that is to instruct himself in both what 
our ancestors have established and in learning, I consider to have acquired everything 
necessary for this praise” (3.5).257  By constantly emphasizing the praiseworthiness of the 
ideal and of those who practice it, Cicero appeals to the Roman elite’s ingrained desire 
for praise and distinction while significantly proposing a new grounds for such praise: not 
merely serving the state, but informing one’s statesmanship with philosophical 
knowledge of virtue.  Cicero’s establishing a new basis for praise in this preface 
foreshadows Laelius’s argument in the body of the book that the practice and possession 
                                                          
257 Quare qui utrumque voluit et potuit, id est ut cum maiorum institutis tum doctrina se 
instrueret, ad laudem hunc omnia consecutum puto. 
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of virtue itself makes one praiseworthy, even if only in one’s own eyes and despite lack 
of recognition from one’s fellow citizens.   
In addition to promoting the ideal of combining ethics and political philosophy 
with political activity, this fragmentary preface also shows evidence of continuing 
Cicero’s project from the first book (cf. 1.15-1.30) of urging the study of more abstract 
studies on the normative reader.  In the midst of a Stoic account of the discoveries of 
human reason, Cicero recounts the rise of mathematics and astronomy:  
To [language] was added number, something that is not only necessary for life but 
also the one immutable and eternal thing, which was the first to push us to the 
point of looking up into heaven; nor did we observe the movements of the 
constellations in vain, and by calculations of the nights and days [***]  (Rep. 3.2) 
 
Accessit eo numerus, res cum ad vitam necessaria, tum una immutabilis et 
aeterna, quae prima impulit etiam ut suspiceremus in caelum, nec frustra siderum 
motus intueremur, dinumerationibusque noctium ac die[rum ***]  
 
The claim that number as one of the discoveries of reason is important for life looks back 
to Scipio’s initially fruitless efforts to convince Laelius that such studies are useful for 
human life, while the success of human beings in making calculations (nec frustra… 
dinumerationibus) based on their observation of the heavens recalls Scipio’s argument 
about the accuracy of predictions that can be made through studying the cosmos (1.25).  
But this passage also looks forward.  Its underscoring of number as immutable and 
eternal looks ahead to the Pythagorean numerology of the Somnium, which is also 
foreshadowed by the mention of the constellations.  It seems that Cicero limits himself to 
making a feint towards these themes in this preface lest it be entirely forgotten between 
the first and the sixth books, since in all likelihood it is not until the Somnium that 
Cicero, through Scipio, will fully develop the relevance of mathematical and 
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cosmological knowledge to politics.  While the preface of Book 3 implies that even these 
more abstract subjects can be useful for politics, since these subjects seem to warrant 
inclusion among “those arts” (illae artes) that Cicero recommends should be combined 
with political action and experience (3.5), these abstract subjects are absent from the 
body of Book 3, as far as we can tell.258  The body of the third book is focused rather on 
the ethical questions and their relevance for the state and statesman. 
iii.) Framing the debate in favor of justice 
Cicero frames the debate on justice in such a way as to incline the reader to side 
with the case for justice.  Prior to the debate, Philus chafes at the morally repugnant task 
assigned him of rehearsing the arguments for injustice: 
Well it’s really an excellent case you’re delegating to me, as you want me to 
undertake a plea on behalf of immorality! … All right, whatever.  I’ll humor you, 
and defile myself intentionally… But if only it were permitted me to use someone 
else’s mouth, just as I’m about to use someone else’s speech!  Now, Lucius Furius 
Philus will have to say the same things as Carneades, a Greek man whose custom 
it was [to employ] in his discourses what was agreeable [***]  (Rep. 3.7) 
 
Praeclaram vero causam ad me defertis, cum me improbitatis patrocinium 
suscipere vultis! … Heia vero, geram morem vobis, et me oblinam sciens… 
Atque utinam, quemadmodum oratione sum usurus aliena, sic mihi ore uti liceret 
alieno!  Nunc ea dicenda sunt Lucio Furio Philo, quae Carneades, Graecus homo 
et consuetus quod commodum esset verbis [***] 
 
Thus the very person designated to make the case for injustice condemns injustice before 
he has even opened his mouth to speak in its defense.  Given the preponderance of 
judicial language (causa, patrocinium suscipere) is as if a lawyer were to disavow his 
arguments in favor of his client when speaking to the jurors in some private meeting with 
                                                          
258 These themes are absent from the extant fragments; it is perhaps more telling that 




them prior to delivering those arguments at the formal trial, a highly ineffective 
procedure for persuading those jurors to believe his arguments; quite the opposite, in fact.  
Giving his full name, Philus also decries the incongruity of having a Roman of noble 
pedigree serve as spokesmen for ideas that were originally advanced by one “Carneades, 
a Greek man,” whom Philus (apparently) characterizes as a flippant intellectual 
opportunist (consuetus quod commodum esset verbis [***]).  Cicero, therefore, further 
prejudices the reader against the upcoming advocacy of injustice by presenting it as 
something foreign to Rome—specifically, Greek—and even worse, as some intellectual 
plaything lacking seriousness, an additional violation of the Roman ethos, this time in 
terms of gravitas. 
The metaphor of judicial advocacy arises again in Scipio’s response to Laelius’s 
speech, in which he praises Laelius as a skilled advocate, effectively endorsing Laelius’s 
argument.  Philus spoke first, followed by Laelius.  Cicero narrates the immediate 
aftermath of Laelius’s speech as follows: 
And when Laelius had finished this speech, although everyone there indicated that 
they were exceedingly pleased by it, nevertheless Scipio, as if more affected than 
the others by some paroxysm of joy, said: ‘So often have you defended many 
causes, Laelius, in such a way that not only [would I not rank] as your equal 
Servius Galba, my colleague (whom you ranked above all others as long as he 
was alive), but also not even [would I rank as your equal] any of the Attic orators 
either in [sweetness ***]  (Rep. 3.34) 
 
Quae cum dixisset Laelius, etsi omnes qui aderant significabant ab eo se esse 
admodum delectatos, gamen praeter ceteros Scipio quasi quodam gaudio elatus, 
‘Multas tu quidem,’ inquit, ‘Laeli, saepe causas ita defendisti ut ego non modo 
tecum Servium Galbam, collegam nostrum, quem tu quoad vixit omnibus 





Scipio’s effusive praise for Laelius is presented as the crowning signal of approval for a 
speech that was already heartily approved by the entire gathering.  Thus to the approval 
of the other interlocutors, consisting of the most prestigious Romans of a previous 
generation, Cicero adds the approval of Scipio, the most authoritative of their number, 
thus increasing the persuasive force of the speech.  Scipio signals to the reader that 
Laelius’s argument is the more persuasive.  Therefore, both before and after the debate, 
Cicero employs the auctoritas of the dialogue personae, themselves prestigious figures 
from the Roman past, to make the reader think that Laelius has the right answer in this 
debate. 
 Though Cicero frames the debate in a slanted manner, this is not to say that he 
himself does not maintain skeptical reserve.  Cicero’s own position and the rhetorical 
effect on the reader of his presentation of the issues are two different issues.  Cicero 
maintains the integrity of the debate as a legitimate philosophic issue despite Philus’s 
expressions of moral repugnance at the arguments in favor of injustice.  Philus’s 
expressions of disgust merely indicate that the arguments in favor of injustice are 
morally, though not necessarily logically, inferior.  Furthermore, as commentators have 
noted, Scipio’s praise of Laelius’s argument for its persuasiveness is not necessarily an 
endorsement of its truth.  There are, therefore, indications of Cicero’s Academic 
skepticism in his treatment of this issue.  And yet these details would have been 
perceived only by a minority of careful and more sophisticated readers.  It is a mistake to 
emphasize these subtle notes of skepticism and thus miss the main point that Cicero 
intended the majority of his readers to take away from their reading of this passage.  
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Furthermore, Scipio’s subtle expression of doubt need not indicate Academic suspension 
of all judgment on the question of justice, but rather doubt about Laelius’s specific 
arguments in its favor.259  In fact, Scipio’s faint praise lays the groundwork for his 
subsequent argument in the Dream, in which he corrects Laelius’s argument by 
establishing justice on a different foundation.260 
iv.) Laelius’s speech: virtue as its own reward 
Cicero uses Laelius’s argument that the reward of acting justly is virtue itself, 
whether one is recognized by others or not, to draw Roman elites to conduct themselves 
with greater moral restrain in public life, and in this way to improve the character of 
Roman politics in general.  According to Laelius, it is in the individual’s own interest to 
act justly for the sake of maintaining the interior harmony of the soul which constitutes 
virtue.  However, as far as one can tell from the little that has survived of Laelius’s 
speech, Laelius does not acknowledge the Greek and/or Stoic origin of the ideal he 
advances of virtue as the highest good and its own reward.  While Cicero had Philus 
attribute his arguments for injustice to a Greek intellectual, the case for virtue as its own 
reward is made to seem more Roman than it really is by remaining unattributed to any 
Greek school and by being assigned to the persona of Laelius.  Although Laelius has 
                                                          
259 Zetzel 1999: 62 n9 notes that “speaking on both sides of a question with equal 
conviction was the basic method used by academic skeptics (including Carneades) for 
proving to their hearers and to themselves the impossibility of certain knowledge of 
anything.”  However, the words of Laelius (3.8) on which Zetzel is commenting here do 
not present the method as leading to denial of knowledge, but rather “to arrive at the truth 
most easily” (Zetzel trans.).  I will argue in the next chapter that Scipio in the Somnium 
presents the truth about justice by combining certain ideas from both Philus’s and 
Laelius’s speeches. 
260 See the next chapter. 
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previously given indication of his extensive learning in Greek ethics and political 
philosophy, his contempt for more abstract Greek studies, his pragmatic orientation, and 
his salient patriotism all contribute to rendering him trustworthy to the normative reader.  
Thus the ideas in Laelius’s speech are made more persuasive to the normative reader 
primarily by means of the persona’s previously constructed ethos. 
The main principle of Laelius’s response to Philus is that man’s nature is 
composed of both body and soul, and that the goods of the soul are higher and preferable 
to those of the body.  It is likely that Laelius was the speaker of an unattributed line from 
De Re Publica that Cicero appropriately quotes in a letter to Atticus, lamenting Caesar 
and Pompey’s unscrupulous pursuit of power:  
And if, as you point out to me, I was correct when I said in that book that “there is 
nothing good except what is noble, and nothing evil except what is base,” then 
each of those awful men is no doubt utterly miserable.  To neither of them have 
the well-being and honor of the fatherland ever been more important than their 
own power and private convenience.  (Att. 10.4.4)  
 
et si, ut nos a te admonemur, recte in illis libris diximus nihil esse bonum nisi 
quod honestum, nihil malum nisi quod turpe sit, certe uterque istorum est 
miserrimus, quorum utrique semper patriae salus et dignitas posterior sua 
dominatione et domesticis commodis fuit.261   
 
The quotation states the classic Stoic corollary of the notion that virtue is the highest and 
only good.  Attributing this line to Laelius, and to his speech on justice in Book 3, is quite 
reasonable considering that his arguments depreciate the exterior things that Philus had 
claimed men were wise to pursue by committing injustice. 
Laelius reunites wisdom and justice by arguing that justice is defined by the 
soul’s internal harmony, which is synonymous with virtue, the good of the soul.  It is 
                                                          
261 Text taken from Shackleton Bailey 1999. 
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wise to act justly, then, because it leads to your own good: a state of internal harmony in 
your soul in which reason rules over desire.  Laelius’s conception of the soul can be seen 
in a fragment in which his immediate aim is to demonstrate that there are two different 
kinds of rule, persuasive and despotic: 
But it should be understood that there are different kinds of command and 
servitude.  For as the soul is said to command the body, and is also said to 
command desire; but it commands the body as a king commands his citizens or a 
parent his children, whereas it commands desire as a master commands his slaves, 
because it applies force and breaks it.  Kings, military commanders, magistrates, 
fathers exercise rule—and peoples over their citizens and allies—in the same way 
as the soul rules bodies; however, masters wear down their slaves in the same way 
as the best part of the soul—wisdom, that is—wears down the vicious and weak 
parts of the same soul, such as desires, feelings of anger, and other passions.  
(Rep. 3.22) 
 
Sed et imperandi et serviendi sunt dissimilitudines cognoscendae.  Nam ut animus 
corpori dicitur imperare, dicitur etiam libidini, sed corpori ut rex civibus suis aut 
parens liberis, libidini autem ut servis dominus, quod eam coercet et frangit.  Sic 
regum, sic imperatorum, sic magistratuum, sic patrum, sic populorum imperia 
civibus sociisque praesunt, ut corporibus animus; domini autem servos ita 
fatigant, ut optima pars animi, id est sapientia, eiusdem animi vitiosas 
imbecillasque partes, ut libidines, ut iracundias, ut perturbationes ceteras. 
 
Laelius suggests that the soul is composed of at least two parts: a rational part, wisdom, 
and a passionate part, which may be further subdivided according to specific passions, 
such as lust, anger, etc.262  Laelius’s argument about the proper order within the soul also 
suggests that only a virtuous man is free, since he keeps desire, anger, and other passions 
                                                          
262 Cf. also Cicero Rep. 1.60, where Scipio describes the parts of the soul in similar terms 
to Laelius’s (though Scipio uses the two terms ratio and consilium to designate the “best 
part of the soul”), with the same specific designations of desire and anger (and using the 
same vocabulary, libidines and iracundiae) within the passionate part.  Both passages 
bear a superficial similarity to the notion of the tripartite soul in Book 4 of Plato’s 
Republic: reason, anger or spiritedness, and desire or appetite.  This account of the soul is 
explored in great detail in Plato; there may have been a similar explanation in Cicero’s 
Republic, now lost. 
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in a state of servitude.  This represents, therefore, an appeal to the ambitious elite 
Roman’s sense of himself as a free man.  He is being told that if he pursues his desires for 
pleasure, money, or fame in a disordered fashion, he is a slave.  To be free, he must 
pursue virtue by maintaining his soul in a state of justice in which reason rules passion.  
But what determines whether or not an action is reasonable and virtuous, and thus 
fosters justice—the rule of reason over the passions—within the soul?  In other words, 
what makes virtuous, noble actions good (nihil bonum nisi honestum)?  The foundation of 
virtue is nature, or natural law, whose existence is, for Laelius, axiomatic: “There 
assuredly is a true law, right reason in keeping with nature, spread among all men, 
unchanging, everlasting; its way is to summon to duty by commanding it, and to deter 
from doing harm by prohibiting it” (3.27).263  Because of this natural law, some things 
are good by nature and others evil: good actions are in keeping with right reason.  So this 
natural law is the foundation of the virtues: some actions are naturally good because they 
are reasonable, and are not simply thought to be good by convention or society.  We can 
get a sense of the argument Laelius developed from Cicero’s paraphrase of it in a passage 
of a later philosophic work on ethics: “It is evident that if fairness, honesty, and justice do 
not take their rise from nature, and if all these things are to be motivated by utility, then a 
good man cannot be found.  And on these matters, quite enough was said by Laelius in 
my books De Re Publica” (De Finibus 2.59).264  Furthermore, the specific virtue of 
                                                          
263 Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, 
sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat. 
264 Perspicuum est enim, nisi aequitas, fides, iustitia proficiscantur a natura, et si omnia 
haec ad utilitatem referantur, virum bonum non posse reperiri, deque his rebus satis 
multa in nostris de re publica libris sunt dicta a Laelio (text taken from Rackham 1931). 
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justice that derives from natural law is to be distinguished from the concept of justice as 
order within the soul (though the former will be a condition of the latter, since the latter 
requires the practice of the virtues).  The virtue of justice arises from nature, and is 
oriented towards the interest of others.  It is likely that Laelius made this argument given 
the following words of Cicero in another letter to Atticus:  
Our friends Lucius and Patro, when they make everything motivated by self-
interest and hold that nothing is to be done for the sake of another person, and say 
that a man ought to be good lest he have any problems and not because this is 
right by nature, they fail to understand that they are speaking of a clever person, 
not a good man.  But I suppose these matters are to be found in those books which 
you have praised and thereby given me new courage.  (Att. 7.2.4) 
 
Lucius noster et Patron… cum omnia ad se referant <nec> quicquam alterius 
causa fieri putent et cum ea re bonum virum esse oportere dicant ne malum 
habeat, non quo<d> id natura rectum sit, non intellegunt se de callido homine 
loqui, non de bono viro.  sed haec, opinor, sunt in iis libris quos tu laudando 
animos mihi addidisti.265 
 
We have already encountered this same Stoic argument about justice as serving the 
interest of others: it occurred in the preface of the first book, where Cicero suggested that 
a necessitas virtutis arising from nature moves us to serve the common interest (1.1, 1.3); 
and in Scipio’s praise of philosophy, where he argued that the philosopher participates in 
politics as in necessariis, fulfilling a duty (1.27).  Consequently, there seems to be an 
unacknowledged tension in Laelius’s Stoic account of justice regarding the motive for 
acting justly: is our motive in acting justly simply to do what is naturally good, benefiting 
others by the fulfillment of a duty to which we are naturally inclined?  Or is our motive in 
thus acting for the benefit of others (and doing other virtuous actions) ultimately our own 
                                                          
265 Text taken from Shackleton Bailey 1999. 
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happiness, which depends on maintaining just order within our souls through the practice 
of the virtues?   
In the end, the evidence of other extant fragments from Laelius’s argument 
inclines towards the latter answer, according to which one acts virtuously out of 
enlightened self-interest, seeking one’s own happiness.  These fragments suggest that 
Laelius emphasized the ultimate motive of seeking virtue as its own reward, the 
possession of which is pleasant to the individual: 
Virtue clearly desires honor, nor is there any other payment for virtue; 
nevertheless, it receives it calmly, and does not bitterly demand it.  (Rep. 3.28) 
 
Virtus paene vult honorem, nec est virtutis ulla alia merces; quam tamen illa 
accipit facile, exigit non acerbe. 
 
But if everyone proves ungrateful, or the many become envious, or powerful 
enemies strip virtue of its own booty, assuredly it delights itself with many 
consolations, and above all it holds itself up on its own by its own splendor.  (Rep. 
3.31) 
 
Sed si aut ingrati universi, aut invidi multi, aut inimici potentes suis virtutem 
praemiis spoliant, ne illa se multis solaciis oblectat, maximeque suo decore se ipsa 
sustentat. 
 
Each fragment rather incongruously introduces the human and civic glory motive into the 
Stoic argumentative context.  Laelius thus reveals his limitations as a philosopher and his 
attachment to the traditional Roman cultural code.  But Cicero also has Laelius mention it 
to help the ambitious reader identify with Laelius, and thus be receptive to the higher 
motive Laelius suggests in the event that the statesman does not receive his due from the 
public for generously serving the interests of the state: he should not become upset, but 
rather seek happiness in himself, contemplating the resplendent internal harmony of his 
own soul.  There is, however, a certain negative impression one can get of this kind of 
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self-contemplating virtue, and it prepares the reader who finds these ideas unattractive for 
the subtle critique to which Laelius’s conception will be subjected by Scipio in his 
Dream.266  The problem is that from the numerous intensive, demonstrative, and reflexive 
pronouns as well as reflexive adjectives–and all in close proximity to one another (illa 
se… suo… se ipsa)—one gets the impression of virtue as fundamentally self-centered; the 
language and the sentence structure itself reveal a virtue that is closed in on itself.  A 
similar concentration on the virtuous man’s enjoyment of the reward he possesses within 
himself may be seen in the following fragment, though with a less suffocating effect: 
“What riches will you hold out to this man, what power, what offices, seeing that he 
considers that stuff to be merely human, but judges his own goods to be divine?” 
(3.29).267  This passage still refers to the virtuous man’s self-regard, presented as an 
alternative to esteeming the external goods of political ambition and riches.  Laelius’s 
argument of virtue as its own reward is also totally consistent with his position on natural 
law, and shows that in the Stoic account, acting justly is not ultimately for the benefit of 
others but for the benefit of one’s own soul.  For failure to observe this law is equivalent 
to self-inflicted punishment:  
It does not command or prohibit upright men in vain, nor does it have any effect 
on wicked men by commanding or prohibiting… whoever does not obey this law 
is himself fleeing himself, plus by this very fact of having spurned human nature 
he pays the greatest penalties, even if he manages to escape the other things that 
are considered punishments.  (Rep. 3.27) 
 
quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut vetat, nec improbos iubendo aut 
vetando movet… cui [legi] qui non parebit ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis 
                                                          
266 See Section II of the next chapter. 
267 Huic tu viro quas divitias obicies, quae imperia, quae regna, qui ista putat humana, 
sua bona divina iudicat? 
197 
 
aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiamsi cetera supplicia quae putantur 
effugerit. 
 
Once again, obeying the natural law really seems to have everything to do with the 
individual, as there are no references to the effects of his behavior on society or anyone 
else; another striking phrase appears with the intensive and reflexive pronouns placed one 
after the other (ipse se).  Obeying the natural law and thus practicing virtue require 
observing a sort of personal honor code.  One is prompted to be virtuous out of the desire 
to maintain one’s sense of self-worth.   
The whole argument about natural law, virtue as the highest good, and virtue as 
its own reward calls to mind the attitude and behavior of Cicero’s contemporary and ally 
in the republican cause, Cato.  By advancing these arguments, Cicero is seeking to 
introduce elite Romans to a more noble manner of life that, like the patriotic and noble 
Cato’s, can be of great utility to the Republic.  However, since we know of Cicero’s 
misgivings about Cato from the public speech Pro Murena and from some private letters 
to Atticus, especially the impracticality of his beliefs and his rigid manner of acting, it 
stands to reason that Cicero’s does not view these Stoic ideas as the best possible 
philosophical grounding of political action.  Thus, as I will show in the next chapter, 
Scipio will subject them to an implicit critique in the Somnium. 
To summarize, Cicero employs Laelius’s Stoic argument about virtue as its own 
reward to persuade ambitious Roman readers that one should not enter politics for civic 
glory or to seize external goods.  He holds out virtue itself as a greater good than civic 
glory.  Although civic glory is a reward one deserves for justly benefitting the state, the 
best reward for engaging in politics is the benefit done to one’s own soul.  By practicing 
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virtue, which involves benefitting the state, you possess the highest good possible, and 
thus benefit yourself as well.  Practicing virtue requires not acting rapaciously in public 
life, because that would upset your internal riches or possession of justice, a state of 
harmony in which reason prevails over excessive desires.  Cicero thus educates his 
ambitious Roman readers in the ways of philosophy, hoping to produce philosophic 
statesmen who will engage in politics with a sense of high moral character that will 
simultaneously prove beneficial to themselves and to the Roman Republic. 
IV. Conclusion 
From the discussion in this chapter, I hope it is clear that De Re Publica is 
strongly linked to Pro Sestio by shared theme.  In both works, Cicero sets out the defense 
of the traditional republican constitution as the axiomatic goal of political engagement 
and is also concerned with providing the reader with incentives to pursue such 
engagement, suggesting various motives, among which there is a good deal of common 
ground.  Both works, appeal to traditional Roman values of patriotism, manliness or 
courage (virtus), and the prospect of the special civic glory that is the due of those who 
risk their private interests to preserve the Roman state.  These appeals, moreover, seem to 
be addressed in both works to the same kind of reader, a member of the Roman elite who 
is abstaining from taking a public stand in favor of the republic at the risk of making 
enemies and losing the enjoyment of his private pleasures. 
There is, however, a noticeable difference between the two works in the way De 
Re Publica places greater emphasis on philosophical arguments for political engagement, 
which Cicero uses to draw the reader to more noble motives for action than the winning 
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of civic glory.  The difference in motives emphasized arises from changes in both genre 
and historical moment, but of these two factors, the second is more fundamental, since it 
is the cause of the first.  Only months after delivering Pro Sestio and promising would-be 
statesmen that civic glory from the boni and a grateful public was available for those who 
would defend the Republic (the necessary corollary of which was resistance to the 
triumvirs), Cicero’s first period of forced retirement commenced with the renewal of the 
triumvirate.  This led to an immediate loss in dignitas, as Cicero eschewed the senate on 
the day for which he himself had helped schedule a debate over Caesar’s Campanian land 
law.  Even worse, to this passive compliance with the triumvirs, Cicero added public 
support by defending the renewal of Caesar’s appointment in Gaul.  In doing all of this, 
Cicero felt he was acting under necessity, and privately deplored his state of affairs.  
Thus Cicero had to confront the public scandal of his own compromise with the 
triumvirs, and felt obliged to find some way to mitigate the impression that he was giving 
up the fight for the republic, lest others give up the fight as well.  Writing dialogues on 
the place of the orator in public life (De Oratore) and on political philosophy (De Re 
Publica and De Legibus) allowed him to continue advancing the case for republican 
political engagement in another forum.   
The change in circumstances also revealed the instability of the republican 
statesman’s personal fortune, and thus forced Cicero to seek new justifications for being 
loyal to the republic, both for himself and for others.  Cicero hoped to become influential 
again at Rome, but he had to ask himself and his readers whether the republican policies 
he had pursued and hoped to pursue again could be considered worthwhile in the event 
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that he should fail to succeed or attain greater social status as a reward for that success.  
Thus, in De Re Publica, Cicero fundamentally departs from the strategy he pursued in 
Pro Sestio of holding out contemporary and posthumous civic glory as spurs to 
republican engagement.  Instead, he advances new motives for engagement that are 
fitting both to the times and to the genre, advocating the Stoic notion that we have a 
natural inclination to care for others, the Platonic notion that we are born to serve our 
country because we have to give her some return for her benefits to us, and the Stoic 
ethical notion that acting virtuously in public (and private) life is worthwhile because 
virtue itself is desirable as an end, apart from the consideration of whether society 
recognizes your virtue and thus confers glory upon you.  These ethical notions are voiced 
by Cicero in the preface of the first book and by Laelius in the third book, and thus by 
personae who have been carefully fashioned in such a way as to win the trust of the 
normative reader.   
De Re Publica also has the unique feature, entirely appropriate to the genre, of 
containing an extended protreptic to philosophic activity itself, the pleasures of which 
Cicero hopes will lessen the attractions of power and wealth.  This case for embracing the 
contemplative life itself as a complement to the political life is placed in the mouth of 
Scipio, whose persuasive efforts in this regard directed at Laelius indicate Cicero’s 
appeal to the normative reader.  Among philosophic studies, broadly conceived, Cicero’s 
Scipio promotes more abstract subjects like cosmology and mathematics not only for 
their inherent delight but also because of their utility for statesmen, both in terms of 
practical applicability in public life and their positive moral effects, as they lead to 
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insights that reinforce the higher ethical ideals for engagement that Laelius agrees with.  
Laelius’s ideal, however, is purely ethical, while Scipio’s links contemplation of more 
abstract subjects to ethics: for Laelius, one behaves virtuously because he esteems virtue 
itself as his interior riches; for Scipio, the contemplative man despises external things and 
behaves with virtuous moderation because he has come to value the delight of gaining 
and possessing cosmological and mathematical insight over external gain.  Finally, De Re 
Publica also exhorts the reader to the more practical departments of philosophy, namely 
political theory and ethics, simply by depicting the authoritative Scipio, Laelius, and their 
illustrious contemporaries engaged in a conversation on political philosophy and ethics.  
Cicero seems to intend that the study of ethics, to which the reader is especially urged by 
the debate staged in the third book, will positively reinforce the ideal of acting virtuously 
as the means of political engagement and the attainment of virtue as its motive, while an 
immersion in political philosophy will acquaint the student with a deeper knowledge of 
the vicissitudes of regimes and thus prepare him to preserve the mixed regime, the end of 
engagement.  
Cicero’s particular focus in De Re Publica on promoting philosophical studies, 
importing Greek ethical ideas, and fictitiously constructing his dialogical personae as 
authoritative exemplars of philosophic statesmen suggest that he was increasingly of the 
opinion that the Roman Republic would not be saved primarily by a revival of the actual, 
historical mos maiorum—though he does try to revive it for a certain portion of his 
audience—or by a revival of the constitution of the middle republic and the statesmen 
who in actuality had failed to sustain it.  That generation no less than Cicero’s 
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contemporaries suffered from the absence of philosophy in Roman culture.  Cicero’s 
project in De Re Publica suggests that the well-being of the state lies rather in the 
prospect of a sublimation and reformation of the mos maiorum through the agency of 
philosophically informed statesmen.  This is not to say, however, that Cicero, though 
idealistic, was unduly optimistic.  As the Somnium will imply, Cicero’s most 
authoritative model of philosophical statesmanship in the dialogue, Scipio, will be killed 
before he can emerge from his forced leisure to guide the state to safety.  Cicero was 
doubtless aware that his attempts at persuasion could fail, and that even if he succeeded 
with some readers, adverse political circumstances or the ever-present improbi might 
prevent them from having any influence on public life, much like Cicero himself at the 














Chapter 3: Political Engagement Sub Specie Aeternitatis in the Somnium Scipionis 
“Use this [nature and power of the soul] in the best things!  But the best cares regard the 
welfare of the fatherland, driven and exercised by which the soul will fly up more quickly 
to this its seat and home; and it will do this more swiftly, if already while still enclosed in 
the body it emanates outwards, and contemplating the things beyond, withdraws itself 
from the body as much as possible.”  (Cicero, De Re Publica 6.33)268 
 
Introduction 
In my discussion of De Re Publica thus far, I have demonstrated that Cicero 
continues to make the case he made in Pro Sestio for political engagement motivated by 
the need to imitate the patriotism and courage of the maiores and directed towards the 
preservation of the traditional republican form of government.  In the philosophical work, 
however, he departs from the earlier speech’s consistent encouragement of civic glory as 
a motive by emphasizing instead motives drawn from Greek ethical philosophy.  Chief 
among these motives are the Stoic ideas that we have a natural inclination to practice 
virtue by serving our fellow man (1.1, 1.3), and that by fulfilling this inclination (and thus 
heeding the law of nature), we can attain the happiness of possessing virtue, regardless of 
the recognition of others (Book 3 passim).  The chief voices employed for advancing 
these ideas are Cicero’s authorial persona from the prefaces and the dialogical persona of 
Laelius.  In addition, for the same reason as Cicero proposes these Greek ethical motives 
for political engagement, Cicero also promotes the more abstract Greek studies of 
cosmology and mathematics, aiming at the same effect of detaching Roman souls from 
the fevered pursuit of glory and material goods, which these studies unmask as ephemeral 
and unsatisfying.  This persuasive effort takes place within the dialogue with Scipio as 
                                                          
268 References to the Somnium in this chapter are keyed to the new paragraph numbering 
of Powell 2006. 
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chief persuader and Laelius as chief persuadee.  The readers Cicero aimed to bring 
around to these ethical ideals and to the study of these abstract subjects were identified as 
consisting of a fairly insignificant number of politically withdrawn Epicureans, who were 
criticized for their neglect of theoretical and practical politics; a greater number of what I 
have termed “Epicures,” who were initially made to feel shame for failing to display the 
courage and public spirit of their ancestors; and most of all the “normative” audience of 
politically ambitious and politically active Roman elites, whose desire for glory, power, 
and wealth needed to be moderated for the sake of the Roman state.  Finally, it was 
shown that, to a lesser degree, Cicero also addresses the minority of politically active 
men in his reading audience attracted to the more abstract side of Stoicism, urging them 
to concentrate on cosmological insights that have political utility and to concentrate more 
on general moral conclusions than theoretical inquiry into abstruse questions. 
In the Somnium Scipionis, Cicero employs the auctoritas of Scipio Aemilianus, 
Aemilius Paulus, and the elder Scipio Africanus to reiterate several of the goals, means, 
and motives for political engagement previously advanced in De Re Publica.  But even 
more significantly, Cicero enunciates a cosmological and eschatological perspective that 
teaches the futility of civic glory even with posterity, and transforms virtue from an end 
in itself to a means to the true end, eternal contemplation.  In Section I below, I will show 
that, to a limited degree, Cicero uses the Somnium to confirm the work’s previous appeals 
to basic ideals of Roman tradition such as courage, patriotism, and duty to the reputation 
of one’s family, arguments for political engagement especially directed at those in his 
reading audience who neglect the mos maiorum, including quietist Epicureans, elite 
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Epicures, or Stoic-leaning politicians.  However, as I will show in Section II, the bulk of 
the Somnium is taken up with the exposition of a new cosmological and eschatological 
perspective that Cicero uses to target the normative reader with a critique of two motives 
for republican political engagement previously advanced by Laelius: first, the motive of 
glory with posterity, which Laelius advances just before the Somnium, and secondly, the 
motive of pursuing virtue for its own sake, which Laelius had advanced in the third book.  
In terms of the dialogical fiction, Scipio269 employs his own auctoritas and that of his 
ancestors in the revelatory dream to teach Laelius that glory with posterity will eventually 
perish and is thus no less futile than contemporary civic glory, while Laelius’s earlier 
teaching that the reward for just political engagement is the awareness of one’s virtue or 
justice, i.e. the temporal contemplation and enjoyment of the harmonious state of one’s 
soul, is corrected by Scipio’s doctrine of the immortal soul’s contemplation and 
enjoyment of the harmony and beauty of the cosmos.  Commentators have suggested that 
the Somnium restates Laelius’s position on virtue as inherently desirable, only from a 
transcendent point of view.270  But Scipio’s cosmology and eschatology actually 
transform Laelius’s virtue from an end in itself to a means to the end.  Moreover, since 
Laelius’s view of virtue as an end is essentially Stoic, Scipio should also be seen as 
critiquing Stoicism by adopting the traditional Platonic and Aristotelian view that the end 
of human life is contemplation.  Scholars have also overlooked Scipio’s rejection of 
                                                          
269 Throughout this chapter, I refer to Cicero’s dialogue character Scipio Aemilianus 
Africanus Minor as “Scipio,” while I refer to the character of Scipio Aemilianus’s 
adoptive grandfather, Scipio Africanus Maior, as “Africanus.” 
270 See Büchner 1984: 496 (on igitur alte spectare…), Zetzel 1995: 249 (on ipsa virtus 
trahat ad verum decus). 
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Laelius’s natural law teaching, the foundation of Laelius’s view that, absent gloria, 
awareness of one’s own virtue is the reward for political engagement, since god enforces 
natural law through the dictates of conscience.  The Somnium, however, posits the 
existence of a god who personally delights in upright political engagement and doles out 
rewards and punishments in the afterlife.271  This correction also represents a critique of 
Stoicism from a Platonic point of view, as Stoic natural law, whose effects are merely 
temporal, is faulted as an ultimately ineffective basis for promoting ethical political 
behavior compared with the promise of eternal reward.  As is well known, Cicero’s 
Platonic perspective is evident in his translation of the proof for the soul’s immortality 
from the Phaedrus and by his imitation of the Myth of Er.  But I particularly wish to 
draw attention to the rhetorical purpose of Scipio’s Platonic arguments as a corrective of 
Laelius’s Stoic ethical motives for political engagement. 
In Section III, I will show how the Somnium not only provides the statesman with 
the proper personal motivation for engaging in politics, but also functions more generally 
as a protreptic to pursuing contemplative activity as a complement to engaging in politics, 
thus bringing to a conclusion a persuasive process focused chiefly on the normative 
reader, represented by the pragmatist Laelius, but also on Stoicizing politicians, 
exemplified by Tubero, who neglect the link between contemplation and action.  This 
                                                          
271 Zetzel 1995: 230 refers to Laelius’s natural law teaching in Book 3 as “a crucial step” 
in De Re Publica’s argument “justifying proper political action.”  It is not clear whether 
Zetzel views the Dream’s teaching about eternal reward and punishment as coherent with 
Laelius’s, though referring to that teaching as “a step in the argument” seems to imply 
coherence.  Zetzel 1996 emphasizes the discontinuity between Laelius’s perspective in 
Book 3, where he declares the possibility of Rome’s being eternal, and the Somnium’s 
assurance that nations and their memory will eventually perish. 
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persuasive process began during the initial discussion among the interlocutors (1.16-30) 
and was especially prosecuted by Scipio during his speech in favor of contemplative 
pursuits (1.26-29).  Cicero promotes philosophy in the Somnium with two chief rhetorical 
aims.  The first aim is to provide both kinds of readers with knowledge of the means and 
ends of statesmanship—which Cicero indicates are, respectively, the practice of an 
altruistic justice and the preservation of social harmony in the mixed constitution—and in 
the process, to show the Stoic politician how to relate his abstract interests to practical, 
political concerns.  Cicero’s strategy involves describing the cosmos in political 
language, as the sun’s activity becomes a model of the justice the statesman should 
practice, while the harmony among the spheres produced by the Sun becomes a model of 
the harmony in the state at which the statesmen should aim.  This designation of the 
means and ends of statesmanship through cosmology, moreover, represents another 
correction of Laelius and Stoic ethics by Scipio.  Laelius understood justice as the 
internal harmony that results from rational control of the passions.  Justice was thus 
essentially focused on the self, even if the community benefits from the politician’s self-
restraint.  Scipio, however, uses the model of the Sun’s governance of the cosmos to 
define justice as an altruistic manner of acting solely focused on producing goods for 
others, and in political terms this means fostering the harmony of the mixed constitution.  
Scipio thus takes up a conception of justice suggested in the Fragments of Book 2 and 
expressly rejected by Philus in Book 3, but ignored by Laelius in his own defense of 
justice in Book 3.   
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Cicero’s second major aim in promoting philosophy is to bring the normative 
reader to engage in politics with moral restraint through his acquired preference for 
pursuing knowledge rather than material goods or power.  Cicero pursues this second aim 
by presenting contemplative pursuits as inherently valuable, in two ways.  First, the 
Somnium makes clear that such pursuits will constitute the activity in which the soul will 
be exclusively engaged and find its entire satisfaction in the afterlife.  Secondly, 
contemplation is so noble that it is itself, as I hope to show, an alternative path to eternal 
reward exclusively of political engagement.  This aspect of Cicero’s teaching in the 
Somnium has generally been neglected by scholars, who have been led by the Dream’s 
rhetorical emphasis on the validation of political engagement to interpret the Dream’s 
philosophical content as a mere foil for political ideas, and to read the Dream as a 
straightforward endorsement of political engagement.272  While Scipio’s cosmology does 
contain political language and offers political lessons (as I noted above), it also ennobles 
the contemplative life independently of politics in order to show which is the inherently 
superior activity that endures in eternity, and to show that political engagement must be 
of the right kind.  Better to be a political quietist philosopher, the Somnium suggests, than 
a politically involved tyrant.  However, while the Dream holds out right political action 
and contemplation as equally valid paths to eternal beatitude, its conclusion (quoted at the 
                                                          
272 See in particular Büchner 1984 passim on the Somnium, esp. 472-77.  Other 
commentators have concentrated on the Dream’s philosophic content, as e.g. Harder 
1929, Boyancé 1936, Luck 1956, Coleman 1964, Ronconi 1967, but while they take 
Cicero’s philosophic sources seriously, they do not afford the same privilege to Cicero’s 
argument about philosophy, opting for the typical conclusion that Cicero elevates the life 
of the statesman over the life of the philosopher (see e.g. Coleman 1964: 3-4).  The most 
balanced and accurate accounts of the Somnium’s double aim of promoting both lives are 
Kretschmar 1938, Luck 1956 (despite much source criticism), and Zetzel 1995. 
209 
 
head of this chapter) argues that the fastest way to eternity is to engage in both, with 
contemplation feeding right political action.  Thus Cicero completes his project in De Re 
Publica of promoting contemplation as a complement to statesmanship with a view to 
improving the moral character of Roman political elites, who will have developed a 
greater appetite for the delights of knowledge than for money, pleasure, or power.   
The literary choice of having an authoritative figure, Scipio, complete the work’s 
case for politics with the recitation of a Dream allows Cicero to maintain the integrity of 
his Academic skepticism and to protect himself from criticism by the incredulous at the 
same time as it allows him to advance his ideas in a compelling manner.  The method of 
using a Dream that is expressly presented as the probable result of the visionary’s waking 
thoughts modestly detracts from the certainty of its truth value at the same time as Cicero 
rhetorically appeals to the prestige and auctoritas of the visionary and of the ancestors 
seen in vision to insinuate the likelihood of its ideas.  It also protects the author from 
mockery at the hands of the more incredulous, who might despise him as naïve if he were 
to simply assert in his own voice such doctrines as the immortality of the soul and a 
divine mechanism for eternal reward and punishment.  The method of persuasion Cicero 
employs is thus highly suggestive rather than dogmatically coercive.  Furthermore, in 
keeping with a typical Platonic myth, it represents a thorough blending of myth and 
philosophic argument that invites the reader to consider its contents as being in some way 
like the truth.  Scholars often speak of the myth of Er in relation to the Somnium, but it 
will be helpful to consider a different Platonic myth to illustrate how the Somnium 
functions.  Just as Socrates at the end of the Gorgias tells the story of the judgement of 
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Minos and the abode of the just on the isles of the blessed, and says that although it 
cannot be proven we have no better account, so Scipio tells a story that is not to be taken 
as literally true, but whose components nonetheless are meant to convey certain truths, or 
ideas the reader is encouraged to view as true.  The main idea is that the soul is immortal 
and experiences a reward for justice and virtue in an eternal state with other men.  The 
vision’s explanation of the exact nature of the soul as drawn from the fires of the planets, 
its eternal abode in the Milky Way, and its experience of eternity as gazing at the other 
heavenly bodies is not meant to be taken literally, as these things are seen in a vision and 
thus are imagined, not established through philosophic reasoning.  Readers are thus urged 
to consider the main ideas taught through this symbolic myth.   
I.  Scipio as exemplar of traditional Roman ideas about political engagement 
In the Somnium, Cicero uses the authoritative exemplum of Scipio’s political 
career as prophesied by his grandfather Africanus to reiterate the goals of political 
engagement that were advanced earlier in the work.  In terms of international affairs, the 
statesman’s goal in pursuing a political career should be to guard the interests of Rome 
against foreign powers.  Africanus begins his address to his grandson Scipio by calling 
attention to the fact that the latter has currently come to north Africa as a soldier to help 
attack Carthage, presented as initiating hostilities, since Carthage, “although formerly 
compelled by me to obey the Roman people, is renewing its wars of old and cannot seem 
to keep the peace” (quae parere populo Romano coacta per me, renovat pristina bella 
nec potest quiescere, 6.15).  Africanus goes on to prophesy that during two different 
consulships, Scipio will have to lead armies to eradicate both Carthage and Numantia 
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(6.15).  As the reader would know, the Numantine war began due to the revolt of Rome’s 
subjects and was concluded by Scipio with the help of several local allies.  Thus the 
Somnium reiterates Laelius’s earlier principle that Rome’s acquisition of empire is just, 
since it has resulted from Rome’ defense of herself and her allies (3.26).  The statesman, 
therefore, should not hesitate to prosecute just wars against the enemies of Rome who 
attack her first.  It is also prophesied that Scipio will eagerly attend to Rome’s interests 
abroad by serving as legate on multiple occasions, to Egypt, Syria, Asia, and Greece 
(6.15). 
On the domestic front, the statesman’s goal is the preservation of the traditional 
constitution by maintaining harmony among the orders and protecting the rights of 
Rome’s allies.  Through Scipio’s authoritative exemplum and by the anti-exemplum of the 
Gracchi, Cicero tries to draw the normative reader away from the revolutionary mode of 
political engagement pursued by the improbi, just as he had done in Pro Sestio.  
Africanus warns Scipio that he will eventually “encounter a republic disturbed by the 
policies of my grandson” (offendes rem publicam consiliis perturbatam nepotis mei, 
6.15).  Africanus, and of course Cicero, accuses Tiberius Gracchus of disturbing the 
Republic presumably because he has upset the balance of the mixed constitution.  
Tiberius’s attempt to impose an agrarian law on the state through the authority of the 
people alone has interrupted the traditional constitutional balance among the orders by 
disregarding the traditional rights of the senate and giving the people an excessive 
amount of power.  The means of restoring proper balance to the state will be the ideal 
statesman, represented in this particular crisis by Scipio, to whom all the other orders 
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besides the people will look to defend their rights by restoring them to their same proper 
place in the constitutional order:  
To you alone and to your name the entire state will turn: to you the senate, to you 
all good men, to you the allies, to you the Latins will look; you will be the one 
man upon whom the safety of the state depends.  (Rep. 6.16) 
 
in te unum atque in tuum nomen se tota convertet civitas: te senatus, te omnes 
boni, te socii, te Latini intuebuntur; tu eris unus in quo nitatur civitatis salus. 
 
The reference to the eagerness of the allies, Latins, and good men to see Scipio come to 
their aid confirms Laelius’s earlier complaint that Scipio was being prevented from 
coming to their aid against the revolutionary actions of the agrarian land commission:  
Although the allies and the ethnic Latins have been provoked, the treaties have 
been violated, extremely seditious triumvirs are plotting something new on a daily 
basis, and good and wealthy men are worried, they won’t let Scipio deal with this 
most dangerous situation.  (Rep. 1.31)273  
  
neque hunc, qui unus potest, concitatis sociis et nomine Latino, foederibus 
violatis, triumviris seditiosissimis aliquid cotidie novi molientibus, bonis viris et 
locupletibus perturbatis, his tam periculosis rebus subvenire patiuntur. 
 
The concern of omnes boni in the Somnium passage, equivalent to Laelius’s boni viri et 
locupletes, is that their landholdings be protected from the depredation of the triumvirs on 
the land commission which had authority to redistribute it among the Roman plebs.  The 
designs of these seditiotissimi introduce disorder into the state (concitatis sociis… bonis 
                                                          
273 Cf. Laelius’s similar complaint about the departure from Roman tradition represented 
by Tiberius Gracchus’s law at 3.34: “Tiberius Gracchus… has neglected the rights 
granted by treaty to the allies and the ethnic Latins.  And if the license involved in this 
practice starts to become even more widespread, then I’m concerned about our 
descendants and about the immortality of our republic, which could be perpetual if it 
continued living according to the customs established by our fathers” (Ti. Gracchus… 
sociorum nominisque Latini iura neglexit ac foedera.  Quae si consuetudo ac licentia 
manare coeperit latius… de posteris nostris et de illa immortalitate rei publicae 
sollicitor, quae poterat esse perpetua si patriis viveretur institutis et moribus). 
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viris et locupletibus perturbatis).  Scipio as ideal statesman must oppose such designs for 
the sake of maintaining social harmony.274   
To a limited extent, Cicero urges the practice of republican political engagement 
by appealing to ideals familiar from Roman culture, which he seems to direct at those in 
his audience who lack sufficient public spirit, in all likelihood quietist Epicureans, elite 
epicures, and Stoicizing stargazers who neglect the study and practice of politics.  The 
normative reader already engaged in politics presumably does not require the same spur 
to action or a reminder of the traditional motives for pursuing public life.  One such 
traditional idea Cicero advances is the urgent need to practice pietas towards both 
country and family.  Pietas to country means placing the debt we owe to it in justice at 
the highest level of our obligations.  Such is Aemilius Paulus’s exhortation to his son:  
But listen, Scipio: just like this grandfather of yours and just like me, the one who 
begot you, be sure to cultivate justice and pietas.  And although these should be 
greatly cultivated towards your parents and relatives, they should be the greatest 
towards the fatherland.  (Rep. 6.20) 
 
Sed sic, Scipio, ut avus hic tuus, ut ego qui te genui, iustitiam cole et pietatem, 
quae cum magna in parentibus et propinquis, tum in patria maxima est. 
 
Paulus thus confirms the obligation we have to serve country above our parents that was 
established at some point earlier in the work, as an unplaced fragment testifies.275   
                                                          
274 Similarly, Cicero states at Sest. 103 that the senatorial elite were opposed to this 
agrarian law because they saw it as a cause for dissension, but were also concerned that 
the power of the state’s leading men would be weakened.  See also Off. 1.85, where 
Cicero lays down the principle (which he credits there to Plato) that one of the goals of 
political engagement is to seek the good of the whole state, rather than benefitting one 
part of society at the expense of the other, which also causes civil strife. 
275 Cf. Rep. Fragment 1 Powell (Nonnius 426.8): “Therefore since the fatherland 
maintains more benefits and is an older parent than the one who has begotten, greater 
favor is surely owed to it than to one’s parent” (Sic quoniam plura beneficia continet 
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But the practice of pietas towards country can also help us fulfill pietas to our 
family, inasmuch as through our accomplishment of glorious deeds for our country, we 
do our duty to maintain and increase the honor of our family’s name.  This is what Scipio 
indicates he has been doing from the time of his youth, prior to receiving the prophecy of 
his future political career with the glories of its outstanding achievements or the 
revelation of eternal reward (on which prospects more below).  Scipio assures Africanus 
that “from the time of my childhood I have set out to follow in my father’s footsteps, and 
yours, nor have I failed the splendor that both of you have” (a pueritia vestigiis ingressus 
patris et tuis decori vestro non defui, 6.30).  Cicero thus appeals to the obligation that 
those who are part of an illustrious family with a record of accomplishment have to 
maintain the family tradition for glorious deeds done on behalf of Rome.  A similar 
appeal is implicit in Africanus’s prophecy that, by the final destruction of Carthage, 
Scipio will acquire by his own actions the cognomen which he previously held only by 
right of inheritance (eritque cognomen id tibi per te partum, quod habes adhuc a nobis 
hereditarium, 6.15).  Cicero thus appeals to Romans of noble family not to rest on the 
laurels of the noble deeds of their ancestors but to show themselves, by their own actions, 
worthy of the glorious name they have inherited.  These nobiles would probably be the 
same persons Cicero criticized in Pro Sestio and in the preface of De Re Publica for 
retreating into private enjoyments and presumptuously expecting to rely on the 
accumulated capital of former generations to continue in the public esteem.  This appeal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
patria, et est antiquior parens quam is qui creavit, maior ei profecto quam parenti 
debetur gratia).  See also Off. 1.160, where the beneficiaries of pietas are ranked in the 
order of immortal gods, country, and parents. 
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may also be directed at Roman elites of Stoicizing bent who neglect the republic for their 
intellectual pursuits.  It is reminiscent of Laelius’s scolding of Tubero for his eagerness to 
resolve a cosmological problem and his corresponding lack of political ambition and lack 
of eagerness to do something to rectify the current political crisis, despite the 
illustriousness of the state and family into which Tubero, “the grandson of Lucius 
Paulus,” has been born (1.31).  Scipio’s appeals to pietas in the Somnium may, therefore, 
be seen as especially directed at Tubero among dialogue characters, and, at the same 
time, at the wider reading audience I have described. 
 Another traditional Roman value exemplified by Scipio to which Cicero appeals 
to motivate the Epicureans, idle nobiles, and Stoicizers to practice republican political 
engagement is Roman manliness or virtus.  Scipio exemplifies the courage entailed in 
soldiering abroad for Rome’s interest and in confronting potentially violent and 
treacherous political enemies at home when pursuing republican political goals.  First and 
most obviously, Cicero stirs up in the memory of his readers the example of Scipio’s long 
career as a soldier and consul leading the Roman army in the field, from the time of his 
campaigning in north Africa “as practically a common soldier” (paene miles, 6.15) to 
leading the conquest of Carthage and Numantia as consul.  Secondly, it is clear from 
Africanus’s prophecy that Scipio’s attempt to intervene in the crisis precipitated by 
Tiberius Gracchus’s agrarian land law will require a singular act of courage, since he will 
be incurring the hostility of dangerous and unscrupulous men: “you will have to establish 
the state as dictator, if you manage to escape the impious hands of your kinsmen” 
(dictator rem publicam constituas oportet, si impias propinquorum manus effugeris, 
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6.16).  It would be easier, of course, to avoid the dangers of military life and of resisting 
political revolutionaries by withdrawing into the pleasures of private life, and this 
temptation must have been particularly strong in the turbulent political culture of the late 
Republic.  In the preface of the first book, Cicero had dismissed the argument justifying 
withdrawal as necessary for a good man to avoid tainting himself by coming into contact 
with wicked men as one of many excuses for enjoying one’s own ease (1.9).  Here in the 
Somnium, he uses the memory of one of Rome’s foremost patriotic heroes to spur 
contemporary elites to courageous action against the improbi of their own day despite the 
desire to withdraw to preserve one’s own safety and comfort.  Finally, the coda to the 
Dream regarding the punishment of “the souls of those who have surrendered themselves 
to the pleasures of the body… obeying pleasures at the impulse of their lusts”276 
condemns the mental weakness shown by those who pursue private pleasures instead of 
applying themselves to “anxieties about the fatherland’s well-being,” in which the soul 
ought to be “agitated and exercised” (6.33).277  This condemnation of pleasure-seeking is 
frequently taken as a criticism of Epicurean philosophy, but it is much more than that: 
Cicero’s words are levelled at anyone who puts personal pleasure above virtus.  
Epicurean philosophers are not expressly mentioned, nor did they have a monopoly on 
the pursuit of voluptas.  Besides, the emphasis here is on the pleasures of the body 
(corporis voluptatibus… impulsuque libidinum), not of the mind, another clue that Cicero 
has another audience in mind in addition to Epicurean philosophers, the ease-seeking 
                                                          
276 eorum animi qui se corporis voluptatibus dediderunt… impulsuque libidinum 
voluptatibus oboedientium… 
277 curae de salute patriae, quibus agitatus et exercitatus animus… 
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epicures of the noble classes, exemplified perhaps by Cicero’s old whipping boy, the 
“fish-pond hatchers” of whom he frequently complained to Atticus. 
Finally, Cicero also makes a limited appeal to civic honor as a potential prize for 
republican political engagement, which is, however, muted in favor of the Somnium’s 
extended teaching on the futility of earthly honors (analyzed in the Section II below).  
There is an acknowledgement throughout the dream at various points that there will be 
some degree of civic honor for serving the Republic, which serves as some small 
encouragement to make public life more attractive to those immersed in private 
pleasures.  It is obvious that several of Scipio’s accomplishments cover him with personal 
glory before his peers and fellow-citizens: he will receive two triumphs, one after 
destroying Carthage (cum… triumphum egeris) and one after razing Numantia (cum eris 
curru in Capitolium invectus, 6.15).  After prophesying Scipio’s political career, 
Africanus prefaces his revelation about the eternal reward of good statesmen with the 
words, “but so that you will be all the more eager to protect the republic” (6.17),278 which 
implies that Scipio has already been given several incentives to serve the republic.  
Besides civic glory, these incentives include the other considerations analyzed in the 
preceding paragraphs: the need for Scipio to do his part to live up to the family name, and 
the need of someone schooled in courage to come to the aid of the whole state in its 
crisis.  Later in the Dream, Africanus acknowledges that although earthly glory is limited 
in terms of both time and space and although Scipio should pay no attention to what 
others say of him, Scipio will nonetheless be talked about for a while in the part of the 
                                                          
278 ‘Sed quo sis, Africane, alacrior ad tutandam rem publicam…’ 
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earth where he is known (quid de te alii loquantur, ipsi videant, sed loquentur tamen, 
6.29).  Through these considerations, Cicero tries to awaken a drive for honor in those 
who have not previously felt its attraction, even as he ultimately wishes to draw them to 
act for the republic out of even higher motives based on a philosophical vision, to which 
we shall now turn in our analysis. 
II. Laelius and a new motive for political engagement  
Most of the foregoing appeals to traditional Roman ideals are found in the 
prophecy of Scipio’s political career that occurs towards the beginning of the Somnium.  
For the normative reader, the concreteness and familiarity of the ideas in this opening 
section, which mostly recalls Scipio’s political career in the second century BCE, serves 
as a captivating opening that is well placed prior to the more abstract ideas about 
cosmology and eschatology that soon follow.  The sheer length of this cosmological 
vision, which takes up the majority of the Dream narrative, underscores Cicero’s special 
effort in the Somnium to teach the normative reader the vanity of human glory, whether 
among contemporaries or with posterity, as a motive for engaging in politics.  This effort 
contrasts with Cicero’s eagerness in Pro Sestio to present posthumous glory as a 
compelling reason for engagement.  It is, moreover, an important generic difference with 
Pro Sestio that allows Cicero to critique that motive, since this critique occurs in the 
course of a philosophical myth—Scipio’s account of a Dream—that is fitting to a 
philosophic dialogue, and in particular to the spirit of the Platonic dialogue.   
Cicero also uses the cosmological vision of the myth to critique the Stoic motive 
for political engagement advanced earlier in the work by Laelius.  Laelius had argued that 
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virtue or justice should be practiced for its own sake, because failure to practice justice 
leads to the penalty of a guilty conscience, through which god enforces the natural law of 
which he is the author.  Scipio’s Dream critiques these ideas by suggesting that our 
motive for virtuously engaging in politics is gaining an eternal reward that consists 
chiefly in contemplation, a blessing conferred by a god who rewards and punishes in the 
afterlife.  For Scipio, therefore, practicing the preeminent virtue of justice is not the end 
itself, but a means to the end of contemplation.  The Dream’s settling on the eternal 
reward of the immortal soul as the most compelling motive for virtuous political 
engagement parallels the movement in Pro Sestio from prior motives to the ultimate 
motive of enjoying immortal glory in a conscious, postmortem state.  However, the 
critique of the glory motive is much more explicit here at the end of De Re Publica, 
where Cicero also develops a fuller description of this postmortem state than he did in 
Pro Sestio. 
A) Cosmology as revealing the futility of glory with posterity 
Laelius’s complaint that Scipio Nasica’s services to the republic have not been 
shown sufficient honor by posterity indicates that he is backtracking from his earlier 
argument that the awareness of one’s own virtue is a sufficient reward if it should happen 
that this virtue is denied its proper reward of recognition by the citizen body (3.28).  As 
we know on the testimony of Macrobius, the immediate impetus for Scipio’s narrating 
the Dream is Laelius’s complaint that Scipio Nasica had not been honored with any 
statues for saving the state from a tyrant, namely Tiberius Gracchus (in Somn. Scip. 1.4.2-
3).  Laelius’s complaint shows that he still wants to be an assured of some kind of glory 
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as a reward for republican political engagement.  His desire to see Nasica vindicated by 
posterity reveals that he is not entirely convinced by his own earlier assertions about 
virtue, and still feels that virtuous statesmanship ought eventually to be afforded glory.  
During the debate on justice, Philus had argued that anyone would choose to be unjust 
while being considered just by others rather than to be just while being considered unjust 
and thus suffering great shame (3.13).  Laelius’s answer to this objection to justice was to 
insist on the sufficiency of being aware of one’s own justice, regardless of the opinion of 
others (3.31).  But now Laelius implicitly reveals that he was not able to answer Philus’s 
argument even to his own satisfaction, as he cannot bear the thought that a just man, who 
ought to have been vindicated with public honors after his death, would continue to be 
thought unjust. 
Scipio’s immediate response suggests that he senses Laelius’s discontent with the 
virtue motive and shares Laelius’s misgivings, even as he informs Laelius that neither his 
expressed desire that the just win posthumous glory nor a reversion to the reward of 
contemporary glory is the answer to the quandary: 
But although for wise men the very awareness of one’s outstanding deeds is a 
very honorable reward for virtue, nevertheless that divine virtue longs neither for 
statues mounted on lead, nor triumphs with their gradually withering laurels, but 
for certain more durable and evergreen kinds of rewards.  (Rep. 6.12) 
 
Sed quamquam sapientibus conscientia ipsa factorum egregiorum amplissimum 
virtutis est praemium, tamen illa divina virtus non statuas plumbo inhaerentes, nec 
triumphos arescentibus laureis, sed stabiliora quaedam et viridiora praemiorum 
genera desiderat. 
 
By following his concession that awareness of virtue is “a very honorable reward” with 
the claim that virtue still “longs for” something (desiderat), Scipio indicates that virtue is 
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not in fact the end but rather points to something else, an idea that will be summed up by 
the grand avowal of Scipio Africanus in the Dream that virtue “ought to draw you to true 
brilliance” (6.29).279  For the moment, Scipio makes clear that virtue does not point back 
to glory, as Laelius seems to have felt all along.  In Book 3, Laelius had said virtue 
“wants honor” (vult honorem) as its proper repayment (nec est virtutis ulla alia merces) 
without bitterly exacting this payment (exigit non acerbe, 3.28), but now gives the lie to 
that claim by peevishly demanding reimbursement in the form of posthumous 
recognition: “Laelius was complaining that Nasica had not received any public statues as 
reimbursement for killing a tyrant” (cum enim Laelius quereretur nullas Nasicae statuas 
in publico in interfecti tyranni remunerationes locatas, Macr. in Somn. Scip. 1.4.2).  
Scipio, however, says virtue “longs for” (desiderat) something more permanent than 
reimbursement through any kind of glory, whether contemporaneous, exemplified by 
triumphal processions, or posthumous, exemplified by monuments.  Scipio’s preliminary 
remarks indicate, therefore, that his Dream will contain a critique of all three motives 
Laelius has suggested thus far: virtue as its own reward, and both kinds of glory.  Rather 
than reverting to glory, Scipio will ground virtuous political engagement on the eternal 
reward of contemplating the cosmos in the company of other virtuous men, to be 
considered gods.  The kind of virtue undertaken with the motive of gaining this reward is 
fittingly designated “divine” (illa divina virtus). 
                                                          
279 Decus is usually translated as “honor” and Africanus’s words suis te oportet illecebris 
ipsa virtus trahat ad verum decus (6.29) are thought to echo Laelius, [virtus] suo decore 
se ipsa sustentat (3.31).  But as I will argue in the discussion below, Africanus’s language 
and the context of the Somnium indicate that the decus referred to here is not virtue’s 
own, but the decus or beauty of the cosmos one is permitted to behold as a reward for 
virtue on earth. 
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Scipio’s Dream demonstrates the vanity of seeking gloria, whether 
contemporaneous or posthumous, drawing a comparison with the cosmos’s eternal 
immensity to show that gloria is fundamentally limited in temporal duration and spatial 
extent.  Scipio develops the same basic ideas on the limitations of gloria as he advanced 
earlier in his speech in praise of contemplative pursuits (1.26), but this time he endows 
these ideas with greater authority through the context of a revelatory Dream, with the 
illustrious Scipio Africanus Maior as oracle.  The treatment of these ideas is also much 
more amplified than the compact summation in his earlier speech.280 
 However, since the Somnium’s arguments against human glory on the basis of a 
cosmological perspective are well known, rather than merely repeating them here, I will 
focus on the radical contradiction they represent to the bulk of Cicero’s own 
argumentation in Pro Sestio, which might be termed “Laelian” to the extent that it held 
out civic glory, especially posthumous glory, as a spur to virtuous, republican political 
engagement.  In Pro Sestio, Cicero attempted to establish the certainty of recognition by 
subsequent generations as a fallback position for the motive of receiving civic glory 
within one’s lifetime.  Cicero’s oratorical persona in those passages, therefore, parallels 
the dialogical persona of Laelius, who wishes to have at least posthumous glory as a 
reward for engagement, and desires it to be seen as a worthy motive.  In the peroration of 
the speech (Sest. 143), Cicero would eventually come around to the motive of gaining 
eternal glory not dependent on human memorialization, but as we saw in Chapter 1,281 his 
                                                          
280 The relationship between the critique of glory in the Somnium and in Scipio’s earlier 
speech is well-known.  See e.g. Büchner 1984 and Zetzel 1995 on Rep. 1.26-29. 
281 See page 59. 
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presentation of it there was ambiguous enough as to seem indistinguishable at first glance 
from glory with posterity.282   
In De Re Publica, by contrast, the expectation of posthumous glory is raised as a 
possible motive only briefly before being subjected to an explicit and thoroughgoing 
critique (6.24-29) on the basis of a universal, eternal perspective proper to the 
philosophic genre.  Scipio relies on the authority of his grandfather Africanus to expose 
Laelius’s hopes for glory with posterity, as well as those of Cicero’s oratorical persona in 
Pro Sestio,283 as utterly illusory: “All that talk is enclosed by these narrow regions you 
see, nor has it ever been everlasting about anyone: it is buried with the death of men, and 
extinguished by the oblivion of posterity” (sermo autem omnis ille et angustiis cingitur 
his regionum quas vides, nec umquam de ullo perennis fuit; et obruitur hominum interitu, 
et oblivione posteritatis exstinguitur, Rep. 6.29).  Africanus had already explained the 
reason for glory’s spatial limitation, namely the vast distances separating Rome from 
other peoples, whether one considers the distance between the two inhabitable zones of 
the earth, the northern and southern hemisphere (6.24-25), or the vast distance separating 
Rome from other peoples within the northern hemisphere itself (6.26).  In calling 
attention to glory’s temporal limitation, Africanus summarizes his previous argument that 
“we cannot even attain long-lasting glory, let alone one that is eternal” (non modo non 
aeternam, sed ne diuturnam quidem gloriam adsequi possumus, 6.27) due to periodic 
floods and fires that eliminate the hope of perpetually passing down the memory of great 
                                                          
282 On the Somnium’s fuller explanation of the nature of this eternal reward and its being 
given a more obviously philosophic basis, see the discussion below in the conclusion of 
this chapter. 
283 Praesentes fructus neglegamus, posteritatis gloriae serviamus (Sest. 143). 
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men’s glorious deeds (6.27).  By destroying vast swaths of the earth’s surface and killing 
so many people, these natural catastrophes evidently remove any trace of former 
monuments and destroy the cultural memory of whole nations.284 
Both the nature and extent of this argument against the value of posthumous glory 
are allowed for by the philosophic genre.  Taking the point of view of eternity in a 
cosmological and eschatological myth is a fitting end to a philosophical dialogue, 
whereas including a supra-political perspective would be out of place in a judicial or 
political speech that confines itself chiefly to the point of view of Rome.  Thus, in Pro 
Sestio, the devaluing of human glory was merely implicit in the peroration’s exhortation 
to act virtuously come what may, and to consider the souls of great statesman to have 
attained immortal glory (Sest. 143).  Cicero did not want the conclusion of his speech to 
detract from its fundamental accent on what his city traditionally held out as a worthy 
motive for serving the Republic, the patriotic imitation of the ancestors’ quest for gloria.  
This rhetorical emphasis is indeed maintained in the peroration by the ambiguous formula 
immortalis gloria, which in its context could denote posthumous glory, since it concerns 
the fame of Hercules and of great Roman statesmen who likewise are to be held in 
                                                          
284 Africanus also reveals that even several years of posthumous glory do not amount to 
much from the cosmic point of view, which measures time by a different standard than 
men do on earth: “Among the people who are capable of hearing about our fame, none of 
us can attain the memory of one year.  For human beings commonly measure a year only 
by the revolution of the sun, that is, of one star.  But in reality, once all the stars have 
returned to the position from which they started out… then that true revolution can be 
called a year, in which period I hardly dare say how many ages of human beings are 
contained” (praesterim cum apud eos ipsos, a quibus audiri nomen nostrum potest, nemo 
unius anni memoriam consequi possit?  Homines enim populariter annum tantummodo 
solis, id est unius astri, reditu metiuntur; reapse autem, cum ad idem unde semel profecta 
sunt cuncta astra redierint… tum ille vere vertens annus appellari potest, in quo vix 
dicere audeo quam multa hominum saecla teneantur, 6.27). 
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perpetual memory for their great deeds.  In that context, Cicero gives only a subtle 
indication that such gloria consists in the enjoyment of a conscious state in his claim that 
the “motions of the soul and the glory of virtue are eternal” (animi vero motus et virtutis 
gloria sempiterna, Sest. 143).  In the Somnium, however, the term gloria consistently and 
explicitly designates something that is ultimately vain and thus not truly compelling as a 
motive for republican political engagement.  Thus the Somnium designates the glory of 
the postmortem state that is earned by a virtuous life on earth with different terms such as 
“blessed enjoyment” (beati… fruantur, 6.17) and “true splendor” (verum decus, 6.29), 
and it also explains more fully in what this state consists, as I now hope to show. 
B) Virtue as means to a new kind of reward: verum decus 
 The reward for virtuous political engagement that Scipio proposes in the 
Somnium, an eternity spent in contemplation, not only serves to correct Laelius’s motive 
of glory with posterity, but also Laelius’s previously proposed motive of seeking virtue as 
its own reward.  Scipio argues that virtue is not the reward to be sought through political 
engagement, but a means to that reward.  Scipio gave a foretaste of this idea in his 
preliminary remark that “although for wise men the very awareness of one’s outstanding 
deeds is a very honorable reward for virtue, nevertheless that divine virtue (illa divina 
virtus) longs… for certain more durable and evergreen kinds of rewards” (6.12).  For 
Laelius, virtue is pursued for its own sake, and its motive is a temporal and human 
reward: being able to contemplate one’s own virtue during life.  Scipio’s virtue, however, 
has an eternal reward as its motive, and is properly termed divine, because it aims at 
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attaining divine status, which consists in the enjoyment of eternal happiness in the society 
of other great statesmen, as Africanus reveals:  
But to be more eager to protect the republic, Africanus, you will henceforward 
consider this: all those who have preserved, aided, or strengthened the fatherland 
assuredly have an established, specific place in heaven where they happily enjoy 
an everlasting eternity.  (Rep. 6.17)  
 
Sed quo sis, Africane, alacrior ad tutandam rem publicam, sic habeto: omnibus 
qui patriam conservaverint adiuverint auxerint, certum esse in caelo definitum 
locum, ubi beati aevo sempiterno fruantur. 
 
Thus Scipio learns that virtuous political engagement, that aims at benefiting the state, is 
the individual statesman’s means to the end of eternal happiness.  The thought of this end 
should be an even more powerful motivating factor (alacrior) than others, whether 
Laelius’s ideal of virtue as its own end or the desire to live up to traditional Roman social 
expectations, many of which were alluded to in the first part of the Somnium, such as the 
exercise of manly courage and patriotism.285  In addition, it is for reasons of rhetorical 
strategy that Scipio reveals the eternal reward for engagement immediately after Laelius 
gives a shout upon hearing the prophecy of Scipio’s possible demise at the hands of his 
kinsmen (6.16).  The revelation that Scipio will gain an eternal reward for his efforts to 
preserve the fatherland in the Gracchan crisis, despite the triumph of injustice that a 
Gracchan victory and Scipio’s murder would represent, aims to provide Laelius some 
consolation by teaching him that those efforts are ultimately worthwhile regardless of 
what anyone else on earth thinks. 
As the narrative proceeds, Scipio makes this point about virtue’s instrumental 
value even more explicitly.  First, he recounts his father Paulus exhorting him to imitate 
                                                          
285 Cf. Section II of this chapter. 
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Paulus and Africanus in the practice of the virtues of justice and piety, which “should be 
greatest of all towards the fatherland: that life is the path to heaven and into this gathering 
of those who having already lived and been freed from their bodies inhabit the place you 
see” (in patria maxima est: ea vita via est in caelum et in hunc coetum eorum qui iam 
vixerunt, et corpore laxati illum incolunt locum quem vides, 6.20).  Secondly, recounting 
an exhortation of Africanus, Scipio pointedly uses many of the same terms as Laelius did 
in Book 3 to get Laelius’s attention, even as he corrects Laelius’s teaching.  Africanus, 
summarizing the lessons contained in what Scipio has seen in the Dream thus far, exhorts 
him not to despair of reaching heaven but to continue looking up above in order to be 
imbued with the proper motive for virtuous political engagement, achieving admittance to 
heaven: 
Given all of this, if you end up despairing of returning to this place, where great 
and brilliant men have all things, how much, really! is that so-called glory of 
human beings worth which can hardly even last for the tiniest part of one Year?  
Therefore, if you prove willing to look on high and to gaze at this dwelling and 
eternal home, do not surrender yourself to the talk of the crowd, nor place hope in 
human rewards in exchange for your deeds: by its own charms, virtue itself ought 
to draw you to true gloriously-beautiful-splendor.  (Rep. 6.29) 
 
Quocirca si reditum in hunc locum desperaveris, in quo omnia sunt magnis et 
praestantibus viris, quanti tandem est ista hominum gloria, quae pertinere vix ad 
unius anni partem exiguam potest?  Igitur alte spectare si voles atque hanc sedem 
et aeternam domum contueri, neque tu sermonibus vulgi dedideris, nec in 
praemiis humanis spem posueris rerum tuarum, suis te oportet illecebris ipsa 
virtus trahat ad verum decus. 
 
Scholars have rightly focused on the way these words drive home the teaching that one 
should not engage in politics for the sake of glory, which is empty.  They have also taken 
these words to be a restatement of Laelius’s position that virtue itself is the thing to be 
sought rather than glory (3.31).  And yet Africanus’s exhortation, recounted by Scipio, 
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actually constitutes a transformation and correction of Laelius’s position, couched in 
Laelius’s own terminology to establish a special connection with Laelius in particular 
among his listeners.  Scipio (through Africanus) is not saying that virtue is to be sought 
for its own sake, but that it points to something even higher than itself: in light of the 
revelation of the eternal home above as one’s ultimate goal, virtue draws (trahat) a 
person not to itself or to its own charms, but to (ad) something distinct from itself, verum 
decus, by means of its own charms (suis illecebris).  By contrast, for Laelius, the 
consolations of virtue belong to virtue itself, among which is the honor or glory inherent 
in virtue; the decus in question for Laelius is virtue’s own (suo decore): “it delights itself 
with many consolations, and above all it holds itself up on its own by its own splendor 
(illa se multis solaciis oblectat, maximeque suo decore se ipsa sustentat, 3.31).  For 
Laelius, therefore, the reward for virtuous political engagement is reflexively 
contemplating one’s own virtue.  But for Scipio, the reward for virtue is contemplating 
something else in the afterlife.  Scipio has already indicated just before the Dream his 
intention to speak of “certain more durable and evergreen kinds of rewards” than “the 
very awareness of one’s outstanding deeds” (6.12).  This “more durable” reward, or this 
distinct and higher thing to which virtue leads, verum decus, is evidently, given the logic 
of Africanus’s sentence (6.29), the literal splendor of “this dwelling and eternal home” 
(haec sedes et aeterna domus) in the heavens that the statesman will be allowed to 
contemplate (spectare… contueri) and enjoy in eternity as a reward for practicing virtue 
during life on earth.  Virtue is said to draw by means of its inherent charms (suis… 
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illecebris) because the statesman comprehends it as the means that will lead him to the 
perpetual enjoyment of the decus above. 
That verum decus denotes the object of the soul’s eternal contemplation, the 
splendor of the heavens, is evident for two additional reasons.  First, the modifier verum 
is proper to a unique concept of glory that is revealed for the first time in the 
cosmological Dream vision.  The Dream’s revelations are emphatically presented as 
having the characteristic of truth, of being the way things really are, as opposed to the 
way human beings perceive or speak of them.  For example, the Dream reveals that souls 
like those of Africanus and Paulus who have escaped the prison of the body are alive (hi 
vivunt), and therefore “what is called (dicitur) ‘life’ among you all is actually death” 
(6.18); there is a contrast between the human measure of time by means of the revolution 
of the sun and the real standard (reapse autem) of the Great Year (6.28); even the names 
of the planetary spheres are repeatedly underscored as conventional (6.21).286  Thus 
“true” decus, in the context of the Dream, is a concept relating exclusively to the Dream 
and to the unique glimpse into reality it gives, and cannot denote the same idea of decus 
as Laelius spoke of earlier in the work.  Secondly, the proliferation of verbs of seeing and 
gazing together with adjectives and nouns denoting light or brilliance in the earlier part of 
the Dream already made it clear that the blessed enjoyment (cf. beati… fruantur, 6.17) of 
this eternal reward consists in the contemplation of the luminous beauty of the cosmos 
from a special place high up in the cosmos (cf. certus… definitus locus, 6.17) to which 
one’s virtue has brought him.  For example, Scipio relates that “as I contemplated (mihi 
                                                          
286 E.g., illa quam in terris Saturniam nominant… ille fulgor qui dicitur Iovis… tum 
rutilus… quem Martium dicitis. 
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contemplanti) everything else from there, it appeared incredibly bright and beautiful 
(praeclara… et mirabilia)” (6.20); and that “I kept gazing in amazement at these things” 
(quae cum intuerer stupens, 6.22), by which he means the survey he has just been given 
of the universe with its nine spheres, called “lights” (lumina), all of which the sun 
“illuminates and fills with its own light” (cuncta sua luce lustret et compleat, 6.21).  
Africanus, therefore, in speaking of the true decus to which virtue leads, is summarizing 
what the Dream has already indicated, namely that the reward for virtue on earth is to 
contemplate the unsurpassed and eternal beauty and splendor of the cosmos.  This glory 
is more real and more enduring than glory as conceived by traditional Roman culture or 
even the glory of virtue praised by the Stoics. 
Contemplating the splendor of the heavens, however, does not fully exhaust the 
meaning of verum decus, which seems also to refer to the recognition by god and other 
great men that the statesman enjoys as part of his conscious postmortem state, as well as 
literally partaking of this decus as a shining star in the heavens.  These are also among the 
“more durable and evergreen kinds of rewards” revealed to Scipio in the Dream.  While 
the sheer happiness of contemplating the universe’s beauty seems paramount in the 
verum decus after death to which a life of virtuous political engagement leads, it consists 
in additional rewards that fulfill Laelius’s longing for some lasting form of moral 
vindication and honor by others.  This recognition comes first in the form of the eternal 
awareness of having been recognized and honored by “the chief god who rules the whole 
universe” with admittance to heaven, since “nothing (that happens on earth, in any case) 
is more pleasing than the councils and gatherings of human beings bound in society to 
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one another by justice, which are called states, whose helmsmen and preservers set out 
from and return here” (6.17).287  Another form of recognition is experienced upon being 
admitted into an exclusive society of other great men,288 where one enjoys their 
friendship and conversation, as appears to be indicated by the pleasant interaction of 
Africanus, Paulus, and Scipio (6.18-20).  Finally, there is the decus of actually shining as 
a star in the heavens.  Paulus explains to Scipio that the soul is drawn from the same fires 
that constitute the stars (6.19) and that, after death, the souls of virtuous men depart from 
their bodies (6.20).  It stands to reason that these souls then regain their original fiery 
splendor, and this is just what Scipio observes when looking at the Milky Way, the 
dwelling place of the departed souls of great statesmen: “it was, moreover, shining all 
around, amidst blazing fire, with a most brilliant splendor” (erat autem is splendidissimo 
candore inter flammas circus elucens, 6.29).  Candore is practically an anagram of the 
noun decus, decoris,289 and in any case amounts to the same thing in sense, especially 
with the added splendidissimo.  Thus the souls of great statesmen literally shine as stars 
in the Milky Way, and their glory can be seen by men on earth. 
While it is tempting to conclude that Cicero is seeking through the Dream’s 
account of apotheosis into a soul-star to popularize the mythico-religious idea that great 
statesmen should be forever remembered and recognized as visible gods in the heavens, 
                                                          
287 Nihil est enim illi principi deo, qui omnem mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat, 
acceptius, quam concilia coetusque hominum iure sociati, quae civitates appellantur: 
harum rectores et conservatores hinc profecti huc revertuntur. 
288 Cf. omnibus qui patriam conservaverint adiuverint auxerint, certum esse in caelo 
definitum locum (6.17); hic locus… in quo omnia sunt magnis et praestantibus viris 
(6.29). 
289 See Ahl 1985 on anagrams in Latin literature. 
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thus assuring himself and other republican statesman of a sort of eternal glory along the 
lines of Laelian posthumous memorialization290 and even anticipating the politico-
religious propaganda of Augustus and the principate,291 such an interpretation would be 
mistaken for several reasons.  First, according to Scipio, all souls are by nature gods since 
they share with gods the characteristic of self-motion (6.30).  Therefore, admittance to a 
special place in heaven does not properly constitute apotheosis or becoming a god, but 
rather signifies recognition for one’s virtuous life.  Admittance to this place, moreover, is 
the final destination of all souls, since even those who were enslaved to pleasure during 
their lives on earth will eventually arrive here after many ages of torment (6.33).  
Secondly, such a goal on Cicero’s part would be at odds with the Dream’s express 
teaching that perpetual posthumous glory is an impossible hope due to the periodic 
destruction of human cultural memory (6.27).  Even if Cicero could convince all men 
through their reading of the Somnium to consider the stars in the Milky Way to be the 
apotheosized souls of great statesman, according to Cicero’s own reasoning, the 
knowledge imparted through the Somnium will eventually be lost through a fire or 
flood.292  Third, the Dream suggests that glory from surviving men on earth is of no true 
value even if it could be perpetual because the crowd are not qualified to pass judgment 
on the virtuous (neque te sermonibus vulgi dedideris, 6.29).  The glory of the 
apotheosized statesmen does not depend on its being acknowledged by men on earth.  
                                                          
290 Cf. Gildenhard 2011: 380-82. 
291 See Cole 2013 passim. 
292 Indeed, until 1821, the rest of De Re Publica had practically suffered such a fate, as its 
memory was maintained only through the transmitted text of the Somnium and from 
quotations in late antique authors. 
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What matters, rather, is the judgment and recognition of the wise and virtuous, and 
therefore of god and of other men judged virtuous enough by god to be admitted to that 
exclusive coetus of great men.  Fourth, as I hope to have shown above, the Dream’s 
emphasis on the joy great statesmen have in contemplating the splendor of the universe 
positively advances the idea that this contemplation is the most significant part of the 
decus they enjoy, another way in which their reward does not depend on human beings 
on earth.  This contemplation of verum decus is the primary and essential aspect of 
eternal reward, moreover, because it fully satisfies the human appetite for knowledge, an 
idea developed by Scipio in the earlier epideictic passage as well as in the Dream, as I 
will discuss in Section III below. 
 Finally, Scipio’s proposal of an eternal reward for political engagement in order 
to provide Laelius and the normative reader with the assurance that such engagement is 
ultimately worthwhile also requires him to reject Stoic natural law in favor of generally 
Platonic notions such as divine reward and punishment in the afterlife and the 
immortality of the soul.  Scipio, therefore, tries to persuade Laelius that Platonism 
provides a stronger foundation for virtuous political engagement than Stoicism.  Scipio’s 
correction of Stoicism with Platonism represents Cicero’s rhetorical aim of leading the 
normative reader from the noble Stoic motives for political engagement with which this 
reader is by now familiar to an even loftier motive based on Platonic eschatology.  
Laelius’s ideal of pursuing virtue as its own reward was dependent on the existence of 
natural law, authored by god.  But god does not personally enforce this law; its only 
mechanism for enforcement is the natural law itself inherent in the human conscience.  
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As Laelius said: “whoever does not obey this law is himself fleeing himself, plus by this 
very fact of having spurned human nature he pays the greatest penalties, even if he 
manages to escape the other things that are considered punishments” (cui [legi] qui non 
parebit ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, 
etiamsi cetera supplicia quae putantur effugerit, 3.27).  Thus the motivation for acting 
virtuously in politics is the need to avoid the sanction of a guilty conscience and to gain 
the reward of a good conscience, which can rejoice in the nobility of the virtue it 
possesses (3.21) and in the awareness of good deeds performed (6.12).  But Scipio 
suggests that natural law does not provide sufficient motivation to engage virtuously in 
politics because it is merely self-enforcing and its effects are only temporal.  According 
to Laelius and the Stoics, god may be the author of natural law, but he is not really the 
enforcer of natural law in any active, personal sense.  Natural law enforces itself, and yet 
its dictates can be ignored by anyone determined to act badly, as Laelius himself 
admitted: “It does not command or prohibit upright men in vain, nor does it have any 
effect on wicked men by commanding or prohibiting” (quae tamen neque probos frustra 
iubet aut vetat, nec improbos iubendo aut vetando movet, 3.27).  And even though such 
disobedience causes the bad man to experience the ongoing pain of a guilty conscience, 
this pain is only temporal, since it ends as soon as the soul ceases to be self-aware.   
 Cicero seeks, therefore, to place a more compelling motive for virtuous political 
engagement before the normative reader by having Scipio remedy these deficiencies of 
the Stoic physical and ethical framework, a move that also places Cicero in dialogue with 
any Stoic-leaning contemporaries.  Although many Stoic ideas pervade the Dream, such 
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as the soul’s being taken from the same material as the heavenly aether (6.19), its 
survival after death by its return to the aether (6.17, 6.20), the identification of god with 
the outermost sphere of nature (6.21), and Cleanthes’s notion of the sun as hegemonikon 
(6.21),293 Cicero nevertheless forges his own philosophic cosmological eschatology with 
the admixture of Platonic notions that provide a stronger motivation for virtuous political 
engagement.  The god that rules the universe, for example, turns out not to be a merely 
impersonal planetary sphere bounding the others but a personal god who takes pleasure in 
justice (6.17) and as a consequence actively metes out reward and punishment in the 
afterlife (cf. 6.17, 6.33).  Cicero imports an ideal of divine enforcement based generally 
on the Myth of Er that ends Plato’s Republic, thereby providing, as Plato did, a 
framework of rewards and punishments that are much longer-lasting than the mere 
temporal pain of conscience threatened by violating natural law.  Barlow (1987: 370-71) 
points out that Scipio wishes to add a stronger motive for concerning oneself with the city 
than Laelius’s natural law argument, and thus adds the idea of the immortality of the soul.  
However, while Barlow views Scipio’s primary audience as the young Stoics present for 
the conversation, especially Tubero, Laelius is no less important a target of Scipio’s 
argument about immortality and eternal reward.294 
Furthermore, Cicero’s Platonism guarantees the eternity of the reward after death 
on the basis of the soul’s true immortality (6.30-32).  If the extended translation of the 
passage from Plato’s Phaedrus were not sufficient proof that Cicero viewed the 
                                                          
293 On the Stoic sources for these ideas, see especially Ronconi 1967. 
294 Likewise, in the climactic moment of the first book of De Legibus, as I will show in 
the next chapter, Marcus directs his argument for philosophic politics to both 
interlocutors present, Atticus and Quintus. 
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immortality of the soul as specifically Platonic, there is also the evidence of a passage 
from the Tusculan Disputations (1.77-79),295 where Cicero explains that although the 
Stoics allow for the survival of the soul after death, this survival is only temporary due to 
the eventual arrival of the ekpurosis.  Moreover, this passage also recalls the way the 
Stoics advocated only a restricted immortality, limiting apotheosis to great benefactors of 
the human race.296  They did not endorse the Platonic view, endorsed in the Somnium by 
Scipio, that all souls are immortal because of their very nature.  Thus, when Africanus 
says that “the soul of Romulus” (Romuli animus, 6.28) was admitted to the place for 
statesmen in heaven after his death, we have to presume in light of the Platonic proof of 
immortality later recited by Africanus that Romulus will be there forever, and not in the 
sense of temporary postmortem survival envisioned by the Stoics.  In sum, Laelius’s 
Stoic argument enshrining virtue as its own end on the basis of natural law does not 
represent one step of a coherent, consistent argument that is confirmed by the Somnium 
from a more transcendent point of view,297 but rather a well-intentioned but deficient 
position that is ultimately corrected by the Somnium’s ideal of eternal reward on the basis 
of postmortem divine enforcement of justice.   
III.  The case for joining philosophy and politics 
In the last section I discussed the way Scipio uses a cosmological and 
eschatological perspective to provide Laelius with the proper motive for virtuous political 
engagement, showing that such engagement should be seen as a means to the personal 
                                                          
295 On this passage, see Douglas 1985: 118 and Cole 2013: 138. 
296 As Margaret Graver points out to me per. litt.; cf. Cato in Fin. 3.66. 
297 See references to Büchner 1984 and Zetzel 1995 in notes 1 and 2 above. 
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end of an eternal reward, verum decus.  Next I will show how Scipio seeks throughout the 
Somnium to draw Laelius to engage in contemplative pursuits as a complement to 
engaging in politics, simultaneously urging Tubero to complement his contemplative 
pursuits with the consideration of ethics and politics.  Scipio’s engagement of Laelius and 
Tubero in the text, moreover, functions externally as Cicero’s attempt to persuade the 
normative reader and the Stoic-leaning politician of his own day. 
Scipio’s rhetorical aims in promoting this complementarity between philosophy 
and politics are twofold.  First, in addition to inculcating the right motive for political 
engagement, Scipio wants Laelius and Tubero to learn from cosmology and mathematics 
a proper understanding of the personal means or manner of engaging in politics, namely 
altruistic justice, modeled by the sun’s activity in the universe and the example of 
Scipio’s resolution to serve the state despite his inclination to family and contemplation.  
Scipio also wants them to learn from cosmology about the ends of statesmanship, namely 
the preservation of social harmony modeled on the harmony of the spheres.  To move 
Laelius to take up contemplation and learn these lessons, Scipio described the cosmos 
with political language and generally strives to make it relevant to politics, teaching 
Tubero at the same time to bring theoretical abstraction into connection with politics.  
Scipio’s second chief rhetorical aim in promoting contemplative pursuits is to detach 
Laelius from earthly goods by cultivating an appetite for knowledge, which will make 
him a more morally restrained politician.  To make these studies more attractive and 
produce these results, Scipio argues that the contemplative life is inherently valuable and 
personally satisfying, on two grounds: he shows that it will constitute our sole activity in 
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eternity, and he dignifies the contemplative life itself with the revelation that its exclusive 
pursuit leads to eternal happiness, even apart from any political accomplishments.  These 
rhetorical ends and the strategies used to pursue them represent a continuation and 
fulfillment of Scipio’s aims and methods towards Laelius and Tubero in his earlier 
epideictic speech (1.26-29). 
A) The means and ends of statesmanship: contemplation as politically relevant 
 Scipio promotes contemplative pursuits for their political relevance and utility, 
showing Laelius and Tubero that the cosmos provides knowledge, first, of 
statesmanship’s means, to be understood as a more altruistic justice than was conceived 
of by Laelius.  This altruism is evident in the Sun’s fulfillment of an altruistic governing 
role focused on the benefit of the other spheres: 
Next, of these seven, holding approximately the middle region is the Sun, the 
chief, leader, and moderator of the other lights, acting as mind and balancing 
force of the universe, and of so great a size that it illuminates and fills all with its 
light.  (Rep. 6.21) 
 
Deinde de septem mediam fere regionem Sol obtinet, dux et princeps et 
moderator luminum reliquorum, mens mundi et temperatio, tanta magnitudine ut 
cuncta sua luce lustret et compleat. 
 
Scipio indicates the political relevance of the sun’s example by designating the sun with 
political language (e.g. dux, rector) that recalls the rector rei publicae discussed earlier in 
the work.298  In addition, the way the sun benevolently casts its light on the other spheres 
recalls Scipio’s insistence that the rector rei publicae provide the light of his soul as a 
model for others: “he should offer himself as an example to the citizens by the splendor 
of his soul and of his life” (ut sese splendore animi et vitae suae sicut speculum praebeat 
                                                          
298 Büchner 1984: 474-75, Zetzel 1995: 238; cf. 239 on the political resonance of comites. 
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civibus, 2.69).  This role of the rector was also brought up earlier in the Somnium itself 
by Africanus,299 who prophesied that when confronting the Gracchan crisis, “at that point 
you, [Scipio Aemilianus] Africanus, will have to show to the fatherland the light of your 
soul, natural ability, and good counsel” (hic tu, Africane, ostendas oportebit patriae 
lumen animi ingeni consilique tui, 6.16).  The connection Scipio draws between 
cosmology and political matters piques the pragmatic Laelius’s interest in the former 
subject, while the intellectual Tubero is taught to relate his cosmological studies to 
political concerns.  Laelius and Tubero have thus been positioned to understand that just 
as the sun’s justice consists in its orientation to the benefit of the other planetary spheres 
by spreading its light and using its magnitude to create order, in like manner the 
statesman’s justice consists in directing his mental capacities and the influence of his 
prestigious example to create harmony in political society. 
The Somnium’s concept of an altruistic and exemplary justice focused on the 
benefit of others, although it somewhat resembles previous formulations of justice earlier 
in the dialogue, is probably different from those that were advanced by Laelius.  It was 
likely Scipio himself rather than Laelius who spoke of justice in this same sense in two 
Fragments of Book 2: 
justice looks outward, and is completely manifest, and stands out  (Rep. 2.8) 
 
iustitia foras spectat et proiecta tota est atque eminet  
 
the virtue that more than all others reaches out and spreads itself out for others’ 
benefit  (Rep. 2.9) 
 
quae virtus praeter ceteras totam se ad alienas utilitates porrigit atque explicat  
                                                          




The emphasis on altruism in this conception of justice seems to have been absent from 
Laelius’s account of justice in Book 3.  Laelius certainly agrees with Scipio that justice 
aims at the benefit of others rather than oneself, as Cicero’s own reference in De Finibus 
(2.59) to Laelius’s argument makes clear.300  Nevertheless, the essence of justice for 
Laelius seems to be not the practice of altruism as such but the maintenance of proper 
order or harmony, the maintenance of rule by the rational over the irrational, whether in 
terms of political society or the soul.  When Laelius justifies the rule of Rome over her 
empire, he does so on the grounds that the rational must rule the irrational, possibly 
reprising Aristotle’s argument for natural slavery (3.22).  Although it may be implicit in 
Laelius’s argument that this rule is for the good of the irrational, and Laelius may have 
developed this point more explicitly in parts of his argument that have not survived (cf. 
Fin. 2.59), Laelius’s conception of justice revolves around the question of who has the 
right to rule, not the character of a just action as purely altruistic.  Furthermore, Laelius’s 
emphasis on virtue as an internal quality of the soul to be contemplated by the individual 
possessing it ignores the particular character of justice emphasized by Scipio as an act 
aimed at others (foras spectat, 2.8).  The other part of that fragment’s definition points to 
another aspect of justice omitted by Laelius, namely its exemplary value: justice is 
                                                          
300 “It is evident that if fairness, honesty, and justice do not take their rise from nature, 
and if all these things are to be motivated by utility, then a good man cannot be found.  
And on these matters, quite enough was said by Laelius in my books De Re Publica” 
(Perspicuum est enim, nisi aequitas, fides, iustitia proficiscantur a natura, et si omnia 
haec ad utilitatem referantur, virum bonum non posse reperiri, deque his rebus satis 




“completely manifest” (proiecta tota est) and is put on display (eminet),301 presumably 
for others to imitate.  Therefore this Fragment, for which we already have evidence 
assigning it to Book 2,302 may well belong to the lost portion of Scipio’s argument 
following his statement that the rector “should call others to imitate him and offer 
himself as an example to the citizens by the splendor of his soul and of his life” (ut ad 
imitationem sui vocet alios, ut sese splendore animi et vitae suae sicut speculum praebeat 
civibus, 2.69).   
It would be a mistake, however, to say that Scipio’s ideal of altruistic justice is 
completely absent from the debate on justice in Book 3.  While there seems to be no trace 
of it in Laelius’s account, it does surface, paradoxically enough, in Philus’s speech on 
behalf of injustice.  At the beginning of this speech, Philus set out a conception of 
altruistic justice similar to Scipio’s before proceeding to disprove its existence, calling it 
“that virtue which alone—if it actually exists—is exceedingly generous and beneficent, 
and which loves everyone more than itself, born for others rather than for itself” (eam 
virtutem quae est una, si modo est, maxime munifica et liberalis, et quae omnes magis 
quam sepse diligit, aliis nata potius quam sibi, 3.8).  Thus in the Somnium, Scipio uses 
the model of the Sun’s role in the cosmos to vindicate an altruistic conception of justice 
denied by Philus and not properly vindicated by Laelius’s defense of justice as the 
harmony manifested in the rightful rule of the rational over the irrational. 
                                                          
301 Clu. 183: ii quorum eminet audacia atque proiecta est. 
302 Cf. Non. 373.30: proiectum… M. Tullius de republica lib. II ‘iustitia… eminet’ 
(quoted in Powell 2006: 90). 
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For Scipio, the harmony of the mixed regime is not justice as such, but the result 
of the statesman’s dedicating himself to this end and setting an example of justice to be 
imitated by the different orders of society.  The harmonious cosmos resulting from the 
influence of the Sun models the political end to which the statesman’s altruistic justice is 
directed, the social harmony of the mixed constitution.  That this is statesmanship’s goal 
was already suggested in the quotation above by the sun’s designation as moderator and 
mundi… temperatio.  The statesman’s goal of social harmony is also implicit in the 
analogy, often noted by commentators, between the way all the orders turn to Scipio (in 
te unum atque in tuum nomen se tota convertet civitas, 6.16) to seek the preservation of 
their proper place in the Roman constitution and the similar way that, in the cosmology, 
the planetary spheres revolve around the Sun.303  The concord of the mixed regime is 
further reflected in the heavens by the music of the spheres, which results from the 
harmonic intervals between the spheres (6.22).  This passage is directly related to 
Scipio’s earlier discussion in Book 2 of the perfect harmony among the orders of society 
produced by the statesman’s political action and personal moral example, which Scipio 
likened to the harmonious sound that results from the musician’s skillful manipulation of 
the different chords of a lyre (2.69).  In sum, “what musicians call harmony in a song is 
concord in a state” (quae harmonia a musicis dicitur in cantu, ea est in civitate 
concordia, 2.69).  When Scipio concludes that “it [concord] can by no means exist 
without justice” (eaque sine iustitia nullo pacto potest esse, 2.69), he indicates that 
political concord is conceptually distinct from justice, the latter producing the former, 
                                                          
303 See e.g. Zetzel 1995: 229.  For the astronomical metaphor implicit in se convertere, 
see Gallagher 2001. 
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contrary to Laelius’s conception of justice in Book 3 as a kind of harmony.  That the 
justice Scipio refers to is, moreover, the individual statesman’s, and that it consists both 
in his dedication to preserving the mixed regime and in his setting a good example of 
moral restraint for society to follow, is evident from the logical sequence of the passage.  
Scipio’s initial statement that the rector “should call others to imitate him and offer 
himself as an example to the citizens by the splendor of his soul and of his life” was 
immediately followed by a long sentence that began with the particle enim before setting 
forth the lengthy analogy between the harmony produced by the musician and social 
concord (Ut enim in fidibus aut tibiis…).  The conclusion of the whole thought was that 
this harmony cannot exist without justice.  Since the analogy about social harmony was 
presented as an explanation (enim) of the importance of the statesman’s being an example 
for the citizens to imitate, it would appear that this example, specifically his justice, is the 
cause of the harmony.  Scipio argues, therefore, that the mixed regime cannot survive 
without just individuals, who make the mixed regime the end of their politics and whose 
personal example of moral restraint makes the rest of society morally restrained as well.  
Thus in the Somnium, Scipio returns to the analogy between musical harmony and social 
concord, arguing that the latter results from an individual statesman’s justice, which 
orients him towards fostering this concord by political action and by personal example. 
B) The value of contemplation and the need for moral restraint  
Since the statesman’s individual justice is necessary for harmony in the state, 
which results not only from the statesman’s altruistic dedication to the mixed regime but 
also from the example of his personal moral restraint, Cicero’s other goal in having 
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Scipio promote contemplative activity to Laelius in the Somnium is to foster moral 
restraint in the normative reader.  The last section (A) has shown how Scipio draws 
Laelius to contemplative pursuits by making cosmology and mathematical theory 
politically relevant, with the goal of teaching him about the means (individual justice) 
and ends (concord of the mixed constitution) of statesmanship.  In this section, I will 
show how Scipio draws Laelius to these pursuits by presenting them as inherently 
valuable, both because they constitute the highest human activity and lead to happiness, 
and because they can lead on their own to an eternal reward.  Scipio expects that by 
inculcating enthusiasm for the life of the mind, moral restraint will naturally follow.  This 
moral restraint will come easily to statesmen who have come to value the pursuit of 
knowledge over the pursuit of money, pleasure, or power.   
 Scipio advances the inherent value of contemplation on the grounds that, as the 
activity in which the soul will find its happiness in eternity, it is per se superior to human 
things, and consequently should be pursued in the present life as much as possible, with a 
corresponding contempt for earthly concerns.  We have seen above (Section II) how the 
blessedness of the eternal reward for statesmen (6.17) consists chiefly in contemplation 
of the beauties and marvels of the cosmos.  Scipio is urged by Africanus to seek this 
blessedness by engaging continuously (semper) in contemplative activity while despising 
human concerns: “I perceive that even now, you are contemplating the dwelling and 
home of human beings; and if it seems small to you, as indeed it is, gaze always at these 
heavenly things, despise the human” (sentio te sedem etiamnunc hominum ac domum 
contemplari; quae si tibi parva, ut est, ita videtur, haec caelestia semper spectato, illa 
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humana contemnito, 6.24).  This command picks up on Scipio’s declaration in the 
epideictic passage on contemplative pursuits that nothing is more grand than “looking 
down on all human things and considering them inferior to wisdom, while never 
considering anything with one’s mind except what is eternal and divine” (quam 
despicientem omnia humana et inferiora sapientia ducentem, nihil umquam nisi 
sempiternum et divinum animo volutare, 1.28).  Since Africanus’s exhortation to do the 
same comes immediately after his explanation of the harmonic relationships between the 
spheres and the special properties of the numbers eight and seven (6.23), he is inviting 
Scipio to study mathematical topics rather than “human” things, including politics, which 
are, by comparison with more abstract subjects, worthy of contempt.  Thus, despite the 
connection between the harmony among the spheres and the harmony of the mixed 
regime, Africanus really is urging Scipio, and through this narration Scipio really is 
urging Laelius, to study mathematics and harmonic theory. 
The same is true of Africanus’s exhortation to study astronomy rather than 
thinking about Rome’s empire on earth, an evidently political and human topic.  
Although the survey Africanus gives of the universe is rife with political language and 
implicit political significance, nevertheless, this survey is given when Africanus urges 
Scipio to turn his gaze away from Rome’s paltry empire and the ground (6.20) towards 
“the temples into which you have come” (nonne aspicis quae in temple veneris, 6.21), 
recalling Scipio’s earlier avowal that the person who has examined the realm of the gods 
will consider nothing great among human affairs (1.26).  Thus Africanus’s depiction of 
the universe really is about studying astronomy, in addition to the universe’s political 
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ramifications, and the higher way to study astronomy is for its own sake without making 
any practical applications.304  Such studies are higher in themselves because they 
constitute the soul’s blessedness (cf. Scipio’s admiration and enjoyment at 6.20).  The 
Somnium suggests that since the object of such studies is divine (divina studia, 6.22), the 
human soul, being itself a god (6.30) that longs to be separated from the body (6.18-20), 
longs for that which is connatural with itself.  Hence Africanus’s closing admonition that 
the soul, “by contemplating the things beyond, should withdraw itself from the body as 
much as possible” (ea quae extra sunt contemplans quam maxime se a corpore abstrahet, 
6.33), as a preparation for its final end. 
Given the validation of contemplation as the soul’s final and blessed end, it is not 
entirely surprising that Cicero also promotes it by designating the contemplative life as an 
alternative path to the eternal reward promised for virtuous political engagement.  
Africanus exhorts Scipio to “gaze always (semper) at the heavens” and to despise human 
things, and Scipio himself had declared thinking of “nothing ever (nihil umquam) except 
the eternal and divine” to be “more grand” (praestantius) than all human things, 
especially depreciating political concerns.305  Taking this semper and nihil umquam 
literally might lead someone to embrace the purely contemplative life.  This choice is 
indeed allowed by the Somnium, which affords the contemplative life the same reward as 
the life of virtuous political engagement.  In the course of his explanation of the music of 
the spheres, Africanus reveals that: 
                                                          
304 Büchner 1984: 474-75 reduces the significance of this passage to its political 
dimension. 
305 Scipio depreciates imperium, magistratus, and regnum by comparison with continual 
contemplation of the divine (1.28). 
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learned men who have imitated it on strings and in songs have opened a way for 
themselves to return to this place, just as others who, with outstanding natural 
ability, have cultivated divine studies during human life.  (Rep. 6.22) 
 
quod docti homines nervis imitati et cantibus, aperuerunt sibi reditum in hunc 
locum, sicut alii qui praestantibus ingeniis in vita humana divina studia coluerunt. 
 
Thus the certum definitum locum (6.17) whence the souls of great statesmen depart and to 
where they return (harum [civitatum] rectores hinc profecti hunc revertuntur, 6.17) is 
also the place of origin and return (aperuerunt sibi reditum in hunc locum) for poets and 
musicians (nervis imitati atque cantibus) as well as philosophers in the broad sense, 
including astronomers and mathematicians (sicut alii qui praestantibus ingeniis in vita 
humana divina studia coluerunt).306  Great statesmen imitate the music of the spheres by 
the cultivation of social harmony; great poets and musicians imitate it in their verses and 
songs, while other intellectuals study all that pertains to the cosmos.  Africanus refers 
again to the presence in heaven of both kinds of men when urging Scipio not to “despair 
of returning to this place, in which great and outstanding men have all things” (si reditum 
in hunc locum desperaveris, in quo omnia sunt magnis et pratestantibus viris, 6.29).  
Magni viri indicates the great statesmen, while praestantes viri denotes those mentioned 
earlier as having merited admission to this place praestantibus ingeniis.  The dative of 
possession, moreover (omnia sunt magnis et praestantibus viris), in the context of an 
eternal reward that consists in contemplation, suggests that both kinds of men acquire 
ownership of all things as members of a select group that contemplates the whole 
universe.  This sentiment recalls Scipio’s declaration: “how fortunate must the man be 
                                                          
306 Powell 1990: 161, who also points the reader to Cicero’s use of the same phrase at 
Cat. 24, divina studia, to designate poets and philosophers (see the many names Cicero 
lists in Cat. 23). 
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thought who alone is truly allowed to claim all things as his own by the right not of 
Roman citizens but of the wise” (quam est hic fortunatus putandus, cui soli vere liceat 
omnia non Quiritium sed sapientium iure pro suis vindicare, 1.27). 
While a careful reading of the Somnium vindicates those who pursue the 
contemplative life exclusively, the overall rhetorical force of the passage is on the 
vindication of political engagement, albeit philosophically motivated and informed, 
through its showcasing of the authoritative exempla of Scipio and his ancestors, all of 
whom embraced the political life.  The vindication of the “pure contemplatives” only 
emerges on a careful reading, and not on the cursory reading that most of the Roman elite 
were likely to give the passage.  The Dream centers around Scipio’s personal avocation 
to continue in the political life, as Africanus’s prophecy makes clear (6.17).  Nor may he 
escape his avocation in life by committing suicide.  When Scipio asks if he can hasten to 
the “true life” and no longer tarry on earth, Paullus reveals that suicide is prohibited, as 
one can only enter heaven when the god has freed him from the body (6.19).  Until then, 
Scipio must fulfill “the human duty assigned to him by the god” (6.19: munus humanum 
assignatum a deo).  There follows Paullus’s exhortation to imitate the life of piety 
towards country exemplified by himself and Africanus, a life that is the way to heaven.  
The injunction to fulfill one’s assigned duty is general enough to apply to the pure 
contemplatives as well, who apparently have their own role of imitating the music of the 
spheres in their learned pursuits—but they are not mentioned by name.  The protagonist 
of the Dream is not Archimedes, Plato, or Aristotle, but Scipio.  Of the other great men in 
heaven, we only learn the names of three, Scipio Africanus, Aemilus Paulus, and 
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Romulus, all Roman statesmen.  Thus while the Somnium allows that some may abstain 
completely from politics, its primary purpose is to provoke imitation of Scipio and his 
ancestors. 
 The Somnium’s revelation that intellectuals can gain an eternal reward along with 
virtuous statesmen, but that pleasure-seekers cannot, also contributes to Cicero’s overall 
argument in De Re Publica that not any kind of political engagement will do, but only 
political engagement of the right kind, which must aim at the good of the state and not 
material gain.  Statesmen and even those who followed only the intellectual life are 
rewarded with a return to heaven, but not so the pleasure-seekers: 
For the souls of those who have surrendered themselves to the pleasures of the 
body and have offered themselves as pleasures’ servants, if you will, obeying 
pleasures at the impulse of their lusts, have violated the laws of the gods and men, 
and having slipped out of their bodies are churned around the very earth, nor do 
they return to this place except after they have been driven hard for many ages.  
(Rep. 6.33) 
 
Namque eorum animi qui se corporis voluptatibus dediderunt, earumque se quasi 
ministros praebuerunt, impulsuque libidinum voluptatibus oboedientium, deorum 
et hominum iura violaverunt, corporibus elapsi circum terram ipsam volutantur, 
nec hunc in locum nisi multis exagitati saeclis revertuntur. 
 
This passage has traditionally been read as the fulfillment of the anti-Epicurean attack 
Cicero began in the preface of the first book.  But Epicureans, as I have attempted to 
show, are not Cicero’s only or even his main audience.  Cicero is also addressing those 
who would engage in politics for the sake of personal gain.  These words, coupled with 
the eternal reward promised to pure contemplatives, confirm Scipio’s earlier praise of 
Archimedes the mathematician and scientist as being more truly active than Dionysius 
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the tyrant, the quintessential pleasure seeker, since the tyrant engages in politics for the 
sake of personal pleasure, to which power is a means.   
For who can really think that Dionysius, at the time when he was devising every 
machination to deprive his fellow citizens of their liberty, was more active than 
his fellow citizen Archimedes, when the latter, although he seemed to be doing 
nothing, made that very sphere of which we were speaking just now?  (Rep. 1.28) 
 
Quis enim putare vere potest plus egisse Dionysium, tum cum omnia moliendo 
eripuerit civibus suis libertatem, quam eius civem Archimedem, cum istam ipsam 
sphaeram <de qua modo dicebatur>, nihil cum agere videretur, effecerit? 
 
Dionysus’s political activity was directed to the end of depriving the Syracusans of their 
liberty, quite the contrary of Cicero’s ideal of preserving the mixed regime.  Thus he was 
not truly politically engaged.  Better, Scipio implies, to be an apolitical intellectual like 
Archimedes, who was so absorbed in his studies that he was not even aware of the 
moment when his city of Syracuse was being captured, than to be politically engaged in 
the wrong way like Dionysus, actively harming the citizens of Syracuse for the sake of 
personal power and pleasure. 
Thus Scipio’s purpose in endowing the contemplative life with such great dignity 
and in promising punishment for pleasure-seekers after death is to bring Laelius to 
engage in politics in the right way, which will come naturally to someone who treasures 
the goods of the mind above all else while despising external goods and the goods of the 
body.  The conclusion of the Somnium leaves no doubt that although the philosophic life 
on its own can lead to heaven and is better than a pleasure-seeking political life, the best 
life involves engagement in politics punctuated by contemplation as much as possible.  
While our final end is for our separated soul to engage exclusively in contemplation—
semper, nihil umquam nisi—and while there can be no greater happiness than this eternal 
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contemplation, as long as we are in this life, there must be statesmen to attend to the 
needs of political society.  Hence Africanus’s closing remarks to Scipio invite him to 
engage in two “best” activities:  
Use this [the soul’s nature and power] in the best things!  But the best cares regard 
the welfare of the fatherland, driven and exercised by which the soul will fly up 
more quickly to this its seat and home; and it will do this more swiftly, if already 
while still enclosed in the body it emanates outwards, and contemplating the 
things beyond, withdraws itself from the body as much as possible.  (Rep. 6.33)   
 
Hanc tu exerce in optimis rebus!  Sunt autem optimae curae de salute patriae, 
quibus agitatus et exercitatus animus velocius in hanc sedem et domum suam 
pervolabit; idque ocius faciet, si iam tum cum erit inclusus in corpore, eminebit 
foras, et ea quae extra sunt contemplans maxime se a corpore abstrahet. 
 
Thus the best things are, first, the “best cares,” which are political matters, and also 
contemplation.  The rhetorical emphasis of the passage, which places political matters 
first and repeats the word optimae to describe them, gives the impression that optimae res 
are identical to optimae curae.  However, the soul is to concentrate not only on politics 
but also on withdrawing itself from the body, which denotes philosophic contemplation, 
an additional “best” activity or “thing” for the soul.  The soul will return faster (velocius) 
to its heavenly home by engaging in best thing number one, political curae, and even 
faster still (ocius) if it engages simultaneously in best thing number two, contemplation.  
Contemplation causes an even faster return to the heavenly home because the focus on 
the things above causes one to lose interest in the things of the body.  When such a 
person engages in politics, it will not be for the sake of bodily things.  This is the kind of 





 The Somnium’s final exhortation to pursue both politics and philosophy, with 
philosophy assuring the just politicians an even faster return to the heavens, bears not 
only on Scipio’s desire to make Laelius morally restrained in politics through 
indifference to the things of the body, but also on the other ideals regarding engagement 
in politics promoted in the Somnium as a whole.  For such continual contemplation, 
pursued “as much as possible,” also encourages proper political participation because it 
places before the statesman’s mind the proper motive, means, and ends of political 
engagement.  Contemplation of the heavens and the awareness of the earth’s 
insignificance from the perspective of the whole cosmos should remind Laelius and the 
normative reader that the reward they should be seeking through political engagement is 
not futile glory, contemporaneous or posthumous, but rather eternal glory, verum decus.  
The example of the sun’s balancing act and shining its light reminds them to pursue 
altruistic justice and to be an example of it to others, while the harmony of the spheres 
that results teaches them the political end at which they should aim, the preservation of 
social harmony through the mixed constitution.   
A survey of the various motives proposed for political engagement in Pro Sestio 
and De Re Publica as a whole reveals a similarity of internal argumentative development.  
In Pro Sestio, Cicero began with appeals to the glory one can win from one’s 
contemporaries and from posterity before rising in the peroration to the higher motives of 
doing right for its own sake and of seeking an immortal glory not dependent on human 
memory, in the same way that Scipio proposes a higher reward for engagement than 
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Laelius’s expectation of the virtuous statesman’s contemporaneous307 or posthumous 
glory.  In Pro Sestio, Cicero dwelt at length on the certainty of receiving contemporary 
civic glory, pointing to the lesson of his own exile and glorious return as proof that 
whatever storms the republican statesmen may encounter, he can always count on happily 
coming to port through the efforts of his grateful fellow-citizens who crown him anew 
with glory (Sest. 50-52).  He made the same point about contemporary glory in the 
excursus on optimates and populares, where he laid down the argument that those 
statesmen who pursue the interests of loyal citizens should receive and, given the general 
pattern of Roman history, will receive glory from these same loyal citizens as their due 
(Sest. 103-4; cf. 106-27).  As for posthumous glory, Cicero gave various examples of 
statesman exiled during their lifetime whose glory was recuperated in the eyes of 
posterity through memorialization, and most notably in the case of one Opimius, who 
died in exile but whose monument, Cicero says, is heavily frequented in the Forum (Sest. 
140).308  These arguments were then summed up before being transcended by an 
argument for political engagement that took the idea of immortal glory to the ontological 
and eternal level (Sest. 143), just as Scipio does in the Dream in response to Laelius’s 
earlier arguments.  Just as Cicero in Pro Sestio ultimately—though only implicitly—
repudiated his shaky promises of contemporary glory based on unpredictable political 
events and persons, as well as monuments that offer the deceptive guarantee of immortal 
                                                          
307 Cf. also Rep. 3.28, where Laelius states: “Virtue wants honor (honorem), nor does 
virtue have any other reward.”   
308 Cicero adds to Opimius the example of Athenian statesmen who were exiled by an 
ungrateful populace and were never recalled in their lifetime but obtained even greater 
glory in the eyes of posterity up to the present day (Sest. 141-42). 
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glory through memorialization, Scipio likewise turns from Laelius’s proposed reward of 
virtus that contemplates its own decus, and from his desire for the glory of triumphs and 
immortality through earthly monuments, to the eternal reward gained by divina virtus, a 
reward that consists in contemplating the decus of the cosmos, and that is “evergreen” 
(viridiora) in comparison with the fading leaves of laurels and “more durable” 
(stabiliora) than statues mounted in lead. 
It is also evident that there a number of continuities linking the peroration of Pro 
Sestio and the Somnium Scipionis that concludes De Re Publica.  Cicero ended Pro Sestio 
by advancing in compressed form the central ideas of the Somnium on the means, ends, 
and motives of political engagement: 
Finally, let us reflect that the body of brave men and of great persons is mortal, 
but the motions of the soul and the glory of virtue are everlasting, and if we see 
that this opinion has been made sacred through what happened to that most 
venerable man, Hercules, of whom it is said that, once his body had been burned, 
his life and virtue were taken up into immortality, then we should be no less 
inclined to consider that those men who have by their counsels and toils 
strengthened or defended or preserved this great Republic have obtained immortal 
glory.  (Sest. 143)  
 
Cogitemus denique corpus virorum fortium magnorumque hominum esse mortale, 
animi vero motus et virtutis gloriam sempiternam, neque, hanc opinionem si in 
illo sanctissimo Hercule consecratam videmus, cuius corpore ambusto vitam eius 
et virtutem immortalitas excepisse dicatur, minus existemus eos, qui hanc tantam 
rem publicam suis consiliis aut laboribus aut auxerint aut defenderint aut 
servarint, esse immortalem gloriam consecutos. 
 
The continuity between this passage and the Somnium is evident in the assurance that 
those who have who have engaged in politics virtuously and endured hardship (means) 
for the sake of preserving the Roman state (end) will receive the crowning reward of 
immortal glory (motive).  Thus the Somnium assures admittance to an exclusive society 
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in heaven reserved for omnibus qui patriam conservaverint adiuverint auxerint (6.17), 
picking up the promise of immortal glory in Pro Sestio for those qui hanc tantam rem 
publicam... auxerint aut defenderint aut servarint.309  In each case, the end to be sought 
in political engagement is the preservation and strengthening of the Roman state.  
Moreover, seeking this end requires engaging in politics in the right way or according to 
the right means, that is, virtuously.  Virtuous engagement especially consists in the 
practice of justice, altruistically putting one’s talents at the service of the state, and of 
courage.  Thus in Pro Sestio, the statesman applies his good counsel (consiliis) to the 
good of the state and endures painful efforts (laboribus) on its behalf.  Similarly, in the 
Somnium, Scipio is to defend Rome by his good counsel and other talents (ostendas 
oportebit patriae lumen animi ingeni consilique tui, 6.16), and to do so at the risk of his 
own life (si impias propinquorum manus effugeris).  The motive for taking these means 
to defend the state, that is for practicing virtue, is the prospect of eternal glory.  From the 
point of view of the individual statesman’s own self-interest, virtue is, in addition to 
being a means to the political end of serving the state, a means to his own eternal reward 
and happiness.  Thus the peroration declares that “the glory of virtue is everlasting” 
(virtutis gloriam sempiternam) because it leads to “immortal glory” (immortalis gloria), 
as the example of Hercules shows (cuius… virtutem immortalitas excepisse dicitur), an 
ideal the Somnium reprises with the assurance that “that life [cultivating justice and piety] 
is the path to heaven” (ea vita [iustitiam colere et pietatem] via est in caelum, 6.20) and 
                                                          
309 Coleman 1964: 3-4 connects this phrase in the Somnium to another passage in Pro 




above all in the phrase “by its own charms, virtue itself ought to draw you to true 
gloriously-beautiful-splendor” (suis te oportet illecebris ipsa virtus trahat ad verum 
decus, 6.29).  In both works, virtue is, in the final analysis, not an end in itself for the 
statesman but a means to his ultimate end of a higher kind of glory. 
 There is also continuity in the common assertion that because the soul is self-
moved, it is immortal and will continue in a state of conscious awareness—with the 
major difference, however, that the Somnium makes the case for the immortality of the 
soul more explicitly.  When Africanus reveals that the eternal reward he makes known is 
ontologically possible due to the duality between body and soul, the one being mortal and 
the other immortal, he explains more extensively the same concept as Cicero announced 
in his own voice in Pro Sestio when referring to the contrast between Hercules’s body 
consumed on the pyre and his soul, taken up to heaven (143).  Referring to those who 
served the state on earth who have since arrived in the heavens to enjoy their eternal 
beatitude, Africanus says: “Having been loosed from their bodies they dwell in the place 
you see (6.20). . . Consider that it’s not you who are mortal, but this body; for you are not 
what that measly appearance declares you to be, but rather your own mind—that’s what 
each man is” (6.30).310  In addition, Cicero’s compact statement in Pro Sestio that “the 
motions of the soul are eternal” (animi… motus… sempiternam, Sest. 143) is fully 
                                                          
310 corpore laxati illum incolunt locum quem vides (6.20) … nec enim tu is es quem forma 
ista declarat, sed mens cuiusque is est quisque (6.30).  Cicero also makes reference to the 
apotheosis of Hercules in De Re Publica, no less than in Pro Sestio.  Augustine (Civ. Dei, 
22.4.1-9) testifies to a passage in which Laelius apparently spoke of the same dualism, 
referring to the cases of Hercules and Romulus in particular (Rep. 3.32).  It is likely, 
however, given what I have attempted to show about Laelius’s embrace of Stoic thought 
in Book 3, that for Laelius the survival of their souls after death was not permanent, but 
only temporary (cf. Tusc. 1.77-79).  
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developed in the Somnium’s long, literal translation of the proof of the soul’s immortality 
from self-motion given by Socrates in Plato’s Phaedrus (Rep. 6.30-32).  In Pro Sestio, by 
contrast, the Platonic import of Cicero’s claim that the soul’s motions are eternal can only 
be understood if one is already familiar with Plato or if one makes the connection, by no 
means immediately obvious upon a first hearing or reading of the speech, to an earlier 
passage where Cicero suggested the possibility that after death the soul may gain a 
“better state of awareness” (melior sensus, Sest. 47).   
The Somnium also differs from Pro Sestio by extending the scope of the claim 
about the soul’s immortality, applying it not only to great statesmen but also to great 
intellectuals and indeed to all other human beings.  In the peroration, Cicero ascribes 
eternal self-motion and a sort of apotheosis to the souls only of “brave men and great 
persons” (viri fortes magnique homines) and refers only to political service as the means 
of attaining immortal glory.  But according to the Somnium, philosophers and poets can 
attain the same eternal reward as virtuous statesmen (6.22, 6.24).  Furthermore, the 
Somnium teaches that the human soul is by its very nature an immortal god due to its 
property of self-motion, as Africanus expressly avers (6.30) and then drives home with 
the proof of the same from Plato’s Phaedrus (6.31-32).  Therefore, the souls of human 
beings who wickedly abandon themselves to pleasure are also immortal, and will after a 
long period of punishment be admitted to the particular place in heaven where great 
statesmen and intellectuals dwell (6.33).  It might be thought that the Somnium says 
nothing about “everyone else,” about those who pursue virtue, knowledge, or pleasure in 
only a “mediocre” way.  But the Somnium seems to envision the vast majority of human 
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beings as belonging to the category of pleasure-seekers, and thus appears to agree with 
Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics that the many wrongly seek pleasure as the good (whether 
practical Epicures or principled Epicureans) rather than virtue and knowledge.   
Finally, the Somnium gives a fuller explanation of what the conscious state of 
immortality consists in, thereby developing more clearly the nature of the eternal reward 
and glory enjoyed by the soul.  By speaking of immortalis gloria in the peroration of Pro 
Sestio, Cicero uses language that more readily calls to mind a conception of glory 
familiar to traditional Roman culture, lasting fame with posterity, and the context 
encourages such an interpretation.  First, the peroration seems to emphasize the role of 
human beings in conferring fame on great statesmen with the admonition that “we should 
likewise consider” (neque… minus existemus) great Roman statesman to have achieved 
the same apotheosis as the famous Hercules.311  Secondly, just before the peroration, 
Cicero had expatiated on the value of glory with posterity, and thus the concluding 
reference to immortalis gloria appears to be a summation of that same idea.  The 
Platonism that informs this idea is easily overlooked in the long sentence (animi vero 
motus) and the earlier reference to attaining a melior sensus (47) is by now easily 
forgotten, and nothing is said about the conscious experience of Hercules or great Roman 
statesmen in the afterlife.  In the Somnium, by contrast, the word gloria expressly 
designates the human glory and fame with posterity which are no longer of any concern 
to the souls who have departed from their bodies, who focus all their attention instead on 
the glories and beauties of the cosmos, designated in such phrases as illustris et clarus 
                                                          
311 Cole 2013: 84 argues that Cicero is advocating the distribution of divine honors by 
society, a divinity and immortal glory dependent on human memorialization. 
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quidam locus (6.15), splendidissimo candore… elucens (6.20), praeclara… et mirabilia 
(6.20), and verum decus (6.29).  Thus the nature of the immortalis gloria attained by 
great statesmen is revealed primarily as the glory of the eternal cosmos, and their 
conscious enjoyment of this glory consists in their contemplation of it, which renders 
them happy (beati… fruantur, 6.17).  In a secondary sense, their conscious enjoyment of 
glory consists in their awareness of shining themselves as part of the glorious cosmic 
tapestry, of recognition by the supreme god (6.17), and of mutual regard enjoyed with 
other great men into whose exclusive society they have been admitted.  This secondary 
aspect of eternal glory, however, is at best implied.  What the Somnium expressly and 
repeatedly drives home is the notion that the glory they experience is the glory of the 
cosmos that they contemplate. 
The Somnium makes the case for immortal glory more explicitly not only because 
of genre considerations but also because of historical moment.  The differences between 
the speech and the philosophic dialogue in motives emphasized can be ascribed to 
changes in Cicero’s political circumstances, since these occasioned the choice of the 
philosophic genre with its more universal, philosophic outlook.  In Pro Sestio, the bulk of 
Cicero’s thematic concern with political engagement to preserve the Republic 
emphasized human glory as a compelling motive, while the argument for engagement 
based on the soul’s immortal glory was presented in only the briefest terms.  This 
rhetorical strategy depended on the historical situation when Cicero delivered this speech 
in February 56.  Cicero chose to motivate immediate political action by especially 
holding out the allure of gloria because his own returned from exile seemed to indicate it 
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was there for the taking for anyone willing to stand up for the republican regime.  Cicero 
was aggressively maneuvering against a triumvirate that he thought was in its dying 
stages, as Pompey appeared to be drifting apart from Caesar, and it also bears mentioning 
that Cicero had already successfully scheduled a discussion of Caesar’s Campanian land 
law in the senate for the following month.  But the renewal of the triumvirate just weeks 
after the speech’s delivery led Cicero in De Re Publica to admit far more openly and 
extensively than in Pro Sestio the futility of human glory as a motive for serving the 
Republic, and to place in relief the necessity of an eternal reward that does not depend on 
earthly success, on the contingencies of time and human behavior.   
Still, it remains true that Cicero’s acknowledgement of the vanity of human glory 
was already implicitly present in Pro Sestio, and this is important because it shows that 
Cicero did not first conceive the motive of eternal reward once he was no longer 
politically relevant.312  Cicero thus consistently had in mind the idea that the prospect of 
eternal reward was, in the final analysis, the most compelling motive for political 
engagement.  He chose to make this motive more explicit when writing in a more 
                                                          
312 Cicero hints at the same idea of the immortality of the souls of great statesman at Rab. 
Perd. 29—“although for many other reasons the souls of good men seem divine and 
eternal to me” (cum multis aliis de causis virorum bonorum mentes divinae mihi atque 
aeternae videntur)—but emphasizes the notion of undying fame with posterity, not yet 
daring to specify any philosophical reasons for believing in a consciously enjoyed 
immortality, as he would later do in Pro Sestio (cf. 47 and 143).  See Powell 1990: 164 
for additional references to the doctrine in the philosophic works.  Syme 1939: 144 
suggests that Cicero’s writings on political philosophy in the 50s BCE represent a turn 
towards flights of fancy that arose from the disillusionment of political failure.  The 
converse of this theory has been proposed by Gildenhard 2013, who cites disillusionment 
with politics as the cause of Cicero’s turn to philosophy under Caesar, especially to 
Platonic notions, while exaggerating the extent of Cicero’s hostility to Platonism in the 
works of the 50s. 
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appropriate genre, the philosophic dialogue, and at the appropriate time, when it was right 
to choose this genre, with its universal and timeless outlook, due to a political climate 
that revealed the fragility and instability of human glory. Cicero’s goal of promoting 
republican political engagement remained constant, therefore, and even the proposal of 
an eternal reward as the highest conceivable motive for such engagement remained 
stable, although he adjusted the emphasis placed on this motive in keeping with genre 


















Chapter 4: From Nature and Lex to Civic Engagement and Leges in De Legibus 1 
In De Legibus, Cicero continues the case for politics from De Re Publica, this 
time by making appeals in his own voice.  Marcus replaces Scipio as the authoritative 
dialogical persona.313  Like Scipio in De Re Publica, Marcus urges political engagement 
informed by philosophical ideas and complemented by ongoing philosophical study 
during periods of leisure, although in terms of the motives and character of political 
engagement, Marcus’s arguments more closely align with Laelius’s focus on virtue as 
having a natural foundation and as being intrinsically desirable than with Scipio’s 
Platonic cosmological metaphysics and eschatology (eternal reward), which drops out of 
view.  Marcus advances his vision of philosophically informed political engagement, 
first, by appealing to Roman cultural norms, calling attention to the example of his own 
politically engaged way of life; and secondly, by advancing philosophical ideas that 
establish a natural basis for political engagement and provide it with a moral basis.  Like 
the Ciceronian persona of the De Re Publica preface, Marcus argues for the existence of 
natural inclinations to human society and to the practice of the virtues.  But unlike in the 
preface of De Re Publica, where the philosophical pedigree of these ideas was masked 
                                                          
313 Thus Benardete 1987: 296 on Cicero’s taking the place of Scipio as main speaker in 
De Legibus.  See also Keyes 1928: 292, “throwing off the mask of Scipio.”  In suggesting 
that Scipio and Marcus are characters that “speak for Cicero,” I do not mean that 
everything these characters/personae say should be taken as Cicero’s actual views, as 
they are not even necessarily the views of the personae themselves.  In the Ciceronian 
dialogue, just as in real life, people may say things for the sake of persuasion and act as 
though such things are true while knowing better for themselves.  Thus while I view these 
three voices as carrying maximum authority and hence great persuasive force, I do not 
think that everything they say represents Cicero’s own views, for the very reason that 
they speak precisely as authorities.  Nevertheless, I hold that sometimes what these 
characters say does indicate Cicero’s own views, as in the present instance. 
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through attribution to Roman tradition, in De Legibus these ideas are explicitly developed 
from a philosophical principle attributed to doctissimi viri (1.18).  The development of 
the natural law argument in Book 1 (starting from the principle lex est ratio summa insita 
in natura, 1.18) serves both as an argument for engagement tout court, directed especially 
at Atticus, and as an argument, directed especially at Quintus, for a particular form of 
engagement that is guided by the virtues both in terms of the public man’s personal 
conduct and in terms of formulating specific leges for the ius civile. 
The importance of the dramatis personae 
The development of Marcus’s natural law argument in De Legibus 1 is well-
documented, and has been the object of a number of recent studies.314  However, the 
purpose of this account in terms of Marcus’s rhetorical aims vis-à-vis the character and 
inclinations of his fellow interlocutors Atticus and Quintus has not been investigated.  
Marcus expressly positions himself between his interlocutors Atticus and Quintus by 
establishing himself as a politically engaged Roman patriot whose engagement is 
informed by a syncretistic philosophical vision that excludes Epicureanism and Academic 
skepticism, favoring justice and virtue as grounded in nature.  Thus in De Legibus, Cicero 
addresses the case for politics as part of a discussion about law among three personae: 
Atticus, someone who is philosophically sophisticated, but inclined towards 
Epicureanism and only involved in politics behind the scenes and through personal 
relationships; Quintus, someone who is relatively naïve philosophically, interested in 
learning but ultimately a practical individual engaged in both political and military 
                                                          
314 See Dyck 2004, Asmis 2008, Annas 2013, and Atkins 2013: 155-87, which also 
discuss the issue of sources. 
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leadership;315 and the persona of the author himself, who exemplifies an elite leader 
whose preferred philosophy differs from Atticus’s putatively quietist and self-seeking 
Epicureanism by being compatible with traditional Roman public service and thus 
acceptable to the Roman traditionalist Quintus, but whose understanding of philosophy 
goes far beyond that of Quintus and the majority of Roman politicians who studied some 
philosophy in their youth or kept token philosophers at home.316 
Marcus’s rhetorical strategies in Book 1 are geared to his two interlocutors.  In 
addressing Quintus, Marcus takes the traditional elite Roman position of engagement in 
politics as a given, fashioning himself as a politically engaged person to form an ethical 
connection with Quintus and employing rhetorical ornamentation in the latter part of 
Book 1 to make the case for a philosophical vision that underpins and informs political 
engagement.  Marcus strengthens the traditional Roman case for politics with the 
argument that man is naturally social, and also establishes a philosophical basis for the 
virtues that the politician must himself possess and inculcate in society through political 
activity that makes use of oratory, as he argues in the climactic laudatio sapientiae at the 
end of Book 1.  Thus with Quintus, Marcus takes it for granted that the Roman elite 
ought to work actively to ensure that the Republic has good laws—lower case leges, if 
you will—but advances a vision according to which upper case Lex and the virtues 
                                                          
315 For the characterization of Atticus and Quintus in Leg., see Kenter 1972: 6-7 and 
Dyck 2004: 23-28; see also Prost 2017: 142-56 on Quintus. 
316 Prost 2017: 138-39 notes that Cicero, in keeping with his practice of striving for 
verisimilitude in his depiction of dialogue characters, portrays Quintus as lacking any 
strong philosophical inclination or affiliation; in other dialogues, Quintus is at various 
points the defender of Epicurean, Peripatetic, or Stoic ideas.  For more on superficial 
engagement with philosophy and philosophers among the Roman elite, see Rawson 1989 
and Griffin 1989. 
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derived from it come to inform the work of promoting good leges through engagement in 
politics.   
In addressing Atticus, Marcus appeals to Atticus’s inclinations as an adherent of 
the philosophical sect known as the Garden, placing his best friend in the pleasure 
gardens of the Ciceronian ancestral estate, where he engages him in a philosophic 
conversation in which he argues that law is rooted in nature and ultimately requires 
political engagement.  Marcus also appeals to Atticus’s special respect for Plato, 
emphasizing the Platonic literary origins of the theme of law even as he moves Atticus in 
the direction of a syncretistic philosophical vision in which not only Platonists but also 
adherents of Epicureanism’s rival Hellenistic schools, Stoics and Peripatetics, have a part.  
Thus, like any good rhetorician, Marcus starts from Atticus’s prejudices and inclinations 
but uses them to lead Atticus in a different direction.  Relying on the charming environs 
of “the Garden of Cicero,” the pleasures of philosophic conversation among friends, and 
Atticus’s special respect for Plato despite his Epicureanism, Marcus lays out an 
understanding of nature based on the idea of Lex and the virtues that flow from it, striving 
to transform Atticus’s Epicurean understanding of nature into one that is reconcilable 
with traditional Roman political culture.  Marcus’s understanding of nature, based on 
Lex, requires political engagement on the grounds that human society is natural.  Thus 
Marcus aims to lead Atticus from the pleasures of conversing about Lex to a practical 
concern for leges.  In addition, the argument Marcus develops from Lex replaces the 
Epicurean doctrine of pleasure as the highest good with an alternate conception in which 
virtue is made to have an essential part in whatever definition of the highest good one 
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might adopt.  Inasmuch as the arguments directed at Atticus create the impression of a 
Roman Epicurean reader who stands apart from politics or is actively engaged in it but 
only for himself and his own gain, it would appear that Cicero thought his radically anti-
Epicurean stance on the question of the highest good had the potential to reform and 
improve the political activity of any Epicureans engaged in Roman politics. 
Historical Context 
De Legibus appears not to have been published during Cicero’s lifetime.  
Although its dramatic date is clearly the late 50s BCE and although Cicero most likely 
composed what remains of it (Books 1-3 with some gaps) in the late 50s,317 De Legibus is 
glaringly absent from Cicero’s review of his philosophical and rhetorical works 
composed to date in the preface of De Divinatione 2, where one would naturally expect it 
to be paired with Cicero’s reference to his sex [libri] de re publica (2.3).  The following 
year, Cicero was dead.  The work apparently not having been circulated during Cicero’s 
lifetime, little can be said about its political circumstances apart from its composition in 
the late 50s BCE and its putative reading audience, namely the same elites among whom 
the De Re Publica had been circulated.  In addition, the work gives the general 
impression of having a certain timelessness that sets it apart from Cicero’s other 
dialogues; he seems to be looking towards his literary status in ages to come.318  The 
work seems intended to function rhetorically on the same kinds of readers among his 
                                                          
317 On the dramatic date of Leg., see Dyck 2004: 20-23.  For its likely composition in the 
late 50s BCE, see Schmidt 1969: 259-92 and 2001; cf. Dyck 2004: 5-7 for discussion and 
additional bibliography. 




contemporaries and posterity.  My analysis, in any case, will focus on the internal 
rhetoric of the work, and will close with some speculation about how various readers 
might have responded to the fictive dialogue. 
I. Initial Appeals to Quintus 
Cicero’s brother Quintus is characterized as a politically active traditionalist, who 
despite his practical orientation is depicted as sympathetic towards the philosophic 
treatment of the topic of law.  Like his brother Marcus, Quintus is enjoying a brief time 
of respite on his family’s home estate in the late 50s BCE in the midst of an otherwise 
busy public career.  There is no reference in the text as we have it to specific events from 
Quintus’s career in public life, but Cicero doubtless assumes his readers are aware of 
Quintus’s having served the state in such capacities as praetor (62), provincial governor 
in Asia (61-58) and legate in Caesar’s army in Gaul (54-51).319   
In a variety of ways, Cicero constructs Quintus’s dialogical persona as that of a 
patriotic Roman traditionalist who, while learned and cultured, has a strong attachment to 
the Roman cultural tradition and a certain suspicion of philosophic theorizing.  First, 
Quintus is portrayed, as indeed he was in actuality, as a poet and lover of poetry, whose 
connections to history and tradition Cicero soon makes evident.  Thus Quintus takes the 
lead in answering Atticus’s initial question about the oak tree and its relation to the poetic 
Marian oak, proclaiming the longevity of poetic objects with such conviction that Atticus 
accuses him of seeking praise for his own poetry (1.1).  Furthermore, Quintus disagrees 
with his brother’s notion of potentially writing a history of Rome with a contemporary 
                                                          
319 On Quintus’s political career, see Prost 2017: 1-136. 
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focus, preferring that Marcus write a history of Rome from its earliest foundations “since 
that period has been written about in a style that is painful to read” (quoniam illa sic 
scripta sunt ut ne legantur quidem, 1.8).  Atticus, by contrast, joins Marcus in his 
preference for a history of more recent times, rather than, “as they say, about ‘Remus and 
Romulus’” (ut aiunt, de Remo et Romulo).  Thus Quintus shows his affection for Rome’s 
traditions, adhering especially to Rome’s traditional self-understanding of her early 
history as constructed through unverifiable myths, eager to see this mythical history 
expounded in a more pleasing fashion for the honor of Rome, which to date lacks a 
historical literature to rival that of the Greeks.320   
This affinity for Rome’s early history, moreover, and the desire to see it discussed 
in a fitting literary style, are connected to Quintus’s love for poetry.  That the myths of 
early Roman history are unverifiable and made up after the fashion of poetry is a point 
Marcus makes when, directing Atticus away from his misguided query about whether the 
oak tree of his poem Marius was based on a tree in the real world, he questions the truth 
of Numa’s meetings with the nymph Egeria and of an eagle’s placing a cap on Tarquin 
(1.4), stories that have been handed down through tradition no less than the Athenian 
myth of Orythia’s abduction by Boreas (sic enim est traditum, 1.3).  Marcus also blurs the 
distinction between poetry and history when he notes that “there are, however, 
innumerable fables both in Herodotus, the father of history, and in Theopompus” 
(quamquam et apud Herodotum, patrem historiae, et apud Theopompum sunt 
innumerabiles fabulae, 1.5).  But Quintus the traditionalist remains ignorant of the 
                                                          
320 Quintus expresses his agreement (1.8) with Atticus’s complaints in this regard (1.5-7), 
as well as with the Antonius of De orat. 2.51–64. 
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inherent logic of his own love of poetry and of Rome’s fictionalized early history.  Thus 
Quintus does not notice that Marcus has just corrected his (Quintus’s) claim that there are 
different laws to be followed in history and poetry (1.5), and that Marcus has just 
qualified his own apparent agreement that Quintus is “certainly right, since in the former 
[most? everything]321 is aimed at truth, while in the latter [most?] everything aims at 
delight” (Quippe, cum in illa ad veritatem <omnia>, Quinte, referantur, in hoc ad 
delectationem pleraque, 1.5).322  Quintus does not realize, then, that as a traditionalist he 
is inclined to identify the ancestral account his country gives of itself with the truth.  
Quintus’s love of poetry and history—especially of Rome’s earliest, unverifiable 
historical traditions—suggest his satisfaction with the surface of things, with the images 
that poets construct in order to give pleasure and that political communities construct, 
also in a pleasing manner, for the sake of binding citizens to the state through affection 
for the images constructed, though speciously presented as true.   
Quintus also indicates his love for Roman tradition by encouraging Marcus’s idea 
of potentially spending his retirement “giving legal advice… in accordance with ancestral 
custom” (more patrio… consulentibus responderem, 1.10).  Quintus passionately avows 
                                                          
321 Cicero’s statement about history may have been even more subtle than it now stands 
with the addition of Ernest’s conjecture omnia (see the apparatus at Powell 2006: 159).  If 
in fact the manuscripts have not omitted omnia or some other word, and thus pleraque 
was to be taken apo koinou with both predicates, then Cicero would be saying that most 
of what we find in history is aimed at the truth, just as most of what one finds in poetry is 
aimed at delight.  This sentiment would better anticipate the following thought about 
Herodotus and Theopompus, in other words, that not everything in history aims at truth.  
The difficulty of interpreting pleraque is complicated further by its ambiguity, since the 
word itself could mean “everything” or “most everything.” 
322 On the connection between poetry and history in the Leg. 1 preface, see Benardete 
1987: 295-300 and Woodman 2012: 1-16. 
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that he has always like this idea: “But, by Hercules, I for my part have always thought 
that our people would have approved if you had dedicated yourself to offering advice 
about the legal code; so as soon as you feel like it, I think you should give it a try” (At 
mehercule ego arbitrabar posse id populo nostro probari, si te ad ius respondendum 
dedisses; quamobrem, cum placebit, experiendum tibi id censeo, 1.12).  The persona of 
Quintus and his expressions of attachment to Roman tradition in the opening scene of De 
Legibus create the impression, as in De Re Publica, of a normative or typical elite Roman 
in Cicero’s reading audience who is involved in public affairs, concerned with preserving 
the mos maiorum, and interested in literature and learning, especially to the extent these 
advance patriotic ends. 
It is to these inclinations in Quintus that Marcus will appeal in Book 1 of De 
Legibus when striving to win Quintus over to his vision of a philosophical basis for 
lawgiving in the real world.  Thus Marcus begins by establishing his bona fides as a 
pragmatic-minded Roman patriot before proceeding to set out a philosophical account of 
“Law”, justice, and virtue that he insists, from the start (1.17) and at its conclusion (1.63), 
has practical importance for “laws”, an argument that appeals to Quintus’s inclination 
towards any form of learning that serves a patriotic purpose. 
 Marcus’s first step in persuasively presenting his philosophic conception of law to 
Quintus lies in the ethical connection he establishes with Quintus by emphasizing his 
status as a patriotic Roman involved in public life.  Thus to a certain extent Cicero 
reprises the same strategy he employed in the preface of De Re Publica for connecting 
with Romans prejudiced against philosophizing.  The strategy at the beginning of De 
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Legibus, however, is not to attack philosophy as inferior to politics as such but rather to 
indicate philosophy’s practical utility so long as it is not embraced as a full-time activity 
that would interfere with one’s obligations as a public man.  Marcus advances this 
particular argument by portraying himself as a man deeply involved in public affairs but 
who finds himself temporarily on vacation on his home estate.  Hence he rebuffs 
Atticus’s suggestion that he should write a history of Rome on the grounds that such a 
task would require extensive leisure time, which he lacks (1.8); he has only “some 
leftover time” (subsiciva quaedam tempora) available, and he dislikes working on a 
project on and off (1.9).  This is our first indication that the present moment of leisure 
being depicted will not last long.  This impression is immediately confirmed when 
Atticus, declaring that the present circumstance is one of these “snatches of time,” 
requests that Marcus write about Roman civil law (1.13), and Marcus appears to be 
receptive to the idea “because we’re on vacation” (quoniam vacui sumus, 1.13).  
Marcus’s initial response to Atticus seems to leave open the possibility of a discussion of 
several days (like the conversation depicted in De Re Publica, for example) when he says 
“you invite me to a lengthy conversation, Atticus” (in longum sermonem me vocas, 
Attice, 1.13).  But when Atticus suggests that Marcus follow up his imitation of Plato’s 
Republic by also writing about laws, Marcus proposes a one-day conversation on the 
model of Plato in the Laws (1.15).  One reason, therefore, that Marcus considers a 
conversation on law to be well suited to his present situation as a public man on a short 
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vacation is the possibility of treating the subject in the course of a single day, as Plato 
did.323   
So while Marcus is eager to satisfy the desire of his philosophically inclined 
friend Atticus, he makes clear to Quintus that he will not allow this philosophical 
conversation to interfere with his ongoing public obligations.324  Therefore, Marcus 
makes the philosophic discussion of the first book palatable to Quintus by making clear 
that philosophical topics are not to be pursued for their own sake or to take the place of 
participation in public life, but rather to be pursued in moderation (that is, in times of 
leisure) and with the ultimate purpose of being politically useful.  Indeed, this is true of 
all Cicero’s philosophical dialogues set in the past, where Roman public men engage in 
philosophical conversation during interludes of otium.325 
Marcus further fashions himself as a politically active man who behaves in 
accordance with traditional Roman cultural expectations by expressing his commitment 
to his civic responsibilities as a senior Roman statesman.  First, he indicates his 
willingness to act in accordance with ancestral custom through a retirement spent offering 
legal advice (1.10).  This statement turns out to be a foil for announcing his intention to 
                                                          
323 Marcus reminds Quintus of the brevity of this conversation in an extremely emphatic 
and indeed highly repetitive fashion, and in a prominent place in the text, at the very end 
of Book 2 (2.69): “I will complete it in one day’s conversation, I hope—particularly on 
this day.  I see that Plato did the same thing, and that his whole speech about the laws 
was concluded on a single summer day.  I will do the same…”  (Zetzel 1999 trans., 
emphasis mine) (hodierno sermone conficiam, spero, hoc praesertim die.  Video enim 
Platonem idem fecisse, omnemque orationem eius de legibus peroratam esse uno aestivo 
die; sic igitur faciam…) 
324 These remarks are exemplary for Atticus, too, of the right measure in which to 
philosophize. 
325 See also Leg. 2.3, where Marcus says he rarely has the chance (raro autem licet) to 
visit his pleasant home estate. 
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remain politically active well into old age.  Atticus suggests that as long as Marcus 
continues to moderate his oratorical style, he will have the energy to keep giving 
speeches for years to come (1.11).  Marcus confirms this, telling Quintus that he will 
probably never be able to dedicate himself to giving legal advice because it would detract 
from the careful thought with which he has always prepared his speeches (1.12).  In this 
way Marcus transforms his avowed willingness to follow ancient custom upon his 
retirement into something that reflects on him even better—the intention to avoid retiring 
at all in order to continue serving the public by doing what he does best, giving speeches 
in court.  Thus Marcus solidifies his image as a man who has every intention of keeping 
up his role as a public man.  He is by no means eager to rush into retirement.  All of this 
endears Marcus to Quintus and renders the latter positively disposed to the philosophic 
argument that is soon to come, since that argument is evidently not the one of a man who 
is eager to shirk his public responsibilities in favor of idle philosophizing.326 
Another way Marcus tries to make philosophy appealing to Quintus from a 
pragmatic point of view lies in the way Marcus presents the purpose of the philosophical 
discussion itself.  The abstract, philosophic treatment of law that takes place in Book One 
is a necessary propaedeutic to confronting the practical issue of what are the best statutes 
for Rome, and of the ways these promote the political health of the community, the 
subject of the remaining books.  Thus Marcus indicates from the outset of his 
philosophical treatment of Lex that the discussion will ultimately bear directly on Roman 
                                                          
326 For a more cynical view of Cicero’s self-fashioning in this preface as primarily 
narcissistic and self-aggrandizing for immediate political purposes, see Dolganov 2008; 
see also Steel 2005 passim (esp. 83-114), interpreting Cicero’s philosophical works, 
along with the rest of his literary oeuvre, as a vehicle for self-promotion. 
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law, a crucial hook for holding the interest of Quintus, who—while sympathetic to 
Marcus’s philosophical approach—is ultimately oriented towards political practice.  
Contrasting his own approach to the question of law with that of the jurists who give 
legal advice on particular statutes,327 Marcus declares that their discussion will proceed 
from “the nature of justice”328 to the general “statutes by which cities should be ruled,”329 
and at last to “those which have been compiled and written down: the laws and 
commands of peoples, among which not even what are called the civil laws of our people 
shall lie hidden” (1.17).330  This last category indicates the ius civile, which contains the 
specific statutes of nations, those of the Romans included.  So while the universalizing 
and thus philosophic tendency of Marcus’s consideration of law is unmistakable, Quintus 
is given the carrot of Marcus’s promise that all of this is relevant to the Roman ius civile, 
which will eventually be treated in their discussion.   
To judge by Quintus’s reaction to Marcus’s plan, this strategy is an effective one.  
Quintus voluntarily signals his approval for his brother’s philosophic, universalizing 
attempt to seek the origins of law and justice: “As ought to be done, brother, you are 
searching out what we’re seeking really deeply and from the top” (Alte vero et ut oportet 
a capite, frater, repetis quod quaerimus, 1.18).  Quintus’s positive reaction to the 
                                                          
327 “For we are not asking in this conversation… what legal advice we should give on 
each matter” (Non enim id quaerimus hoc sermone… quid de quaque consultatione 
respondeamus, 1.17).  See also Marcus’s extended criticism of the pettiness of jurists in 
1.14 (cf. Mur. 23-30). 
328 natura… iuris (cf. the jurists’ alleged neglect of universum ius in the complaint at 
1.14). 
329 leges quibus civitates regi debeant. 
330 quae composita sunt et descripta, iura et iussa populorum, in quibus ne nostri quidem 
populi latebunt quae vocantur iura civilia.  For an explanation of these three categories 
of law and their symmetrical relationship, see Atkins 2013: 217-23. 
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philosophic method his brother proposes also suggests that Quintus has an intellectual 
side to which Marcus can strategically appeal in order to develop and deepen Quintus’s 
engagement with philosophy.  As we have seen, Quintus is characterized from the start as 
a cultured man; after all, he composes his own poetry (cf. 1.1).  It is not, therefore, a 
blatantly anti-intellectual person whom Marcus is addressing, but a pragmatic individual 
for whom philosophy seems not to have any political utility.  Marcus is able to win him 
over to the value of a philosophical discussion of law by keeping its ultimately practical 
purpose in view.   
 Marcus is careful to reiterate his practical purpose in the midst of the theoretical 
discussion in Book 1, emphasizing that his ultimate goal in discussing Lex in a 
philosophical fashion is the improvement of practical politics, of actual states, by means 
of the ius civile.  After logically deducing the implications of his definition of lex as ratio 
summa in natura (1.18), identified with the divine that rules nature (1.21), Marcus states 
that this discussion was prefatory to a more focused argument in favor of the principle 
that justice exists in nature (ius in natura esse), promising that “once I have said a few 
things about this, then I will come to the ius civile, from which this whole speech was 
born” (de quo cum perpauca dixero, tum ad ius civile veniam, ex quo haec omnis est nata 
oratio, 1.34).  Shortly afterwards, he calls his account a “journey” (iter): “But you can 
see what the journey of this conversation is: my whole speech is advancing towards the 
goal of strengthening states, that is, of establishing laws, healing peoples” (sed iter huius 
sermonis quod sit vides: ad res publicas firmandas—id est ad stabilienda iura, sanandos 
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populos—omnis nostra pergit oratio, 1.37).331  Marcus’s metaphorical presentation of his 
discourse on law as going on a journey to the destination of political practice is 
appropriate, given that he spends the whole first book of the work making the case only 
for the first stage of the discussion as outlined at 1.17, “explaining the nature of justice” 
(natura enim iuris explicanda nobis est), whose origins he is seeking in nature (repetam 
stirpem iuris a natura, 1.20).332  It should also be noted that, in light of Marcus’s plan for 
his discussion as outlined at 1.17, the reading stabilienda iura, proposed by Ursinus as a 
correction of the manuscripts’ stabiliendas vires, is preferable to Powell and Dyck’s 
stabiliendas res.333  Since there has been no prior indication in De Legibus that Marcus is 
particularly concerned to comment on property,334 such a statement would be 
incongruous here.335  Nor is it correct to say that stabilienda iura would have to mean 
                                                          
331 I have retained Powell’s correction id est for et of the MSS., but I prefer the reading 
ad stabilienda iura to Powell’s ad stabiliendas res for reasons discussed below. 
332 For the Pindaric origins of this metaphor and its imitation in Plato’s Laws, see Dyck 
2004: 166-67. 
333 Dyck (2004: 167) credits Powell with the conjecture res (“Res is surely needed for 
vires [so Powell, also changing et to id est]”), while Powell (2006: 176) credits Dyck in 
his textual apparatus (“res Dyck”).  In general, the discussion of this textual problem at 
Kenter 1972: 147 is far more satisfying.  Kenter plausibly opts for Davies’s ad 
stabiliendas leges, and his best evidence is the uncontested reading at 1.62, stabiliat leges 
(he mistakenly sees a parallel between 1.37 and “the tripartite objective of this work, 
alluded to as far back as 1.20”).  However, the resonance of 1.37 with the earlier outline 
at 1.17, discussed below in this paragraph, inclines me towards iura, though in this 
context it is equivalent in sense with leges. 
334 On the contrary, in one of the only mentions of private property law in Leg., Cicero 
displays mockery for the specifics of property law: see the reference to disputes over 
water rights at 1.14 (de stillicidiorum ac de parietum iure). 
335 Dyck’s (2004: 167) reference to Cicero’s belief in the state’s role in protecting 
property rights at De Officiis 2.73 and 78 is a tendentious comparandum.  Off. displays a 
thematic concern with the question of private property as it relates to the virtue of justice; 
Leg. does not. 
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“stabilizing rights.”336  Marcus spoke earlier of his ultimate intent to arrive at a treatment 
of iura et iussa populorum, a context in which iura certainly did not mean “rights” but 
rather “laws” (1.17).337  Indeed, that earlier phrase provides a model for understanding 
Marcus’s whole statement here.  For in that context, Marcus was describing the final 
stage of his discussion that would follow upon theoretical grounding of law.  Here, too, 
Marcus is speaking of the ultimate purpose of the theory of law currently being 
expounded.338  Thus we would expect that, in addition to the generalized goal of making 
republics stronger, he would say something about the specific goal of improving the state 
through laws.  Finally, the Ursinus reading is more likely because Marcus’s other stated 
goal, sanandos populos, also recalls the general sentiment about his stated goals in 1.17, 
where he spoke of the iura et iussa populorum.  Given that the grounding of justice in 
nature or lex comes first, Marcus’s intent is to evaluate the written iura et iussa 
populorum (1.17) in light of that prior principle339 in order to make peoples healthy (ad 
sanandos populos).  Thus in 1.37, Marcus recalls to a certain extent his original plan 
stated at 1.17, reassuring Quintus that the theoretical discussion of law is not pursued for 
its own sake but will ultimately have practical import.340 
                                                          
336 Dyck 2004: 167. 
337 See the translation “laws” in Zetzel 1999: 111. 
338 Dyck misses the point of Cicero’s remarks when he argues against the conjecture 
stabilienda iura on the grounds that it “seems to leap over the stage of establishing what 
ius is, which is the topic of the current discussion (§ 17)” (2004: 167).  Cicero’s point is 
to recall the ultimate purpose of the theoretical topic under discussion. 
339 See also the more explicit discussion of this notion between Marcus and Quintus at 
2.11-14. 
340 For the climax of this movement from philosophical theory to political practice in 
1.62, see the section on the laudatio sapientiae below. 
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II. Initial Appeals to Atticus in “The Garden of Cicero”: The Pleasures of Nature, 
Philosophy, and Friendship 
Marcus relies on Atticus’s Epicurean appreciation for the pleasantness of the 
natural surroundings of the estate and for learned conversation among friends as first 
steps in drawing him to a markedly anti-Epicurean philosophical conception of nature.341  
When the dialogue opens, the interlocutors find themselves in a pleasant grove (lucus) on 
Cicero’s estate.  This grove, moreover, has both literary and personal significance to 
Atticus.  He associates the grove with one that he has often read about in Marcus’s poem 
Marius, thinking he recognizes the literary grove in the real world (1.1).  Atticus thus 
shows his literary inclinations from the start.  But the grove is of interest to Atticus not 
just because of its connection with literature, but also because the literary object in 
question was written by his friend.  Atticus does not make this second idea explicit at this 
point, but he does in the preface of the second book, professing his special fascination 
with Marcus’s estate because it is the estate of a friend: “For we are moved, for some 
reason, by the very places in which we find the traces of those whom we love and 
admire” (2.4: Movemur enim nescioquo pacto locis ipsis in quibus eorum quos diligimus 
aut admiramur adsunt vestigia).342  The very place in which Atticus finds himself 
exercises a rhetorical force (movemur) over him because it is the estate of a dear friend, 
rendering him more receptive to his friend’s ideas.  
                                                          
341 As we will see, according to this conception, nature is superintended by the gods, man 
is naturally inclined to the virtues, and political engagement is ultimately an obligation 
required by man’s nature as a social and civic being. 
342 A little later, Atticus concludes: “Therefore from now on I will have a greater love for 




Finally, the grove and the pleasure grounds of Cicero’s estate are attractive to 
Atticus, inasmuch as Atticus finds himself in a locus amoenus that provides him with 
pleasant surroundings for their conversation, which is rendered more pleasant and makes 
Atticus more well-disposed to Marcus’s ideas.  Marcus expressly appeals to the pleasure 
afforded by a philosophic conversation in this place when Atticus urges him to take up 
the topic of the ius civile: “So then, why don’t we walk to those walks and benches of 
ours?  There, after we have done enough walking, we will take a break.  And you can rest 
assured that there will be no lack of delight as we ask each other questions about different 
things” (1.14: Quin igitur ad illa spatia nostra sedesque pergimus?  Ubi, cum satis erit 
ambulatum, requiescemus, nec profecto nobis delectatio deerit aliud ex alio 
quaerentibus).  Atticus approves: “Certainly, and if you like, we should head to the Liris 
along the shady bank” (1.14: Nos vero, et hac quidem ad Lirem, si placet, per ripam et 
umbram).  Nor does the experience fail to delight: at the beginning of the second Book, 
Atticus enthusiastically remarks on the natural beauty of the place he has by now come to 
know (2.2).343   
Atticus’s inclinations (which are made more explicit in the preface of the second 
book) prepare the way for Marcus to appeal to his friend’s interest in literature, 
philosophy, and the pleasures of the natural world with the suggestion that their 
conversation should take the form of a reenactment of Plato’s Laws.  This suggestion 
                                                          
343 Properly speaking, the lexemes amoenitas/amoenus do not occur until the second 
book, with reference to the island in the Fibrenus where the interlocutors continue their 
conversation after walking along the river during Book 1; Marcus Cicero calls the island 




comes about in the following way.  When Marcus insists that a more elevated treatment 
of law that considers universum ius is proper to him rather than the minute disputes over 
the ius civile (1.14), Atticus, having already brought up his friend’s poem Marius, now 
brings up De Re Publica, proposing that as Plato followed up his Republic with the Laws, 
Marcus should “do the same and write about laws” (1.15: ut scribas tu idem de legibus).  
But rather than simply agreeing, Marcus slightly transforms Atticus’s suggestion: rather 
than promising to write, Marcus calls for a conversation about law in the here and now in 
which his friend Atticus is to be an active participant, and in the course of which the three 
friends will imitate the walk through nature by the three interlocutors of Plato’s Laws: 
[M.]  Do you wish, then, just as he [Plato] discourses on a summer day (as he 
describes it) with Kleinias the Cretan and with Megillus the Lacedaemonian 
amidst the cypresses of Knossos and the forested walks, frequently coming to a 
stop, and occasionally resting, about the institutions of states and about the best 
laws, so would you have us, as we walk along the verdant and shady bank among 
these lofty poplars, inquire into the same matters with somewhat greater depth 
than is called for by forensic usage?  (1.15) 
 
[A.]:  Well I certainly am eager to listen to all this.  (1.16) 
 
[M.]  Visne igitur, ut ille Crete cum Clinia et cum Lacedaemonio Megillo, aestivo 
(quaemadmodum describit) die in cupressetis Gnosiorum et spatiis silvestribus, 
crebro insistens, interdum acquiescens, de institutis rerum publicarum ac de 
optimis legibus disputat, sic nos inter has procerissimas populos in viridi 
opacaque ripa inambulantes, tum autem residentes, quaeramus eisdem de rebus 
aliquid uberius quam forensis usus desiderat? 
 
[A.]:  Ego vero ista audire cupio. 
 
Marcus deftly appeals to Atticus’s literary and philosophical inclinations, and his love for 
nature, to induce him to become an active participant in a series of arguments that will be 
contrary to Epicureanism in orientation, focused as they are on virtue as an essential 
element of the highest good, and culminating as they do in political engagement.  Marcus 
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forecasts that one of the topics this more “in-depth” (uberius) discussion will include is 
“for the sake of cultivating and accomplishing which duty we have been born” (cuius 
muneris colendi efficiendique causa nati… simus, 1.16).  The full implications of this 
reference to a duty to be performed will only become clear at the end of the first book, 
where Marcus will argue in the laudatio sapientiae that the culmination of wisdom is the 
insight that we have been “born for civil society” (a civilem societatem natum), a 
realization that prompts us to participate in public life (1.62).344   
However, to say that Marcus appeals at the outset to Atticus’s interest in literature 
and philosophy is too simple.  In particular, Marcus is appealing to Atticus’s interest in 
and respect for Plato, deftly framing the philosophic treatment of law as a Platonic theme 
rather than presenting it as the theme of a rival school of Epicureanism such as Stoicism, 
even though the subsequent argument about law appears to owe as much to the Stoics as 
it does to Plato.  That Atticus is more positively disposed to receive ideas that are 
presented as Platonic is evident both from the fact that he was the one who brought up 
Plato and encouraged Marcus to continue his literary emulation of him, and from the way 
he speaks highly of Plato later in the dialogue:  
You [Marcus] truly won’t ever be able to praise him [Plato] either too much or 
too often.  For even those friends of mine, who want no one except their own [i.e. 
Epicurus] to be praised, allow me to esteem him [Plato] in accordance with my 
own judgement.  (2.1) 
 
Tu vero eum nec nimis valde umquam nec nimis saepe laudaveris; nam hoc mihi 
etiam nostri illi, qui neminem nisi suum laudari volunt, concedunt, ut eum 
arbitratu meo diligam. 
                                                          
344 The other major Platonic intertext of De Legibus is the Phaedrus, to which Cicero 
alludes implicitly through Marcus’s comments about the myth of Orithyia at 1.3, and 




Atticus is, therefore, exceptional among Epicureans in his esteem for Plato and apparent 
willingness to agree with him on occasion.  Although this friendly disposition towards 
Plato is only revealed to the reader at the beginning of the third book, Marcus evidently 
knows this from the beginning and deftly presents the investigation into law as a Platonic 
endeavor.345   
III. Transforming Nature for Atticus: from impulse for pleasure to impulse for virtue 
It is by now a commonplace of scholarship on De Legibus that Marcus makes two 
different arguments for natural law and virtue in Book 1, the first of which employs 
subtle dialectic (1.18-34), the second a more rhetorical style (1.40-52).346  To this basic 
idea, however, I wish to add the notion that the first argument is particularly directed at 
Atticus as its recipient, while the second is especially meant for Quintus.  Marcus’s two 
methods of approaching the question of law illustrate the two methods by which 
knowledge of the truth can be advanced according to the laudatio sapientiae, logic and 
rhetoric (1.62).  The former is required for the wise man to establish the truth for himself: 
“And he will fortify all of these insights—with a certain hedge, as it were—with a 
dialectical method, the science of adjudicating truth and falsehood, and with a certain art 
of understanding what follows from and is contrary to each premise” (1.62).347  It is this 
method that Marcus adapts when speaking to Atticus to advance his vision of law and 
                                                          
345 On the importance of the dramatic setting for Cicero’s philosophical dialogues, see 
Gildenhard 2007 and Baraz 2012. 
346 See Kenter 1972: 144, Benardete 1987: 303, and Atkins 2013: 169. 
347 Atque haec omnia, quasi saepimento aliquo, vallabit disserendi ratione, veri et falsi 




virtuously grounded political engagement.  The second method is more proper to 
communication with one’s fellow citizens, who are not philosophic and with whom 
subtle dialectic will not be effective: “And when he perceives that he has been born into 
civil society, he will think it necessary to make use not only of that subtle manner of 
discussion, but also of a continuous, more broadly effusive manner of speaking” 
(1.62).348  Therefore Marcus will argue for law in a more rhetorical fashion when 
addressing Quintus, who displays the qualities of an elite Roman citizen with a limited 
taste for philosophical argument.349 
Thus the first major argument for law in Book One, which is more logical in 
character, will be directed at Atticus.  Besides the argument’s more strictly logical style, 
another indicator that it is chiefly aimed at Atticus can be seen in the special participatory 
role Atticus plays in this section.  Indeed, the argument’s effectiveness in engaging 
Atticus is evident in his enthusiastic participation (1.21-22, 1.28, 1.32) and accurate 
summary of its basic points (1.35).  While scholars have traditionally viewed the 
character of Atticus and his responses as a convenient foil for the argument Cicero wants 
to develop, I hope to show that the argument itself and the dramatic setting speak to the 
way that Cicero’s Marcus has gauged this particular argument to the character of his 
interlocutor. 
Marcus, having initially framed his treatment of law as a Platonic theme in 
keeping with Atticus’s positive inclination to Plato and Marcus’s Platonic project (1.15), 
                                                          
348 Cumque se ad civilem societatem natum senserit, non solum illa subtili disputatione 
sibi utendum putabit, sed etiam fusa latius perpetua oratione. 
349 See the next section. 
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continues his persuasive strategy towards Atticus by attributing his initial definition of 
law to an indeterminate group of doctissimi viri, thus encouraging Atticus to think of this 
definition as a Platonic concept despite wording that is taken from the Stoics.350  Marcus 
needs to downplay Stoic influence before Atticus, who respects Plato but as an Epicurean 
is more naturally hostile to a rival Hellenistic school such as Stoicism.  Hence Marcus 
begins: “And so it has seemed good to the most learned men to begin from law, and I 
suppose this is basically correct, provided that law is, as these same men define it, 
supreme reason implanted in nature” (1.18: Igitur doctissimis viris proficisci placuit a 
lege, haud scio an recte, si modo, ut idem definiunt, lex est ratio summa insita in natura).  
Scholars have observed that this definition of law is Stoic,351 and yet it is conceptually 
akin to the basic Platonic premise of Laws 10.352  Cicero apparently wishes to build his 
                                                          
350 Scholars have interpreted the word doctissimi as reflecting the eirenic spirit of 
Marcus’s expressed desire at 1.36ff. to promote a consensus among all philosophic 
schools who agree that the honorable is to be sought for its own sake.  They overlook, 
however, that in that later passage, Marcus has shifted his focus in particular to the 
Hellenistic schools and their leaders in his own time, a shift reflected in his now speaking 
of philosophi rather than doctissimi (on this difference see Benardete 1987: 298).  In De 
Legibus, Doctissimi viri include Plato himself (or the Athenian Stranger, though Marcus 
posits no difference between the two), Zeno (from whom the definition is taken—see the 
next note), and perhaps Aristotle, while philosophi refers to their successors in the 
Hellenistic schools, i.e. Platonists, Stoics, Peripatetics.  In Cicero’s other philosophic 
works, however, the founders of the schools are denoted as philosophi.  
351 For the Stoic origins of this definition, see SVF 2.4.2-3 (Chrysippus; cf. the similar 
definition involving command and prohibition given by Laelius at Cic. Rep. 3.27); cf. 
Zetzel 1999: 111n23, Dyck 2004: 109-10, Asmis 2008: 6 with 11n, Annas 2013: 212, 
Atkins 2013: 165-66. 
352 Hence Benardete 1987: 297 asserts that Cicero’s Laws begins with Book 10 of Plato’s 
Laws.  For the derivation of the Stoic doctrine from Laws 10, see Morrow 1960: 565 and 
Atkins 2013a: 162-63, especially his reference at 163n18 to “the relevant raw material in 
Plato’s Laws… between 10.893b and 10.905d” with further bibliography.  For Atkins’s 
argument that Marcus’s account of natural law in Book 1 is an orthodox Stoic account, 
see 169-76.  See also Atkins 2015 on the development of Stoic natural law doctrine. 
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argument on a Stoic development of a basic idea about law from Plato, but in order to 
avoid alienating Atticus at the outset of his argument, he speaks of his definition of law 
as the common property of all the most learned men.  Since Marcus has just established 
their conversational enterprise as analogous to the discussion in Plato’s Laws (1.15), it is 
only natural for Atticus to think of Plato when he hears the word doctissimi.  And yet the 
analogical (rather than identical) character of the present discussion begins to manifest 
itself here with the Stoic coloring of the definition given to law.  After all, three centuries 
of philosophy have intervened since the time of the writing of Plato’s Laws, and Marcus 
wants to incorporate the Stoic development of ideas about law from Plato.353  Particularly 
relevant to Marcus’s purpose vis-à-vis Atticus is the Stoic argument for man’s status as a 
social creature inclined to the virtue of justice, to which Marcus especially wants to move 
Atticus. 
Marcus’s next step is to appeal to Atticus’s esteem for nature before explicitly 
investing this principle with divine qualities.  Marcus elaborates on his initial definition 
of lex by affirming that “the beginning of justice must be brought forth from lex” (a lege 
ducendum est iuris exordium, 1.19)354 and announcing his intention to “seek the root of 
justice from nature, under whose guidance I must unfold the whole discussion” (repetam 
                                                          
353 Another important aspect of Cicero’s treatment of law that is merely analogous to 
Plato’s is, of course, the changed social and political context of Republican Rome with its 
particular traditions and form of government, and which administers a world empire.  The 
novel Roman context becomes especially important in Books 2 and 3. 
354 See also his exhortation (also in 1.19) “let us take the beginning of establishing justice 
from that supreme law” (constituendi vero iuris ab illa summa lege capiamus exordium). 
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stirpem iuris a natura, qua duce nobis omnis est disputatio explicanda, 1.20).355  Lex and 
natura are treated as synonymous, which would seem to be in keeping with the first 
principle that lex is somehow present, “implanted” (insita), in nature (1.18).356  But it is 
the language of following natura in particular (rather than lex, though the two are 
identical conceptually) that prompts the Epicurean Atticus to agree with enthusiasm: 
“That is absolutely right, and with that as our guide, it will certainly be impossible to go 
astray” (1.20: Rectissime; et quidem ista duce errari nullo pacto potest).  Having gained 
Atticus’s assent to nature as a principle of justice, Marcus instantly transforms the idea of 
nature held by the Epicurean Atticus into something that is divinely ruled and controlled.  
“So do you concede to me, Pomponius (for I already know Quintus’s opinion), that all of 
nature is ruled by the … ratio of the immortal gods?  For if you don’t approve of this, 
then I will have to begin the argument with [a justification of] this point” (1.21: Dasne 
igitur hoc nobis, Pomponi (nam Quinti novi sententiam), deorum immortalium… 
ratione… naturam omnem regi?  Nam si hoc non probas, ab eo nobis causa ordienda est 
potissimum).  Marcus now reveals that ratio in the definition lex est ratio summa insita in 
natura (1.18) is the ratio of a divine agent.357  When Atticus assents, Marcus reminds 
                                                          
355 It is this principle of justice (ius), derived from lex/natura, that will ultimately serve as 
a standard for the particular laws that should accompany the form of government 
designated as best in De Re Publica (1.20), laws which Marcus will announce in the 
subsequent books. 
356 This also seems to be the meaning of Cicero’s definition of law at Rep. 3.27, placed in 
the mouth of Laelius: lex est recta ratio naturae congruens (cf. 1.18, lex est ratio summa 
insita in natura). 
357 The identification of ratio summa in nature with the divine is reiterated and made even 
more clear at 2.8-10. 
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him that this principle expressly violates Atticus’s Epicurean view of nature, in which the 
gods play no part (1.20).  
Though the conclusions that will follow from this principle will be deduced in 
strictly logical fashion, Marcus secures Atticus’s adherence to this blatantly anti-
Epicurean first principle358 not by mounting an argument for it,359 but relying on the 
seductive force of the natural surroundings and on Atticus’s appreciation as an 
intellectual for an interesting argument.  The first factor is evident in Atticus’s response 
to Marcus’s initial request that he concede the principle: “I grant it, if you are demanding 
a writ of prosecution; since, due to this harmonious singing of the birds and the noise of 
the rivers, I have no fear that any of my fellow students will overhear” (1.21: Do sane, si 
postulas; etenim propter hunc concentum avium strepitumque fluminum non vereor 
condiscipulorum ne quis exaudiat).  Atticus’s response is full of wit, of course, whether 
one considers the play on legal language in postulas, as if Marcus were demanding legal 
permission to prosecute Epicureanism for impiety, or the joke about no one overhearing 
Atticus’s betrayal.  But the very centerpiece of that joke—the muffling effect of nature 
sounds—indicates that Atticus is enjoying the natural surroundings so much that his 
Epicurean adherence to the pleasure principle triumphs over his need to be loyal to the 
other teachings of his fellow Epicureans.360  The second factor in Atticus’s concession, 
                                                          
358 A principle, it should be emphasized, that is a sine qua non for the conclusion that 
people must practice justice through concern not only for their fellow human beings in 
general (1.28-34) but also for civil society (1.62). 
359 Though Marcus suggests he is willing to do so if Atticus requires it. 
360 Görler 1974: 140-41 interprets the reference to the birds and the waters as an implicit 
confirmation on Atticus’s part of the Stoic idea of providence that Cicero is about to 
develop.   
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namely his intellectual inclinations, is evident in his response to Marcus’s teasing: “Go 
on, please; for I am waiting to see where the thing I have conceded to you leads” (1.22: 
Perge, quaeso; nam id quod tibi concessi quorsus pertineat exspecto).361  Atticus is 
evidently curious to see what Marcus intends to develop from this basic principle.  Thus 
Atticus is willing to go along with the principle of the divine control of the universe as 
the starting point of an intriguing thought experiment.362 
With ineluctable logic, Marcus proceeds to derive from his friend’s concession a 
series of anti-Epicurean conclusions which logically oblige the philosophically inclined 
Atticus to accept that man, as a creature endowed with reason by the gods, is obliged to 
fully develop that reason by practicing virtue, and preeminently justice by fulfilling his 
obligations towards others, and ultimately to take an active role in politics.  In what 
follows, without treating the entire argument, which has already been done several 
times,363 I shall limit myself to a summary demonstrating the logical character of the 
argument and the virtue of justice it seeks to inculcate.  Having first laid down that all of 
nature is ruled by a ratio that is divine, it follows, Marcus argues, that human beings, who 
also have ratio, must have been endowed with this and other faculties by the gods at the 
                                                          
361 Cf. Atticus’s question sed quorsus hoc pertinet? at 1.63, following Marcus’s laudatio 
sapientiae. 
362 Benardete 1987: 306 suggests Atticus’s friendship with Marcus as the reason for 
Atticus’s concession.  Cicero’s arrangement as author of this anti-Epicurean concession 
adumbrates Marcus’s exclusion of Epicureanism and of the New Academy from the 
conversation at 1.39.  Cicero’s diligence in avoiding any significant challenge to 
Marcus’s ideas in Book 1 contributes to the impression of De Legibus as one of Cicero’s 
dogmatic dialogues, notwithstanding that Cicero’s personal adherence to the New 
Academy, and even Marcus’s, survives intact (see Görler 1995). 
363 For a more detailed analysis of Marcus’s argument in this section, many recent 
scholars may be usefully consulted (see n2 above for references). 
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time of their creation (1.22).  This means that human beings have ratio in common with 
the gods (1.23); but from this it follows that they also have virtue in common with the 
gods, “since virtue is nothing else but nature brought to completion and developed to the 
full,” (1.25: est autem virtus nihil aliud nisi perfecta et ad summum perducta <natura>), 
a nature endowed with ratio.   
Indeed, it is the idea that it is man’s destiny to practice virtue, and in particular 
justice, that Marcus especially wishes to emphasize to Atticus.  When Atticus expresses 
his enthusiasm at the extreme extent (right back to the gods and to the natural human 
faculties) to which Marcus goes to seek the origins of law and justice, indicating that he 
would be happy to spend the whole time discussing these origins of law instead of civil 
law (1.28), Marcus instantly re-orients him towards the practice of justice: 
But of all the topics that learned men spend time on in their discussions, there is 
certainly nothing more excellent than to understand clearly that we have been 
born for justice, and that right has been established by nature and not by opinion.  
(1.28) 
 
Sed omnium quae in hominum doctorum disputatione versantur, nihil est profecto 
praestabilius, quam plane intellegi nos ad iustitiam esse natos, neque opinione sed 
natura constitutum esse ius. 
 
Appealing again to the authority of learned men (homines docti—cf. 1.18, doctissimi 
viri), which again signals Plato to Atticus without excluding the Stoics, who are tactfully 
left unmentioned, Marcus aims to bring Atticus to the conviction that human beings are 
destined to practice justice, and that this justice, contrary to Epicurean teaching, is not 
merely a matter of convention.  He says he will prove his claims about justice—both our 
destiny to practice it and its firm foundation in nature—by showing Atticus “that there is 
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a society and conjunction of human beings among themselves” (1.28: hominum inter 
ipsos societatem coniunctionemque).   
Marcus’s proof of the claims that “we are born for justice” (nos ad iustitiam esse 
natos, 1.28) and that justice exists by nature and not convention prepares Atticus in a 
general way for the more specifically political conclusion that Marcus will draw for him 
in the laudatio that a person should realize se ad civilem societatem se natum (1.62).364  
Marcus points out the common natural faculties of human beings and their common 
beliefs, at least when led by reason, about virtue and vice, concluding that “since from 
these things it is understood that in the whole human race, men are united among 
themselves, the conclusion is that an account of how to live correctly makes human 
beings better” (1.32: Quibus ex rebus cum omne genus hominum sociatum inter se esse 
intellegatur, illud extremum est, quod recte vivendi ratio meliores efficit).  Thus there is a 
correct way of life that applies to all human beings and is based on the proper 
understanding of justice.  When Atticus says on behalf of himself and Quintus that they 
require no further explanation of these ideas365—an assertion that, significantly, Quintus 
by no means affirms, which suggests that it is really only Atticus who is following the 
argument—Marcus states: “It follows, therefore, that by nature we have been made to 
                                                          
364 This realization then obliges him to engage in public life by practicing oratory (1.63), 
that preeminent means of securing social bonds among men that Marcus had referred to 
in the initial stages of his argument to Atticus about human nature: “I pass over the rest of 
the body’s faculties and capacities: the modulation of the voice, the power of speech, 
which gathers especially human society together” (1.27: Omitto opportunitates 
habilitatesque reliqui corporis, moderationem vocis, orationis vim, quae conciliatrix est 
humanae maxime societatis). 
365 “But we don’t have any questions, if I may answer for both of us” (1.32: Nos vero 
nihil [requirimus], ut pro utroque respondeam). 
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cause each other to participate in justice, and to communicate it to all (1.32: Sequitur 
igitur, ad participandum alium cum alio communicandumque inter omnes ius nos natura 
esse factos).  First, it is noteworthy that Marcus presents this next idea as a logical 
consequence of the foregoing argument, as he continues his strategy of appealing to the 
philosophical Atticus on the basis of the logical consequences of the first premise he had 
conceded.366  Secondly, the ultimate consequence of this idea will be the necessity of 
political engagement on the part of the person who knows about justice, for it is only by 
this person’s communication of justice through a system of law that life can be made 
better for others.  Thus at 1.34, Marcus represents his discussion about the natural 
foundations of justice up to this point (1.18-34), and the additional discussion that will 
follow (1.40 ff.), as a necessary prelude to the discussion of civil law.  The promotion of 
proper laws through active engagement in politics—causing others to participate in 
justice (1.33)—requires a prior, proper understanding of justice.   
It is also with a special view to Atticus the Epicurean that Marcus brings his first 
argument about law to a close by drawing a corollary from his basic principle that justice 
is natural: there is no separation between the justice of an act and its utility.  Marcus 
states: “And Socrates rightly used to condemn whoever it was that first separated utility 
from justice; for he complained that this was the beginning of all destruction” (1.33: 
Recteque Socrates exsecrari eum solebat, qui primus utilitatem a iure seiunxisset; id 
enim querebatur caput esse exitiorum omnium).  Dyck (2004: 155) finds the reference to 
utilitas here puzzling, and indeed the gaps in the text that occur immediately before and 
                                                          
366 Pace Dyck 2004: 155, sequitur igitur is indeed logical in nature: cf. sequitur igitur 
ut… (Tusc. 5.53); sequitur ergo ut (Par. Stoic. 3.22). 
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after this sentence do not make it any easier to follow Marcus’s train of thought.  
However, it stands to reason that Marcus would decry the utilitarian theory of morality 
when addressing an argument about natural justice to his Epicurean friend, who 
presumably subscribes to his school’s moral utilitarianism.  Indeed, Cicero teases Atticus 
about this issue in a letter: 
I’m glad to see that you delight in your little daughter and approve the proposition 
that there is a natural affection towards one’s children.  For in fact if this does not 
exist, there can be no natural bond among human beings; and if this is destroyed, 
life in society is destroyed.  (Att. 7.2.4) 
 
Filiola tua te delectari laetor et probari tibi φυσικὴν esse τὴν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα.  
Etenim si haec non est, nulla potest homini esse ad hominem naturae adiunctio; 
qua sublata vitae societas tollitur. 
 
The letter continues with Cicero’s condemnation of the utilitarianism of the Epicureans 
Lucius and Patro (previously quoted in chapter 2), who “say that a man ought to be good 
in order to avoid having any problems and not because this is right by nature” (ea re 
bonum virum esse oportere dicant ne malum habeat, non quod id natura rectum sit).367  
As we saw in chapter 2, Epicurean utilitarianism also came under attack in Laelius’s 
speech in De Re Publica 3, where he argued for the existence of natural law against 
Philus’s contention that someone should be good only in order to avoid punishment.  
 Marcus makes the same point to his Epicurean friend here in De Legibus.  Just as 
Cicero challenged Atticus in the letter to consider that his own experience militated 
against the Epicurean idea that there is no natural bond of justice among human beings, in 
De Legibus Marcus challenges Atticus to consider the logical consequence of admitting 
the existence of nature as ruled by divine reason.  From this premise it followed that all 
                                                          
367 Cf. Fin. 2.59. 
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men have been given a share in reason by the gods and a share in justice (1.34), and the 
ultimate consequence is that the standard of right action applies to all human beings, and 
that right actions are both right by nature and beneficial to all human beings.368   
Atticus summarizes these ideas and accepts them as proven (1.35), but their 
ultimate, practical import for the question of civil law is not yet clear to him.  Marcus is 
preparing Atticus for the ultimate conclusion that the person endowed with knowledge of 
right action and endowed with a natural impulse towards right action must seek the best 
way of life for everyone in practice, starting with his fellow citizens (1.62-63).  In Books 
2 and 3, Atticus will engage in a second-best form of political engagement, political 
philosophy, as he joins with Marcus and Quintus in a consideration of lawgiving in 
practice.369 
IV. Rhetorically advancing a philosophical vision of virtue for Quintus 
 Having completed the first argument and won over Atticus, Marcus turns his 
attention to Quintus with a separate, more rhetorically ornate argument for the specific 
thesis that justice exists by nature.370  I will argue that Marcus finds it necessary to argue 
for his thesis about the natural basis of justice in a more rhetorical mode because he 
thinks that Quintus, lacking interest in or ability to follow the more technical argument, 
                                                          
368 Cicero also quotes this maxim of Socrates at Off. 3.11, and develops the unity of 
morally right action and utility throughout Book 3. 
369 See the discussion in Chapter 2 of Cicero’s similar rhetorical goals regarding 
Epicureans in the preface of De Re Publica. 
370 In this second argument (1.40-52), Cicero “only deals with the purely ethical aspect” 
of natural law (Kenter 1972: 144).  However, he does not develop an entirely new 
argument for natural law, but remains dependent on the principles previously established 
(1.18-34): see e.g. 1.45, which takes up the previously established postulate from 1.18 
that “reason is certainly in nature” as one of the steps in the argument (Dyck 2004: 174). 
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has not yet sufficiently internalized the proper understanding of justice and the virtues.371  
This understanding is necessary for Quintus to engage in politics well, both in terms of 
personal conduct and in terms of his ability to legislate well.  Quintus already accepts 
engagement, but Marcus wants to alter the character of that engagement by imbuing 
Quintus with a prior knowledge of virtue that will help him both to be a more virtuous 
statesman himself and to frame civil law in such a way as to inculcate virtue.  
The dramatic details suggest that at the end of Marcus’s first argument, Quintus 
possesses only the most superficial understanding of Marcus’s ideas, while by the end of 
the second, Quintus is clearly paying attention and quite enthused.  While Atticus 
enthusiastically engages with Marcus’s first argument and gives a clear summary of its 
basic points (1.35), Quintus, by contrast, merely asserts that he is persuaded and suggests 
that there is really no need for the second argument Marcus proposes: “You can indeed 
say a little bit about it at this point; for from what you’ve said, even if Atticus feels 
differently, it seems certain to me at least that justice arises from nature” (1.34: Tu vero 
iam perpauca licet; ex eis enim quae dixisti, <etiamsi aliter> Attico, videtur mihi quidem 
certe ex natura ortum esse ius).  Quintus’s evident boredom with the argument and 
eagerness to turn to the practical consideration of the ius civile belie his claim to have 
already been convinced.  But by the end of Marcus’s second argument about the natural 
basis of justice and the virtues, Quintus will be so captivated that far from expressing 
impatience, he will show eagerness to continue with Marcus to the next point: “Gladly, 
brother, would I be dragged along with you to the next place where your speech leads” 
                                                          
371 See Schofield 1995b compares this second argument for natural law with the first in 
terms of a different Stoic approaches to justice. 
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(1.52: Libenter enim, frater, quo ducis ista oratione, tecum prolaberer).  Atticus by 
contrast, does not immediately react to the second argument.  Thus their roles are 
switched, as Marcus’s more rhetorically stylized account falls somewhat flat with Atticus 
while proving more engaging to Quintus. 
During the transition from the first to the second argument (1.34-40), Marcus 
hides from Quintus his rhetorical intention of inculcating in his brother the strong 
conviction that justice exists by nature and that virtue is desirable for its own sake, views 
that represent an eclectic philosophic consensus of the Hellenistic schools (minus 
Epicureanism and the New Academy; cf. 1.39).  Marcus misleads Quintus, claiming that 
he needs to give a second argument to establish the truth of ideas for philosophers who he 
also indicates already hold these ideas, and are even accustomed to argue for them in this 
same way, a proposition that makes no sense in itself but does become intelligible in light 
of Marcus’s rhetorical designs on Quintus.  Marcus’s indirection starts with the way he 
appears to ignore Quintus during this transition and addresses Atticus instead.  Marcus 
tells Atticus that since his whole theoretical discussion aims at making states stronger and 
establishing laws, he must ensure that the principles are “well thought-out and diligently 
investigated” (bene provisa et diligenter explorata, 1.37).  This is the reason Marcus 
gives for his plan to give a separate argument proving ius esse natura, in accordance with 
“the custom of philosophers—not of those ancients, but of those who have set up 
workshops, so to speak, for wisdom” (philosophorum more—non veterum quidem 
illorum, sed eorum qui quasi officinas instruxerunt sapientiae), who discuss matters 
piecemeal (articulatim distincteque, 1.36).  Since these philosophers are contrasted with 
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the ancients, Marcus evidently refers to the more recent philosophers of the Hellenistic 
schools.372  The principles to be proven by the second argument, moreover, are held by 
these same philosophers: they will not be approved by everyone, but by “those who have 
held the view that all moral and noble things should be sought for their own sake” (1.37: 
ei qui omnia recta atque honesta per se expetenda duxerunt), among whom Marcus 
expressly includes followers of the Hellenistic schools, naming the Old Academy, 
Aristotle and Theophrastus (Peripatetics), and Zeno (the founder of the Stoa) (1.38).  But 
if adherents of these philosophic schools are accustomed to argue separately ius esse 
natura and already approve the idea that the noble is desirable in itself, then they have no 
need of the upcoming argument.373  What Marcus really intends is to take the eclectic 
consensus of the Hellenistic schools and present it in an attractive light to Quintus, who 
does have need of these ideas.  Thus Marcus’s goal in this section is similar to Laelius’s 
effort in De Re Publica 3 to promote a vision of virtuous political engagement to the 
older (Manilius, Spurius Mummius) and younger Romans (his two sons-in-law) present 
for that conversation. 
                                                          
372 Kenter 1972: 143-44: “Among the more recent ones we should not only count the 
Stoics… but all schools which have built workshops, so to speak, for the production of 
philosophy (officinas sapientiae) of whom an enumeration is given in 37-39: the Old 
Academy, Peripatos, Stoa, Epicureanism, New Academy.”  The procedure of these 
philosophers is contrasted with that of the veteres, apparently meaning philosophers up to 
and including Plato, who treated all the aspects of a given topic together as part of an 
integral whole.  For this interpretation of veteres, see Kenter 1972: 143-44 (citing Ac. 
2.14 as a comparandum) and Zetzel 1999: 118 n45. 
373 For a different view, see Kenter 1972: 144-45, where he suggests that Quintus has 
indeed already been convinced (thus taking Quintus’s comments in 1.34 at face value), 
arguing that the rationale for this section is Cicero’s aim as an author “to convince not 
only his two interlocutors but as many people as possible, at any rather those who 
recognize certain ethical dogmata… Cicero wants to avoid that followers of certain 
philosophic orientations attack the theoretical foundations of his political science.” 
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Just as Laelius’s argument involved both a claim for the existence of natural law 
from which all moral standards flow and an argument that virtue ought to be desired for 
its own sake, Marcus’s arguments in this section may be divided into two kinds, in 
accordance with the two major ideas to which he seeks to gain Quintus’s allegiance.  
With one set of arguments (especially 1.40-47), Marcus proves to Quintus that justice has 
a natural foundation, with the important implication that a country’s civil law derives its 
authority from its conformity to natural justice.  With a second set of arguments 
(especially 1.48-52), an offshoot of the first, Marcus tries to imbue Quintus with the 
desire to pursue justice and virtue for their own sake, arguing that this is the proper 
attitude of anyone who wants to consider himself one of the boni.  By contrast with the 
first major argument for law directed at Atticus (1.18-34), in the two kinds of argument 
that comprise this section (1.40-52), Marcus holds the interest of the less philosophical 
Quintus by employing a highly rhetorical style, expertly analyzed and commented—
though without special reference to Quintus—by Dyck (2004: 173-208), a style aimed at 
persuading not through strict logical sequence of ideas but through “instinctive 
reactions… the absurd consequences of the opposing theories… and invective.”374  But to 
Dyck’s observations on the rhetorical tropes of this section, I will add the idea that 
Marcus will on occasion also implicitly appeal to Roman aristocratic ideals to which the 
Roman traditionalist Quintus is inclined, such as honor, shame, and fides in the patron-
client relationship, especially as a means of achieving his second rhetorical goal of 
drawing Quintus to virtue. 
                                                          
374 Dyck 2004: 174. 
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Furthermore, in the following analysis of Marcus’s second argument in favor of 
natural law (1.40-52), I am also attempting to qualify the scholarly consensus that 
Cicero’s purpose in this passage—a corollary of Kenter’s idea that Marcus is striving 
here to gain the sympathy of Stoics, Old Academics, and Peripatetics—is to refute the 
Epicurean theories of conventional justice and utilitarian morality.375  While it is 
certainly the case that the arguments mounted here are contrary to those Epicurean 
positions, focusing on this aspect of the passage overlooks the possibility that there were 
elite Romans who were not Epicurean and held no theory of morality of any kind, and yet 
were inclined to conform to moral standards merely out of convention.  And Quintus is 
characterized as just such a Roman: for Quintus, the ancestral is the good.  Consequently, 
his adherence to the Roman moral code is mindless and lacks any permanent theoretical 
foundation, a problem redressed by Marcus’s first set of arguments.  Moreover, viewing 
morality as a matter of social (Roman) convention means that Quintus’s motive for virtue 
would primarily be the esteem of his social peers rather than the rightness of virtue in 
itself, a problem redressed by Marcus’s second set of arguments.  Finally, focusing on 
anti-Epicureanism in this passage is also unwarranted in light of Marcus’s announcement 
during his prefatory remarks to the argument that those who measure everything by 
pleasure should remain in their gardens (he clearly means the Epicureans) and stand 
aside, since they have nothing to do with the political implications of the upcoming 
argument (1.39).  In addition, Atticus has already shown (1.35) that he was convinced by 
                                                          
375 A nearly 100-year old uninterrupted arc of commentary ranging from Heinemann 
1928, Schmidt 1959, and Kenter 1972 to Zetzel 1998 (footnotes to his translation) and 




the first argument (given its first premise, in any case), and Marcus has no need to 
continue harping on the natural foundations of justice for Atticus’s sake, and least of all 
with rhetorical arguments that the latter would find even less convincing than more 
strictly logical proof. 
One of the ways Marcus achieves his first rhetorical goal of the second argument, 
namely convincing Quintus that justice has a natural foundation and thus nature should 
serve as a standard for civil law, is through a reference to tyrannical laws, an example 
that is bolstered by invective and an impassioned rhetorical question.376  Convincing 
Quintus that justice, in the broad sense of right and wrong, exists by nature (ius esse 
natura) matters to Marcus because he is attempting to bring Quintus into sympathy with 
the idea of engaging practically with Roman civil law on the basis of a prior 
philosophical principle, a procedure that Marcus will subsequently illustrate in practice in 
Books 2 and 3.  Marcus strengthens an assertion about the illegitimacy of tyrannical laws 
with a personal attack on anyone who would disagree: “But now to the consideration of 
what is utterly stupid: thinking that all things are just that have been sanctioned by the 
customs or laws of peoples” (1.42: Iam vero illud stultissimum, existimare omnia iusta 
esse quae scita sint in populorum institutis aut legibus).  Then he confirms the point with 
a rhetorical question denying that the laws passed by the thirty tyrants at Athens or by a 
tyrannical Athenian assembly should be considered just (1.42).  Thus Marcus obliquely 
invites Quintus to be willing to question received Roman civil law.  This is not to say that 
                                                          
376 The first of Marcus’s arguments for natural justice occurs when the text picks up in 
1.40 after a lacuna, with Marcus appealing to human experience: the guilty conscience 
that follows upon the commission of a bad deed, Marcus argues, proves that actions are 
by nature just or unjust.  
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Marcus considers the whole Roman civil law to be unjust or to have been decreed by 
tyrants; the reference to tyranny is an extreme example that illustrates the basic principle 
that the civil law of a given nation is not ipso facto just.  But if those who pass leges are 
ignorant of law, the foundation of natural justice, then the statutes partake of injustice: 
“law is the one thing that has established [justice], which law is right reason in commands 
and prohibitions.  But the one who is ignorant of [law] is unjust, whether that law be 
written anywhere or not” (1.42: quod [ius] lex constituit una, quae lex est recta ratio 
imperandi atque prohibendi.  Quam qui ignorat, is est iniustus, sive est illa scripta 
uspiam sive nusquam).  Thus some unjust things may have made it into the Roman law 
code that require redress by the prudent man in whose mind knowledge of natural law 
resides (cf. 1.18-19):  
Law is supreme reason implanted in nature… when this same reason has been 
strengthened and brought to completion in the mind of a human being, it is law… 
The principle of justice must be drawn from law; for it [law] is a force of nature, it 
is the mind and reason of a prudent men, it is the standard of justice and injustice. 
 
Lex est ratio summa insita in natura… Eadem ratio cum est in hominis mente 
confirmata et perfecta, lex est… a lege ducendum est iuris exordium; ea est enim 
naturae vis, ea mens ratioque prudentis, ea iuris atque iniuriae regula. 
 
Marcus is striving in this argument to form Quintus into such a prudent man whose 
knowledge of lex allows him to serve as the bridge between lex as ratio summa insita in 
natura (1.18) and leges et instituta of peoples (1.42), ensuring that the latter are just. 
Marcus also argues that justice is natural and not conventional through reductio 
ad absurdum that culminates in two positions that are deeply contrary to the Roman 
ethos.  The first is that the virtues would be lost.  “And if justice is not established by 
nature,” Marcus objects, “[all the virtues] are destroyed” (1.43: Atque si natura 
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confirmatum ius non erit, tollantur <omnes virtutes>).  He proceeds with a rhetorical 
question that places before Quintus’s mind the dreadful consequences of this position: 
“For where can there be any liberality, where will love of the fatherland be, where will 
pietas be, where can there be either a willingness to do something good for someone else 
or to return the favor?” (1.42: Ubi enim liberalitas, ubi patriae caritas, ubi pietas, ubi aut 
bene merendi de altero aut referendae gratiae voluntas poterit exsistere?).  The values 
described here, whose potential loss is made more poignant by anaphora of ubi, sound 
very much like those of Quintus and the Roman elite: liberality, patriotism, pietas, and an 
elaborate periphrasis for what we would call the patron-client relationship.  Marcus adds 
that it is not just human obligations relating to pietas that will be destroyed, but man’s 
duties towards the gods as well (1.43).  The second absurd result to which Marcus points 
is that, if justice is not by nature, then all the vices would be just, once they had been 
approved by legal decision of the people, political leaders, or jurors (1.43): “it would be 
just to commit robbery, it would be just to commit adultery, it would be just to bear false 
witness (1.43: ius esset latrocinari, ius adulterare, ius testamenta falsa supponere).  
Through the outrageous consequences evoked by anaphora of ius, Quintus is to be 
impressed with a strong sense that the denial of justice’s natural foundation would 
logically allow for a total breakdown of the Roman social customs he holds dear and 
would sanction the most obvious forms of injustice. 
In the midst of this argument about the natural foundation of justice, Marcus also 
begins to pursue his other major rhetorical goal or second kind of argument in this 
section, namely his effort to persuade Quintus to pursue virtue for its own sake and not 
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for self-interested, utilitarian motives.  Marcus subtly proposes an alteration of the 
traditional Roman motive for such actions, claiming that we are inclined to do these 
things by nature: “For these things [the virtues just enumerated] arise from the fact that 
we are inclined by nature to love human beings, an inclination which is the foundation of 
justice” (1.43: Nam haec nascuntur ex eo quia natura propensi sumus ad diligendos 
homines, quod fundamentum iuris est).  With this assertion Marcus tries to alter Quintus’s 
motive for conforming to the Roman expectation to practice certain virtues, suggesting 
that he should act virtuously out of a natural inclination to do good to others.  Marcus’s 
strategy here recalls that pursued by Cicero of the preface of De Re Publica, where he 
attempted to persuade the Roman elite to engage in politics out of a natural inclination to 
love humanity rather than for personal gain (1.3).377  Indeed, Marcus makes clear that the 
alternative to acting uprightly out of a natural love for other human beings is a base 
utilitarianism whereby we behave rightly—or not—depending on whether some 
advantage may accrue to us: “if (as these same men say) everything should be measured 
by the standard of utility then a person who thinks that some action will be beneficial to 
himself will disregard the laws and break them if he can get away with it” (1.42: si [ut 
idem dicunt] utilitate omnia metienda sunt, negleget leges easque perrumpet, si poterit, is 
qui sibi eam rem fructuosam putabit fore).  With these claims, Marcus appeals to 
Quintus’s aristocratic sense of honor, making him feel ashamed at the thought of 
behaving in such a mercenary, self-calculating way.  Thus Marcus urges Quintus to 
behave rightly not so much out of a concern for the honor of his peers, to whose 
                                                          
377 Cf. 1.1: tantam esse necessitatem virtutis generi hominum a natura… datum. 
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conventional mode of acting he would conform, but out of his own personal sense of 
honor in the recesses of his own mind.378   
It also helps Marcus’s persuasive cause that he continues to make it sound as if he 
is not addressing anything that has to do with Quintus.  That is, he avoids attacking 
Quintus directly by attributing to other people the idea he wants to disprove.  Zetzel 
(1999: 120n57) notes that by idem, the Epicureans are meant.  The view in question 
certainly fits the Epicureans, but idem is thrown in rather abruptly here, as Marcus has 
not previously announced that he is attacking the Epicureans (unless they were expressly 
mentioned in the lacuna before 1.40).  The indeterminacy of idem allows Marcus to 
critique tendencies in Quintus under the guise of Epicureanism, in much the same way as 
Cicero used anti-Epicurean vocabulary in Pro Sestio and the preface of De Re Publica as 
a cover for his attacks on the politically withdrawn or pleasure seekers among the elite. 
 Marcus continues his effort to make Quintus truly virtuous in his conduct by 
appealing to his personal sense of honor and shame to practice the virtues for their own 
sake, rather than out of concern for the good opinion of the other boni.  Marcus implies 
(as Laelius did in De Re Publica 3) that one should not demand a reward for virtuous 
activity of any kind, including public service, whether that reward would be honor from 
others or pleasures gained from one’s position in office; satisfying one’s personal sense 
                                                          
378 Cf. 1.41 for another argument that one must behave out of a concern for the good of 
others rather than solely for one’s own advantage, an argument in which Marcus also 
appeals to shame.  At the idea of stealing gold from another person on a desert island if 
one could get away with it and there were no one to see the deed, Marcus offers the 
indignant exclamation: O rem dignam in qua non modo docti sed etiam agrestes 




of honor at having done the right thing should be a sufficient motive for fulfilling our 
natural tendency (cf. 1.43) to practice justice towards other human beings.  Marcus 
appeals to Quintus’s conception of himself as one of the boni by arguing that a good man 
pursues what is naturally honorable and naturally good: It follow that both justice and 
every noble thing should be sought in and of themselves.  For all good men love equity 
itself and justice itself” (1.48: Sequitur… et ius et omne honestum sua sponte esse 
expetendum.  Etenim omnes viri boni ipsam aequitatem et ius ipsum amant).  If a good 
man loves what is just itself, Marcus continues, then all the virtues are to be pursued for 
the sake of their intrinsic goodness as well (1.48).  Marcus cites the example of liberality 
again (cf. 1.42), but goes further than he did before (cf. 1.42) by arguing that it is 
practiced for the sake of duty rather than to get something: “What of liberality?  Is it 
gratuitous or mercenary?... There can be no doubt that a person who is called liberal or 
kind is following duty, not gain” (1.48: Quid liberalitas?  Gratuitane est an 
mercenaria?... nec est dubium quin is qui liberalis benignusve dicitur, officium, non 
fructum sequatur).  Marcus thus raises the traditional Roman patron-client relationship to 
a higher moral plane.379  Given the etymological relationship between liberalitas and 
liber, Marcus implies that generosity should be part and parcel of one’s conduct as a 
freeborn citizen rather than as a self-interested means to an end.  Likewise, with a series 
of indignant rhetorical questions, Marcus decries the idea of practicing the virtues such as 
temperance (temperantia) and shamefacedness (verecundia) for the wrong reason: “So do 
people act uprightly and with moral restraint in order to hear themselves well-spoken of, 
                                                          
379 For Cicero’s effort to reform the patron-client relationship through philosophical 
ideas, see also De Amicitia. 
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and do they have a sense of shame in order to gain a good name?” (1.50: Innocentes ergo 
et vercundi sunt ut bene audient, et, ut rumorem bonum colligant, erubescunt?).   
Pleasure, moreover, is to be despised as virtue’s opposite, and as something that 
merely has the appearance of what is good (imitatrix boni voluptas, 1.47).  For only a 
corrupted person mistakes pleasure for what is in fact naturally good (cuius [voluptatis] 
blanditiis corrupti, quae natura bona sunt… non cernunt satis).  Likewise, one should not 
practice the virtues for the sake of anything else, and least of all for the sake of gaining 
pleasure, the rejection of which is in fact the surest index of virtue (1.52). 
 Through all these impassioned arguments, Marcus calls Quintus to practice virtue 
for the sake of its intrinsic goodness, not out of social conformity or desire to be honored 
by others.  Marcus thus aims to make Quintus, one of the boni, worthy of that name by 
making him one of the boni in fact, on a moral level.  Quintus is quite taken with the style 
and content of his brother’s argument and declares his eagerness to continue listening as 
Marcus takes the next step in the argument (1.53).   
But that next step leads to the problem of the highest good, an abstract question in 
which Quintus will quickly lose interest while Atticus, by contrast, resumes a more active 
role for the theoretical question at hand.  The digression on the question of the highest 
good shows that a definitive solution to the question is not necessary for Marcus’s basic 
goal of providing a philosophical foundation for political engagement; this only requires 
that virtue play some key part in one’s understanding of the highest good.   
After a brief conversation between Marcus and Atticus on the question of whether 
the Stoic view that virtue is the “only” good can be reconciled with the Old Academic 
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and Peripatetic view that virtue should be considered a great good as compared with other 
goods (1.54-56), Quintus interrupts and demands that Marcus move forward with the 
practical project of applying his teachings about natural law and virtue to the civil law:   
Bravo, brother!  You just now took possession of the vocabulary of the ius civile 
and of laws, and it is on this sort of law that I am awaiting your discussion.  For 
that, of course, is a great matter to be judged, as I have often enough learned from 
you yourself.  But certainly this is how things stand: the highest good is [either] to 
live by the standard of nature, that is, to enjoy a life that is moderate and furnished 
with virtue; or, to follow nature and to live as if by its law, that is, to omit nothing 
(as far is it lies in one’s power) that helps to attain what nature demands, which 
likewise amounts to this, living by virtue as if by a law.  And so I’m not sure if 
this matter can ever be judged, but it certainly can’t in this dialogue, at least if we 
are to finish what we have undertaken. (1.56) … Now let us do what we started, 
especially since this disagreement about the highest evil and good has nothing to 
do with it.  (1.57) 
 
Praeclare, frater!  Iam nunc a te verba usurpantur civilis iuris ac legum, quo de 
genere exspecto disputationem tuam.  Nam ista quidem magna diiudicatio est, ut 
ex te ipso saepe cognovi.  Sed certe ita res se habet, ut <aut> ex natura vivere 
summum bonum sit, id est vita modica et apta <e> virtute perfrui; aut naturam 
sequi et eius quasi lege vivere, id est nihil (quantum in ipso sit) praetermittere 
quominus ea quae natura postulet consequatur, quod item hoc valet, virtute 
tamquam lege vivere.  Quapropter hoc diiudicari nescio an numquam, sed hoc 
sermone certe non potest, siquidem id quod suscepimus perfecturi sumus. (1.56) 
… nunc id agamus quod coepimus, cum praesertim ad id nihil pertineat haec de 
summo malo bonoque dissensio.  (1.57) 
 
Quintus refers to the legal language his brother has just used while imagining the three 
interlocutors adjudicating among the different Hellenistic schools on the question of the 
highest good (the finis bonorum) as if they were resolving a boundary dispute (finis as it 
concerns possessio or legal ownership, thus playing on the double meaning of fines as 
“boundaries” and “moral ends,” 1.55).  Quintus responds with a joke of his own that 
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playfully accuses his brother of wrongly “claiming ownership” (usurpare)380 of the 
language of civil law, illegally appropriating it for philosophical discourse, when in fact 
the plan for the conversation, Quintus reminds him, requires the opposite: they are 
supposed to move from the broader philosophical background to a discussion of the ius 
civile (cf. 1.17).   
Quintus shows that he has internalized Marcus’s arguments about virtue’s natural 
foundation and intrinsic desirability, as he argues that either of the two positions on the 
controversy of the highest good is acceptable since they both amount to pursuing virtue.  
He gives an accurate summary of the two positions on the highest good previously stated 
by Marcus (1.54), insisting that either one will be sufficient for placing Roman law on a 
solid philosophic foundation.381  His impatience with this theoretical question and his 
insistence that it does not matter for their practical project recalls Antonius’s insistence in 
De Oratore (1.222) that it is not necessary for the orator to know the nature of the 
summum bonum.  In a similar way, Marcus’s response—prudentissime, Quinte, dicis 
(1.57)—confirms Quintus’s view that it is not necessary to reach a definitive resolution to 
                                                          
380 OLD usurpare.  As far as I am aware, scholars have not previously noted the legal 
resonance in Quintus’s use of this word, which should be added to the highly 
concentrated series of legal puns in 1.55-56. 
381 The first option summarizes the position of the early Academy and Peripatos: the 
highest good is living in accordance with nature (cf. the definition attributed to them in 
Fin. 4.14), understood as combining a moderate enjoyment of bodily and external goods 
with virtue (see the idea of living according to nature attributed to Xenocrates and 
Aristotle in Fin. 4.15; cf. Fin. 2.34 and Ac. 2.131).  The second possibility Quintus 
suggests aligns with the Stoic position.  It understands nature as a commanding force and 
hence a sort of law, commanding virtue, which is the content of this law.  There are 
several other passages in Cicero’s philosophic works where the Stoic notion of living 
according to nature is understood as pursuing virtue, and that basic notion is echoed here: 
see e.g. See e.g. Fin. 2.34 and 3.31; Off. 3.13. 
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this question in order to pursue practical wisdom.  The dramatization of this scene on 
Cicero’s part rhetorically moves the reader to understand that a sufficient philosophical 
basis for political engagement is the lawgiver’s knowledge of virtue as grounded in 
nature, and as a guide both for his own life and for the specific laws he will frame as a 
matter of practical political engagement. 
V. The Rhetoric of the Laudatio Sapientiae 
Before turning at last to the civil law, Marcus concludes the first book with a 
passage of extraordinary passion in praise of sapientia.  He drives home several points 
from his previous arguments in the typical manner of a peroration,382 but frames the 
entire speech in terms of various insights that belong to sapientia and self-knowledge.383  
Sapientia and self-knowledge include the additional insight, explored in a magnificent 
period (1.63), that all the philosophic ideas explored in the body of Book 1 and reiterated 
in this epideictic passage are to be the lodestar of public life, and not just in terms of 
lawgiving.  With the laudatio, therefore, Marcus indicates that the philosophical ideas 
explored thus far are to serve as the basis not only for the ensuing conversation on the 
civil law in Books 2 and 3, but also for any person’s engagement in public life by means 
of oratory.  The ramifications of the laudatio thus extend beyond the context of the 
interlocutors’ one-day dialogue on natural and civil law.  
                                                          
382 On the connection between the laudatio and the previous argument of Book 1, see 
Heinemann 1928: 239, Schmidt 1959: 229, and Dyck 2004: 223. 
383 Benardete 1987 (esp. 298 and 308), Courcelle 1969: 114 ff., and Dyck 2004: 226 have 
noted the self-knowledge theme in the laudatio, and have argued for its Socratic 
resonance, citing in particular Plato’s Phaedrus and Alcibiades 1. 
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In what follows, I will analyze Marcus’s rhetorical aims and methods with a view 
to his two interlocutors.384  On the one hand, Marcus seeks to encourage the politically 
ambitious Quintus to pursue philosophy and practice virtue, using the virtues as a guiding 
light for the ends to be pursued while as engaging in public life, including but not limited 
to engaging with the ius civile.  On the other hand, for the Epicurean Atticus, Marcus 
reiterates the philosophic doctrines that compel him to care for his fellow man and then 
suggests that the logical culmination of these insights is Atticus’s obligation to engage in 
politics in his own particular city of Rome. 
Persuading Quintus 
Marcus’s encomium of wisdom takes on the character of a protreptic385 that 
invites Quintus to pursue philosophic studies for the sake of his own happiness and the 
good of the state.386  
                                                          
384 Traditional scholarly approaches to this passage include (1) the Quellenforschung of 
continental scholars working on this passage in the mid-20th century.  Cf. e.g. Heinemann 
1928: 316-17, who connects this passage to Tusc. 5.68-72 and argues for Posidonius as 
the source of both; Giusta 1967: 393 ff. also connects this passage with Tusc. 5.68-72, but 
argues for the Platonic provenance of both; Boyancé 1975 offers a detailed, line-by-line 
analysis of the speech, speculating about possible philosophic sources.  Like Giusta, he 
traces several ideas back to Plato, taking issue with scholars who have viewed most of the 
philosophical notions in the speech as simply Stoic, and yet dogmatically insisting in his 
own right that everything should be attributed to the Platonist Antiochus of Ascalon (cf. 
Theiler 1930: 45 ff. and Müller 1968: 227-28).  (2) More recently, scholars have argued 
that this passage demonstrates Cicero’s adherence to the practice of the Athenian 
Stranger in Plato’s Laws of delivering persuasive preludes prior to the promulgation of 
specific laws. For Book 1 of Cicero’s De Legibus as a persuasive prelude to the law code 
of Books 2 and 3 on the model of the Athenian stranger’s persuasive prelude in Plato, 
Laws 5, see Annas 2013: 212-17; on the execution of the oratorical principles in Leg. 
1.62 in the proems to the laws in Books 2 and 3, see North 2002: 142-43. 
385 Dyck 2004: 225, commenting on Cicero’s etymology of the Greek word “philosophy” 
in 1.58, suggests that the same “etymology (also at Off. 2.5) probably figured in the 
Hortensius.”  Given the generally protreptic force of this passage, it might offer 
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Marcus initially seeks to gain a foothold in Quintus’s soul through the latter’s 
concern for virtue.  Prior to Marcus’s speech praising wisdom, Quintus has just expressed 
his desire for Marcus to start giving practical leges: “it is my expectation that you will 
give laws and a method of training for living” (1.57: te existimo... leges vivendi et 
disciplinam daturum).  He takes hold of Quintus’s interest by stating from the outset that 
wisdom is the source of the ethical precepts which Quintus desires:  
What you’re waiting for, Quintus, certainly belongs to this discussion, and if only 
it were within my capacity!  But certainly it’s the case that, since the law must be 
the reformer of vices and the encourager of virtues, a teaching for living should be 
derived from it.  In this way it comes about that <* * *> the mother of all good 
things [is] wisdom...  (1.58) 
 
Est huius vero disputationis, Quinte, proprium id quod expectas, atque utinam 
esset etiam facultatis meae!  Sed profecto ita se res habet, ut quoniam vitiorum 
emendatricem legem esse oportet commendatricemque virtutum, ab ea vivendi 
doctrina ducatur.  Ita fit ut      <* * *> mater omnium bonarum rerum sapientia... 
 
It is true that law should promote the virtues, Marcus states, and yet particular laws 
themselves have their source in yet another source, their “mother”, sapientia: “the mother 
of all good things is wisdom” (1.58: mater omnium bonarum rerum sapientia).  It is as 
though Marcus says, I would like to give you laws for life and a rule of life, but I am 
unable to do so of myself, since the giver of such laws is wisdom herself.  Indeed, 
Marcus’s expression of modesty, “if only it were within my capacity” (utinam esset 
facultatis meae), makes more sense when, having concluded the speech, he explains that 
his pursuit of sapientia has made him what he is: “I am unable to pass over in silence the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
additional clues for the reconstruction of Cicero’s Hortensius; Dyck 2004: 230 notes the 
similarity of certain fragments of Hortensius to parts of the present laudatio. 
386 Atkins 2013: 75 notes that Cicero enumerates the kinds of knowledge necessary for 
the good statesman. 
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one by whose pursuit I am held bound, and who has made me whatever it is that I am” 
(1.63: eam cuius studio teneor, quaeque me eum quicumque sum effecit, non possum 
silentio praeterire).  The implication is that Marcus, Quintus, and any theoretical 
lawgiver needs to acquire sapientia as a prior condition of lawgiving. 
Having connected ethical precepts and laws to wisdom, Marcus has engaged 
Quintus’s attention and can now move forward with his attempt to draw Quintus towards 
a more philosophic life.  In the course of the speech, Marcus strives to attract Quintus to 
philosophy in a variety of ways.  First, terminologically, he strives to gain Quintus’s 
sympathy by eschewing the Greek term philosophia, which occurs only once and is 
analyzed etymologically.  Moreover, the most recent editor, Powell, considers this 
etymological remark to be parenthetical, and Marcus’s tone of voice very well could have 
further downplayed its importance: “In this way it comes about that <* * *> the mother 
of all good things [is] wisdom (from the love of which, by means of a Greek word, 
philosophy found its name)” (1.58: ita fit ut <* * *> mater omnium bonarum rerum 
sapientia (a cuius amore Graeco verbo philosophia nomen invenit).387  Philosophy is 
specifically treated as a Greek word, and Cicero claims the concept for the Latin 
language through the periphrasis sapientia (a cuius amore).  He presents the idea of 
philosophy in Latin dress, preferring sapientia (1.58; 1.59; 1.62, where it is the last word 
of the whole speech) and various periphrases for the Greek γνῶθι σεαυτόν such as ut 
nosmet ipsos nosceremus (“that we should know ourselves,” 1.58; cf. qui ipse se norit, 
                                                          
387 See Kenter 1972: 232 on philosophia: “He has never been able to find an adequate 
translation of φιλοσοφία and has accepted philosophia or circumscriptions like studium 
sapientiae (Leg. 1.62; Tusc. 1.1; 5.9), doctrinae studia (Leg. 3.14; Fin. 5.53), disciplina 
sapientiae (Ac. 2.114).”  See also Stang 1932: 85. 
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“whoever has himself known himself,” 1.59; cum se ipse perspexerit, “after he has 
himself examined himself,” 1.59; quam se ipse noscet, “how he will himself know 
himself,” 1.61; cumque se... senserit, “after he has perceived himself,” 1.62; qui se ipsi 
velint nosse, “those who prove willing themselves to know themselves,” 1.62).  Cicero 
employs Latin terminology with a view to Quintus’s presence in the audience, attempting 
to make the idea of philosophy and its activity, the pursuit of self-knowledge, seem less 
foreign and un-Roman to Quintus than if the same idea had been constantly referred to in 
Greek.388 
A second salient method of rhetorical appeal to Quintus is Marcus’s impassioned 
claim that the pursuit of self-knowledge leads to happiness.389  Happiness results from the 
knowledge and practice of the virtues, which themselves arise from self-knowledge, 
granted by sapientia:  
And when he has thoroughly examined and entirely tested himself, he will 
understand how he has come into life equipped by nature, and how many 
instruments he has for obtaining and attaining wisdom, since at first he conceived 
in his soul and mind, the, if you will, shadowy forms of all things;390 and when 
                                                          
388 On the Roman overtones of sapientia in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, see 
Gildenhard 2007: 97-106 and Baraz 2012: 105-08.  However, while Gildenhard marks 
sapientia in the Tusculans as an indicator of the wisdom of the mos maiorum, the 
sapientia to which Marcus refers here, as I am in the process of arguing, represents a 
fusion of Greek wisdom (“philosophia”) with Roman participation in public life.  It is 
something pursued neither by contemporary Greek intellectuals nor, in general, by 
Roman elites. 
389 See Annas 2013: 215-16 on Cicero’s presentation of the philosophic life as a path to 
virtue, and hence happiness. 
390 The meaning of quasi adumbratas intellegentias is disputed.  Rudd translates “dim 
perceptions”; Zetzel, “sketchy conceptions.”  Dyck ad. loc. asserts that intellegentiae 
refers to “the ἔννοιαι of Hellenistic epistemology,” but Boyancé 1975: 24-26 and Theiler 
1931: 41 had previously pointed out that they could refer (mediated by Antiochus) to the 
Forms as described in Plato’s Meno, where Socrates enunciates a theory of knowledge.  
Dyck’s interpretation is based on Cicero’s earlier mention of inchoata intelligentia at 
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these have been illuminated under the leadership of wisdom, he realizes that he is 
a good man, and for that very reason will be happy.  (1.59) 
 
et cum se perspexerit totumque temptarit, intelleget quaemadmodum a natura 
subornatus in vitam venerit, quantaque instrumenta habeat ad obtinendam 
adipiscendamque sapientiam, quoniam principio rerum omnium quasi adumbratas 
intellegentias animo ac mente conceperit; quibus illustratis sapientia duce bonum 
virum et ob eam ipsam causam cernat se beatum fore. 
 
It is self-knowledge which leads to knowledge of the virtues and happiness, providing a 
link between philosophic pursuits and ethics in a way which shows the practical 
usefulness and indeed vital usefulness of seeking self-knowledge.  Sapientia herself aids 
the individual by giving him this knowledge (sapientia duce), demonstrating Marcus’s 
earlier claim that “she alone has taught us not only other matters but also the most 
difficult thing of all, knowing ourselves” (1.58: haec391 enim una [sapientia] nos cum 
ceteras res omnes, tum quod est difficillimum docuit: ut nosmet ipsos nosceremus).  It is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Leg. 1.27, where Cicero appears to speak in a Stoic vein; but see Altman 2016: 51-52 
(with 52n98) for an alternative view.  For a significant discussion of Cicero’s reception of 
Plato’s theory of Forms, see Gildenhard 2013: 225-75, who argues for its increased 
importance for Cicero’s thinking in the philosophica of the 40s. 
391 There is some dispute about the antecedent of haec.  The two authors of commentaries 
on Leg. in modern times, Kenter and Dyck, both state that its antecedent is philosophia, 
but as I mentioned earlier, Powell, the editor of the OCT, places philosophia in 
parentheses; the choice of the commentators also appears to reflect their assumption that 
Marcus is praising philosophy in this speech, which he undoubtedly is if philosophy is 
considered as a concept; and yet Marcus repeatedly places the emphasis on sapientia, 
relegating philosophia to its original Greek context.  Dyck’s argument in favor of his 
choice, that it is philosophy that is given to men by the gods, and not wisdom, does not 
convince.  Here is the full context: Ita fit ut <* * *> mater omnium bonarum rerum 
sapientia (a cuius amore Graeco verbo philosophia nomen invenit), qua nihil a dis 
immortalibus uberius, nihil florentius, nihil praestabilius hominum vitae datum est.  Haec 
enim una nos cum ceteras res omnes, tum quod est difficillimum docuit: ut nosmet ipsos 
nosceremus... (1.58).  Since Marcus says that sapientia leads a person to knowledge of 
the virtues through his realization of the forms innate in his own mind, it is likely that 
sapientia is meant to be understood in 1.58 as the one who has taught self-knowledge; the 
rhetorical emphasis on sapientia at beginning and end of the speech suggests this 
interpretation as well. 
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noteworthy, however, that Marcus makes no attempt to prove that knowledge of the 
virtues leads to their practice.  Rather, it is simply asserted that becoming aware of the 
virtues leads a person to the realization of his own goodness and of his future happiness, 
as if their practice were assured.  Marcus appears to offer an explanation with what 
follows, starting with the word nam.  But what actually follows is a description of the 
different ways in which a person who has awareness of the virtues puts them into practice 
(necessarily, it appears), capped with an emotional exclamation that such a person must 
indeed be happy: 
For when the soul, having come to know and perceive the virtues, has departed 
from the slavish indulgence of the body, and trodden down pleasure as some stain 
of shame, and escaped every fear of death and of pain, and taken up the worship 
of the gods and pure religion, [and] sharpened the point of his judgment for the 
purpose of choosing the good and rejecting what opposes it (which virtue is called 
prudence from looking ahead), what could possibly be called or considered more 
happy than this?  (1.60) 
 
nam cum animus cognitis perceptisque virtutibus, a corporis obsequio 
indulgentiaque discesserit, voluptatemque sicut labem aliquam dedecoris 
oppresserit,392 omnemque mortis dolorisque timorem effugerit...393 cultumque 
deorum et puram religionem susceperit...394 exacuerit... ingeni aciem ad bona 
seligenda et reicienda contraria (quae virtus ex providendo est appellata 
prudentia), quid eo dici aut cogitari poterit beatius? 
 
Note that the description of temperance appeals to Quintus’s sense of libertas and 
independence (obsequio) as well as honor and shame (dedecoris).  In Cicero’s description 
of the virtues, the praise of prudence particularly stands out, as it is the only virtue 
                                                          
392 Here we see Marcus describing the virtue of temperance (see Boyancé 1975: 27). 
393 Fortitude (ibid. 28). 
394 Justice, of which piety was traditionally considered a part (ibid. 28: Boyancé cites the 
philosophical precedent of Pl. Euthphr. 12e, as well as Cic. Nat. D. 1.116, “where the 




specifically named, and its etymology is supplied.  Just before the speech, Marcus had 
praised Quintus for speaking prudentissime (1.57) in calling the conversation back 
towards the original subject of law.  Therefore, Marcus’s emphasis on prudence and its 
role in living a moral life is especially designed to appeal to Quintus.  We can also 
observe that Marcus has not actually undertaken to prove (as he does attempt to do in 
Tusc. 5) that virtue is sufficient for happiness.  Rather, this idea is simply asserted in 
heavily adorned language and with the greatest rhetorical effects.  The two chapters on 
ethics from which we have just quoted (59-60) take the form of elaborate periods;  
homoeoptoton and homoeoteleuton395 contribute to the sense of the logical progression of 
ideas;396 and happiness is repeatedly emphasized as the result of knowing and practicing 
the virtues (59 fin., beatum; 60 fin., beatius).  Furthermore, as we have seen, Marcus ends 
the second period (1.60) with a rhetorical question, while various figures contribute to the 
high style and lofty tone, including personification,397 similes,398 metaphors,399 and 
anaphora.400  In short, Marcus spares no rhetorical technique in his attempt to bring 
Quintus around to an appreciation for the study of ethics. 
                                                          
395 See Rhet. Her. 4.28 ff. for definitions and examples of these figures. 
396 corporis... indulgentiaque discesserit, voluptatemque... dedecoris oppresserit... 
omnemque mortis dolorisque timorem [also note the chiasmus] effugerit, societatemque 
caritatis coierit... omnesque... duxerit, cultumque... susceperit... exacuerit (Leg. 1.60). 
397 emendatricem [legem]... commendatricemque; mater... sapientia (1.58). 
398 divinum ingeniumque... sicut simulacrum aliquod (1.59); quasi adumbratas 
intellegentias (1.59); sicut labem aliquam (1.60). 
399 quantaque instrumenta habeat (1.59); ingeni aciem (1.60). 
400 Anaphora of nihil is combined with something resembling homoeoptoton, as seen in 
the repetition of the endings of the comparative adverbs: nihil a dis immortalius uberius, 
nihil florentius, nihil praestabilius (1.58). 
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By promoting the study of cosmology, Marcus also promotes the goal of making 
Quintus more virtuous by encouraging an awareness of the distinction between the 
eternal and the transient, leading Quintus to detachment from glory, traditionally one of 
the primary motives of an elite Roman’s involvement in public life.  In a passage that 
shares linguistic and conceptual features with the Somnium Scipionis, as commentators 
have frequently noted, Marcus asserts that study of the universe includes an awareness of 
(1.61) “what is mortal and corruptible in them, what divine and eternal” (quid in eis 
mortale et caducum, quid divinum aeternumque sit)401 and refers to the philosopher’s 
grasp of (1.61) “the very one [the god] who oversees and rules the universe” (ipsumque 
ea moderantem et regentem <deum>).  Furthermore, looking up to the heavens leads to 
the realization that in addition to local affiliation, he is a (1.61) “citizen of the whole 
universe, of one city, so to speak” (civem totius mundi quasi unius urbis).  Cicero thus 
promotes Stoic cosmopolitanism to Quintus, suggesting that this broader awareness of 
our place in the cosmos leads to a reevaluation of what is commonly considered glorious:  
Through this grandeur of the universe and through this inspection and knowledge 
of nature, immortal gods! how that man will himself know himself (as Pythian 
Apollo has commanded), how he will look down upon, how he will despise, how 
he will consider as nothing what is commonly said to be glorious!  (1.61) 
 
In hac ille magnificentia rerum atque in hoc conspectu et cognitione naturae, di 
immortales, quam se ipse noscet (quod Apollo praecepit Pythius), quam 
contemnet, quam despiciet, quam pro nihilo putabit ea quae vulgo dicuntur 
amplissima! 
 
                                                          
401 Cf. Rep. 6.21: infra autem iam nihil est nisi mortale et caducum… supra lunam sunt 
aeterna omnia (“but below, at that point there is nothing except what is mortal and 
corruptible… above the moon, all things are eternal”). 
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Quintus is drawn to the study of physics by the grandeur of the vision invoked in the 
mind’s eye and through the infectious enthusiasm of the anaphora of quam; the moral 
lesson to be drawn from this study—the contempt of glory—is emphasized by the word 
that concludes the period.  But Cicero also makes a bold move, challenging traditional 
Roman culture’s view of glory as a commonly held but false belief.  The commonly held 
view is contrasted with the truth as revealed by the philosophic perspective, of which 
elites clinging to the Roman cultural code’s delusions about the inherent value of glory 
remain ignorant.  Therefore, Quintus and ambitious Roman elites are being conditioned 
to see their place in the universe in a new way, completely alien to traditional Roman 
culture, with a view to moderating political ambition.402   
Marcus concludes his appeal to Quintus by linking the traditional departments of 
philosophy to rhetoric and public life, thereby casting the contemplative life in a more 
favorable light for the pragmatic Quintus.  Having discussed ethics, epistemology, and 
physics, he suggests that the art of dialectic or logic protects the truths discovered (1.62):  
And he will fortify all of these things—with a certain hedge, as it were—with a 
dialectical method, the science of adjudicating truth and falsehood, and with a 
certain art of understanding what follows from and is contrary to each premise.  
(1.62) 
 
Atque haec omnia, quasi saepimento aliquo, vallabit disserendi ratione, veri et 
falsi iudicandi scientia, et arte quadam intellegendi quid quamque rem sequatur et 
quid sit cuique contrarium. 
                                                          
402 In the Somnium Scipionis, Cicero places greater emphasis on the earth’s small size, 
and Rome’s small place within it, in comparison with the vastness of the cosmos, and is 
more explicit in drawing the moral lesson that fame is transitory.  And yet here in Leg. as 
in Somn., these realizations do not lead to the individual’s rejection of political activity 
for a life spent exclusively in philosophic contemplation.  Rather, the individual still 
engages in public life (as we shall see in Leg. 1.62), but apparently from a new, 




This explanation of dialectic is decidedly brief, in keeping with the protreptic’s aim of 
fostering interest in the philosophic life and of providing the statesman with a knowledge 
framework that can elevate political activity.  Dwelling at length on an abstruse subject 
like dialectic would be contrary to Cicero’s aims.403  Therefore Marcus quickly pivots to 
rhetoric, deftly connecting the philosophic disciplines advocated thus far with public 
oratory, an activity that Quintus and any man of his day would recognize as 
unquestionably useful and important, thereby gaining their sympathy for the preceding 
studies in pursuit of self-knowledge: 
And when he perceives that he has been born into civil society, he will think it 
necessary to make use not only of that subtle manner of discussion, but also of a 
continuous, more broadly effusive manner of speaking, with which to direct 
peoples, with which to establish laws, with which to reprove traitors, with which 
to protect loyal citizens, with which to praise illustrious men, with which to set 
forth to his fellow-citizens, in a manner fit to persuade, policies conducive to their 
national security and prestige, with which to have the power of exhorting to the 
honorable course, of dissuading from the base one, of assisting those who are in 
trouble, and of publishing the deeds and counsels of the brave and the wise, as 
well as the ignominy of the immoral, in everlasting memorials.  (1.62) 
 
Cumque se ad civilem societatem natum senserit, non solum illa subtili 
disputatione sibi utendum putabit, sed etiam fusa latius perpetua oratione, qua 
regat populos, qua stabiliat leges, qua castiget improbos, qua tueatur bonos, qua 
laudet claros viros, qua praecepta salutis et laudis apte ad persuadendum edat suis 
civibus, qua hortari ad decus, revocare a flagitio, consolari possit afflictos, 
factaque et consulta fortium et sapientium cum improborum ignominia 
sempiternis monumentis prodere. 
 
The speech rises to its climax with the loftiest of periods, and itself extols rhetoric with 
all the grandeur Cicero can muster, with the anaphora of qua particularly standing out.  
Previously in the speech, Cicero had made use of “stately periods,” personification, an 
                                                          
403 Dyck 2004: 232 observes that “dialectic receives a brief, jejune description, rhetoric a 
full, resonant one.” 
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abundance of metaphor and similes, chiastic arrangement, anaphora, in short, all the 
stylistic tools of adornment which rhetoric, and particularly the epideictic genre, can 
provide an orator.  Rhetoric itself has been the medium of the explanation of and 
exhortation to the philosophic life, and Quintus, at home with oratory as much as any 
Roman, cannot but experience a certain pleasure and admiration as he listens to his 
brother’s protreptic.  Furthermore, nothing in the speech was more consciously rhetorical 
than this last part, and therefore both the rhetorical nature of the remarks and the content 
of the remarks themselves, the praise of rhetoric, make a lasting impression on Quintus’s 
mind and render the praise of sapientia, said to be the mother of these things, much more 
congenial and convincing.404   
Finally, looking back at the speech’s structure, we see that it was framed on its 
outer edges by two subjects which would strike the typical educated Roman as relevant to 
his concerns.  It began with ethics and ended with rhetoric, while those aspects of 
philosophy which seem especially speculative, physics and dialectic, were sandwiched in 
the middle, dialectic being given particularly short shrift.  And yet while ethics and 
rhetoric are the two subjects on the outer edges of the rhetorical organism, sapientia is 
credited with teaching all these subjects to a person through self-knowledge, and she 
herself is the last word of the speech: “And since there are so many and such great things 
which are perceived as present in a human being by such as are themselves willing to 
                                                          
404 Cicero’s method of using oratory itself to make philosophy more attractive to his 
Roman audience has recently been highlighted by Baraz 2012: 128-49 in her treatment of 
the prefaces to Paradoxa Stoicorum, Nat. D. 1, and Tusc. 1.  In Section III below, I will 
show how this process works in the opposite direction as well, as Cicero uses philosophy 
to lead Atticus to oratory and public life. 
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know themselves, their parent and nurse is wisdom” (1.62: Quae cum tot res tantaeque 
sint, quae inesse in homine perspiciantur ab eis qui se ipsi velint nosse, earum parens est 
educatrixque sapientia). 
At the most fundamental level, however, the ultimate purpose of Cicero’s 
combination of philosophy and oratory in the laudatio as it concerns Quintus is the need 
to provide him with moral grounding to become an orator who is himself “good” (i.e. 
morally good) and who seeks to do “good.”  I wish to underline that Marcus’s conception 
of philosophy in the first book and in the laudatio is above all moral and normative, and 
is valued especially for its potential of bringing about moral improvement.  Marcus’s aim 
in promoting philosophy, as in De Re Publica, is to produce leaders who are morally 
good, including but by no means limited to the specific purpose of being able to imbue 
the laws with moral goodness.  Scholars often argue that in Cicero’s view, the chief value 
of a philosophic education for oratory lies in its capacity for producing a technically 
skillful (especially in terms of dialectic) and widely learned orator.405  Although there is 
doubtless evidence for this view of the relationship between philosophy and oratory in De 
Oratore,406 the laudatio in the De legibus downplays philosophy’s role of imparting 
knowledge of human nature and customs as well as dialectical skill for speaking more 
effectively and abundantly, emphasizing rather its positive moral effects on the individual 
                                                          
405 Kretschmar 1938: 61-64 and Kenter 1972: 245 see a departure from Cicero’s view in 
De Oratore that philosophy is valuable as an instrument for oratory.  Dyck 2004: 236 
seems to misunderstand what is at stake when he argues against Kretschmar that Cicero 
“had a lifelong interest in both… and did not sharply distinguish the two.”  No scholar 
would deny that Cicero was “interested” in both philosophy and oratory.  The question is 
rather, is philosophy’s influence on the latter merely instrumental or also normative? 
406 See May and Wisse 2001: 11-12, 25. 
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who will become an orator.  According to the laudatio, philosophy prepares the orator by 
making him a good person who then becomes capable of using his oratory for good ends, 
the knowledge of which he has acquired through his studies.407  When Marcus’s lover of 
wisdom in the laudatio gains knowledge of the virtues (1.59-60), he knows himself as a 
good man (bonum virum… cernat se, 1.59), and practices the virtues accordingly (1.60).  
His study of physics also has the good moral effect of detaching him from what public 
men traditionally seek after, and with too much eagerness: glory, wealth, power (quae 
vulgo dicuntur amplissima, 1.61).  So when such a person engages in politics, everyone 
gains.   
A similar argument concerning the desirability of having this wise man engage in 
politics is made in the Tusculans:  
Let this same wise man pass over to protecting the state.  What could be more 
outstanding than this, since his prudence perceives the advantage of his fellow 
citizens, his justice steals nothing from the public for his own private use, and he 
exercises so great a variety of so many different virtues?  (Tusc. 5.72)  
Transeat idem iste sapiens ad rem publicam tuendam.  Quid eo possit esse 
praestantius, cum prudentia utilitatem civium cernat, iustitia nihil in suam domum 
inde derivet, reliquis utatur tot tam variisque virtutibus? 
In other words, society especially stands to benefit from a statesman who knows the 
virtues to which his fellow citizens should be directed—their true advantage—and who is 
himself a morally restrained person who will refrain from doing injustice.  Rather than 
                                                          
407 This aspect of the orator’s philosophic education seems to come up in De Oratore 
when Crassus notes that “eloquence… must be joined with moral probity and the utmost 
prudence” (eloquentia… probitate iungenda summaque prudentia, 3.55).  Probitas is 
obviously a moral quality; if, by prudentia, Crassus means the same thing as it means in 
the laudatio, namely the capacity “to choose good and avoid evil things” (Leg. 1.60), then 
his motives in demanding the orator’s philosophical education would not be limited to 
helping the orator win cases, but would also include its normative value. 
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being a tool with which the orator can more effectively manipulate people, philosophy 
actually gives the rhetorician knowledge of (1) how to live his life, i.e. as a morally 
upright person and as a statesman, and (2) the proper ends to which he should direct 
society.  Otherwise politics will be amoral—if not immoral—and rhetoric must be 
unprincipled, its employment arbitrary.  Marcus says in the laudatio that the philosopher-
orator will assure himself of his own discoveries about philosophy by means of dialectic, 
but as a citizen of a particular society will employ a rhetorical manner of speaking to 
exhort his fellow citizens to choose the noble course over the base, to embrace the useful 
course, and to praise good men and condemn the wicked.  How is he going to know what 
nobility and baseness are, what utility is, and who good men are and who bad men are 
without knowledge of morality?  And why would he bother to do any of this for his 
fellow citizens, and not for his own gain (i.e. for the things commonly considered 
amplissima), unless he were a truly good man?  Cicero thus strives to bring Quintus to 
philosophy for the sake of providing a moral scope for political engagement that will 
ultimately make politics more moral for the benefit of all Rome’s citizens.   
Persuading Atticus 
Marcus makes a strong rhetorical appeal to Atticus designed to draw him to a 
vision of philosophy which can assure his happiness (so Marcus claims, against the 
promises of Epicureanism) and which will be useful for politics, both because this vision 
of philosophy posits doctrines favorable to the political order and because it leads to the 
individual’s participation in public life. 
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The praise itself of wisdom and the pursuit of self-knowledge captures the interest 
of Atticus the homo philosophicus and disposes him to be attentive to the speaker.  Two 
references to the Delphic origin of the precept to know oneself establish the Greek 
character of this quest for Cicero’s friend Ἀττικός, even as the terms for “know thyself” 
are given in Latin: 
For she alone [Wisdom] has taught us not only all other subjects, but also the 
most difficult thing of all: to know ourselves, a command whose proverbial power 
is so great that it is attributed not to any man but to the god of Delphi (1.58)… 
how he will know himself (as Pythian Apollo commands)!  (1.61) 
 
Haec enim una nos cum ceteras res omnes, tum quod est difficillimum docuit: ut 
nosmet ipsos nosceremus, cuius praecepti tanta vis et tanta sententia est, ut ea non 
homini cuipiam sed Delphico deo tribueretur… quam se ipse noscet (quod Apollo 
praecepit Pythius)! 
 
In these two passages, we also see Marcus adopting a procedure of which he will make 
use time and again in his appeal to Atticus.  That is, Marcus begins a statement by giving 
voice to a notion which Atticus as a philosophical man and Epicurean would accept, and 
then immediately follows it up with an idea which is specifically anti-Epicurean.  
Atticus’s interest is thereby positively engaged even as his cherished philosophical views 
are undermined.  In the case of these two passages, Marcus refers to the classic Greek 
philosophic dictum γνῶθι σεαυτόν, but immediately afterwards asserts that it is the 
statement of a particular god (Delphico deo; Apollo... Pythius), thereby positing contra 
Epicureanos a providential concern of the gods for men, since they have communicated 
their wish that men should seek to know themselves.  In addition, at the beginning of the 
speech, “know thyself” is a dictum, sententia; towards the end, he refers to it as a 
command: quod Apollo praecepit Pythius.  The presence and influence of the gods on 
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men looms larger as the speech proceeds, and indeed just before we get to this reference 
to Apollo, Marcus asserts that knowledge of the cosmos includes an awareness of the god 
who “oversees and rules” the universe: “and when he has practically taken hold of the 
very one [the god] who oversees and rules the universe” (1.61: cum... ipsumque ea 
moderantem et regente <deum> paene prenderit).   
The presentation of this last doctrine within the discussion of physics provides us 
with another example of Cicero’s procedure of adding anti-Epicurean ideas to acceptable 
Epicurean tenets.  Epicureans especially cherished the study of the physical universe, and 
believed that wisdom resulted from its contemplation, especially the insight that there is 
no teleological order behind the workings of nature.  In his discussion of physics, Marcus 
starts by encouraging study “de rerum natura”: “again, when he has thoroughly examined 
the heavens, the earth, the seas, and the nature of all things, and whence they came, 
whither they will return...” (1.61: idemque cum caelum terras maria rerumque omnium 
natura perspexerit, eaque unde generata, quo recursura…).  But to these basic Epicurean 
concerns, Marcus adds standard Stoic notions with the continuation of the sentence: “and 
when he has seen how they will perish, what in them is mortal and perishable, what is 
divine and eternal...” (1.61: quomodo obitura, quid in eis mortale et caducum, quid 
divinum aeternumque sit viderit....).  The suggestion that the universe will eventually 
perish is likely derived from the Stoic doctrine of ἐκπύρωσις.408  Through the addition of 
these Stoic elements, the workings of the universe suddenly become teleological, and of 
course for there to be a rational telos requires gods who oversee and lead it in its cycles: 
                                                          
408 See Dyck ad. loc. 
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“the very one [the god] who oversees and rules the universe…” (1.61: ipsumque ea 
moderantem et regentem <deum> paene prenderit).  Therefore, in the same sentence, 
Atticus’s philosophical interests and inclinations are used to lead him from Epicureanism 
to a Stoicizing vision in which a god exercises control over the universe, and by 
implication, over human affairs.  This doctrine serves as a necessary foundation for the 
discussion of religious laws which Marcus intends to take up in the next part of the 
conversation.  If Atticus is to be anything more than a silent observant in Book 2, Marcus 
needs to gain his mind over to a doctrine which obliges him to take religion seriously. 
The Lucretian overtones of Marcus’s initial remarks about the study of the 
physics engage the Epicurean Atticus as a first step in an argument that actually promotes 
the divine rule of the universe.  Marcus’s words caelum terras maria rerumque omnium 
naturam (1.61) bear a striking resemblance to Lucretius, de Rerum Natura 5.91: principio 
maria ac terras caelumque tuere.  There is a case to be made for an intentional intertext 
here.  First, Cicero appears to have reversed the order of “seas-earth-sky” to “sky-earth-
seas.”  Secondly, he has added the phrase rerum... naturam as an unmistakable sign to 
Atticus to think of Lucretius’s text and theme.  Third, Cicero has substituted his own verb 
of seeing, perspicere, for Lucretius’s tuere.  Fourth, Cicero’s use of asyndeton imitates 
Lucretius’s frequent practice regarding the same terms in Book 5— see for example 5.68, 
fundarit terram caelum mare sidera solem; 5.115, terras et solem et caelum mare sidera 
lunam.  Cicero’s imitation of Lucretian language and style is both a literary response to 
Lucretius addressing cosmological themes from a theistic point of view, but it is also 
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rhetorically calculated to capture the attention of Atticus the Epicurean as the first step in 
a Stoicizing correction of Epicurean non-providentialism.409 
Marcus can be seen once again employing the same method in his description of 
the virtue of courage or fortitude: “when the soul… has escaped all fear of death and 
pain…” (1.60: cum animus... omnemque mortis dolorisque timorem effugerit…).  Here, 
Cicero adds to the overcoming of the fear of death—standard Epicureanism—the 
overcoming of the fear of pain, which accords both with Stoicism and with traditional 
Roman sternness and striving for duty no matter the cost to one’s personal comfort.  
Atticus is, in effect, invited to modify his Epicureanism in order to live more in 
accordance with traditional Roman mores. 
This and the other ethical insights resulting from self-knowledge are, of course, 
said to lead to happiness: “what greater happiness than this can be spoken of or even 
conceived?” (1.60: quid eo dici aut cogitari poterit beatius?).  Marcus, then, replaces 
Epicurus’s vision of happiness with a completely different one.  Someone who places the 
enjoyment of private pleasures and friendships at the summit of his activities has failed to 
know himself.   
But the most daring part of Marcus’s argument comes when he claims that self-
knowledge includes awareness of one’s status as a member of a particular political 
community.  This realization leads to the conclusion that one must cultivate not only 
dialectic, the manner of speaking proper to philosophic conversation, but also oratory, the 
                                                          
409 See Gee 2013 for the thesis that Lucretius consciously imitates the language of 
Cicero’s Aratea even as he turns the providentialist, Stoic premises of the Aratea on their 




manner of speaking proper for achieving political goals, as Marcus claims in the 
magnificent period on political engagement via oratory previously quoted above (1.62).  
The decision to embrace these publicly useful functions of oratory results, in Marcus’s 
account, from the individual’s pursuit of self-knowledge, which included the study of 
ethics and physics.  Cicero is attempting to teach Atticus, and by implication all Roman 
would-be Epicureans, that the proper pursuit of the philosophic life leads logically to the 
pursuit of public life as well. 
The study of physics is also linked in Marcus’s account to the conclusion about 
embracing public life.  Marcus emphasizes that knowledge of the cosmos leads to an 
awareness of one’s status as a citizen of the whole world: “and when he realizes that he is 
not surrounded by the walls of a certain place, but is, rather, a citizen of the whole world, 
as if of one city...” (1.61: cum... seseque non circumdatum moenibus alicuius loci, sed 
civem totius mundi quasi unius urbis agnoverit).  The cosmopolitanism inherent in this 
idea will doubtless have appealed to Atticus.  And yet in the sequence of insights 
contained in sapientia as Marcus recounts them, what directly follows upon 
contemplation of the universe is the realization that one has born into a particular society.  
Marcus’s qualification of cosmopolitanism in this passage suggests an implicit criticism 
of Atticus’s removal from Rome to Greece, to Athens and Epirus, a semi-expatriation 
which was itself the cause of his friend’s receiving the name Atticus.  Perhaps this 
criticism is confirmed when, right after the speech’s conclusion, Marcus addresses his 
friend by way of his Roman cognomen Pomponi.  The use of Atticus’s Roman family 
name in place of the familiar “Titus” or the all-too-Greek “Atticus” can be seen as a 
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serious attempt to remind his best friend of his native city, and of his obligations towards 
that city.410 
Thus Marcus argues to Atticus that the necessity of political engagement on 
behalf of one’s own country is itself a philosophic insight.  Marcus’s earlier Stoic 
argumentation in the body of the first book (1.30-34) and in the laudatio (1.60)411 had 
established the sociability of human nature only in a general way.  At the end of the 
laudatio, however, the generalizing ad iustitiam nati sumus (1.30) becomes the more 
specific and localized cumque se ad civilem societatem natum senserit (1.62).  As in the 
Somnium, Marcus appears to teach that the comprehension of the grandeur of the 
universe and the part of it that is eternal will inspire a form of justice that is characterized 
above all by generosity on behalf of one’s fellow citizens.  Perhaps the philosopher is 
inspired by the example of the generosity witnessed in “the one tempering and ruling the 
natural universe” (ipse… ea moderans et regens, 1.61) to imitate it by “ruling peoples by 
means of oratory” (qua [fusa latius perpetua oratione] regat populos, 1.62).   
Marcus occupying the middle ground 
As soon as the speech is finished, Atticus asks Marcus to explain the relevance of 
this speech in praise of sapientia to law, ostensibly the main topic of their conversation 
“You have indeed praised her solemnly and truthfully, but what is the point of this?” 
(1.63: laudata quidem a te graviter et vere, sed quorsus hoc pertinet?).  The very framing 
                                                          
410 Pace Dyck 2004: 235-36, who gives the admittedly plausible explanation that 
addressing Atticus as Pomponi is in keeping with the solemn tone of the speech which 
has preceded. 
411 “And when… he has entered into a society of friendship with his own, and considers 
as his own all those with whom he is joined by nature…” (cum… societatemque caritatis 
coierit cum suis, omnesque natura coniunctos suos duxerit…) 
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of the question, in which Atticus concedes that sapientia has been praised truly, indicates 
in the fiction of the dialogue that Atticus has indeed been persuaded.412  Marcus then 
answers that the first reason for this speech was the need to lend gravity to the disciplines 
of philosophy and rhetoric as the sources whence the law code of the following books 
will be derived, hence increasing this law code’s authority (1.63).  This statement lends 
credence to the notion of this passage’s function as a persuasive prelude to the statutes of 
the next two books.  But it also contains another important implication that has reference 
to the content of the speech itself.  The word Cicero uses to describe the gravity or 
authority of the sources of law is amplissima, the same as was used earlier (1.61) in 
reference to commonly held notions of glory (quae vulgo dicuntur amplissima, “the 
things which are commonly called glorious”).  What is truly glorious, it is implied, is not 
the esteem of other men, but rather the pursuit of the philosophic life and its practical 
application in judicial and political oratory that aims at the good of other men.  The 
philosophic subjects and truths described above are themselves glorious and worthy of 
admiration, as are the philosophic and political lives themselves.  Pursuing both is itself a 
glorious thing, regardless of the opinion of others.  
Marcus’s second reason bears on the exemplary function of his own way of life 
and of his education in, and ongoing pursuit of, philosophy and oratory: “I am unable to 
pass over in silence the one by whose pursuit I am held bound, and who has made me 
whatever it is that I am” (eam cuius studio teneor, quaeque me eum quicumque sum 
                                                          
412 Cf. Caspar 2011: 76, who asserts that Atticus is persuaded by Cicero’s speech but 




effecit, non possum silentio praeterire).  The elusive phrase quicumque sum, placed as it 
is in the context of a circuitous reference to Marcus’s love of wisdom (eam cuius studio 
teneor)—that is, his pursuit of philosophy and oratory—implies that Marcus is not simply 
an orator, nor a philosopher in the traditional Greek understanding of that word.  He is 
something different—he is both.  In fact, this concluding note to De Legibus 1 finds a 
striking parallel towards the beginning of Cicero’s Orator: “I declare that I stand out as 
an orator, if that’s what I actually am, or in any case, whatever it is I may be, not because 
of the workshops of rhetoricians, but rather due to the exercise tracks of the Academy” 
(Orator 12: fateor me oratorem, si modo sim aut etiam quicumque sim, non ex rhetorum 
officinis, sed ex Academiae spatiis exstitisse).413  In both passages, Cicero implies that he 
is more than an orator, and proclaims the same philosophical-rhetorical ideal: the best 
orator is the one who is also a philosopher, and in particular, an Academic philosopher 
who combines training in the traditional departments of philosophy with training in 
rhetoric.  Cicero, therefore, serves as an example to Atticus and Quintus of a person who 
properly understands and puts into practice the relationship between philosophy and 
rhetoric; as such, he occupies the middle ground between politically indifferent 
philosophy (Atticus) and philosophically indifferent politics (Quintus).414  As a true 
philosopher, a true devotee of sapientia, he not only pursues the life of the mind, but also 
                                                          
413 Also cited by Dyck 2004: 236; he refers the reader to Cicero’s catalogue of his own 
works in Div. 2.1 ff., where the rhetorical and philosophical works are listed together. See 
Reinhardt 2000 on the probable features of Cicero’s rhetorical training under Philo in the 
New Academy; see 531n5 for the scholarly disagreement on whether the union of 
philosophy and rhetoric was Cicero’s own idea or someone else’s. 
414 Cf. Leg. 3.14, where Cicero calls attention to his ideal combination of political action 
and philosophic achievement.  Van der Blom 2010: 302 notes Cicero’s self-fashioning as 
an exemplum in this passage. 
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puts his knowledge, whether moral, physical, or dialectical, to good use as an orator in 
the service of his fellow citizens.415  Cicero ultimately claims that his pursuit of the 
philosophic life, of true sapientia, has led him to political involvement and has in turn 
informed that involvement, specifically, the oratory that has been the chief means of his 
civic engagement.  In the final analysis, this passage vindicates Plutarch’s assertion about 
Cicero’s self-understanding: “He often asked his friends not to call him an orator, but a 
philosopher; for he said he had chosen philosophy as his work, but made use of rhetoric 
as an instrument for his needs while engaging in politics.”416 
Conclusion: Effect on Various Readers 
 The persona of Quintus and the arguments Marcus directs at him create the 
impression of a Roman elite reader committed to the traditional aristocratic ideal of 
serving the res publica but with limited taste or ability for philosophy.  Roman elites of 
this sort, having partaken of a rhetorical education but not necessarily a philosophic one, 
are likely to have at least been intrigued by the more rhetorically ornate form of 
philosophical argumentation that Marcus employs in favor of natural justice and the 
natural foundation of the virtues (1.40-52).  As for that argument’s content, Cicero’s 
attempt in this section to present a persuasive epitome of the ethical consensus of Stoics, 
Peripatetics, and Platonists seems likely to have found a decent reception among a 
number of elite readers who had at least a superficial interest in philosophy.  Here I have 
                                                          
415 It is the same call for the reconciliation of philosophy and rhetoric as we see in the 
youthful Cicero (Inv. rhet. 1.1-5), where he suggests that wisdom requires the cultivation 
of both disciplines.  See also De or. 3.69, where Crassus makes a similar argument. 
416 Plut. Cic. 32: καίτοι πολλάκις αὐτὸς ἠξίου τοὺς φίλους μὴ ῥήτορα καλεῖν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ 
φιλόσοφον· φιλοσοφίαν γὰρ ὡς ἔργον ᾑρῆσθαι, ῥητορικῇ δ᾿ ὀργάνῳ χρῆσθαι 
πολιτευόμενος ἐπὶ τὰς χρείας.  
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in mind people like Pompey and Lucullus, who employed house philosophers and, in the 
latter case, even patronized learning and collected libraries.  While it is impossible to 
know for certain what such readers might have thought about Marcus’s arguments, one 
might theorize with Joachim Sauer (2013) that the responses Cicero anticipated in readers 
of De Legibus are reflected in the comments of his dialogue characters.  Thus, as Sauer 
would have it, when Quintus responds to the rhetorical argument (1.40-52) by telling 
Marcus that he is eager to continue with him to the next point (1.54), this should be seen 
as an indication of the way Cicero expected readers of similar bent to Quintus to respond. 
 However, rather than as an anticipation of reader reaction, the comments of the 
dialogical personae could have been intended by Cicero the author to coach his readers, 
to encourage them to react in the same way as those personae with which they identify or 
sympathize.  On this reading, we might expect readers of practical orientation who 
identify with Quintus to be influenced in their own thinking by the way that Quintus 
reacts to Marcus’s ideas.  Thus, in the example cited above, when Quintus expresses 
enthusiasm for the rhetorical argument in favor of the natural basis of justice and the 
virtues, this should be taken not as evidence of actual reader reaction, but of desired 
reader reaction.  The positive reaction attributed by the author to the fictional Quintus 
would thus be a rhetorical strategy on the author’s part to persuade the reader who shares 
Quintus’s character traits and inclinations to be receptive to the argument as well. 
The persona of Atticus and the arguments directed at him form an impression of 
another kind of reader, one who is deeply intellectual and not actively involved in 
politics, and who, significantly, is open-minded and flexible despite his learned opinions 
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and philosophical commitments.  Or, in keeping with the idea that the reactions of the 
personae are there to push the reader in a certain direction, Cicero might have intended 
Atticus’s open-mindedness as a means of persuading Epicureans to be less dogmatic in 
their philosophical commitments.  Moreover, Atticus’s appreciation for a good thought 
experiment and his broad-minded interest in Plato create the image of a reader who is not 
necessarily an Epicurean like Atticus himself, but rather anyone of intellectual bent who 
maintains an appreciation for the philosophic life in general to such an extent that he 
pursues his philosophic interests at the expense of civic responsibility.  Just as the 
persona of Tubero in De Re Publica suggested a reader whose interest in philosophy 
militated against concern for politics, whether this reader was actually a Stoic like 
Tubero, an Epicurean, or some other intellectual abstaining from political life, so in De 
Legibus, Atticus, despite his specific affiliation with Epicureanism, creates the image of 
any intellectual who neglects involvement in politics.  This intellectually inclined reader, 
whatever his views, is presented with a logical argument that proceeds on the basis of a 
principle to the conclusion that human beings are social and have obligations in justice to 
one another (1.18-34).  This reader is taught further in the laudatio that it also belongs to 
philosophical wisdom to know ourselves as citizens with an obligation to promote justice 
in the real world to our fellow citizens, and to know the art of rhetoric which lends 
effectiveness to our efforts in pursuit of that aim. 
 Finally, what of Marcus himself?  It would be easy to assume that Marcus is 
merely an idealized Cicero, a self-fashioned image with no appeal to anyone other than 
Cicero himself.  And yet there were likely some readers who would identify with Marcus 
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because of the way they already lived their lives and the views they already held: that is, 
public men who were deeply learned in philosophy and imbued with high ethical ideals, 
and who aspired to bring their philosophical commitments to bear on their public activity.  
In particular, Marcus’s eclectic and eirenic validation of the ethical stance of the Stoics, 
Peripatetics, and Old Academics would certainly have appealed to the learned statesmen 
Brutus and Varro, followers of the philosophic syncretism of Antiochus of Ascalon; and 
since Cicero also approves of Stoicism’s nobility in this passage, a Stoic statesman such 
as Cato would find much to admire as well.  And yet since this minority of Cicero’s 
readers was already in fundamental agreement with Marcus’s ideal of philosophical 
politics, they did not stand to acquire this basic outlook from Marcus in Book 1.  
However, Cicero may have intended to draw these readers into sympathy with Marcus in 
the first book in preparation for the lessons he had for them about the prudent application 
of philosophic principle in the formulation of his law code in Books 2 and 3.  A politician 
such as Cato, for instance, was notorious for his impractical rigidity when it came to the 
way he pursued philosophic politics in practice.  But in Books 2 and 3, Marcus is no 
Cato, as his law code is characterized by moderation in its application of philosophic 
principles. 
 To conclude, in De Legibus 1, Cicero makes the case for politics using similar 
strategies to those employed in De Re Publica.  He makes use of the dialogical personae, 
especially an authoritative spokesman in each case, to promote not just involvement in 
politics tout court, but a particular vision of political engagement informed by 
philosophy, which is to exercise a normative influence on Roman statesmen personally 
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and on the policies they should pursue.  In addition, the concluding passage of De 
Legibus 1 makes clear in a way that is not as evident from the fragmentary text of De Re 
Publica that oratory is to be the tool par excellence of the philosophic statesman’s 




























This dissertation has explored the timeless issues of engagement in politics and 
the relationship between philosophy and politics through a cross-generic study of 
Ciceronian oratory and political philosophy in the 50s BCE.  We have seen that Cicero 
promotes a variety of personal motives for pursuing a political career, and is keen to 
advance his vision of the particular character engagement in politics should have in order 
to be legitimate.   
But the place of philosophy in Cicero’s vision for political engagement varies in 
accordance with historical circumstances and with genre, the former determining the 
latter.  While the case for politics centers on appeals to traditional “Romanitas” in Pro 
Sestio and motives derived from philosophy are relatively sparse, in De Re Publica, the 
Somnium Scipionis, and De Legibus, Cicero argues for political engagement that is 
inspired and continuously informed by philosophy, in effect qualifying the Romanitas of 
the speech.  Cicero turns to this argument after the renewal of the triumvirate.  In political 
circumstances when republicanism no longer has the upper hand and those who gain 
glory are those who undermine the constitution, a change in strategy is required.  Cicero 
has to find a way to convince people to support republicanism even if they are not going 
to gain accolades, and will be on the losing side for the foreseeable future.  Roman 
political culture, he decides, needs a salutary injection of philosophy to save it from itself.  
From his political philosophy it emerges, παρὰ προσδοκίαν, that Romanitas is inferior to 
Greek philosophy as the basis of political engagement.   
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 Romanitas is a double-edged sword, because while it inspires political 
engagement through some sentiments that do no harm to the Roman character, such as 
shame, patriotism, and the obligation in pietas to imitate the maiores, its strongest appeal 
is to the wrong reasons, to motives that undermine virtuous engagement benefitting the 
state.  The most compelling motives offered by Romanitas are the desire to gain power, 
wealth, and especially glory.  But these aims are potentially a drag on the moral character 
of an elite class increasingly inclined to undermine the Roman constitution for the sake of 
gain.  The actions of the triumvirs, their allies, and Clodius abundantly demonstrate the 
willingness of some Roman elites to pursue the passion for glory at the expense of 
republican government rather than as a reward for preserving it.  In addition to the self-
destructive tendency of a political culture based on personal glory-seeking, Cicero was 
faced with the practical problem that once the triumvirate had been renewed in the 
aftermath of Pro Sestio, and Cicero and his allies in the senate saw their power and social 
standing plummet, it was much harder to make a convincing case for the proposition that 
the possession of glory is dependent on and inseparable from service to republican 
institutions.417 
Philosophy, however—properly understood and notwithstanding Roman 
assumptions—is superior to Romanitas in making the case for politics, because 
philosophy both inspires political engagement and supplies the elite with more worthy 
motives that ennoble the character of that engagement for the benefit of the state.  
                                                          
417 We might make an analogy between Cicero’s attempting to reconcile ambition with 




Philosophy inspires engagement because through the study of ethics, one comes to 
understand that man is naturally inclined to virtue and thus to a concern with fostering 
justice for the benefit of his fellow men to whom he is naturally bound.  It also 
simultaneously inspires engagement and ennobles the character of that engagement, 
because one learns through philosophy that happiness lies not in the possession of the 
fleeting goods emphasized by Romanitas, but in the exercise of virtue, whether 
understood as its own reward (a Stoic philosophic argument), or, in light of the 
immortality of the soul (a Platonic philosophic argument), as a means to an eternal 
reward (Platonic conjectural and mythical eschatology).  It also ennobles engagement 
because the desire for fleeting goods is tempered by the superior attractions of philosophy 
itself as an activity and of other intellectual pursuits. 
Turning to a review of the particular works analyzed, we can see that Cicero 
adjusts his arguments in accordance with historical circumstances and genre, the former 
determining the latter, and the latter in turn conditioning the specific arguments.  We 
have seen in the first chapter that in the Pro Sestio, Cicero aims to motivate his listeners 
to defend republican government primarily through appeals to traditional Roman culture.  
Cicero appeals to the need to avoid the shame of neglecting Roman manliness, the 
obligation to imitate the patriotism of the ancestors, and the prospect of gaining civic 
glory for the present or with posterity.  At the end of the speech, however, a philosophical 
idea emerges when Cicero argues that the soul is immortal and great statesmen can 
expect the reward of immortal glory in a conscious, postmortem state.  And yet given the 
strong emphasis on civic glory with posterity that comes just before this final argument, 
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and given the way Cicero illustrates his claim with the myth of Hercules rather than a 
philosophical argument, it is likely that most of his audience would have understood the 
soul’s immortal glory in the traditional Roman sense of perpetual civic memorialization. 
The relative absence of philosophical ideas is fitting given the genre of public 
oratory whose audience does not chiefly consist of intellectuals.  More fundamentally, 
however, Cicero’s emphasis throughout the speech on the glory to be won from public 
service is fitting for the historical context.  The speech was delivered at a moment when 
the triumvirate was weakening.  Cicero sought to take advantage of the opportunity to 
inject new life into the republican cause, assuring the ambitious that they could have 
immediate gratification of their desire for glory by taking a courageous stand against 
other politicians who were undermining the Republic, freely alluding to Clodius and less 
obviously to the triumvirs, especially Caesar; Pompey had already begun a 
rapprochement with Cicero and the senatorial conservatives.  The argument for glory 
delivered in this context suggests that, with Cicero and Pompey in the lead and with the 
backing of the Roman people who have already recalled and generously welcomed back 
Cicero from exile, those who engage in politics on their side will be gratefully rewarded 
with civic glory. 
In the second chapter, we have seen how Cicero was prompted by his loss of 
public standing after the renewal of the triumvirate to make the case for politics in a new 
genre, the philosophical dialogue.  In De Re Publica, philosophy becomes the foundation 
of political engagement in two ways.  First, Cicero subtly promotes ethical ideals, drawn 
from the Stoics but not expressly attributed to them, to inspire and inform political action.  
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Secondly, the activity of studying philosophy writ large, including ethics, cosmology, and 
mathematics, is promoted as a continuous complement to political activity.  In these two 
ways, noble ethical ideals and contemplative pursuits are, in Cicero’s vision, to take their 
place in Roman political culture as ennobling influences in the stead of ideals held out by 
traditional Romanitas.  Some of these ideals are positively corrupting—the drive for 
power, money, and fame—while others are no longer effective: due to the decline of 
moral customs, appeals to shame or the obligation to be a Roman vir, and to the sacred 
cause of patriotism, will not affect those surrounded by a corrupt culture in the same way 
as they might have affected former generations.  One simply may no longer find it 
shameful to abstain from politics, especially if fortified by the example of one’s peers—
Atticus certainly did not, Lucullus felt no shame in retiring with his friends to tend his 
estate, and Catullus and his circle seem to have positively gloried in their political 
indifference.  Or one may have no love for a political system that prevents him from 
amassing greater power and fame or from rewarding his friends, as Caesar, Pompey, 
Crassus, Clodius, and others seem to have felt.  I do not, however, suggest that Cicero 
intended his promotion of philosophical political engagement to have an effect on these 
men.  It seems more likely that Cicero had his sights set only on a minority of those from 
his own generation, and most of all on the younger generation, his concern for which is 
reflected in his avid letter-writing to young elites in the 50s BCE, and again in the 
philosophical works of the 40s. 
It is also significant that Cicero’s rhetorical strategy before his potentially 
resistant Roman audience consists in adopting an initial pose of hostility towards 
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philosophy even as he begins advancing a Stoic understanding of virtue as the inspiration 
of political engagement.  He proceeds to put philosophical ideas in the mouths of his 
Roman dialogical personae and has some of them speak in favor of philosophical activity.  
In this way, any readers prejudiced against philosophical ideas are steered clear of their 
Greekness through the impression that the leading men of the Roman version of “the  
Greatest Generation” themselves subscribed to philosophical ethical ideals and engaged 
in philosophical pursuits. 
Therefore, while De Re Publica is thematically concerned as a whole with the 
case for politics and the role of philosophy in the active life, a variety of ideas on the 
subject are explored through different dialogic voices.  Not everyone agrees, and different 
readers may be inclined to side with different points of view expressed in the dialogue, 
although Scipio’s auctoritas is likely to influence readers’ point of view.  The first 
dialogical voice is that of Cicero’s authorial persona in the preface.  He begins the work’s 
turn to philosophy by downplaying the motive of civic glory in favor of less mercenary 
motives drawn from Greek ethical philosophy, our natural inclination to practice virtue 
by securing the common safety regardless of the outcome for ourselves in terms of glory.  
Early in Book 1, before the conversation has turned to the question of the best form of 
government, Scipio promotes philosophy and contemplative pursuits as inherently 
enjoyable, seconded by Tubero, while Laelius resists and demands a focus on political 
and ethical philosophy—though it is also significant that he does not designate them with 
that Greek term.  Later, in the fragments of his speech in Book 3, we find Laelius 
defending, with greater depth and development than the Ciceronian persona of the 
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preface, the Stoic concept of virtue as well as the closely allied concept of natural law.  
Not only in the absence of glory, but even if one is unfairly considered by everyone to be 
an evil man, the awareness of one’s possession of virtue is a sufficient reward for one’s 
virtue.  From other fragments of Laelius’s speech, it appears that the reason for virtue’s 
self-sufficiency is the existence of natural law, which enforces itself by rewarding or 
punishing a man in the court of his own conscience. 
The third chapter takes up the grand conclusion of De Re Publica, the Somnium 
Scipionis, analyzing the way Cicero uses this philosophico-political myth to complete the 
work’s exhortation to engage in politics as inspired and informed by philosophy.  Scipio 
completes the case he made earlier for the necessity of practicing the contemplative life 
alongside or as an active, ongoing complement to the active life.  Knowledge of the 
cosmos is beneficial for statesmanship because the cosmos provides models of the 
republican political order and of altruistic public service.  Furthermore, gazing at the 
cosmos and thinking about the immortality of the soul elevate the individual morally, 
detaching the person from the pursuit of earthly goods through politics and teaching 
rather that virtuous engagement is a means to an eternal end. 
In addition, the extended emphasis of the Somnium on the futility of glory with 
posterity marks a radical departure from the case for political engagement in Pro Sestio.  
Thus in the conclusion of De Re Publica, Cicero refuses to allow the fallback position he 
advocated towards the end of Pro Sestio, namely the certainty of being compensated with 
glory in the eyes of subsequent generations even if one misses out on recognition from 
one’s contemporaries.   
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And yet from another point of view, Pro Sestio and De Re Publica taken as a 
whole display a certain similarity in internal development.  In both works, a series of 
motives for political engagement are capped by a final consideration that looks beyond 
any kind of temporal glory from one’s fellow humans, whether contemporary or 
posthumous, to eternity itself, to a posthumous state in which those who have served the 
Republic may attain a certain godlike status and consciously enjoy unending personal 
happiness.  For, in the stirring peroration of Pro Sestio (143), the motives of engaging out 
of patriotism and or for the sake of posthumous glory cede to still more noble 
considerations, first to doing the right thing for its own sake regardless of the outcome, 
and finally to acting for the sake of postmortem apotheosis and immortal glory.  
Similarly, in De Re Publica, considerations of patriotism and pietas, and even the 
philosophical motives of following a natural inclination to virtue or pursuing virtue for its 
own sake, ultimately cede to the motive of joining the society of the just as a brilliant 
god-star and enjoying eternal contemplation of the decus of the cosmos.   
But while in Pro Sestio the promise of such eternal glory and conscious 
enjoyment of an eternal reward was left merely implicit and undeveloped, as these ideas 
were intelligible only by reading the peroration (143) in light of an earlier paragraph in 
the speech (47), in the Somnium, Cicero advances this ultimate of all motives for 
republican political engagement much more explicitly and at great length.  The greater 
explicitness and volume are evident both in the Somnium’s expressly deconstructing the 
allure of temporal glory throughout the Dream, and in its fuller exposition of the nature of 
the eternal reward in question.  Pro Sestio established only the general notion that this 
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eternal reward is characterized by some sort of conscious state (Sest. 47) in which one 
enjoys immortal glory through some sort of apotheosis (Sest. 143).  The Somnium, 
however, fills out the picture through a philosophical myth in which the conscious state 
consists in contemplation of the cosmos’s beauty (decus, with its connotations of both 
“beauty” and “honor”), and apotheosis takes the form of a return of the soul, which is in 
fact already a god, to its celestial origins to join other great men.  In the Somnium, what 
Cicero previously called “immortal glory” (Sest. 143) takes on the double sense of the 
object of the soul’s contemplation (the eternal decus of the cosmos) and its admittance to 
a special society of other great men-turned-gods who are literally shining stars forming 
part of the heavenly tapestry.  The philosophical myth of the Somnium also gives a fuller 
explanation of the metaphysical basis for the conscious enjoyment of an eternal reward 
by republican statesman, revealing that it depends on the immortal nature of the human 
soul and on the existence of a god who takes his greatest pleasure in well-run states.   
In the Somnium, Scipio also offers a correction of Laelius’s stance on virtue, now 
to be seen as a path to the enjoyment of eternal verum decus rather than as an end in 
itself, worth possessing for the sake of virtue’s own decus.  The contrast between Scipio 
and Laelius on the finality of virtue is ultimately the difference between a dogmatic 
Platonic metaphysical eschatology and dogmatic Stoic ethics.  Where Cicero himself 
personally stands is, as always in his philosophic writings, unclear, especially in light of 
his practice of concealing his own views (Tusc. 5.11; Nat. Deor. 1.10).  It is surely 
striking, however, that Cicero ends De Re Publica with the same Platonic argument for 
the immortality of the soul from self-motion that bookended his public speech Pro Sestio, 
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where it was even more incongruous than in the midst of the Dream vision at the end of 
the philosophic dialogue.  This common thread suggests that for Cicero, the obligation to 
engage in politics virtuously does in fact require that there ultimately be a necessary 
connection between glory and virtuous devotion to the right kind of politics—in other 
words, it requires that the basic premise of Pro Sestio about glory as a reward for virtuous 
political service be true in some sense.418  But the immortal glory argument suggests, in a 
Platonic mode, that the civic glory that is the chief aspiration of Romanitas and 
dominates most of Pro Sestio is merely a deceiving image of permanent, lasting glory, of 
the permanent, lasting recognition which can only be had in some non-earthly condition.  
That is the explicit lesson of the Somnium, which draws out at much greater length the 
basic idea implicit in the immortal glory argument at the end of Pro Sestio.  Paullus tells 
Scipio Aemilianus that what people on earth call life is actually death, presumably 
because it is mortal; so glory on earth may be called glory but is not lasting, and is 
mortal.  In the Somnium, the earth, like the Cave in Plato’s Republic, is the place of 
                                                          
418 There are, of course, many other ways of interpreting the continuity of this theme.  We 
could read it as Cicero the Academic skeptic offering limited assent to an argument that 
he temporarily found persuasive from 56-51 BCE.  Or one could see Cicero the 
rhetorician simply resorting in each case to the argument he feels is most likely to inspire 
and spur the reader to engage in politics.  But it seems unlikely that Romans would have 
found this argument convincing.  It might be inspiring and strike one with admiration, but 
is unlikely to have gained ready assent from a cynical elite.  I get the sense, rather, that 
Cicero thinks this is not the most effective argument in practice but a logical necessity 
nonetheless, an idea that must be posited to justify the notion that there is a right way to 
engage in politics that truly matters.  To justify an objective code for political 
engagement, he is logically required to posit some kind of vindication and reward that 
lasts.  This does not prove that Cicero believed in the justification he advances, but it is 
likely he thought something like this—a divine and eternal sanction for justice—needed 
to be true if political engagement was to be justified. 
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deceiving appearances, while the heavens, like the heavens outside the Cave, are the 
abode of reality and truth. 
But while the Somnium issues a sharp rebuke to and a correction of the dominant 
argument about civic glory in the Pro Sestio—whether present or posthumous, all glory 
on earth is ephemeral—the Somnium’s position on the connection between glory and 
virtue is at least analogous to that of the Pro Sestio, and for that reason, is in greater 
agreement with the Pro Sestio than with the Stoic conception of virtue as its own reward 
(advanced by Cicero in Rep. 1 and Laelius in Rep. 3) due to its own inherent glory or 
beauty (decus).  For both Pro Sestio and the Somnium, virtue is rather for something else 
distinct from itself that the virtuous person stands to gain, namely some form of glory 
outside of virtue itself.  In Pro Sestio, that glory comes from being talked about by one’s 
fellow citizens, but it is only temporary; in the Somnium, it is the eternity of verum decus, 
which designates both the glory of belonging to the coetus of great men in the heavens 
and being mutually appreciated, and the glory of the heavens that one contemplates. 
The Platonic conception that implicitly lies behind the distinction between the 
false, fleeting civic glory of the Pro Sestio (and traditional Romanitas) and the true glory 
of belonging to a select group in the heavens in the essentially “philosophical” peroration 
of the Pro Sestio and in the Somnium illustrates the relationship between rhetoric and 
philosophy, or more specifically between oratory and philosophy.  The speech is guided 
by and advances the same basic premise as the philosophical view of the Somnium, 
namely that glory is the reward of virtue.  The speech thus orients the reader towards the 
same moral end—the practice of virtue, of virtuous political engagement—but in a 
347 
 
different manner.  The method of the speech is to link virtue to a lower form of glory, one 
that is familiar to the experience of his audience, the majority of whom are not 
philosophic.   
It is just such a conception of the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric 
that Cicero advances at the conclusion of De Legibus 1, as we saw in the fourth chapter.  
In De Legibus, Cicero advances a concept of natural law that establishes man’s social 
nature and obligation to practice the virtues.  This argument culminates in a grand speech 
in praise of sapientia, according to which a person who has acquired knowledge of 
natural law, justice and virtue through the study of philosophy will also be aware of his 
obligation to promote them among his fellow citizens through public oratory, which 
becomes the chief means of engaging in public life.  Sapientia, therefore, consists in both 
theoria and praxis; it leads to and provides moral grounding for political rhetoric.   
In the body of the first book, Marcus is confronted with the problem that Atticus 
is inclined to theoria but holds philosophical views that prevent praxis.  Marcus directs at 
his intellectually inclined friend a logical argument in favor of a more Stoic outlook that 
seamlessly leads to the obligation to engage in politics to promote the bonds of justice 
among men.  Quintus, meanwhile, has praxis, but with no theoria to ground law and 
morality in nature; his personal morality is superficial, relying solely on the social 
sanctions; the laws and policies that he would promote through the spoken word as a 
member of the conservative elite have no moral standards to guide them.  To Quintus, 
Marcus makes a more rhetorically ornate argument that the virtues are grounded in 
natural law, are to be practiced for their own sake, and should serve as the guide for the 
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statesman’s personal conduct in political life and for the civil law.  The laudatio 
sapientiae that concludes the first book integrates the previous arguments in a passionate 
rhetorical appeal to both men to follow Marcus’s lead in mastering philosophy and 
rhetoric, and to use both for the benefit of their fellow citizens in the political arena by 
cultivating the very style exemplified by Marcus’s speech.  
The Case for Politics makes several important contributions to Ciceronian 
scholarship, demonstrating in contrast to previous approaches that Cicero’s rhetorical 
aims in a judicial speech can go far beyond getting his client acquitted, and that his 
dialogues on political philosophy can be read in terms of rhetorical aims and strategies 
through special attention to dramatic setting and dialogical personae.  It also shows that 
despite the way historical circumstances and genre affect the kinds of arguments 
emphasized, we can nonetheless discern a unified voice in Cicero’s writings, as the orator 
consistently strives to promote involvement in politics on behalf of the Roman Republic. 
However, the dissertation’s most important contribution is to show that Cicero, 
far from being the smug believer in Roman superiority to Greek culture for whom he is 
so often taken, thought that Roman political culture needed to be reformed through Greek 
philosophy.  To the timeless question of which life is better, the active versus the 
contemplative, Cicero responds that this is a false dichotomy, and while Roman tradition 
has emphasized the former and Greek philosophy the latter, the contemplative life 
properly understood actually inspires and informs the active.  Furthermore, the 
dissertation’s analysis of the relationship between philosophy and the cultivation of 
rhetoric in public life at the end of De Legibus 1 shows that contrary to the scholarly 
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communis opinio, philosophy in Cicero’s view, is not, at least in De Legibus, merely a 
branch of rhetoric useful for making effective arguments.  Rather, philosophy provides 
rhetoric with a moral basis, and thus grounds the orator-statesman, both personally and in 
the policies he pursues, in a concern for truth and justice. 
The project initiated by this dissertation can naturally be extended with additional 
investigation of this last insight about the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric—
which for Cicero means engagement in public life through oratory—in Cicero’s 
rhetorical theory.  The addition of a chapter on Cicero’s rhetorical theory is also 
necessary to extend the exploration of Cicero’s arguments for political engagement in 
multiple genres; in the dissertation, I have only explored two.  Moreover, the major work 
to be considered is De Oratore (On the Ideal Orator), a dialogue on rhetoric written in 
the 50s BCE that forms a natural complement to De Re Publica and De Legibus, which 
were written in the same period.  The scholarly consensus on Cicero’s De Oratore holds 
that the work advances a theory of rhetoric in which the study of philosophy has a purely 
instrumental value, providing the orator with superior dialectical ability and greater 
knowledge of human nature through the study of ethics, but with no bearing whatsoever 
on the orator’s moral character or the morality of his policies.  
However, a number of passages and dramatic features suggest just the opposite.  
For example, the dialogue character Crassus promotes the same concept of sapientia as 
Cicero did in De Legibus.  Sapientia for Crassus comprises right thinking and speaking.  
Eloquence is a virtue, but this virtue is not possessed by someone who has technical 
knowledge of rhetoric but lacks “moral integrity and prudence” (probitas et prudentia—
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see 3.55).  Scholars have rightly observed that Cicero’s theory of rhetoric in De Oratore 
assigns a particularly important place to emotional appeals to one’s audience, but with the 
notable exception of Gary Remer’s new monograph (2017), they have not seen that these 
emotional appeals, to be morally licit, must be regulated by the pursuit of moral ends.419  
This idea may seem immoral—as indeed it did to the Stoics, whom the dialogue 
characters thoroughly criticize—since it seems to justify the Machiavellian principle that 
the ends justify the means.  But for Cicero, there is nothing immoral about this; it is 
simply the nature and purpose of rhetoric to promote the truth through a combination of 
appeals to reason, to the trustworthiness of the speaker, and to emotion.  If appeals to 
ethos and especially to emotion are lacking, rhetoric ceases to be rhetoric and becomes 
philosophy; but philosophical discourse is in itself ineffective before the many, and then 
truth and justice fail to win out (cf. the preface of Cicero’s De Inventione and of 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric).  
And yet philosophic knowledge on the part of the orator is necessary to ensure the 
morality of the purpose for which his rhetoric is applied.  In De Oratore, the character 
Antonius, who emphasizes the importance of pathos and natural talent but dismisses 
Crassus’s demands in Books 1 and 3 that the orator study philosophy, represents the 
traditional Roman position of a morally rudderless rhetoric.  Crassus, by contrast, is 
represented as someone who employs an emotionally charged rhetoric that is also 
exercised in the pursuit of moral ends (3.2-5) learned through philosophic contemplation, 
                                                          
419 Zetzel 2003: 131-32 and Prost 2017: 149 claim in passing that the ideal orator in De 




a truth that is shown dramatically in Crassus’s moment of Socratic contemplation (3.17).  
Crassus’s criticism of Socrates is thus misleading; he criticizes Socrates’s rejection of 
public oratory and political engagement (3.60ff.), but also implies that he agrees with 
Socrates’s criticism in the Gorgias of orators who lack knowledge of and concern for 
justice (3.55).  The content and dramatic setting of De Oratore suggest that the emotional 
pathos of an Antonius without the philosophically grounded morality of a Crassus leads 
to a Sulpicius, one of the younger interlocutors, whom the reader is told became a 
seditious revolutionary after the dramatic date of the dialogue (3.11). 
Another useful way to extend this intergeneric project while maintaining a special 
focus on the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric involves the addition of a 
fourth genre, ethical theory, through a study of De Officiis in relation to Cicero’s last 
efforts at public oratory, the Philippics.  A comparison of these two works would make 
an ideal case study of the extent to which, and the specific manner in which, Cicero 
employed rhetoric in practice to promote ethical ideas from philosophy about the right 
way to be engaged in politics.  Considering the Philippics in light of De Officiis is also 
fitting because Cicero composed most of these speeches only shortly after the ethical 
treatise.  Scholars have noted some thematic similarities in passing, but a comprehensive 
comparison of the arguments advanced in these works about the right way to engage in 
politics is still lacking.  How does the oratorical context affect the way Cicero promotes 
the same ethical ideas from De Officiis?  In other words, how does Cicero use the 
standard features of rhetoric—stylistic adornment, appeals to his own person and to 
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emotion—to inculcate ideals about the proper way to be engaged in politics that were 
previously set forth in the more logical, philosophical discourse in De Officiis?420  
One of the more obvious themes that the philosophic treatise and the speeches 
have in common is Cicero’s teaching about the morally legitimate way to seek glory—a 
theme that will nicely link this final chapter to the book’s first chapter on Pro Sestio, 
which was also centrally concerned with this question.  But the Philippics do this in a 
particularly off-putting way, with their constant personal attacks on Marc Antony, whom 
Cicero pillories as seeking glory and power at the expense of justice.  The invective to 
which Cicero so frequently resorts in these speeches raises important questions for our 
own day, when personal insults have become increasingly common in political discourse. 
Can such insults be justified in terms of legitimate moral purpose, or was Cicero violating 
the principles about decorum that he himself had expressed in De Officiis?421 
I will close with a few remarks that bear both on the argument of the dissertation 
and the case I intend to make about Ciceronian ethics, politics, and rhetoric when I 
expand on this present study.  Suggesting that Cicero intended knowledge of ethics to 
serve as a guide for the politician’s personal conduct, policies to be pursued, and laws to 
                                                          
420 To approach the question of philosophy in the Philippics in this way—that is, in terms 
of the way the speeches promote moral ideas drawn from philosophy—would also be a 
marked departure from Gildenhard’s (2011) analysis of philosophy in Cicero’s speeches.  
Gildenhard’s monograph is solidly in the tradition of scholarship that holds that for 
Cicero, philosophy’s value for the orator is as a tool to make more effective arguments.  
Cicero emerges as an opportunist who incorporates philosophical ideas not out of a 
concern to promote the truth or make justice prevail, but to the extent that they help him 
win a given case.  Thus Cicero is “constructing reality,” as the title of the book suggests, 
rather than infusing his speeches with moral ideas he considered through his study of 
philosophy to be (provisionally) true and necessary for the preservation of a just society. 
421 In addition to Remer 2017, Kapust 2011 will be an essential starting point for the 
study of this issue. 
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be framed, and oratory to be employed as a tool for these last two purposes might also 
come up against the following problem: Cicero was, after all, an Academic skeptic who 
held that one could not have certain knowledge of anything, including ethics.  However, 
as scholars have shown, a mitigated skeptic such as Cicero claimed he could live his 
skepticism, and Cicero could, consistent with his search for the probabile or verisimile, 
embrace for himself and promote to others a probabilistic ethics as a guide for personal 
conduct and political ends.  Alternatively, one might suppose that Cicero did, in fact, 
despite frequent professions of Academic skepticism, claim for himself certain 
knowledge of some ethical truths,422 since the philosophical position of the skeptical 
Academy is incoherent and self-defeating.  There is, after all, a logical contradiction in 
the character Cicero’s statement that Socrates “made only one exception” to the claim 
that nothing can be known, namely that “he knew that he knew nothing” (Ac. 2.74)423, 
and an intelligent man such as Cicero was surely aware of the arbitrary nature of an 
exception for which no justification is given.  Whatever the position one takes, I hope to 
have shown that in De Re Publica and De Legibus, Cicero employs his powers of 
persuasion to promote the idea that philosophical ethics and the activity of philosophy 
itself should inspire and regulate the Roman elite’s participation in political life. 
 
                                                          
422 In Leg. 1.58, in any case, knowledge of the virtues is not presented as probable.  The 
passage is followed, moreover, by Marcus’s declaration that sapientia (which includes 
such ethical knowledge) has made him whatever it is that he is (1.63). 
423 excepit unum tantum, scire se nihil se scire.  In Ac. 1.45, the Academic skeptic 
Arcesilaus seems to be more consistent when he is cited as having said that since nothing 
can be known, Socrates did not even know this.  And yet Arcesilaus, too, by making a 
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